AF447 final crew conversation - Thread No. 1
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When the airbus reverts to direct law, it is an airplane again, just like the DC-9 (I'm old Northwest, too).
The problem Air France had was that bad data from frozen pitot/static sensors drove the autothrust and normal law protections the wrong way.
I'd like to think I would sense the deck angle, check the ground speed on the data/gps page, determine my airspeed input is wrong, disable the automation, and recover from the stall in the middle of the night over the middle of the ocean in thunderstorms. I'm ready to face that challenge now, with help from the Air France experience.
The airbus method does a lot for you, but you always need to be ready to turn off the magic and fly the airplane. When you turn off the automation, she'll do anything a DC-9 would do.
The problem Air France had was that bad data from frozen pitot/static sensors drove the autothrust and normal law protections the wrong way.
I'd like to think I would sense the deck angle, check the ground speed on the data/gps page, determine my airspeed input is wrong, disable the automation, and recover from the stall in the middle of the night over the middle of the ocean in thunderstorms. I'm ready to face that challenge now, with help from the Air France experience.
The airbus method does a lot for you, but you always need to be ready to turn off the magic and fly the airplane. When you turn off the automation, she'll do anything a DC-9 would do.
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TT, absolutely correct & controlled contribution when it might be tempting to be a bit more colourful! I flew 73,75,& 76 before going A340. Hated the latter. You do not fly the plane. All autopilots out, no, you are NOT connected to the controls. You are still connected to computors. Tough, high speed conditions gave us those lovely things called PCU's. Lose all hydraulics in the 73 & you really were connected to the contol surfaces. It was called Manual Reversion. Very tough to fly , especially with an engine out. 75 made me scared when I read the clear statement in Mr Boeing's manual..."There is no manual reversion". Three hydraulic systems and a RAT made it unnecessary. 76 was the same. Forced on to the A340 made me rethink my career. Horrible. It flew me. Even when esteemed Instructor told me once, "Knock it all out & fly it like any other plane" ! Oh yeah, side stick was kinda fun & the plane did go where I pointed it. But, no thrust levers ! I mean they are there but they do not move. Going way off thread here though. I am a bit late into this discussion but I did notice pure Airbus pilots think through the automatics. Not their fault, they are trained that way & recurrently tested that way. Boeing pilots think like stick & rudder men. The AF pilots were faced with very confusing indications but it disappoints me to note (like a previous contribution) that 'Flight with unreliable airspeed' manouvres were not followed or were not properly understood.Oh, glad to be back on the Boeing.
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With that caveat out of the way my personal feeling is that the entire airbus concept is the single worst development in professional aviation. It unquestioningly takes flying to the lowest common denominator and I think that AF447 has to be taken as the wake up call.
A question I'd like to ask you, and I throw it out in general too - and I'd like an honest answer. If the FBW technology used in the Airbus was developed in the USA, would you feel so strongly about disliking it?
Maybe you forgot that this string is about the crews final conversation. Some of these readers may not be interested in pedantic and anal analysis. That's over in the tech log.
My generalizations regarding the way an Airbus is hand flown are correct.
NOTHING you say or write will change the FACT that the SS does not directly control the control surfaces in other than direct law.
I've flown cable controlled, steam gauge, jets for thousands of hours and I assure you that an lateral yoke deflection in a Lear does not result in a roll rate; it results in an aileron deflection which results in a roll rate depending on the airspeed and other factors. Likewise, yoke movements in pitch do not directly result in load factor changes; yoke movements in a Lear result in elevator movements which result in load factor changes depending on A/S etc.
Of course there's a difference between commanding roll rate directly and controlling ailerons directly, but of those Airbus pilots without an axe to grind who have controlled the thing in Normal, Alternate and Direct, the vast majority state that the difference is not that pronounced, and very easy to get used to - I think someone a long time ago compared it to losing power steering in a car, the only difference being that it was slightly more sensitive as opposed to more heavy.
I am NOT anti Airbus FBW. I'm anti the continual statements to the effect that it flys like any other airplane. It does not, and most anyone who actually operates one understands that fact.
