AF447 final crew conversation - Thread No. 1
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Looks like nothing to do with Airbus and not the first time ?
Originally Posted by Bearfoil
MASTER CAUTION. CAVALRY CHARGE. PITCH DARK. TURBULENCE. DUFF SPEEDS. HARPY F/O (imo). (DOES he have a screen?)
OK, heroes, what do YOU do?
OK, heroes, what do YOU do?
However, as a regular, boring, normal but experienced 320 series person, I'll tell you what I and I think everyone else would do (assuming at high altitude).
1. When the A/P drops out, you read the FMAs. This normally tells you what failed, and what you are left with. Very important, since it might influence step 2 (if you have thrust lock for example, or -FD2).
2. Ensure I have control, by possibly getting manual thrust. Fly wings level at my memorised numbers: 2.5/82.5. Say them out loud "2.5, 82.5". Easy to remember. Your type may vary, but for any modern jet it will be about 2.5 and most, but not all, of the thrust.
3. Start the diagnosis. A good diagnosis will normally lead to a good decision. Ask for the GPS monitor page to get height and speed trend, and the QRH for some more accurate pitch and power. Continue the diagnosis until you know which instruments are good. Try to ignore the dinging from the ECAM, until you are ready to draw it into your diagnosis. Consider the BUSS.
4. Make the goal a safe descent to get out of the high altitude flight problem area. Something like FL250. The WXR would be part of this process.
I would not pitch up like a madman. I would not select TOGA thrust, which of course is no different to climb thrust (in a 320), and not much higher than my target thrust. I imagine I would be somewhere between quite apprehensive and scared - but I know that if I stick to basics and work through the problem I should be fine.
I believe holding pitch and power is what all the other crews did, quite successfully, in all the other high altitude UAS events.
And all this talk of "autotrim" makes this discussion sound like week 1 of an Airbus type rating course.
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Hi,
An chronology ...........
AF 447. Significant events.
chronology
Note:
The equipment must operate an aircraft throughout its flight envelope and we accept that there may be failures whose probability of occurrence should not exceed a threshold defined by the level of risk (minor, major, hazardous, catastrophic). In the case of blocked pitot probes, it can not be used in probability because it is not a failure but a fault or defect. The manufacturer and the regulator have the obligation to eliminate all the defects of an airplane.
Before the crash
October 1993:
certification of the A330 with the Rosemount Pitot probe P / N 0851GR. DGAC and Airbus made a number of impasses:
Impasse 1: the JAR 25 requires that the equipment of an aircraft operate in all foreseeable conditions [1309 (a)] and recommends the vulnerability assessment of the Pitot probes to ice crystals and test their operation in these conditions [ACJ 25.1419.4]. DGAC and Airbus has failed to establish the proper functioning of the Pitot probes in the presence of ice crystals in the certification of the A 330.
Impasse 2: the JAR 25 requires that an alarm "LOCK PITOT" is available to drivers * 1309 (c) +. This alarm does not exist.
Impasse 3: JAR 25 requires that the alarm works as a dropout the incidence is higher than the value at which the alarm occurred * 207 +. For the A 330, the manufacturer has provided that when the velocity measurements of the three ADR is less than 60 kt, the values of incidence of the three ADR are invalid and the stall alarm is then ineffective.
December 1995:
TFU 34.13.00.005. Airbus made the finding of a lack of certification for Pitot probes in the presence of ice crystals and start the development of the probe Goodrich P / N 0851HL. This document certifies that the case of inconsistency rates were measured in the A340 fleet of Air France at that time.
August 1996:
The NTSB made the following recommendation: Revise the icing certification testing regulation to Ensure That airplanes are Properly Tested for All Conditions in Which They Are Authorized to operate, or are able Otherwise Shown to Be Such of safe flight into conditions. If safe operations Can not Be Demonstrated by the manufacturer, Operational limitations Should Be Imposed in flight to Prohibit Such terms and Flight Crew Should Be Provided With The Means to POSITIVELY determined When They are in icing conditions That Exceed the limits for aircraft certification. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-96-56)
November 1996:
Certification of the probe Goodrich P / N 0851HL
April 1998:
certification of the probe Sextant (Thales) P / N C16195AA. How Sextant Pitot probe
(then Thales) C16195-AA has it been certified by the DGCA in the light of experience Rosemount?
