To me that final conversation and the utter lack of CRM calls into question Air France's pilot training. This was exacerbated by the fact that the control sticks on the Airbus move independently (a feature I always believed created more problems).
At some of my past employers the practice of putting two SIC's in the cockpit on oceanic flights became a common practice for the obvious savings in cost. I had been against it for this very reason, no defined chain of command. Internal evaluation revealed that without a set chain of command CRM degrades to a point that safety of flight is compromised.
We ran into a similar problem when two cruise SIC's couldn't make a decision because one was senior to the company and the other was senior on that aircraft type. Despite this and other evidence about the dangers of not having a PIC present on the flight deck I was told that the company would fly two SIC's until the regulators force them to change that policy. The savings in payroll was too much for the bean counters to pass up.
I hope this accident prompts that change, but I doubt it will. The airline industry has lost much of its responsibility as control of operations is taken from experienced, mandated personnel like the Director of Operations and given to accounting. The regulating bodies do not back up those responsible for safety of flight operations and we get situations like this.