DiCaprio

This may have been answered before, but in a highly-automated airplane such as this, why did it not occur to PF or PM to re-activate AP when airspeed indications tallied? One assumes that 'pitch and thrust' would be one of the first things the AP would 'try', since that's been identified endlessly as the missing reaction?

Also, how come there was no warning when control input asymmetry of a certain magnitude/duration was observed by the flight management system? That would seem like a sound worth hearing.

Yeah, I'm but a punter, but one with a lot of time paying your salaries, and enough wits about me to comprehend much of this. So ne flamez-vous pas, svp.

Island-Flyer

To me that final conversation and the utter lack of CRM calls into question Air France's pilot training. This was exacerbated by the fact that the control sticks on the Airbus move independently (a feature I always believed created more problems).

At some of my past employers the practice of putting two SIC's in the cockpit on oceanic flights became a common practice for the obvious savings in cost. I had been against it for this very reason, no defined chain of command. Internal evaluation revealed that without a set chain of command CRM degrades to a point that safety of flight is compromised.

We ran into a similar problem when two cruise SIC's couldn't make a decision because one was senior to the company and the other was senior on that aircraft type. Despite this and other evidence about the dangers of not having a PIC present on the flight deck I was told that the company would fly two SIC's until the regulators force them to change that policy. The savings in payroll was too much for the bean counters to pass up.

I hope this accident prompts that change, but I doubt it will. The airline industry has lost much of its responsibility as control of operations is taken from experienced, mandated personnel like the Director of Operations and given to accounting. The regulating bodies do not back up those responsible for safety of flight operations and we get situations like this.

Rockhound

Lyman,
It seems to me that, by somehow gaining access to the output of both the CVR and FDR, Otelli has stolen a march on the BEA. I doubt that the BEA's final report will provide much that has not already been reported by Otelli.

Clandestino

Airbus A/P doesn't have attitude hold mode and it does not command thrust.

There is the aural warning when both sticks are out of neutral at the same time. Recorded at 2:13:03.

Consider yourself flamed.

CRM is useless when pilots lack resources of their own to manage.

Air France pilots have previously successfully negotiated loss of all airspeed in A330s.

As long as anyone claiming independent sticks on Bus are problem does not support the claim with some verifiable research, I'll consider such utterances unreliable & irrelevant.

jcjeant

As long as anyone claiming independent sticks on Bus are not problem does not support the claim with some verifiable research, I'll consider such utterances unreliable & irrelevant.
All happy

Island-Flyer

@Clandestino

What resources did these pilots lack? Their airspeed indication? I didn't realize you were suppose to disregard CRM when the aircraft encounters an instrumentation malfunction. My opinion based on their interactions is the only resource they lacked was adequate training.

How many times? A good training program is not "good enough", it means that 100% of the time the crew would be able to identify a malfunction and take appropriate action to a satisfactory outcome. Obviously these pilots could not understand what should have been a relatively easy avionics error to "fly through".

Defensive much? I didn't state that as a fact but rather that I believe it, as in it's my opinion. However from the information I've read on AF447 it appears that the independent movement of control sticks was a small contributor to the accident chain and removed one additional opportunity for the accident to be prevented. Had the PNF noticed that the PF had frozen his stick nose up perhaps he would have forced the proper correction. All I can tell you is that there have been times in my career when an uncommanded or unintentional control input has been noticed because the PNF control column moved and was noticed, resulting in proper correction. Mind you this applied primarily to GNE due to lateral errors and rarely pitch problems.

Gretchenfrage

Well, Otelli's publication, the PM article are somewhat verifiable research, in the absence of the still withheld evidence of the same by the BEA (just wonder why ....).

So it really starts being quite some evidence, if one cares to read correctly.

You can all continue to play the ostrich, which only suggests that the brain mass might be equivalent, or there must be some other reason!

But to me the lines in the PM article are horrifyingly evidence enough that independent controls are a distinct disadvantage to coupled ones. The latter would have most probably triggered a very much earlier reaction of the PNF, ......, and most probably have saved the day for those extremely poor pilots.

wozzo

I'm curious: What kind of reaction?

PNF (as PF) had at a crucial time continuous and then repeated stall alarm in his ears and altitude, attitude and vertical speed indication before his eyes. But he, as hasn't PF, never identified the condition "stall". In my opinion so far, recognizing stall was conditional for adequate measures to "save the day".

So, considering "stall" never made it into the conscious of either member of the crew, what kind of information precisely would PNF have gathered from coupled sidesticks, and what kind of measure one would have to expect as consequence?

Gretchenfrage

read that paragraph taken from the PM article:

Maybe Bonin was so tense that he continuously pulled on the SS without realizing it, who knows, or he was just reacting wrongly. But the fact remains, that Robert did not realize it, at least for too long a time, because the ss is not visible to him and he was rightfully fixed on the PFD. With coupled controls it would have been more easily visible in front of him and furthermore tangible.

Therefore my strong opinion that with coupled controls he would have intervened earlier.

This should be a strong point in favor of coupled controls = feedback.

Clandestino

First and foremost, ability to recognize what was happening.

Keep on not realizing as it is correct thing to do. I have not written it was to be disregarded, what I meant to convey is that it would be useless to use CRM when there is no knowledge or skill to manage.

Valid if the only thing affecting the interaction were training. It is not, therefore: invalid.

At least twice. Interim2 lists only MSNs and dates. It is easy to check who was the operator at the time of the occurence using Airfleets, ATDB or similar but I didn't have the inclination to go through the whole list.

Errr... not quite. There is a thing we call Threat and Error Management that claims we humans are not 100% reliable (quite realistic view, I'd say) but that there are times when we can still work with reduced reliability and yet successfully cope with our eff-ups. Like in cruise.