I do have a question for you. Why is it that old dogs like myself, reared on the likes of DC9s, (NWA crews for example) manage to maintain control of UAS A330s in the ITCZ while the only airframe lost was flown by Airbus only pilots? BTW, everyone who's read more than my last three posts knows that I defend the pilots and am insulted by those who want to blame this accident on them.
As an aside - the DC-9 is one thing, but Douglas made the mistake of trying to keep things too simple when they made their first widebody and disregarded some basic mechanical and physics principles - with the result that the DC-10 became notorious and the company eventually ceased to exist in its own right. Plenty of pilots loved the DC-10 when she was working, but when she developed a fault she could, and often would bite you badly.
75 made me scared when I read the clear statement in Mr Boeing's manual..."There is no manual reversion". Three hydraulic systems and a RAT made it unnecessary. 76 was the same.
Going way off thread here though. I am a bit late into this discussion but I did notice pure Airbus pilots think through the automatics. Not their fault, they are trained that way & recurrently tested that way. Boeing pilots think like stick & rudder men.
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Of course there's a difference between commanding roll rate directly and controlling ailerons directly, but of those Airbus pilots without an axe to grind who have controlled the thing in Normal, Alternate and Direct, the vast majority state that the difference is not that pronounced, and very easy to get used to - I think someone a long time ago compared it to losing power steering in a car, the only difference being that it was slightly more sensitive as opposed to more heavy
If you wanted an actual comparison you'd have a car where your steering wheel would not be connected at all to the steering rack, and the "steering assist" would modulate your steering inputs according to speed. If it were to fail, probably 99% of the time it wouldn't make a difference and you wouldn't notice - except if you were to say drive on the autobahn at 250km/h and fail to adjust your steering wheel deflection to your speed and gallantly drive off the road into the side barrier thinking "what the hell just happened".
Originally Posted by TTex600
I may be technically incorrect about the exact function of the FMGC, but that doesn't matter. My point is that the SS's are not connected to the controls, the SS's are connected only to computers; a point that you yourself concede.
Originally Posted by TTex600
I do have a question for you. Why is it that old dogs like myself, reared on the likes of DC9s, (NWA crews for example) manage to maintain control of UAS A330s in the ITCZ while the only airframe lost was flown by Airbus only pilots?
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@Shorrick Mk2:
I believe it was someone describing the way it *feels*, not the way it *works*. It's easy to mistake one for the other, especially given the misunderstandings as to what constitutes "direct control" of the flying surfaces. I've even read articles where people assume that the controls on the B777 are directly connected when they most certainly are not.
I believe it was someone describing the way it *feels*, not the way it *works*. It's easy to mistake one for the other, especially given the misunderstandings as to what constitutes "direct control" of the flying surfaces. I've even read articles where people assume that the controls on the B777 are directly connected when they most certainly are not.
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Dozy,
I could care less where the aircraft is made and it's not the technology....it's the core concept. Conceptually the Airbus does everything possible to remove aviator from aviation....right down to the name....BUS. In effect it trivializes the pilots and equates them with being a bus driver. Accordingly many are now paid like one.
TTex,
This is the core of my question/concern. My understanding is that the stall itself is a direct result of the PF's initial actions. The plane was literally flown into a stall. The elevator trim was a direct result of the pilots continued back pressure on the SS. So this creates two issues for me...
1) Completely incorrect initial response to a known issue resulting in loss of control.
2) Continued application of SS appears to be a lack of system knowledge on two fronts. Once a nose up condition is achieved (regardless of the correctness) continued back pressure is incorrect. Beyond that the maximum deflection wound the trim up all the way. Should not the PF be aware of the effect of this pressure??
To me the "autotrim" in response to stick input is another horrific idea from AB. Under manual control the only thing trimming an airplane ought to be the person flying it.
My perspective is that the PF was attempting to abdicate his responsibility to actually fly the plane and mistakenly expecting the computers on the airbus to figure things out for him. A pilot "flys" the plane with control inputs...the moment the input achieves the desired effect on attitude the stick is returned to neutral until additional input is required. As a general rule any individual deflection is limited to a relatively small range of the sticks total movement range.
