Case One

No apologies for not having read most of the nearly 800 preceding posts.

For those of you debating independent side-sticks and yolks who cares? Those of us operating equipment from Toulouse know its not going to change. And there are lots of other issues with Airbus aeroplanes - and with every other manufacturer as well. Like it and understand it or get a type change.

I'm much more concerned about a crew that comprised, if I'm correct, the following. A captain who crosses the ITCZ at night with his RADAR brightness turned down (I've had that one pulled numerous times). A junior FO who apparently can't recognise actions that would lead to a stall, or the symptoms of a stall, and hence doesn't attempt to recover from said stall. A relatively senior FO who either also can't recognise a stall, or who doesn't have the gumption to take control PROPERLY (and Airbus pilots should know what I mean) when the other pilot is grossly mishandling the aeroplane.

Its been my opinion for over a decade that the entire airline pilot recruitment, training and checking program is not fit for purpose. And then there's flight time limitations and fatigue. Trouble is, the guys in charge - and you know who you are - remain blissfully unconcerned. I hope they enjoy their pensions.

Apologies for spelling and grammer errors, I'm originally an engineer by training.

CONF iture

Where ... ?

fantom

As an ex Airbus TRE and base trainer I have to agree. I was pleased to leave the system when I saw the writing on the wall.

Sad but true.

Wingswinger

Fantom,

A point well made. When the full, truthful report is published it is going to hurt. The politicians and regulators will HAVE to do something.

BEagle

Case One, well said.

In addition, one has to ask why it is that Air France has had so many serious accidents with modern aircraft in recent years?

25 Jul 2000 AF4590 Concorde (nr. Paris)
5 Aug 2005 AF358 A340 (Toronto)
1 Jun 2009 AF447 A330 (nr. TASIL)

It can't be just bad luck.......

jcjeant

This was if I remember well .. posted age ago in one of the thousand messages
Anyways ... BEA know it .. Airbus know it .. and we know it ..
It must be also available in the box "RTK" (Right to know) for Airbus pilots
If it's not in the "RTK" box ... the constructor of this aircraft should be prosecuted for premeditated murder
As a professional (as any professional) the pilot must be aware that he pilot "his aircraft" and not "an aircraft"
He is responsible and must do everything possible to know his tool in order to achieve the best results and thus honor his profession and therefore also the safety of lives and equipment entrusted to it

Petercwelch

What was the rationale for independently moving side sticks in the design phase of the airbus??

Lyman

To me and my cynical mind, I would venture that a jump straight to single pilot transport category a/c may have been a bit much thirty odd years ago. The "Independent Command Stick" seems a step along the way, a "proof" of sorts that SP was perfectly acceptable. Obviously, if so, it was a moronic blunder.

RunSick

After giving a moral speech about other people not being professionals, to claim to know something because it was posted in pprune... Is that how we are supposed to fly the plane now? According to what we read in pprune?

But anyway, could somebody please post the reference if it exists? Would really appreciate it.

IcePack

All very interesting. As you know the SS commands G. So the a/c was in unusual attitude law during it's decent. So manual fwd trim would be required to position the stab in the required direction. OK
I would like to see what position the elevators would have maintained had the flying pilot held full fwd SS. I hope full down, but would they? The reason for my interest is that the aircraft was in a very unusual position and attitude which I wonder how much testing was done by airbus in that part of the envelope.
(Recent Sim exercise we could not get the a/c into the unusual attitude law & speed only got down to 120Kts with VS -6000'/min. fwd stick was not really enough to get the nose down but as the stab would run with the SS held fwd the aircraft recovered fine. But trouble is the sim is unreliable outside the normal flt envelope)

As to any pilot thinking + 16 NU at 30+ thousand feet must have dismissed the attitude indicators as well as the airspeeds as it looks really weird.

vapilot2004

I am not rated for the A330, however I can recall no mention of any 60 knot figure as it relates to stall warning indications going missing during the whole of my A320 course. A quick review of verbose notes also shows no reference to an airspeed-based cutout of the cricket and/or voice warnings.

Since the warnings (and condition) are generally based on AOA, I never imagined speed data thresholds played into the logic until now.

DouglasFlyer

Here is some information about the law while stalling the aircraft to very low speed:




"The law in pitch is the alternate law without protection" which I interpret as no low speed protection (including stall warning) available

vapilot2004

Thank you, Mr. Flyer. The basic text here tells us protections may be lost at sub 60 knot airspeeds (as output by the air data units), but the stall warning going mute is an assumption only. Agreed?

RunSick

Thanks DF.
I must say though that the interpretation, although a correct one, is VERY obscure given the importance of the issue. It would not come directly into the mind of the reader the the Stall warning synthetic voice, which is related to the angle of attack would be included on this. Why would it be? (Yes, I have now read some explanations about it, but it was news to me, as I´m sure to many others)

The info you posted + reading the "Low speed stability" which includes the stall warning among its items may also help to figure it out. But I would like to know how many pilots read this before the AF accident and where really clear about this interpretation? Wouldn´t it have been better to have somewhere a Note that clearly stated "The stall warning synthetic voice will not activate below 60kts"?

acbus1

That's been my opinion for three decades.

As is so often the case, its all about aviation authorities and airline management covering their @r$e$. Effectively sorting out problems and deficiencies takes a back seat to whatever minimum action will preserve their ego-fuelled, brain-dead pleasure ride on the gravy train.

Lets not forget profits. Re-write FTL until profits are maximised and the prevention of fatigue is a joke. Keep those Airbus sidesticks; they've clearly contributed to a major accident, but think of the cost of ripping them out and fitting 'safe', moving control yokes in full view of all flight deck members. Can't have that, so lets blame it on a need for more 'high altitude training'. That sounds good. Ar$eS covered; job done.

BOAC

- assuming you mean 'Abnormal' then you are at odds with BEA and Airbus.

clivewatson

In any non FBW aircraft, I would argue that stick position (elevator) will tell you far more than you might think. I am not a bus driver, but suspect that in Alt Law, the same will apply here.

Perhaps next time you visit the sim or while conducting a test flight, why not try to stall the airplane in a variety of configurations, including accelerated stalls? I'll bet you don't manage to do it unless the stick position is substantially aft of neutral.

If you happen to be fortunate enough to fly a type fitted with an AoA gauge, you need not even bother stalling the sim...just track AoA versus stick position - it will prove the direct relationship, and amply demonstrate the point that stick position can, (and is, by many) be used as a primary reference.

vapilot2004

RS: The AOA data is voted invalid by the air data computers at speeds below the threshold due
to the aerodynamic limitations of the sensor vanes. This makes perfect sense and the floor value
was undoubtedly proven during flight testing and certification.

However, going beyond the obvious flight control computer safety limitations regarding halted
operation (and subsequent hand-off) when presented with bad AOA data, the stall warning logic,
if our suppositions of a 60 knot cutout floor are correct, might well be subject to a recommended revision
by the BEA in its final report.

Zorin_75

Sigh. BEA Report:

IcePack

BOAC Quite.
That is what I meant & as the aircraft was less than 60 Kts. Well the rest was fishing for comments.
Thanks.