Originally Posted by
SLFinAZ
I recognize that my views are fundamental not professional in the sense that my actual first hand experience is limited to basic airman-ship (152/172) vs flying more complex aircraft.
I've never flown anything more complex than a DHC Chupmunk, and that was 15 years ago, not to mention heavily supervised! All opinions here are usually welcome, that's one of the reasons I like it.
With that caveat out of the way my personal feeling is that the entire airbus concept is the single worst development in professional aviation. It unquestioningly takes flying to the lowest common denominator and I think that AF447 has to be taken as the wake up call.
Why do you think that? If you're referring to the reliance on autopilot from climb-out to finals then you've got the wrong target. The A300 series did pioneer the use of digital computers in flight management systems, but it was the B757 and B767 that made the technology mainstream. These systems are completely distinct and separate from the FBW aspect.
A question I'd like to ask you, and I throw it out in general too - and I'd like an honest answer. If the FBW technology used in the Airbus was developed in the USA, would you feel so strongly about disliking it?
Originally Posted by
TTex600
Dozy, does it disturb you that someone such as myself actually flys the Bus? I obviously don't know much about flying it or anything else.
Not at all, as long as you're willing to learn more about how the thing works (and possibly lose some of the preconceptions in the process), and the same is true about any line pilot on any airliner. The fact is that given the amount of off-base commentary on the Airbus FBW technology and how it relates to other airliners (slowjet's post is a good case in point), it seems that some B757 and B767 pilots (not to mention those on the B777) are completely unaware as to just how much the computers were tied into their aircraft from the outset.
Maybe you forgot that this string is about the crews final conversation. Some of these readers may not be interested in pedantic and anal analysis. That's over in the tech log.
I'm well aware, but as long as the commentary demonstrates a misunderstanding of the concepts and technology involved, as well as a knee-jerk dislike of computers in aviation (including the false idea that Airbus was alone in pushing the technology) then someone has to make it clear, and it might as well be me.
My generalizations regarding the way an Airbus is hand flown are correct.
No they are not. The amount of control the sidestick gives you is *way* in excess of what the autopilot turn control in a conventional airliner gives you.
NOTHING you say or write will change the FACT that the SS does not directly control the control surfaces in other than direct law.
You're missing the point I made that the yokes of more conventional airliners do not directly control the control surfaces either, and that has been the case since the late '60s.
I've flown cable controlled, steam gauge, jets for thousands of hours and I assure you that an lateral yoke deflection in a Lear does not result in a roll rate; it results in an aileron deflection which results in a roll rate depending on the airspeed and other factors. Likewise, yoke movements in pitch do not directly result in load factor changes; yoke movements in a Lear result in elevator movements which result in load factor changes depending on A/S etc.
This is true, but you cannot make an aircraft the size of a DC-10, B767 or indeed an A330 without sacrificing that directness of control, simply because the surfaces are too large and powerful to be moved by muscle force alone. Slowjet is correct when he says that even the little B737 was an absolute nightmare to control under manual reversion - which was why you had hydraulic assist. When the widebodies came along, they were hydraulic only, because muscle power could not move those surfaces *at all*.
Of course there's a difference between commanding roll rate directly and controlling ailerons directly, but of those Airbus pilots without an axe to grind who have controlled the thing in Normal, Alternate and Direct, the vast majority state that the difference is not that pronounced, and very easy to get used to - I think someone a long time ago compared it to losing power steering in a car, the only difference being that it was slightly more sensitive as opposed to more heavy.
I am NOT anti Airbus FBW. I'm anti the continual statements to the effect that it flys like any other airplane. It does not, and most anyone who actually operates one understands that fact.
Would the addition "more-or-less" help there? The fact is that it is controlled by exactly the same flight surfaces as any other airliner, you have speedbrakes to slow down and disrupt lift, flaps and slats as high-lift devices and tricycle landing gear to get 'er on and off the ground. That the connection to the ailerons and elevators uses a system that's marginally smarter than the old Q-feel systems is a difference, but in the long run it's not really such a big one.
I do have a question for you. Why is it that old dogs like myself, reared on the likes of DC9s, (NWA crews for example) manage to maintain control of UAS A330s in the ITCZ while the only airframe lost was flown by Airbus only pilots? BTW, everyone who's read more than my last three posts knows that I defend the pilots and am insulted by those who want to blame this accident on them.
If you can point me to anywhere I've blamed the pilots I'd be happy to concede, but I'm pretty sure I've done no such thing. Given that of the 30-odd UAS incidents that occurred - not to mention the thousands of safe flights that transit the ITCZ every year (many of which are on FBW Airbuses), only one ended up in an accident, don't you think you're overgeneralising a bit there? If you're saying that airlines have skimped on training because of the presence of these new technologies - which, remember, are not solely Airbus's domain - then that is a question that the airline training departments must answer, and for what it's worth I think it is AF's training department that has the most questions to answer in the case of this accident.
As an aside - the DC-9 is one thing, but Douglas made the mistake of trying to keep things too simple when they made their first widebody and disregarded some basic mechanical and physics principles - with the result that the DC-10 became notorious and the company eventually ceased to exist in its own right. Plenty of pilots loved the DC-10 when she was working, but when she developed a fault she could, and often would bite you badly.
Originally Posted by
slowjet
You do not fly the plane. All autopilots out, no, you are NOT connected to the controls. You are still connected to computors.
On the B757 you were connected to an electronic feel unit hooked up to the hydraulics. It may have felt like you were directly connected, but you weren't.
75 made me scared when I read the clear statement in Mr Boeing's manual..."There is no manual reversion". Three hydraulic systems and a RAT made it unnecessary. 76 was the same.
If you want to see what happens when the pitot tubes or static ports are blocked on a 757, I suggest you look up the Birgenair and Aeroperu 757 crashes respectively. The computers were *heavily* tied in to the warning systems on those aircraft.
Going way off thread here though. I am a bit late into this discussion but I did notice pure Airbus pilots think through the automatics. Not their fault, they are trained that way & recurrently tested that way. Boeing pilots think like stick & rudder men.
Massive, *massive* overgeneralisation. You have only to look at the posts made by Airbus pilots on the Tech Log threads (though admittedly that would take a while) to see that you're incorrect there. Posters to look out for include PJ2, Lemurian, HazelNuts39 among others.