How does one pilot judge anothers "airmanship"....isn't it via the deftness of his control inputs. Generally newer pilots tend to over control an aircraft via larger control movements leading to the need to "correct" their own inputs and creating a self induced scenario where they are behind the airplane.
So how does a professional pilot with thousands of hours dial in such a massive sustained control input and for what reason???
I could care less where the aircraft is made and it's not the technology....it's the core concept. Conceptually the Airbus does everything possible to remove aviator from aviation....right down to the name....BUS. In effect it trivializes the pilots and equates them with being a bus driver. Accordingly many are now paid like one.
TTex,
This is the core of my question/concern. My understanding is that the stall itself is a direct result of the PF's initial actions. The plane was literally flown into a stall. The elevator trim was a direct result of the pilots continued back pressure on the SS. So this creates two issues for me...
1) Completely incorrect initial response to a known issue resulting in loss of control.
2) Continued application of SS appears to be a lack of system knowledge on two fronts. Once a nose up condition is achieved (regardless of the correctness) continued back pressure is incorrect. Beyond that the maximum deflection wound the trim up all the way. Should not the PF be aware of the effect of this pressure??
To me the "autotrim" in response to stick input is another horrific idea from AB. Under manual control the only thing trimming an airplane ought to be the person flying it.
My perspective is that the PF was attempting to abdicate his responsibility to actually fly the plane and mistakenly expecting the computers on the airbus to figure things out for him. A pilot "flys" the plane with control inputs...the moment the input achieves the desired effect on attitude the stick is returned to neutral until additional input is required. As a general rule any individual deflection is limited to a relatively small range of the sticks total movement range.
How does one pilot judge anothers "airmanship"....isn't it via the deftness of his control inputs. Generally newer pilots tend to over control an aircraft via larger control movements leading to the need to "correct" their own inputs and creating a self induced scenario where they are behind the airplane.
So how does a professional pilot with thousands of hours dial in such a massive sustained control input and for what reason???
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Dozy,
I could care less where the aircraft is made and it's not the technology....it's the core concept. Conceptually the Airbus does everything possible to remove aviator from aviation....right down to the name....BUS. In effect it trivializes the pilots and equates them with being a bus driver. Accordingly many are now paid like one.
I could care less where the aircraft is made and it's not the technology....it's the core concept. Conceptually the Airbus does everything possible to remove aviator from aviation....right down to the name....BUS. In effect it trivializes the pilots and equates them with being a bus driver. Accordingly many are now paid like one.
The use of the term "Airbus" was in fact originally a design specification for BEA (meaning British European Airways, not the French accident investigation branch), and this goes all the way back to 1965. See DeHavilland's HS.134 design to meet this specification below (and in the process note how much it looks like the eventual configuration of the B757 - now remember this was drawn up in *1967*.)
British Airliners 'Nearly Get It Right' Shock!
The concept is not therefore about "remov[ing] the aviator from aviation" and turning him into a bus driver - although let's be honest, the glamour was fading from the airline profession even by the mid-'70s, and Ronnie's union-busting antics meant that the only way pay and conditions could go from the '80s onwards was down. In fact the aviators who were instrumental in designing the Airbus FBW system would probably be mortally offended by that insinuation, and I for one wouldn't blame them.
"Airbus" was simply (at the time) a convenient umbrella name for the collaboration of European aviation companies - nothing more to it than that.
Anyways, back to the topic at hand...
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Originally Posted by Intruder
.
I hope you wait forever. CVR and DFDR data were NOT designed for public release!
I hope you wait forever. CVR and DFDR data were NOT designed for public release!
see, NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board and you'll find that every report includes a complete CVR transcript.
Last edited by TTex600; 3rd Nov 2011 at 15:25.
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Originally Posted by Clandestino
Interim 2 lists 37 UAS events in 330/340 that ended completely uneventfully (pages 50-53 & 99-102). Nowhere is the experience of the crews involved listed so your statement is not based on BEA reports. Would you be so kind to provide your source(s)?
