AF447 final crew conversation - Thread No. 1
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But that was never the case - you show me a single trade-level article proving that automation was designed to minimise pilot ability or replace the pilot in the cockpit, and I'll give you that point, but the fact is even in the early days that was not the intent at Airbus or anywhere else
But if you made a critical reading (reading between the lines) you will quickly inform you of the possibilities and prospects (proposed) has not said or written about the automation
If you've read (closed and rigid mind) about the beginning of automation in industries .. it was written that it would relieve the worker of the painful and repetitive work and more leisure was assured ... he was not told at the time that this would send workers to unemployement
A this time some had already foreseen the danger (read between lines)
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Sorry, but "autotrim" is not an AB idea. It's much older than that. Concorde had an auotrim system, and apart from having to do some clever tweaking during flight testing, it never really was a problem. But then the Concorde pitch trim had the "bicycle bell", so you knew when it was doing its job.
CJ's well aware of this, but the initial sidestick development and testing was done on a Concorde airframe. Someone kindly provided me the documentation, but I lack the requisite French to read it thoroughly. Maybe one day...
@jcj - This is only my opinion, but if someone decided that by, as you say "reading between the lines", then they got it wrong. The only training cost that the FBW Airbus series was designed to reduce was *conversion between types* by keeping a virtually identical flight-deck layout throughout the range.
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Hi,
If you read all with a closed or rigid mind .. of course you will find not a word about automation was designed to replace the pilot in the cockpit
But if you made a critical reading (reading between the lines) you will quickly inform you of the possibilities and prospects (proposed) has not said or written about the automation
If you read all with a closed or rigid mind .. of course you will find not a word about automation was designed to replace the pilot in the cockpit
But if you made a critical reading (reading between the lines) you will quickly inform you of the possibilities and prospects (proposed) has not said or written about the automation
The higher level A/P flight-director etc. - maybe. But, they were never intended to be a safety-critical must-be-working item, if they have become a crutch for less well trained pilots who cannot fly without them, that is operational failure (and cost cutting at expense of safety).
The FBW is more interesting. Look at the AB control law and particularly the way it is path-stable - it was designed to reduce pilot workload in hand-flying. Why spend effort on that if the intention is to get rid of the pilot ?
The real irony of course is that since AB designed this system, it appears that higher level automation SOPs and regulation has all but eliminated hand flying. If designing today, why would you bother reducing workload on a task pilots hardly ever do ?
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The PF had 61 hours over the last 30 days and 368 hours with 18 take-offs and 16 landings over the previous 6 months (more then either the captain or other FO). Obviously he was getting significant "grooming" {looking at take-offs/landings}.
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You're missing the point I made that the yokes of more conventional airliners do not directly control the control surfaces either, and that has been the case since the late '60s.
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Answering a question with another question
These guys rarely fly.
How do you expect them to recover from a stall?
How do you expect them to recover from a stall?
Here's another better question: If this pilot(s) was confused, why should that have happened? Eh?
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Organfreak, FWIW, I have recalled tentative conclusions drawn by others in my post no. 1646 on the “thread 6” in tech log. Briefly, some ATPL’s thought PF confused the status with overspeed.
I was reminded of other accidents, and also by somebody posting earlier, that stressed people can fix on a presumed problem and keep trying to correct it, even when their efforts are unsuccessful – it is a “how the brain works” thing.
I was reminded of other accidents, and also by somebody posting earlier, that stressed people can fix on a presumed problem and keep trying to correct it, even when their efforts are unsuccessful – it is a “how the brain works” thing.
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Well .. reading some stances of the CVR (Otelli book) not published by the BEA is chilling and I understand why the BEA is not happy with this publication
Who can find in these dialogues a bit of professionalism ?