June 1998:
Airbus said that pilot training is not necessary to drop
January 1999:
The BFU recommended changing the certification standards of the Pitot probes.
February 2001:
Implementation of the new procedure "Unreliable AIRSPEED" AD 2001-069 (B) by DGAC
June 2001:
The FAA also requires that new AD 2001-13-13 procedure specifying the risk is out of the flight and that the response to an "unsafe condition"
August 2001:
The DGAC mandates the replacement of the sensor by Rosemount probes
Goodrich and Thales AA by AD 2001-354 (B).
July 2002:
In the ILO 999.0068/02/VHR, Airbus made the observation of defects of the probe Thales (ex
Sextant) P / N C16195AA.
December 2002:
The FAA mandates the replacement of the sensor by Rosemount probes Goodrich and Thales AA stating that the risk is out of the flight and that is the answer to an "unsafe condition"
January 2005:
Thales launches the project "ADELINE" Actual air data equipment IS Composed of a large number of probes and pressure sensors Individual. This equipment Delivers vital parameters for the safety of the aircraft's flight Such as air speed, altitude and angle of attack. The loss of These Data Can cause aircraft crashes Especially in case of probe icing.
August 2006:
Airbus fixed frequency of cleaning probes all visits "C", that is to say, every 21 months. The manufacturer Bombardier has had the same problem on some sensors equipping its DHC-8. Transport Canada responded aggressively by AD CF-
2005-15R1 of 23 June 2008 to impose a cleaning every 600 hours of flight, that is to say every 4 months.
September 2007:
The EASA is the finding of a lack of certification of Pitot probes in a
conference in Seville.
September 2007:
In a Service Bulletin, Airbus recommends but does not require the replacement of the probe by the probe C16195AA Thales Thales C16195BA
August 2008:
Air France decided to replace the AA probe by the probes BA "on failure" by the
NT 34-029
September 2008:
2 ACA Events Company. Airbus recognizes "the difficulty encountered by the crew for a rapid implementation and effective procedure unreliable AIRSPEED and reflects a change checklists"
September 2008:
Air France Airbus expresses its great concern over the numerous cases
inconsistency of measured speeds "as flight safety IS involved"
September / October 2008:
the shortcomings of the probe C16195BA Thales, "which was not designed to
respond to icing problems, "are recognized by Airbus and Air France (TFN Info N ° 5).
September 2008:
The DGAC EASA requests on whether to mandate the replacement of AA by the probes probes BA (issuance of AD)
September 2008:
The VCA offers the publication of an operational refuses to DGCA
November 2008:
Air France simply asks its drivers to be vigilant with a note that does not refer to the procedure to apply and does not reflect the dangerous nature of events. Some drivers do not see it go
March 2009:
Thales confirms the limitations of tests of the Pitot probes in "wind tunnel"
March 2009:
The response to the DGAC EASA that "unsafe condition" is not demonstrated and it is
no need to mandate the replacement of the AA probe.
April 2009:
Air France decided to replace AA Pitot probes by the probes BA and received his first batch in May. 15 precursor events to Air France between May 10, 2008 and June 1, 2009.
9 have been an ASR. Neither BEA nor the DGAC have analyzed the ASR (same for ASR ACA) Generally, an event related to the failure of the Pitot probes were analyzed by the BEA or received followed by DGAC
Note:
BEA and Airbus have identified 32 events related to the failure of the Pitot probes between 2003 and
2009. Must be added those that occurred between 1993 and the replacement of the Rosemount probe (to
AFR in particular) and those that occurred in the A320 fleet. This should go a long way ...
