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AF 447 Thread No. 8

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AF 447 Thread No. 8

Old 20th Apr 2012, 14:10
  #101 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by PJ2
No, there almost certainly isn't.
After revisiting Habsheim, I'll have to contradict you here.
On page 48 of the Habsheim report, the page selection for the ECAM lower display or SD was already available :




If I was one of those 3 pilots, I would make sure, where ever I am ... to provide ALL the data to my family and friends, before I let them kill me a second time.
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Old 20th Apr 2012, 17:01
  #102 (permalink)  
 
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@CONFiture

If I was one of those 3 pilots, I would make sure, where ever I am ... to provide ALL the data to my family and friends, before I let them kill me a second time.


The inference is clear, and your standing is one of integrity and passion. Can you elaborate? I for one believe the power of silence and secrecy must stop. It can stop with this tragic loss.

What are the data going to say to us? (Possibly). It is quite clear, and do not believe those who say: "It is traditional to keep data witheld". That is true, but does not suggest why, only that it is 'traditional'.

No human being or group has the right to keep secret material that is relevant and has bearing on Public Safety. Secrecy is toxic to Safety, and the right of all people to decide their own agreements and plans in public carriage, finance, and destiny. Enough of this.

with respect
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Old 21st Apr 2012, 02:35
  #103 (permalink)  
 
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Thanks for your support Lyman.

Following any accident, serious incident, or incident that requires data extraction, AS SOON AS the data are extracted, a FULL copy should go to :
  1. the investigation body
  2. the manufacturer
  3. the airline
  4. the pilots, or their pre-designated representatives
Add anyone you like to that list … but #4 is ineradicable.
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Old 21st Apr 2012, 02:53
  #104 (permalink)  
 
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Thank you. I find it reprehensible that those here who would defend the secrecy clamor for us all to assume that the displays were available and accurate for the crew, when they need a leap of faith, yet the actuals re: ECAM, clearly extracted, get no such clamor. What is the fear? Alice would be pleased at the hypocrisy.

Two then, for the heirs to be informed.
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Old 21st Apr 2012, 03:32
  #105 (permalink)  
 
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So you think the FDR readouts were different than the flight instruments the pilots saw? Just asking??? Both sides of the cockpit attitude indicators failed so the PF pulled up into a stall? The senior FO not flying let him do it?
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Old 21st Apr 2012, 03:41
  #106 (permalink)  
 
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So you think the FDR readouts were different than the flight instruments the pilots saw? Just asking??? Both sides of the cockpit attitude indicators failed so the PF pulled up into a stall? The senior FO not flying let him do it?
Anybody can think anything .. as anybody (public) haven't seen so far the AF447 FDR listings
If the FDR is published .. methink many speculations (anyone) will be shut down
When we say a small child can not open the cabinet because it contains a secret .. his imagination will invent many things
Only when he opens it he will know the truth and imagined jams and sweets can maybe be no there as expected
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Old 21st Apr 2012, 09:43
  #107 (permalink)  
 
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Bubbers, jcjeant

I would ask that you read BEA IR #3 pp. 79 to wit:

"4.3 Recommendations relating to Flight Recorders
Analysis of the FDR parameters and audition of the CVR provide information that is essential to an understanding of the event. However, it is difficult to reconstruct the indications that were available to the crew on their instrument panel, especially the instructions given by the Flight Director crossbars when they reappear. It is also impossible to see whether there have been any attempts to re-engage the autopilot. A view of the instrument panel would complete the information provided by the FDR and the CVR and would make it possible to confirm the indications that were available to the crew and the actions that they made. Numerous recommendations have already been made on this subject over the past ten years without any real progress having been made.4.3 Recommendations relating to Flight Recorders
Analysis of the FDR parameters and audition of the CVR provide information that is essential to an understanding of the event. However, it is difficult to reconstruct the indications that were available to the crew on their instrument panel, especially the instructions given by the Flight Director crossbars when they reappear. It is also impossible to see whether there have been any attempts to re-engage the autopilot. A view of the instrument panel would complete the information provided by the FDR and the CVR and would make it possible to confirm the indications that were available to the crew and the actions that they made. Numerous recommendations have already been made on this subject over the past ten years without any real progress having been made."

It is BEA who suggest there are serious problems with the indications available the pilots, as to reconstruction, availability.