- à 00h54mn37s : PCB : Tu fais le message ou tu veux que je le fasse ? Tu veux que je fasse la première partie ou..." MD : "SID, c'est quoi ? C'est Natal ? puis dix secondes plus tard PCB : "SID c'est à Sal... Oui, c'est ça, SID, c'est Sal. Tu demandes carrément le changement du point d'appui et MD : "Oh oh, ça va pas changer grand-chose pour nous. Pui PCB se rend compte que Sal peut être ouvert en cas d'urgence et à 00h57mn41s : PCB : "Ah merde... Ah ben oui... C'est permis, ils ont raison"
Après une explication des vols ETOPS à une hôtesse venue les voir dans le cockpit pour faire régler la température dans la soute (elle rapportait de la bidoche !), reprise du dialogue
- à O1h05mn32s : MD :"Alors, je leur ai demandé un autre point d'appui... C'est pas compliqué... (incompréhensible)... Réponse de PCB : "Donc, euh, sa réponse , on s'en contente ? MD : "Hein ? et PCB :"On s'en contente de sa réponse ?" MD : "Oh oui... ça m'inquiète pas trop, hein" et PCB insiste : "oui, ben moi non plus... Donc tu lui demandes un changement de point d'appui..." MD : " T'as pas l'air inquiet ?" PCB :" Ce qui est un peu dommage, c'est que tu ne lui as pas demandé son avis... (incompréhensible)... pour trouver un autre point d'appui... Et il te répond : ben non, ce sera comme ça quand même." MD : "C'est pas grave" PCB :"OK , alors on lui envoie les trucs..." MD : "Il est où... la réponse, là... du... Ah tu l'as rentrée." PCB : "Tu pourras la remettre à David... Tu pourras lui dire que... (incompréhensible)..
L'Hôtesse quitte le cockpit à 01h12mn 53s : "Bon, bien, je vous laisse. MD : "Bien, bienà tout à l'heure." L'hôtesse : "A tout à l'heure."
Erreur de MD sur le point où ils doivent appeler le contrôle
- à 01h14mn30s : "Air France 447, on a passé "Femur" à 01h13 minutes , niveau 350... On contacte Atlantico en fréquence HF sur 6349."
réponse du contrôleur de Recife :"Négatif, après "Intol" appelez Atlantico en fréquence HF sur 6349."
A l'appel d'Atlantico, arrivés à Intol à 01h31mn34, le contrôleur de Recife appelle l'avion : "Air france 447 ?" MD à PCB : "On arrive à Intol" puis Puis MD au contrôle :"Air France 447, allez-y ?" Le contrôleur de Recife : "Air France 447, contactez maintenant "Atlantico" sur la fréquence 66195565... (incompréhensible)... fréquence 6535...
réponse de MD :" J'ai compris : 6649 et 5565 et 6535" réponse du contrôleur : "Ce sera 6535 seulement après le point"Tasil" avec Dakar, Air France 447" le contôleur n'a pas remarqué le mauvais collationnement des fréquences
- à 01h56mn16s MD : Euh, qui c'est qui pose, c'est toi ? bon ben, il va prendre ma place.
- à 01h56mn20s : MD :3T'es PL, toi ? réponse immédiate de PCB : "Ouais"
- arrivée de DR dans le cockpit et MD recule son siège pour lui laisser la place
- à 01h59mn32s : MD : "Bon, ça y est ?"
- à 01h59mn38s PCB : "T'asdormi ?" Réponse de DR : "Moyen" puis MD : "T'as dormi, non ?"
- à 01h59mn47s PCB : " Il dit, moyen, moyen, moyen" et DR s'assoit en place gauche
- à 02h00mn08s MD : "Bon allez je me casse." discusion sur les turbulences et la couche et l'impossibilité de monter en raison de la température trop haute (standard + 13) et allusion au contact avec Atlantico
- à 02h01mn20s : PCB : "Le logon a échoué avec Dakar.. On a bien entendu le contact avec le dispatch.
- à 02h01mn22 : PCB à MD : "Tu veux bien nous rappeler les fréquences exactement que ça a donné,s'il te plaît ?"
- à 02h01mnéçs : MD : "Hein ?" et immédiatement PCB : "Les fréquences ? Qui est qui ?
- à 02h01mn31s : MD : "Euh... 6649, 5565 et après c'est 6535.
- à 02h01mn 39s DR : "A partir de "Tasil", c'est 6535 !
