AF 447 Thread No. 8
Lyman;
With reference to loss of radome,
Loss of the radome in flight due to lightning strike or bird strike and the effects upon CAS etc is already covered in the QRH. The Report must deal with what is; the radome was not lost in flight, the QRH already covers radome damage. This is not a stone-unturned.
With reference to loss of radome,
...if stones are left unturned there will be pushback...
A few days late with a response
PJ2:
Indeed. Detailed comments after seing to Dozy's remark, but FWIW I was using OODA in the context of instrument scan. IMO you can overlay the basics of the OODA loop to describe the use of an effective instrument scan.
In one of the earlier threads, I asked "what we he seeing?" While most estimates are "his instruments showed him about what the PNF was seeing" (most analysis leads to "the RH flight instrument cluster was not acting up") we'll never know due to how FDR takes its information.
Dozy:
Respectfully disagree, in part.
What needed to be recalled from original PPL and ATPL certification was how to use and apply an instrument scan to inform control inputs to correct for out of parameters performance. That basic skill would have prevented the stall, and thus the need to step outside the box and handle stall recovery, versus stall prevention.
The evidence so far suggests to me the following: the pilot flying did not have a functioning instrument scan in progress. Had his instrument scan been functioning (see OODA comment above to PJ) he'd have made earlier and more fffective corrections to the nose attitude than he did.
Some evidence points to his colleague in the left seat having his scan working for a bit, based on the corrections he was calling for. Beyond that, I remain in the dark in re CRM, and how the second set of eyes and the second brain were not well used. I hope the final report can shed a bit of light, but I don't know if it will.
I hear music. I could swear that it is an overweight mezzo soprano singing, yet again the
Pitch and Power Chorus
from Wagner's opera, The Flight of Valkyrie 447's Gotterdamerung.
This is not as complicated as "OODA" and Boyd. The appropriate and correct responses are already there in the SOPs etc and do not require sophisticated techniques to address and correct. If the instantaneous and then sustained pull-up had not occurred as in the other thirty-odd UAS events there would be nothing to discuss here.
In one of the earlier threads, I asked "what we he seeing?" While most estimates are "his instruments showed him about what the PNF was seeing" (most analysis leads to "the RH flight instrument cluster was not acting up") we'll never know due to how FDR takes its information.
Dozy:
The junior crew on this flight didn't need an encyclopaedic knowledge of the A330's systems to recover, all they needed to remember was the stuff they learned back when they were doing their PPL - namely recognising the symptoms of, and recovery from, a stall (which are more-or-less the same whether you're flying a microlight, a space shuttle or everything inbetween). Unfortunately airline management don't see fit to mandate revision of the basics like this by and large, probably considering it too costly.
What needed to be recalled from original PPL and ATPL certification was how to use and apply an instrument scan to inform control inputs to correct for out of parameters performance. That basic skill would have prevented the stall, and thus the need to step outside the box and handle stall recovery, versus stall prevention.
The evidence so far suggests to me the following: the pilot flying did not have a functioning instrument scan in progress. Had his instrument scan been functioning (see OODA comment above to PJ) he'd have made earlier and more fffective corrections to the nose attitude than he did.
Some evidence points to his colleague in the left seat having his scan working for a bit, based on the corrections he was calling for. Beyond that, I remain in the dark in re CRM, and how the second set of eyes and the second brain were not well used. I hope the final report can shed a bit of light, but I don't know if it will.
I hear music. I could swear that it is an overweight mezzo soprano singing, yet again the
Pitch and Power Chorus
from Wagner's opera, The Flight of Valkyrie 447's Gotterdamerung.
Clandestino
Yes, combat pilots of last thirtysomething years usually do have a little gizmo making their life easier during approach and landing, it's either doughnut & chevrons type AoA indexer or AoA bracket on HUD.
