Franzl, thank you very much for correcting and elaborating on my amateurish take on the use of AoA in fighters. Sowieso, I can't help noticing that you didn't address my fundamental objection: airliner pilots do not share military interest in AoA as we don't indulge in manuevers where AoA gauge is of utmost importance, such as maximum possible rate turns etc. You have flown your Rhino by reference to it, Airbus pilots fly their steed without reference to it. Horses for courses.
but, pray tell us, what are the advantages to the AB sidestick system if cost (weight savings) are removed as a factor? That is the only justification I've ever seen for such a design.
Lesser complexity compared to yokes pretending they are doing something more then driving transducers. More cockpit space. Easier to get in and out of seat. Safer in incapacitation where unconscious pilot falls over controls.
Could we look at this more objectively?
>Sigh< We can try.
I'm aware that the 'low speed awareness' markings are fundamentally different from Airbus' markings of 'characteristic speeds'.
Not valid for all Airbus characteristic speeds. Valpha max and Wsw on Airbus are very similar to low speed cue. ADC/IR design, flight controls and display architecture are different yet displayed information is similar.
But when airspeed has 'gone south' and in Alternate Law, may be the 'low speed awareness' is better?
If airspeed is lost, how could we have possibly have low speed awareness? High alpha awareness is even better and is provided through aural stall warning.
While the speed tape is faulty (maybe it should be 'greyed'), the 'low speed awareness' tape is valid, correctly displaying the stall margin.
Assumption too much, I'm afraid. It doesn't work that way on any tape ASI I'm aware of. I am sure that people designing, building and certifying those things know a whole lot more about them than two of us put together.
It would have informed the pilots of the 'validity' of the first brief stall warnings, that they were transient and no reason for concern at that time
At the cruise Mach, they were not 'valid', they were valid. They were transient as the aeroplane was jerked into climb at its max recommended cruise level and were reason to be very, very concerned.
It doesn't have the big drawbacks of the BUSS that you lose all three ADR's for the remainder of the flight, and that it is virtually useless above (IIRC) FL250.
That's putting the cart in the front of the horse; BUSS doesn't cause loss of all ADRs - it's the way around. As long as you have at least one valid ADR, you fly by it. You go to BUSS when all hope is lost that at least one ADR can be recovered.
No .. neither the BEA or DGAC for those on AF aircraft that were involved in this type of incident
Hmmm... then who ordered replacing the pitots if no one was aware of the incidents? Back to PPRuNe: thirty-something crews goes through similar ordeal as AF447 without PPRuNe even noticing and now we have eighth thread on AF447? Aren't we indulging in a bit of outcome-based-analysis here?
Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
What needed to be recalled from original PPL and ATPL certification was how to use and apply an instrument scan to inform control inputs to correct for out of parameters performance. That basic skill would have prevented the stall, and thus the need to step outside the box and handle stall recovery, versus stall prevention.
Absolutely correct! That's the reason why other crews managed to save themselves, fly out of the trouble and no-one notices something weird goes on. IMHO, the idea that AoA gauge would have saved AF447 crew is unfortunately just wishful thinking. What are the chances that pilot who is unable to grasp the meaning of increasing attitude and altitude indications, therefore being unaware he's pushing aeroplane up where it just can't fly and finally displays paradoxical and provenly lethal reaction to stall warning, would pay heed to AoA gauge?