Après une explication des vols ETOPS à une hôtesse venue les voir dans le cockpit pour faire régler la température dans la soute (elle rapportait de la bidoche !), reprise du dialogue
- à O1h05mn32s : MD :"Alors, je leur ai demandé un autre point d'appui... C'est pas compliqué... (incompréhensible)... Réponse de PCB : "Donc, euh, sa réponse , on s'en contente ? MD : "Hein ? et PCB :"On s'en contente de sa réponse ?" MD : "Oh oui... ça m'inquiète pas trop, hein" et PCB insiste : "oui, ben moi non plus... Donc tu lui demandes un changement de point d'appui..." MD : " T'as pas l'air inquiet ?" PCB :" Ce qui est un peu dommage, c'est que tu ne lui as pas demandé son avis... (incompréhensible)... pour trouver un autre point d'appui... Et il te répond : ben non, ce sera comme ça quand même." MD : "C'est pas grave" PCB :"OK , alors on lui envoie les trucs..." MD : "Il est où... la réponse, là... du... Ah tu l'as rentrée." PCB : "Tu pourras la remettre à David... Tu pourras lui dire que... (incompréhensible)..
L'Hôtesse quitte le cockpit à 01h12mn 53s : "Bon, bien, je vous laisse. MD : "Bien, bienà tout à l'heure." L'hôtesse : "A tout à l'heure."
Erreur de MD sur le point où ils doivent appeler le contrôle
- à 01h14mn30s : "Air France 447, on a passé "Femur" à 01h13 minutes , niveau 350... On contacte Atlantico en fréquence HF sur 6349."
réponse du contrôleur de Recife :"Négatif, après "Intol" appelez Atlantico en fréquence HF sur 6349."
A l'appel d'Atlantico, arrivés à Intol à 01h31mn34, le contrôleur de Recife appelle l'avion : "Air france 447 ?" MD à PCB : "On arrive à Intol" puis Puis MD au contrôle :"Air France 447, allez-y ?" Le contrôleur de Recife : "Air France 447, contactez maintenant "Atlantico" sur la fréquence 66195565... (incompréhensible)... fréquence 6535...
réponse de MD :" J'ai compris : 6649 et 5565 et 6535" réponse du contrôleur : "Ce sera 6535 seulement après le point"Tasil" avec Dakar, Air France 447" le contôleur n'a pas remarqué le mauvais collationnement des fréquences
- à 01h56mn16s MD : Euh, qui c'est qui pose, c'est toi ? bon ben, il va prendre ma place.
- à 01h56mn20s : MD :3T'es PL, toi ? réponse immédiate de PCB : "Ouais"
- arrivée de DR dans le cockpit et MD recule son siège pour lui laisser la place
- à 01h59mn32s : MD : "Bon, ça y est ?"
- à 01h59mn38s PCB : "T'asdormi ?" Réponse de DR : "Moyen" puis MD : "T'as dormi, non ?"
- à 01h59mn47s PCB : " Il dit, moyen, moyen, moyen" et DR s'assoit en place gauche
- à 02h00mn08s MD : "Bon allez je me casse." discusion sur les turbulences et la couche et l'impossibilité de monter en raison de la température trop haute (standard + 13) et allusion au contact avec Atlantico
- à 02h01mn20s : PCB : "Le logon a échoué avec Dakar.. On a bien entendu le contact avec le dispatch.
- à 02h01mn22 : PCB à MD : "Tu veux bien nous rappeler les fréquences exactement que ça a donné,s'il te plaît ?"
- à 02h01mnéçs : MD : "Hein ?" et immédiatement PCB : "Les fréquences ? Qui est qui ?
- à 02h01mn31s : MD : "Euh... 6649, 5565 et après c'est 6535.
- à 02h01mn 39s DR : "A partir de "Tasil", c'est 6535 !
Drain Bamaged
Genuine question.
Is it Mr Otelly who did this CVR trimming !? Sort of the other way around of the BEA, leaving only the crap talking in the CVR or is it you ?
No quotation for example of what the Captain is actually saying for is briefing when he leaves. Just a notation about it.
While making sure to leave for all to read "Bon allez je me casse"
Is it Mr Otelly who did this CVR trimming !? Sort of the other way around of the BEA, leaving only the crap talking in the CVR or is it you ?