Yes, combat pilots of last thirtysomething years usually do have a little gizmo making their life easier during approach and landing, it's either doughnut & chevrons type AoA indexer or AoA bracket on HUD.
Use during approach and landing is a side effect though, the primary task being ab le to maneuver at high AOA´s in a fast changing altitude and speed environment, where the speed indication tape as an performance instrument would be of less value.
Clandestino
It is there to make their already complicated life easier by reducing the need to accurately calculate their approach speed for actual weight plus any effect from external stores.
It is there to make their already complicated life easier by reducing the need to accurately calculate their approach speed for actual weight plus any effect from external stores.
Clandestino
No, it is not 100% reliable as AoA vanes do get stuck or birdstricken then it's reversion to monsieur Pitot again.
No, it is not 100% reliable as AoA vanes do get stuck or birdstricken then it's reversion to monsieur Pitot again.
Clandestino
Of course, one has to be proficient in its use, which can only be achieved through practice. It is of utmost importance to know that yellow light means stick back, red stick forward, not the other way around.
Of course, one has to be proficient in its use, which can only be achieved through practice. It is of utmost importance to know that yellow light means stick back, red stick forward, not the other way around.
As the discussion about AOA (not the AOA gauge) from the beginning of this thread shows, it seems difficult to understand the physics and effects of AOA from those pilots, who have never seen an AOA indicator. On the other hand we can find in former and updated present procedures about UAS and upsets a lot of references to AOA without having that information readily available in the cockpit.
Lonewolf_50;
Yes, I see what you meant, and concur with this.
One gets used to the different scan, (as compared to the "T"), very quickly - it's close enough that you can "gestalt" it, by which I mean, see "normal" and not the actual numbers until it varies slightly - it's also more efficient as much of the horizontal and vertical situation is built for you in the PFD and ND respectively, including a superb picture of the energy state of the aircraft.
I have little doubt that the right-side PFD and ND were functioning normally. There are no indications in any of the data that would lead one to conclude otherwise. That said, we don't know; - but much has already been drawn as "given" elsewhere through secondary evidential chains and there is no reason why such cannot be drawn here. Besides, there is no parallax and we know the left PFD and ND were functioning as was the ISIS horizon which is large and easy to read, (compared to the steam group in older A330's). There could be no doubt as to the pitch attitude of the aircraft and, prior to the stall warning then apogee, the rate of climb.
Also, groundspeed is provided on the top-left corner of the ND, and would have been available during the UAS event as both are IRS-driven. The TAS would not be available and wind information would be "NCD" and presented as three dashes on the ND. In addition, selection of the GPS Groundspeed is part of the UAS Drill.
2 . System Description
A. General
The IR portion is a strapdown inertial system which provides a quality
reference for attitude, heading (true and magnetic), angular rates and
accelerations.
The IR software also computes:
- the inertial position
- the ground velocity
- the baro inertial vertical speed
- the drift angle
- the wind
- the flight path data.
IMO you can overlay the basics of the OODA loop to describe the use of an effective instrument scan.
One gets used to the different scan, (as compared to the "T"), very quickly - it's close enough that you can "gestalt" it, by which I mean, see "normal" and not the actual numbers until it varies slightly - it's also more efficient as much of the horizontal and vertical situation is built for you in the PFD and ND respectively, including a superb picture of the energy state of the aircraft.
I have little doubt that the right-side PFD and ND were functioning normally. There are no indications in any of the data that would lead one to conclude otherwise. That said, we don't know; - but much has already been drawn as "given" elsewhere through secondary evidential chains and there is no reason why such cannot be drawn here. Besides, there is no parallax and we know the left PFD and ND were functioning as was the ISIS horizon which is large and easy to read, (compared to the steam group in older A330's). There could be no doubt as to the pitch attitude of the aircraft and, prior to the stall warning then apogee, the rate of climb.