On June 1, 2009 2h10.05, the crew of Flight 447 suddenly recovers its A330 in manual control. Thales Pitot probes are blocked, the indications are inconsistent speed, the autopilot and auto-thrust is disconnected, the flight controls are passed into law ALTERNATE degraded. The computers were in dilapidated meaning "we do not know how, make do." They left the pilot's lack of understanding what was happening.
While control of the aircraft is reduced, the crew must keep it in a very limited flight envelope and deal in a very short period of time, to an incredible number of alarms, some of which are as false as the speeds they have under the eyes. It's an overload, an "unsafe condition".
The A 330 stall and can not be recovered.
228 victims.
After the crash
June 4, 2009:
Airbus reminds pilots to apply the procedure in case of inconsistency of measured velocities. Airbus acknowledged that it be difficult to apply in October 2008 ...
June 9, 2009:
EASA says, "That We confirm the type Airbus A330 Airbus aircraft and All Other kinds are airworthy and safe to operate"
August 10, 2009:
EASA and Airbus conduct emergency (PAD 09-099) to the elimination of the Pitot probe Thales AA. To do this, EASA issues a "airworthiness directive" (AD) by claiming that it is a simple precaution. However, an "airworthiness directive" for a precautionary measure, it does not exist. An "airworthiness directive" provides an answer to an "unsafe condition". When the manufacturer and EASA detect a problem that is not an "unsafe condition" but that requires a response, EASA must issue a SAFETY INFORMATION BULLETIN
(SIB). To remove the pitot probe Thales AA, EASA issued AD and not a one ILS. there
was therefore an "unsafe condition" that required a response before the accident.
August 31, 2009:
EASA began changing the certification standards of the Pitot probes by the diffusion of NPA 2009-08. It is a "safety priority" (page 3 paragraph AI5). The Agency confirms that it has erred in not modifying these standards before the accident. She had made the finding of the necessity of this change in 2007 after the BFU in 1999 and Airbus
1995
September 4, 2009:
Airbus is trying to influence the FAA so that it specifies in the future as AD
removal of the probe AA is a precautionary measure. The FAA does not comply
September 8, 2009:
The FAA conducts emergency disposal of the AA by the Pitot probe AD 2009-18 -
08 indicating that the response to an "unsafe condition"
October 20, 2009:
Air France officials are belatedly measures they deem necessary to remedy the defect of the Pitot probes
November 30, 2009:
EASA NPA proposes 2009.12 with a change in the CS-25. Among these changes, the loss of all information transmission becomes a catastrophic risk
December 17, 2009:
In its report No. 2, the BEA specifies that the inconsistency of the measured velocities is a major risk classified by EASA. But at the time of the accident, the current document CS25 which deals with the certification states that the loss of primary information speed is a risk that the probability of occurrence must be "Extremely Remote". It is a probability that the risk class
"Hazardous".
December 17, 2009:
In its report No. 2, the BEA dare say that the analysis of events related to the blocking of the Pitot probes conducted after the accident showed that the tests for validation of these facilities did not appear not suitable for high-altitude flights. The BEA wants us to believe that the certification standards of the Pitot probes are "appeared" out of date after the accident of June 1, 2009. It is a lie because the BEA can not ignore that this observation was made by Airbus in 1995 by the BFU in 1999 and by EASA in 2007
May 12, 2010:
Airbus amend the procedure for dropping out and recommends the training of pilots
in this area
January 2011:
In No. 11 of "The Airbus Safety Magazine," says Jacques Rosay display in TOGA initial action and the procedure would stall before its amendment, the A330 can make unrecoverable
July 28, 2011:
In a "Safety Information Bulletin," EASA inform operators that the standards used for certification of aircraft in icing conditions do not take into account phenomena such as ice crystals or freezing rain. In practice, this means that the protective equipment against icing (including Pitot probes) may not be suitable for all conditions as they arise. EASA recommends that airlines reviewing existing procedures and if necessary amend them or develop. See the NTSB's recommendation in August 1996.