Specifically, autopilot commands, attitudes and speeds. OH, and FLIGHT DIRECTOR CROSSBARS


Thought you might be interested.

respect
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Old 21st Apr 2012, 10:14
  #108 (permalink)  
 
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Habsheim - interesting accident. A pilot performs unauthorised manoeuvres and then blames his machine. The luddites immediately rush to support him. Fast forward to now certain individuals are trying to link this to AF447. This isn't a quest for the truth this is a quest to prove outlandish theories. Let us lay out the reality of AF447 - the pitots iced up causing UAS. That is all. There is literally no evidence that any of the other instruments went Lady Gaga. The flight crew didn't respond to the incident in an appropriate manner putting the aircraft into a stall. That is all. No smoking gun, no conspiracy, no manipulative manufacturer. Just mundane errors - a whimper not a bang.
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Old 21st Apr 2012, 15:09
  #109 (permalink)  
 
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One commendable early notification was along the lines:
" We do not know yet what has happened to AF447 but it may be connected to Pitots and / airspeed..."
(Was this from AF, AB or BEA ? It doesn't matter.)
This would give any pilot a chance to reread the UAS Drill for his aircraft. Do people still do " Touch Drills " ( Touch - but don't move anything...) ?
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Old 21st Apr 2012, 15:56
  #110 (permalink)  
 
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o Hathat than

OC The attempted linkage of Habsheim/447 is in your mind. If you had taken the time to read for comprehension, the nexus was only that ECAM artifacts are available via DFDR post accident/incident. There are similarities whenever complex machinery of any kind meets its destruction. Wiser people than us seek out these commonalities, and forge us new processes.

Linktrained. I for one get immense pleasure and some comfort when you share your history here. Everything has a beginning; we stand on the shoulders of our forebears, and ridicule them at great risk to our safety, if not our conceit.
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Old 21st Apr 2012, 23:44
  #111 (permalink)  
 
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It is possible the PNF was getting out the UAS checklist while the PF was pulling up because of fear of being too fast if the overspeed was going off. Every jet I flew had an UAS checklist to fly with inop airspeed indicators. It seems he would have monitored what the PF was doing while he was getting it though. Just read an article in a pro pilot magazine about knowing how to fly with no operable air speed indicators. Seems like some of the corporate pilots have a higher understanding than airline pilots how to deal with their planes when they develop a problem. The last jets I flew with AOA indicators were corporate aircraft decades ago.
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Old 22nd Apr 2012, 01:43
  #112 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by OC
Let us lay out the reality of AF447 - the pitots iced up causing UAS. That is all. There is literally no evidence that any of the other instruments went Lady Gaga. The flight crew didn't respond to the incident in an appropriate manner putting the aircraft into a stall. That is all. No smoking gun, no conspiracy, no manipulative manufacturer. Just mundane errors - a whimper not a bang.
Well, the stall warning system did not behave as most of us would have expected it to, but other than that, I agree.

Now if you were in BEA's position, what kind of recommendations would you be developing to prevent the next accident?
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Old 22nd Apr 2012, 03:11
  #113 (permalink)  
 
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The stall warning should not operate before takeoff speeds are achieved so why should they not be silenced if they go to those low speeds. They are normal for in flight conditions.
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Old 22nd Apr 2012, 03:49
  #114 (permalink)  
 
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The stall warning should not operate before takeoff speeds are achieved so why should they not be silenced if they go to those low speeds. They are normal for in flight conditions.
One good reason would be that there was no weight on the wheels, i.e. they were airborne where such things matter greatly.
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Old 22nd Apr 2012, 03:57
  #115 (permalink)  
 
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Anybody of you the experts can tell me other type of aircrafts (excepted Airbus) that the stall alarm stops when the aircraft is still in full stall state ?
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Old 22nd Apr 2012, 05:59
  #116 (permalink)  
 
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he

jcjeant

Howdy there. AF447 died of a frequently terminal (fatal) condition called STALL. She did not crash due to STALL WARNING.

On an a/c that shuns manual control and seat of the pants flying, there is no ALERT/STALL. ONLY a WARNING. It is clear the crew rejected STALL, (both its warning, and its physical eveidence) at least to me. Therefore, they are left with textbook aero behaviour of the STALL condition to diagnose it: Nose Drop and BUFFET, to get that the airframe is STALLED. The NOSE did not drop, at least characteristically, in fact, the PF may have lifted the NOSE each time he started to recover! Leaving the Mush state, and transiting through the beginning of LIFT, the Nose would have dropped, and the STALL WARN activated, at least once.

The "Buffet" that is touted by BEA as "possible", to me seems questionable, and anyway, it did not serve to alert the crew sufficiently to STALL.

So here. The evidence strongly points to crew ignorance of the STALL condition, and the physical clews were missing also. Without some emphatic a/c warning of ACTUAL STALL, the outcome is assured, as we see. There is no recovery from STALL, absent strict and prescribed maneuvers, as discussed here at length. Without a starting point (diagnosos of STALL), the crew will drop into the sea, again, as we see they did.

It is not a fault of the aircraft sufficient to even raise one's eyebrows. (IMHO).