Also, groundspeed is provided on the top-left corner of the ND, and would have been available during the UAS event as both are IRS-driven. The TAS would not be available and wind information would be "NCD" and presented as three dashes on the ND. In addition, selection of the GPS Groundspeed is part of the UAS Drill.
2 . System Description
A. General
The IR portion is a strapdown inertial system which provides a quality
reference for attitude, heading (true and magnetic), angular rates and
accelerations.
The IR software also computes:
- the inertial position
- the ground velocity
- the baro inertial vertical speed
- the drift angle
- the wind
- the flight path data.
Last edited by Jetdriver; 8th May 2012 at 08:03.
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hre
One can assemble stretchers, splats, posts, rails, with hardware, a fabric mat, and sell it to the public, but they will see a "chair".
The "chair" is gestaltic, for "what becomes the whole....."
Likewise, as PJ2 says, and Lonewolf has offered, the "picture" is what we want.
The "Get", The "have", the understanding. It is not made up of individual parts, but the whole, only. One patterns the brain to then eliminate the pieces, and reduce the elements, until the whole is become unity. This is done by not relying on the traditional, but opening up the aware. 'Pattern Aware', if one wishes.
It used to be called the "Right Stuff". But that had more to do with attitude, and demeanor, which, though not unimportant, isn't the critical thing.
"Er, what are you doing...." Captain DuBois, upon entering the flight deck. He no doubt knew, in some fashion, else he would not have been so direct. One does not Command a wide body across the Oceans without some "Stuff". From what we have, we need to look at what we have, and I do not mean to be obtuse. I can with great reluctance concede a lack of "Stuff" from the F/Os, but not the Captain. And for the F/Os? Only with objection.
To paraphrase a Wannabe, "If a klutz like me can takeoff, recover from STALL and Land, then anyone can....."
The technicals are insufficient to condemn, all they open up is a frustration at not hearing the actual CVR. "What was that?" I would like to know, for I doubt seriously it was Robert rhetorically showing his 'klutz' re: the STALLWARN. Likewise, and this is important, It is not possible the crew was un aware of STALL. How can I say that? Because PJ2 has said the displays were consistent with the recovered data.
That cannot mean the displays were duff, only that PJ2 says they were golden. Fine, and I mean it. Is it possible that something unknown to the group here was occurring that prevented a standard solution, and there was insufficient time to implement a work around? Early on, a person who claimed to have heard the recording stated that the Captain said, beyond ...."doing?" "This is a STALL, get the (expletive) Nose Down."
Probably made up? We have not seen that report for some time, and it originated in the World of Journalism.....so.
Unless and until the complete CVR is heard, I hold my fire. I don't need to hear it, but some one does who has no agenda. If it is as bubbers44, 757 pilot says, "no professional pulls up into a STALL and falls into the SEA..." then I will choose another airline, one with friendlier skies than AIR FRANCE.... And possibly eschew the air, for SEA, in a slow boat.
The "chair" is gestaltic, for "what becomes the whole....."
Likewise, as PJ2 says, and Lonewolf has offered, the "picture" is what we want.
The "Get", The "have", the understanding. It is not made up of individual parts, but the whole, only. One patterns the brain to then eliminate the pieces, and reduce the elements, until the whole is become unity. This is done by not relying on the traditional, but opening up the aware. 'Pattern Aware', if one wishes.
It used to be called the "Right Stuff". But that had more to do with attitude, and demeanor, which, though not unimportant, isn't the critical thing.
"Er, what are you doing...." Captain DuBois, upon entering the flight deck. He no doubt knew, in some fashion, else he would not have been so direct. One does not Command a wide body across the Oceans without some "Stuff". From what we have, we need to look at what we have, and I do not mean to be obtuse. I can with great reluctance concede a lack of "Stuff" from the F/Os, but not the Captain. And for the F/Os? Only with objection.
To paraphrase a Wannabe, "If a klutz like me can takeoff, recover from STALL and Land, then anyone can....."