July 29, 2011:
BEA removes a recommendation on dropping out in its report No. 3. it
appears that the system STALL WARNING the A330 does not comply with JAR 25 207 (c).
My conclusions
EASA and Airbus have ignored an "unsafe condition" generated by the recurrent failure of the Pitot probes, leaving the pilots with the task of ensuring accountability of the "unsafe condition" by applying a checklist while according to its definition, an "unsafe condition" can lead the crew in a physical distress or excessive workload that does not allow it to perform its tasks accurately or to carry out.
DGAC and BEA have left to do, Air France has not taken the necessary steps.
(updated 14/10/2011) HMC
Original document (French , PDF)
http://henrimarnetcornus.20minutes-b...1271654027.pdf
An chronology ...........
AF 447. Significant events.
chronology
Note:
The equipment must operate an aircraft throughout its flight envelope and we accept that there may be failures whose probability of occurrence should not exceed a threshold defined by the level of risk (minor, major, hazardous, catastrophic). In the case of blocked pitot probes, it can not be used in probability because it is not a failure but a fault or defect. The manufacturer and the regulator have the obligation to eliminate all the defects of an airplane.
Before the crash
October 1993:
certification of the A330 with the Rosemount Pitot probe P / N 0851GR. DGAC and Airbus made a number of impasses:
Impasse 1: the JAR 25 requires that the equipment of an aircraft operate in all foreseeable conditions [1309 (a)] and recommends the vulnerability assessment of the Pitot probes to ice crystals and test their operation in these conditions [ACJ 25.1419.4]. DGAC and Airbus has failed to establish the proper functioning of the Pitot probes in the presence of ice crystals in the certification of the A 330.
Impasse 2: the JAR 25 requires that an alarm "LOCK PITOT" is available to drivers * 1309 (c) +. This alarm does not exist.
Impasse 3: JAR 25 requires that the alarm works as a dropout the incidence is higher than the value at which the alarm occurred * 207 +. For the A 330, the manufacturer has provided that when the velocity measurements of the three ADR is less than 60 kt, the values of incidence of the three ADR are invalid and the stall alarm is then ineffective.
December 1995:
TFU 34.13.00.005. Airbus made the finding of a lack of certification for Pitot probes in the presence of ice crystals and start the development of the probe Goodrich P / N 0851HL. This document certifies that the case of inconsistency rates were measured in the A340 fleet of Air France at that time.
August 1996:
The NTSB made the following recommendation: Revise the icing certification testing regulation to Ensure That airplanes are Properly Tested for All Conditions in Which They Are Authorized to operate, or are able Otherwise Shown to Be Such of safe flight into conditions. If safe operations Can not Be Demonstrated by the manufacturer, Operational limitations Should Be Imposed in flight to Prohibit Such terms and Flight Crew Should Be Provided With The Means to POSITIVELY determined When They are in icing conditions That Exceed the limits for aircraft certification. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-96-56)
November 1996:
Certification of the probe Goodrich P / N 0851HL
April 1998:
certification of the probe Sextant (Thales) P / N C16195AA. How Sextant Pitot probe
(then Thales) C16195-AA has it been certified by the DGCA in the light of experience Rosemount?
June 1998:
Airbus said that pilot training is not necessary to drop
January 1999:
The BFU recommended changing the certification standards of the Pitot probes.
February 2001:
Implementation of the new procedure "Unreliable AIRSPEED" AD 2001-069 (B) by DGAC
June 2001:
The FAA also requires that new AD 2001-13-13 procedure specifying the risk is out of the flight and that the response to an "unsafe condition"
August 2001:
The DGAC mandates the replacement of the sensor by Rosemount probes
Goodrich and Thales AA by AD 2001-354 (B).
July 2002:
In the ILO 999.0068/02/VHR, Airbus made the observation of defects of the probe Thales (ex
Sextant) P / N C16195AA.