Yup. WoCL, anyone?

It would be useful if you would retell the relevant part of mr Otelli's publication. Parts that got to the PPRuNe make his book look more similar to snuff porn than serious aviation safety text. Of course, such a selective quoting might lead to extremely biased view on the matter. Or not.

I don't find your ad hominem (or more precisely: ad struthiocamelum) very informative or entertaining.

Since 1988, aeroplanes with uncoupled sticks are allowed to participate in public passenger transport, worldwide. Certifying authorities do not share your concern. What do you know that they don't?

Gretchenfrage

Now that's comforting.
They have certified a lot of aircraft that needed redesign. Think of the DC10.
Just why couldn't they learn? Just why would Airbus be immune to redesign if deficits appear? Just because they flew since 1988? Great argument!

Anyway, I simply flew both systems and that's where my opinion and concern originates.
But then again, what does a simple pilot know ......

And by the way, I didn't want to be entertaining. Metaphors are here to underline a point of view.
Ostrich is quite suitable for some attitudes concerning the apparent deficit in Airbus controls.

Over and out.

DC-ATE

OK.....I'm just an "antique" pilot long ago retired, but someone fill me in please on these "uncoupled" side sticks. Just WHICH one has the authority ???

Lyman

DiCaprio.

No comment re: a/p not reselected, it's in here or TechLog. Post 447, Airbus issued Safety Bulletin: "Do not reconnect Autopilot too quickly post UAS, the aircraft may enter an uncommanded climb."

UAS procedures prior to, and to this day, are a "work in progress" for the Bus.


DC-ATE Sometimes the PIC, sometimes not. Sometimes Both, sometimes neither. It's a proprietary thing, Captain. If you are a BUS flyer, you are permitted to know almost always, especially when the a/c is docile, which is most the time. Rarely, when UPSET, the STICK is mysterious, and no one is permitted to know, lest someone actually have a clue. When one is busy, the other fella is to mind his bidness. It's a French thing.

CONF iture

But Investigation bodies (at least one of them and this is not the BEA of course) share our concern. What do you know they don't ?

chrisN

DC-ATE, from answers posted previously by those who know, if the two side sticks are sending different messages, and nobody pressed the priority button, the aircraft takes the average.

If one pilot presses the button, that takes priority. If the other one then presses his/hers, it reverts to that one.

Apparently the intention was to enable one to take over if needed, not to resolve a tug of war between two pilots who refuse to agree.

At one point, PNF Robert pressed his and announced that he was taking it. Shortly after, Bonin took it back, with no such announcement, and it stayed that way.

AIUI.

Chris N

Plectron

ref Post #722, LapSap, surely you must be joking. With all the posts on PPRune about lack of actual hands-on flying, how can anyone ask this question? There are MAJOR players out there who hire non-pilots, train them in Cessnas for a couple hundred hours, let them languish for over a year while learning the books, and then put them on the line in big long-haul wide-body aircraft.

Once on the line, they are forbidden to land in any significant crosswind (and if you are the Captain you would know why), fly MAYBE 3-4 legs a month with the autopilot on by 1500' AGL and off at the marker inbound at which point the plane is basically ballistic.

In 10 years of this great experience they make him a "Commander". If he doesn't screw up 2 years later he is an "Instructor".

Of course, as long as the resulting incidents don't end of as flaming craters, the incidents get buried and you will only see quick blips on here. Any and all negative comments are shouted down by the cheering squad.

rudderrudderrat

See page 7 of this EASA doc. of MAY 2011.
Sounds like some timely concern to me.

http://www.easa.eu.int/rulemaking/do...%202011-09.pdf

"c) The use of side stick controllers together with electronic flight control systems which provide control augmentation and control deflection limiting systems could affect piloting awareness that the aircraft is approaching a control limited flight condition. It may be that return to normal flight condition and/or continuing of safe flight needs a specific crew action. In these circumstances a suitable flight control position annunciation is required to be provided to the crew, unless other existing indications are found adequate or sufficient to prompt that action.
(2) CS 25.777 Cockpit controls
Side stick controller force-deflection characteristics in pitch and roll together with displacement sensitivity and gains need to be evaluated. The intention is to show that normal inputs on one control axis will not cause significant unintentional inputs on the other. Consequently a new paragraph CS 25.777(i) is proposed requiring a suitable assessment."

DC-ATE

OK.....thanks for the replies, Lyman - chrisN.
Sure sounds like a STUPID system to me !!

Mr Optimistic

A bit surprised there isn't a drill controlling who is allowed to touch the stick: if you haven't got control, shouldn't your hand be clear and visibly so ?

chrisN

AIUI (perhaps ATPL’s will put me right if I have it wrong!):

A “drill” is perhaps not quite the right expression, but I’m not sure what is. Under CRM, even a junior pilot is supposed to be able to propose a change from what PIC is doing, or even take over if necessary. Ideally, it never gets to an unresolved argument. But I have seen criticism from ATPLs of a FO who knew that PIC was messing up an approach but felt unable to take over because of his rank. They all died, IIRC. (India? Short runway on top of hill? Went over the end, when FO said go around and PIC did not until too late?)

But what if FO is convinced PIC is doing it wrong, but FO is actually wrong?

In the end, the commander is paid to take decisions, although after CRM-following hearing what the other(s) say.

In AF447, commander left the junior FO as PIC, not just PF, and that seems to have inhibited the other FO in spite of his greater experience. When junior FO Bonin took back control, other FO Robert then tried harder to get commander back, and left it to him to sort it out. Which the latter did not in time.

(IMHO, at least partly because he was not properly told what had happened re stall warning, PF holding stick back, no-one pointing out NU attitude combined with low speed and high descent rate = stalled – but that is another aspect, though still a CRM issue AIUI.)