The technicals are insufficient to condemn, all they open up is a frustration at not hearing the actual CVR. "What was that?" I would like to know, for I doubt seriously it was Robert rhetorically showing his 'klutz' re: the STALLWARN. Likewise, and this is important, It is not possible the crew was un aware of STALL. How can I say that? Because PJ2 has said the displays were consistent with the recovered data.
That cannot mean the displays were duff, only that PJ2 says they were golden. Fine, and I mean it. Is it possible that something unknown to the group here was occurring that prevented a standard solution, and there was insufficient time to implement a work around? Early on, a person who claimed to have heard the recording stated that the Captain said, beyond ...."doing?" "This is a STALL, get the (expletive) Nose Down."
Probably made up? We have not seen that report for some time, and it originated in the World of Journalism.....so.
Unless and until the complete CVR is heard, I hold my fire. I don't need to hear it, but some one does who has no agenda. If it is as bubbers44, 757 pilot says, "no professional pulls up into a STALL and falls into the SEA..." then I will choose another airline, one with friendlier skies than AIR FRANCE.... And possibly eschew the air, for SEA, in a slow boat.
Franzl, thank you very much for correcting and elaborating on my amateurish take on the use of AoA in fighters. Sowieso, I can't help noticing that you didn't address my fundamental objection: airliner pilots do not share military interest in AoA as we don't indulge in manuevers where AoA gauge is of utmost importance, such as maximum possible rate turns etc. You have flown your Rhino by reference to it, Airbus pilots fly their steed without reference to it. Horses for courses.
Lesser complexity compared to yokes pretending they are doing something more then driving transducers. More cockpit space. Easier to get in and out of seat. Safer in incapacitation where unconscious pilot falls over controls.
>Sigh< We can try.
Not valid for all Airbus characteristic speeds. Valpha max and Wsw on Airbus are very similar to low speed cue. ADC/IR design, flight controls and display architecture are different yet displayed information is similar.
If airspeed is lost, how could we have possibly have low speed awareness? High alpha awareness is even better and is provided through aural stall warning.
Assumption too much, I'm afraid. It doesn't work that way on any tape ASI I'm aware of. I am sure that people designing, building and certifying those things know a whole lot more about them than two of us put together.
At the cruise Mach, they were not 'valid', they were valid. They were transient as the aeroplane was jerked into climb at its max recommended cruise level and were reason to be very, very concerned.
That's putting the cart in the front of the horse; BUSS doesn't cause loss of all ADRs - it's the way around. As long as you have at least one valid ADR, you fly by it. You go to BUSS when all hope is lost that at least one ADR can be recovered.
Hmmm... then who ordered replacing the pitots if no one was aware of the incidents? Back to PPRuNe: thirty-something crews goes through similar ordeal as AF447 without PPRuNe even noticing and now we have eighth thread on AF447? Aren't we indulging in a bit of outcome-based-analysis here?
Absolutely correct! That's the reason why other crews managed to save themselves, fly out of the trouble and no-one notices something weird goes on. IMHO, the idea that AoA gauge would have saved AF447 crew is unfortunately just wishful thinking. What are the chances that pilot who is unable to grasp the meaning of increasing attitude and altitude indications, therefore being unaware he's pushing aeroplane up where it just can't fly and finally displays paradoxical and provenly lethal reaction to stall warning, would pay heed to AoA gauge?
but, pray tell us, what are the advantages to the AB sidestick system if cost (weight savings) are removed as a factor? That is the only justification I've ever seen for such a design.
Could we look at this more objectively?
I'm aware that the 'low speed awareness' markings are fundamentally different from Airbus' markings of 'characteristic speeds'.
But when airspeed has 'gone south' and in Alternate Law, may be the 'low speed awareness' is better?
While the speed tape is faulty (maybe it should be 'greyed'), the 'low speed awareness' tape is valid, correctly displaying the stall margin.