No quotation for example of what the Captain is actually saying for is briefing when he leaves. Just a notation about it.
discusion sur les turbulences et la couche et l'impossibilité de monter en raison de la température trop haute (standard + 13) et allusion au contact avec Atlantico
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Genuine question.
Is it Mr Otelly who did this CVR trimming !? Sort of the other way around of the BEA, leaving only the crap talking in the CVR or is it you ?
No quotation for example of what the Captain is actually saying for is briefing when he leaves. Just a notation about it.
Is it Mr Otelly who did this CVR trimming !? Sort of the other way around of the BEA, leaving only the crap talking in the CVR or is it you ?
No quotation for example of what the Captain is actually saying for is briefing when he leaves. Just a notation about it.
Well seem's that MD (captain) tell no more during the briefing (words in Otelli book + words in BEA preliminary report N°3)
In fact the briefing is made by the two copilots .. the captain "assist" .. likely a spectator ...
In all those chatters between pilots I don't perceive (my feeling) any signs of authority from the captain MD
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English translation
Could someone possibly translate the excerpt from this 'unofficial' CVR publication into english - for those philistines like myself who never had the privilege of learning French, please?
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There is absolutley no need to translate this. It has nothing to do with the accident and the information value of the discussion is zero. They are just casually talking. Which is not uncommon during a flight of 12 hrs or more. What professionalism? Do you expect a crew to sit on their mouth for all this time? Obviously you have never visited a cockpit on a long haul flight.
I agree that the hand over briefing is somewhat minimal but in reality you don't need to talk a lot (except a CRM question: "Did you sleep?" - "mediocrly" he replies, which means not really). Specially if it is the captain who has to be briefed, and nothing has happened, there isn't anything to be briefed except "everything is normal". You see with one glance the point you are flying to, the state of the Satcom and of course also the technical condition of the aircraft.
This is again a useless discussion to find answer in areas where they aren't, for the reason that they don't understand the real ones.
I agree that the hand over briefing is somewhat minimal but in reality you don't need to talk a lot (except a CRM question: "Did you sleep?" - "mediocrly" he replies, which means not really). Specially if it is the captain who has to be briefed, and nothing has happened, there isn't anything to be briefed except "everything is normal". You see with one glance the point you are flying to, the state of the Satcom and of course also the technical condition of the aircraft.
This is again a useless discussion to find answer in areas where they aren't, for the reason that they don't understand the real ones.
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The "real issues" here are readily apparent and surprisingly simple...
1) the PF completely failed in following SOP for the event. Instead of flying pitch and power when confronted with unreliable airspeed he commanded the aircraft to climb. Beyond that initial failure he maintained maximum control surface deflection (full back stick) for most of the descent.
2) The PM failed to exercise command authority even though he was the senior pilot on the flight deck and was well aware that the PF was not handling the situation correctly.
3) The Captain did not assume command upon return the the flight deck in any meaningful way.
1) the PF completely failed in following SOP for the event. Instead of flying pitch and power when confronted with unreliable airspeed he commanded the aircraft to climb. Beyond that initial failure he maintained maximum control surface deflection (full back stick) for most of the descent.
2) The PM failed to exercise command authority even though he was the senior pilot on the flight deck and was well aware that the PF was not handling the situation correctly.
3) The Captain did not assume command upon return the the flight deck in any meaningful way.
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Obviously you have never visited a cockpit on a long haul flight.
BTW .. you will be outlaw to allow me in the cockpit
Those chatters are maybe not DIRECTLY tied with the accident .. but the tone (if you read between the lines) used between the pilots show a real lack of authority and discernment of MD (captain)
Lack of CRM .. already before the event
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SLF.
Sorry. You are quite out of line. You have a pov, yes, but let's look at it more closely.
1. You are a line pilot flying for AF? How did you become so adamantly conversant with SOPs?
2. Explain how you have conclusively linked "Senior" with "Command"?
3. Captain issued orders that were followed. Smells like "Command" to me.
Defense? Because of your powerful and irrefutable pronouncements, I am interested in the trail of thought that produced them.
Seriously.
Sorry. You are quite out of line. You have a pov, yes, but let's look at it more closely.