We have one UAS event that resulted in a airframe loss. AF447. If I read interim 3 correctly, the AF447 PF had no other significant non Airbus experience. Therefore the only UAS that resulted in an accident was piloted by Airbus only pilots. It is entirely possible that the other 37 were Airbus only crews, but that doesn't change the fact that the accident pilot was Airbus experienced only.
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Originally Posted by Dozy
Originally Posted by TTex600
My generalizations regarding the way an Airbus is hand flown are correct.
Quote:
Originally Posted by TTex600
NOTHING you say or write will change the FACT that the SS does not directly control the control surfaces in other than direct law.
I never mentioned autopilot turn control in a conventional airliner. I stated this in post #613: "As long as the FBW is in normal law, the SS is nothing more than a autopilot input device. Adding a bank request through the SS is the same as turning the heading select knob on the flight control panel. Both actions result in the autopilot turning the aircraft". Nowhere in that statement did I in any way compare the SS to an conventional (your word - which I find quite ironic)autopilot turn control.
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Dozy,
There is nothing emotive or knee-jerk in my reasoning. The simple reality is that aviation is unforgiving and 99.9% wont get it done on the day you need the other .01%. Military aviation training comes with a sustained and quantifiable loss rate. The bottom line is that real mission capability requires realistic training and that leads to fatalities.
"Old School" professional pilots tended to have a military pedigree and while that might entail other issues by and large they had a very well qualified "stick and rudder" skill set.
The philosophical move away from aviation skill set to a sophisticated software designed to minimize or eliminate "pilot error" has led to less and less qualified pilots overall IMO. Flying will always entail risk and anything that minimizes a pilots actual ability to handle that other .01% will eventually come into play. The moment that "automatics" went from being an aid to the pilot and became a replacement aviation went backward 50 years.
There is nothing emotive or knee-jerk in my reasoning. The simple reality is that aviation is unforgiving and 99.9% wont get it done on the day you need the other .01%. Military aviation training comes with a sustained and quantifiable loss rate. The bottom line is that real mission capability requires realistic training and that leads to fatalities.
"Old School" professional pilots tended to have a military pedigree and while that might entail other issues by and large they had a very well qualified "stick and rudder" skill set.
The philosophical move away from aviation skill set to a sophisticated software designed to minimize or eliminate "pilot error" has led to less and less qualified pilots overall IMO. Flying will always entail risk and anything that minimizes a pilots actual ability to handle that other .01% will eventually come into play. The moment that "automatics" went from being an aid to the pilot and became a replacement aviation went backward 50 years.
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PF's Experience
TTex600:
Responding more to a previous post that I can't find right now, one that called PF "very experienced," from the first Interim Report at
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...90601e1.en.pdf
is an abridged paste of his experience:
Flying hours:
total: 2,936
on type: 807
PNF had approximately 4.5 times as much type experience.
If I read interim 3 correctly, the AF447 PF had no other significant non Airbus experience.
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...90601e1.en.pdf
is an abridged paste of his experience:
Flying hours:
total: 2,936
on type: 807
PNF had approximately 4.5 times as much type experience.
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I never mentioned autopilot turn control in a conventional airliner. I stated this in post #613: "As long as the FBW is in normal law, the SS is nothing more than a autopilot input device.
Adding a bank request through the SS is the same as turning the heading select knob on the flight control panel. Both actions result in the autopilot turning the aircraft".
Nowhere in that statement did I in any way compare the SS to an conventional (your word - which I find quite ironic)autopilot turn control.
I'm not trying to annoy you or start an argument here, I'm just pointing out that you have a fundamental misconception as to how the Airbus control and autoflight systems are implemented.
The philosophical move away from aviation skill set to a sophisticated software designed to minimize or eliminate "pilot error" has led to less and less qualified pilots overall IMO. Flying will always entail risk and anything that minimizes a pilots actual ability to handle that other .01% will eventually come into play. The moment that "automatics" went from being an aid to the pilot and became a replacement aviation went backward 50 years.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 3rd Nov 2011 at 17:36.
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IIRC (it was a long time back), "airbus" in those early days was a generic term we used for widebody-shorthaul-twin designs in general, until "Airbus" snapped up the term and made it a trade mark.
To me the "autotrim" in response to stick input is another horrific idea from AB.