It would have informed the pilots of the 'validity' of the first brief stall warnings, that they were transient and no reason for concern at that time
It doesn't have the big drawbacks of the BUSS that you lose all three ADR's for the remainder of the flight, and that it is virtually useless above (IIRC) FL250.
No .. neither the BEA or DGAC for those on AF aircraft that were involved in this type of incident
Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
What needed to be recalled from original PPL and ATPL certification was how to use and apply an instrument scan to inform control inputs to correct for out of parameters performance. That basic skill would have prevented the stall, and thus the need to step outside the box and handle stall recovery, versus stall prevention.
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Retired F4
I see what you mean now - I was thinking of a different definition of expectation pattern. That you have a certain desire and when you move the controls you think that the aircraft will respond to your expectation no matter what the reality is. This seems to have been the situation of the PF. However, your instruments should still be your indicator of what your aircraft is doing.
With unreliable instruments there are SOPs and ways of analysing the issue. CRM is also a vital tool. Korean Airlines 8509 is especially relevant here as it demonstrates how to and how not to deal with unreliable instruments. But in the case of AF447 we have the PNF seeing from his instruments that something was amiss but taking no action. This indicates a breakdown in CRM which no yoke would have alleviated.
I see what you mean now - I was thinking of a different definition of expectation pattern. That you have a certain desire and when you move the controls you think that the aircraft will respond to your expectation no matter what the reality is. This seems to have been the situation of the PF. However, your instruments should still be your indicator of what your aircraft is doing.
With unreliable instruments there are SOPs and ways of analysing the issue. CRM is also a vital tool. Korean Airlines 8509 is especially relevant here as it demonstrates how to and how not to deal with unreliable instruments. But in the case of AF447 we have the PNF seeing from his instruments that something was amiss but taking no action. This indicates a breakdown in CRM which no yoke would have alleviated.
Lyman;
Just to be precise, I don't mean anything complicated by the term, "gestalt"; if you fly lots of hours, you'll know what I mean.
Those who "wear" their aircraft when they strap it on know the sounds, the instrument readings, the vagaries and the "tune" of their machine and know instantly, before formal cognition, when something is amiss and they are already moving towards solutions even if such action is to wait...
The difficulty with digitizing an environment is that it becomes cold, aloof and analogically foreign to the mind. Digital readings require first an act of cognition then imagination, whereas old-fashioned guages always show "how much", and "how much too much/too little" without actually reading the guage first, because one knows "normal".
In a digital airplane, one can fly it without understanding it, mainly because one isn't actually flying it; the full-time automation is and we must build in substitutes for the experience of flying it, most of the time successfully. But the priority has shifted from knowing how to fly to knowing which mode to be in. This has been said many times here.
In the face of voluminous digitized automation, the task of cognition and imagination is monumental. This is as much a philosophical point as it is a psychological or merely ergonomical one.
While many will dismiss this as academic nonsense even though there is no such thing, this was the first, and instant impression I had when I first sat in the A320 in 1991 to learn how to fly it after having flown the B767, the L1011 and three steam airplanes before them. As I've posted many times, one gets used to anything if one does it long enough; it becomes as comfortable as an old shoe.
The thought occurred to me when I was uncomfortable in that first exposure to the A320, that we do not perceive digitally and so the cognitive processes required to understand the airplane and fly it well were/are subtlely different but the differences are masked by the enormous success of these aircraft and of brilliant automation solutions which work extremely well - I love these solutions but it took a while to known and trust them.
These aren't areas of frequent examination and I don't expect that to change nor do I expect much interest in the comment because "automation" is successful. But when things go pear-shaped, the character of failure and accidents changes and I think this is one reason why. I guess most just get used to it.
Just to be precise, I don't mean anything complicated by the term, "gestalt"; if you fly lots of hours, you'll know what I mean.
Those who "wear" their aircraft when they strap it on know the sounds, the instrument readings, the vagaries and the "tune" of their machine and know instantly, before formal cognition, when something is amiss and they are already moving towards solutions even if such action is to wait...
