Originally Posted by OK465
topping out at an 'apex' of FL379.
Sorry, I have mistaken your reference to trajectory apex to be referring to pitch. My bad.
Originally Posted by Machinbird
How many of the 30+ flights that didn't lose control experienced roll oscillation?
No idea how many of them banked to the whole 11° right / 9° left but I find interesting some of them went through stronger turbulence than AF 447 (0.2 / 1.9 compared to 0.7/1.6)
Originally Posted by CONF iture
I write how illusionary it is to pretend to maintain indefinitely a 5 deg pitch in altitude but you find 5 reasons to state I’m wrong but now you feel the need to precise it is only for the necessary time to get the QRH out …
You are mistaken about the source of what you call "precising". It's not me, it's all written in the procedure - the one a whole bunch of PPRuNers malign while displaying enviable ignorance.
Why 5 degrees and climb power?
It's to be used when pilots' primary concern is staying within the envelope while level bust takes back seat. It is preferable to keep flying on your assigned FL when speed goes AWOL but if you are unsure if you can make it, go for memory items, they 'll keep you flying. That is not to say it is the only combination of attitude and performance that maintains one unstalled and this side of the Macrit. 5° ANU was clearly marked on any AH/ADI I've ever flown so it would be safe bet it is so on the large majority therefore making it easy to set the aeroplane symbol against the mark. Climb power is there for all the pilots who can't remember exact cruise power for their weight when proverbial hits the fan at 4 AM. Especially if they are involved in mixed fleet flying - CFM A320 with IAE A321 can be pretty interesting mix, not to mention SA/TA combinations.
5°/climb thrust works for every aeroplane except:
1. low mach limited, high trust to weight ratio, turbojet powered ones, of which none flies passengers anymore.
2. those which stall below 5° AoA in steady, low Ma flight. None of these has successfully taken-off so far. Such a machines can be safely omitted from further consideration.
Originally Posted by CONF iture
to not apply that procedure for low level has proved to be deadly, but then the procedure was not published yet …
Reference, please.
When you are low & slow, option of trading potential energy for kinetic is unavailable. As it is policy to train for the most critical failures (V1 cut, anyone?), during
approach to stall recovery practice it is assumed that it happens very low, that's why minimal loss of altitude is emphasized. Of course, the ignorant then wrongly assume that minimum loss of altitude is applicable for every approach to stall recovery or stall recovery itself.
It is preferable to miss the obstacle, even if by the narrowest of margins, at 1.1 Vs than hit it at 1.3. Knowing when the situation is so desperate to grant using up the normal margins is the part of what we call "airmanship". Avoiding such situations is another part of it.
There is absolutely no recovery from low altitude, low speed stall that would not involve hitting the ground in the process. Only pilot with realistic chances of survival is the one strapped to high-performance ejection seat, who doesn't hesitate much when time comes to part the company with the aeroplane.
Originally Posted by PJ2
The question, as always when such changes occur and the distribution and incorporation of infomation is involved is, how are these changes incorporated into training by airlines operating Airbus equipment?
My last flight on A320 was in January 2009. No mention of "if safe conduct of flight affected" at the time. We were using company customized manuals.
Originally Posted by PJ2
Since most crews appeared to have kept the aircraft level while troubleshooting, (we don't know this for certain but it appears so),
We don't know that yet. Interim 2 mentions variation in altitude remained within 1000 ft or so while not mentioning what was the exact distribution. Five cases of descent following the stall warning are mentioned.
Originally Posted by TTex600
The only real way to "fly" the bus requires one to turn the A/P, A/T and F/D's all off. Otherwise, you're mixing things up and confusing both the co-pilot and FiFI/Henri/HAL.
Exactly! I'm pretty sure I've heard it before my first hour in groundschool has expired.
Originally Posted by AlphaZuluRomeo
There is no debate in my mind that a HUD is a valuable tool for the pilot.
Absolutely, but we'll get it only if it's valuable for management. I got mine only because it reduced ILS minima to 200/50 from 300/100. Our Airbi are 75/NO DH so no gain there.
Originally Posted by gums
It would have shown the climb
As altimeter and vario did. If they believed whole air data system went tits up, they could have flown attitude+power. They said or did nothing that would indicate it was the case. Only coherent picture from FDR and CVR is of total confusion on both sides of the cockpit. If just one pilot kept the presence of mind, chances are PPRuNe discussion regarding the UAS on A330/340 would make it barely to the second page.
Originally Posted by Machinbird
Seriously, with guys flying intercontinental routes and bagging only 5-7 hours of actual stick time a year, do you really expect them to have the touch at 2 am after their handling skills have had a few years to atrophy?
Yes. Absolutely. Interim 2, chapter 1.16.3 refers.
Originally Posted by gums
As with many here, I have serious problems with the airmanship of the new crop
Not me. Not with the whole crop, that is. All of my F/Os confirm DP Davies maxim that the enthusiasm about flying is one of the best things a pilot can have. Most of them affirm it positively.
Originally Posted by BOAC
I am not denying that all this work is important and of great value
Not all of it is important and of great value. It's easy to sell well sounding psychobabble to people who are mostly trained in technical stuff, such as pilots.
Originally Posted by Retired F4
our old rhino had nothing of those gimmicks and we did the job and survived like others did.
That's a very nice example of survivor bias. Spare some thought for your colleagues that did not make it to retirement through no fault of their Rhinos or lack of good intentions.
They were not bad pilots. They did not intend to make that last mistake.
It can happen to anyone. It's just the matter of reducing chances.