1. You are a line pilot flying for AF? How did you become so adamantly conversant with SOPs?
2. Explain how you have conclusively linked "Senior" with "Command"?
3. Captain issued orders that were followed. Smells like "Command" to me.
Defense? Because of your powerful and irrefutable pronouncements, I am interested in the trail of thought that produced them.
Seriously.
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Lyman,
Are you a pilot of any sort, meaning have you solo'd any airplane...
I think that the answer is no from what you've written. My observations here have nothing at all to do with any given airlines "SOP". Things like unreliable airspeed can happen on any type of plane. Learning how to deal with these types of issues is a fundamental aspect of learning to fly. From what I can recall no mention of any checklist or procedural conversation has been highlighted.
The immediate response to unreliable air speed is to fly pitch and power and then once the plane is stable the PM can begin to sort out the details. The PM knew the PF was not responding correctly but i'm unaware of him initiating a formal scan related dialog. Meaning at no point did he read off pitch and power to the PF...which may very well been all that was needed to put the PF's head back in the game.
Aircraft law is derived from admiralty law. On any plane or ship there is always a chain of command. with the captain off the flight deck the PM was the senior staff member on the flight deck and unless otherwise specifically stated command authority was delegated by the captain he legally was in command of the airplane until the captains return.
By the time the captain returned it is entirely possible that the airframe was no longer recoverable. However from what dialog has been released and conversations here the Captains actions were entirely incorrect. He was unable to clearly see the PF's inputs or instruments. By relieving the PF and having the PM assume control during the brief transition he would have accomplished two things. The PM seems much more capable and coherent so he would have gotten a much better situation update in the 15 or seconds it would take to strap in and do a scan. He could then assume control and have both the best experience level and most accurate information.
It is inconceivable to me that the airplane crashed without the captain at the controls.
My comments needed no defense simply because they are so self evident and fundamental. Any pilot candidate would be fully expected to know that you fly pitch and power under those initial circumstances as well as understanding that the 1st step in unusual attitude recovery is to unload the air frame. It was fundamentally incorrect for the PF to apply any back stick pressure beyond what was required to level the airplane. The moment he began to climb the PM knew it was a mistake and failed to exercise his legal obligation to take command of the aircraft until the captains return...period end of story.
Are you a pilot of any sort, meaning have you solo'd any airplane...
I think that the answer is no from what you've written. My observations here have nothing at all to do with any given airlines "SOP". Things like unreliable airspeed can happen on any type of plane. Learning how to deal with these types of issues is a fundamental aspect of learning to fly. From what I can recall no mention of any checklist or procedural conversation has been highlighted.
The immediate response to unreliable air speed is to fly pitch and power and then once the plane is stable the PM can begin to sort out the details. The PM knew the PF was not responding correctly but i'm unaware of him initiating a formal scan related dialog. Meaning at no point did he read off pitch and power to the PF...which may very well been all that was needed to put the PF's head back in the game.
Aircraft law is derived from admiralty law. On any plane or ship there is always a chain of command. with the captain off the flight deck the PM was the senior staff member on the flight deck and unless otherwise specifically stated command authority was delegated by the captain he legally was in command of the airplane until the captains return.
By the time the captain returned it is entirely possible that the airframe was no longer recoverable. However from what dialog has been released and conversations here the Captains actions were entirely incorrect. He was unable to clearly see the PF's inputs or instruments. By relieving the PF and having the PM assume control during the brief transition he would have accomplished two things. The PM seems much more capable and coherent so he would have gotten a much better situation update in the 15 or seconds it would take to strap in and do a scan. He could then assume control and have both the best experience level and most accurate information.
It is inconceivable to me that the airplane crashed without the captain at the controls.
My comments needed no defense simply because they are so self evident and fundamental. Any pilot candidate would be fully expected to know that you fly pitch and power under those initial circumstances as well as understanding that the 1st step in unusual attitude recovery is to unload the air frame. It was fundamentally incorrect for the PF to apply any back stick pressure beyond what was required to level the airplane. The moment he began to climb the PM knew it was a mistake and failed to exercise his legal obligation to take command of the aircraft until the captains return...period end of story.