The difficulty with digitizing an environment is that it becomes cold, aloof and analogically foreign to the mind. Digital readings require first an act of cognition then imagination, whereas old-fashioned guages always show "how much", and "how much too much/too little" without actually reading the guage first, because one knows "normal".
In a digital airplane, one can fly it without understanding it, mainly because one isn't actually flying it; the full-time automation is and we must build in substitutes for the experience of flying it, most of the time successfully. But the priority has shifted from knowing how to fly to knowing which mode to be in. This has been said many times here.
In the face of voluminous digitized automation, the task of cognition and imagination is monumental. This is as much a philosophical point as it is a psychological or merely ergonomical one.
While many will dismiss this as academic nonsense even though there is no such thing, this was the first, and instant impression I had when I first sat in the A320 in 1991 to learn how to fly it after having flown the B767, the L1011 and three steam airplanes before them. As I've posted many times, one gets used to anything if one does it long enough; it becomes as comfortable as an old shoe.
The thought occurred to me when I was uncomfortable in that first exposure to the A320, that we do not perceive digitally and so the cognitive processes required to understand the airplane and fly it well were/are subtlely different but the differences are masked by the enormous success of these aircraft and of brilliant automation solutions which work extremely well - I love these solutions but it took a while to known and trust them.
These aren't areas of frequent examination and I don't expect that to change nor do I expect much interest in the comment because "automation" is successful. But when things go pear-shaped, the character of failure and accidents changes and I think this is one reason why. I guess most just get used to it.
Last edited by PJ2; 7th May 2012 at 23:49.
O.C.
Yes. Even more, it is a complete breakdown in cockpit discipline from which all else proceeds.
There are significant similarities with the Royal Air Maroc event out of AMS, being discussed in another thread.
So, Why?
This indicates a breakdown in CRM which no yoke would have alleviated.
There are significant similarities with the Royal Air Maroc event out of AMS, being discussed in another thread.
So, Why?
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PJ2, I loved the early 737's and 727's but didn't want the automation of the Airbus so stayed away from it. Only because it took a lot of your control away and let automation take over.
When pilots cannot control an airplane because automation is doing something they don't understand I don't like it. Maybe I am too old and don't understand the new technology but I love the feeling of being in control no matter what the computer thinks. My 757 let me do all of that. I loved that airplane. It had more power than you knew what to do with and it did exactly what you told it to do. It was really hard to screw up with a decent pilot flying a fool proof airplane like that.
When pilots cannot control an airplane because automation is doing something they don't understand I don't like it. Maybe I am too old and don't understand the new technology but I love the feeling of being in control no matter what the computer thinks. My 757 let me do all of that. I loved that airplane. It had more power than you knew what to do with and it did exactly what you told it to do. It was really hard to screw up with a decent pilot flying a fool proof airplane like that.
An unobtrusive indication of AOA can be made available in a DU through an OPC change by simply enabling the appropriate pins. The data is already in the system.
It certainly does not have to be used in any phase of air transport flying...until it becomes useful information. Now when could that be?
Don't look at it if it annoys you. You can take your mind off of it by concentrating on the stick shaker.
Don't buy it if you're absolutely set against it. This will prove your point.
Don't use it if someone buys it for you and you're really miffed with their paternalistic approach to your well being.
BUSS is a 'pig in lipstick'.
How about the guy that showed up a little late for the 'dance'?
(I would have sworn you need TAS for wind info on the ND.)
It certainly does not have to be used in any phase of air transport flying...until it becomes useful information. Now when could that be?
Don't look at it if it annoys you. You can take your mind off of it by concentrating on the stick shaker.
Don't buy it if you're absolutely set against it. This will prove your point.
Don't use it if someone buys it for you and you're really miffed with their paternalistic approach to your well being.
BUSS is a 'pig in lipstick'.