The problem is straightforward. The Autopilot will not operate without Airspeed reporting that meets its criteria. The crew will not be able to fly without accurate a/s either, failing certain requirements that were obviously missing. At the very least, the Pilot Flying did not immediately acclimate to manual control, and never did understand his instruments, (assuming they were working, and accurate).

The a/c crashed due to the events we see reported by BEA, the picture is clear.
Unprepared, in turbulent air, and without accurate airspeeds, the plot was lost from the git by PF, and the PNF either did not understand either, or lacked the training to seize immediate control, instead (we assume) calling for the Captain, to help. What exactly caused the chain to fracture so quickly and terminally is open to discussion. By the time the a/c departed aero flight, there was no chance to recover, given the conditions to hand.

For me, the table appeared to be set for disaster directly by the lack of response in changing out defective (in theory) probes, and indirectly due lack of even a basic recognition of the dangers in flying an aircraft with such rapid changes occurring in a very narrow window of parameters. I do not understand how some here (with a straight face) are so dismissive of the piloting, and so reassured by the a/c. The a/c was no more in a state of readiness than the people. IMHO.

bon nuit

BTW, what happened to that leak re: Captain's initial reaction upon re-entering the cockpit? He is upposed to have said, "What are you doing? That is a STALL, Go with the nose down!!? " The quote in the report is "Er...what are you doing?"

Any question, regardless of content missing, means he knows something is wrong. On page 31 BEA IR #3, the last thing reported from CVR is "Er...what are you doing...." The conversation is then shut down, no more CVR, indexed with the plane's attitude. Why not? Those three pages, if continued further in sequence would tell us the rest of the story.

Last edited by Lyman; 22nd Apr 2012 at 06:17.
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Old 22nd Apr 2012, 11:02
  #117 (permalink)  
 
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Lyman
Of course there is an attempt to link Habersheim with AF447 otherwise why mention it?

Machinbird
A very interesting question - will a UAS warning system actually be practical or developable? If so will it actually be feasible in service? We know that pitot tubes are being changed to the more reliable Goodrich models. However, it is probably time to replace the pitot tube with something new though what that could be is beyond me. I would recommend considerably more training and hands on experience for pilots and a thorough reorganisation of Air France's flight operations (which might even be underway as we speak) as I do believe that there is an airline specific cultural issue here.
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Old 22nd Apr 2012, 12:32
  #118 (permalink)  
 
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'The stall warning should not operate before takeoff speeds are achieved so why should they not be silenced if they go to those low speeds.'I was under the impression that aircraft systems have some idea of altitude. Seems reasonable to enable the stall warning as appropriate when at 35000 ft irrespective of any other logic.
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Old 22nd Apr 2012, 13:16
  #119 (permalink)  
 
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Cool

Hi,

Old Carthusian
I do believe that there is an airline specific cultural issue here.
If you challenge the culture of the company .. you must also include the various unions of Air France pilots
They are to represent the pilots .. but not only
They are guard dogs and should intervene when things do not unfold as planned by the rules
More .. there are also official control agencies who must play a role
If Air France has reached the point of having a bad culture .. one can not discount some others players
The Helios accident report:
Latent causes
1. The Operator’s deficiencies in organization, quality management and safety culture, documented diachronically as findings in numerous audits.
2. The Regulatory Authority’s diachronic inadequate execution of its oversight responsibilities to ensure the safety of operations of the airlines under its supervision and its inadequate responses to findings of deficiencies documented in numerous audits.
Contributing Factors to the Accident
3. Ineffectiveness of international aviation authorities to enforce implementation of corrective action plans after relevant audits.
Airline execs convicted over 2005 Greece crash | Athens News

Last edited by jcjeant; 22nd Apr 2012 at 13:47. Reason: Added quote Helios report
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Old 22nd Apr 2012, 13:43
  #120 (permalink)  
 
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@ O.C.:

All Thales probes have been replaced per AD.

Besides the probe replacement program, several hardware and software changes have been introduced, IMO they are optional and not mandated.

- BUSS (SW always available) - already available before AF447!
- FMGEC: AP/FD not available after UAS condition. (Last MOD)
- FCPC: F/CTL ALT LAW (PROT LOST) ECAM MSG accompanied with reason. (Last MOD)
- FCDC: More rigid USE MAN PITCH TRIM PFD message when autotrim not available. (Last MOD)
- FWC: **NAV IAS DISCREPANCY MSG When 2/more IAS are detected to be different.
Added AoA data filtering to improve SW detection in turbulent conditions.

- AoA: Conical shaped ground base to prevent water ingression. (Last MOD)

** Don't know if F-GZCP was equipped with this mod but the mod was available at that time. (BEA doesn't mention the presence of this message, suspect it was NOT available in F-GZCP)

The B787 is equipped with ADR voting logic, details are not known by me, but the fault isolation logic determines which ADR supplies PFD.
Above that there seems to be a synthetic AS available when the voted fails

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