What are the chances that pilot who is unable to grasp the meaning of increasing attitude and altitude indications, therefore being unaware he's pushing aeroplane up where it just can't fly and finally displays paradoxical and provenly lethal reaction to stall warning, would pay heed to AoA gauge?
(I would have sworn you need TAS for wind info on the ND.)
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Also a side stick with a single pilot plane would be just fine. The Airbus isn't a fighter aircraft so needs two pilots so why not let the PNF see what the PF is doing without a flashlight? If you totally trust the other pilot it might not be necessary but in this case it would have helped.
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Clandestino
EASA issued an airworthiness directive to eliminate the Thales AA Pitot probe defective the August 31 2009
After the AF447 crash ..... nice timing
Hmmm... then who ordered replacing the pitots if no one was aware of the incidents? Back to PPRuNe: thirty-something crews goes through similar ordeal as AF447 without PPRuNe even noticing and now we have eighth thread on AF447? Aren't we indulging in a bit of outcome-based-analysis here?
After the AF447 crash ..... nice timing
bubbers44;
I think automation has made our work and the transport industry much safer in the various trades made to achieve it but it isn't automation alone that's done it. The lessons which gave rise to SOPs, the introduction of CRM, TCAS, and EGPWS and safety programs like FOQA/FDM and SMS for example, came at a very high price but they too, have reduced risk and lowered the accident rate. These are pretty straightforward, non-spectacular, sensible advances which are easy and reasonably inexpensive to implement, learn and check. Automation is only a tool but its use and what it is tending to replace are requiring some re-thinking.
I think automation has made our work and the transport industry much safer in the various trades made to achieve it but it isn't automation alone that's done it. The lessons which gave rise to SOPs, the introduction of CRM, TCAS, and EGPWS and safety programs like FOQA/FDM and SMS for example, came at a very high price but they too, have reduced risk and lowered the accident rate. These are pretty straightforward, non-spectacular, sensible advances which are easy and reasonably inexpensive to implement, learn and check. Automation is only a tool but its use and what it is tending to replace are requiring some re-thinking.
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Lyman,
So, if it wasn't ice blocking the pitots, what caused the UAS? Do you have a theory or two or three? 
Did you ever think you may have already heard the complete CVR? Under extreme pressure, most people don't have much to say except for four letter words... It's not a conversational time... 
By Lyman: It is also not concluded that Pitots were blocked by ICE (granulitic), or ICE, solid.
Or by ICE at all? I believe it is assumed.....
Or by ICE at all? I believe it is assumed.....
By Lyman: Unless and until the complete CVR is heard, I hold my fire. I don't need to hear it, but some one does who has no agenda.
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jcjeant,
Your quote:
So as not to confuse the more recent followers of this event, what you are saying is true regarding EASA, but doesn't cover the factual waterfront. AF experienced 9 incidents involving UAS with Thales pitot tubes prior to AF447. In 2008, Airbus recommended replacement of the Thales pitots with Goodrich pitots which had less susceptibility of failure due to icing or heavy rain conditions. Many airlines proceeded to replace at least two of their pitots on each affect aircraft, but AF, for one reason or another, didn't replace any on AF447 before the incident.
A discussion was held between Airbus and AF in October of 2008 regarding Thales AA pitots and Airbus recommendations to switch to Goodrich in two positions, 1 and 3.
I am not supporting or degrading EASA, but AF was forewarned of the situation, but didn't take action immediately as other did.
Your quote:
EASA issued an airworthiness directive to eliminate the Thales AA Pitot probe defective the August 31 2009
After the AF447 crash ..... nice timing
After the AF447 crash ..... nice timing
A discussion was held between Airbus and AF in October of 2008 regarding Thales AA pitots and Airbus recommendations to switch to Goodrich in two positions, 1 and 3.
I am not supporting or degrading EASA, but AF was forewarned of the situation, but didn't take action immediately as other did.