December 2002:
The FAA mandates the replacement of the sensor by Rosemount probes Goodrich and Thales AA stating that the risk is out of the flight and that is the answer to an "unsafe condition"
January 2005:
Thales launches the project "ADELINE" Actual air data equipment IS Composed of a large number of probes and pressure sensors Individual. This equipment Delivers vital parameters for the safety of the aircraft's flight Such as air speed, altitude and angle of attack. The loss of These Data Can cause aircraft crashes Especially in case of probe icing.
August 2006:
Airbus fixed frequency of cleaning probes all visits "C", that is to say, every 21 months. The manufacturer Bombardier has had the same problem on some sensors equipping its DHC-8. Transport Canada responded aggressively by AD CF-
2005-15R1 of 23 June 2008 to impose a cleaning every 600 hours of flight, that is to say every 4 months.
September 2007:
The EASA is the finding of a lack of certification of Pitot probes in a
conference in Seville.
September 2007:
In a Service Bulletin, Airbus recommends but does not require the replacement of the probe by the probe C16195AA Thales Thales C16195BA
August 2008:
Air France decided to replace the AA probe by the probes BA "on failure" by the
NT 34-029
September 2008:
2 ACA Events Company. Airbus recognizes "the difficulty encountered by the crew for a rapid implementation and effective procedure unreliable AIRSPEED and reflects a change checklists"
September 2008:
Air France Airbus expresses its great concern over the numerous cases
inconsistency of measured speeds "as flight safety IS involved"
September / October 2008:
the shortcomings of the probe C16195BA Thales, "which was not designed to
respond to icing problems, "are recognized by Airbus and Air France (TFN Info N ° 5).
September 2008:
The DGAC EASA requests on whether to mandate the replacement of AA by the probes probes BA (issuance of AD)
September 2008:
The VCA offers the publication of an operational refuses to DGCA
November 2008:
Air France simply asks its drivers to be vigilant with a note that does not refer to the procedure to apply and does not reflect the dangerous nature of events. Some drivers do not see it go
March 2009:
Thales confirms the limitations of tests of the Pitot probes in "wind tunnel"
March 2009:
The response to the DGAC EASA that "unsafe condition" is not demonstrated and it is
no need to mandate the replacement of the AA probe.
April 2009:
Air France decided to replace AA Pitot probes by the probes BA and received his first batch in May. 15 precursor events to Air France between May 10, 2008 and June 1, 2009.
9 have been an ASR. Neither BEA nor the DGAC have analyzed the ASR (same for ASR ACA) Generally, an event related to the failure of the Pitot probes were analyzed by the BEA or received followed by DGAC
Note:
BEA and Airbus have identified 32 events related to the failure of the Pitot probes between 2003 and
2009. Must be added those that occurred between 1993 and the replacement of the Rosemount probe (to
AFR in particular) and those that occurred in the A320 fleet. This should go a long way ...
On June 1, 2009 2h10.05, the crew of Flight 447 suddenly recovers its A330 in manual control. Thales Pitot probes are blocked, the indications are inconsistent speed, the autopilot and auto-thrust is disconnected, the flight controls are passed into law ALTERNATE degraded. The computers were in dilapidated meaning "we do not know how, make do." They left the pilot's lack of understanding what was happening.
While control of the aircraft is reduced, the crew must keep it in a very limited flight envelope and deal in a very short period of time, to an incredible number of alarms, some of which are as false as the speeds they have under the eyes. It's an overload, an "unsafe condition".
The A 330 stall and can not be recovered.
228 victims.
After the crash
June 4, 2009:
Airbus reminds pilots to apply the procedure in case of inconsistency of measured velocities. Airbus acknowledged that it be difficult to apply in October 2008 ...
June 9, 2009:
EASA says, "That We confirm the type Airbus A330 Airbus aircraft and All Other kinds are airworthy and safe to operate"
August 10, 2009:
EASA and Airbus conduct emergency (PAD 09-099) to the elimination of the Pitot probe Thales AA. To do this, EASA issues a "airworthiness directive" (AD) by claiming that it is a simple precaution. However, an "airworthiness directive" for a precautionary measure, it does not exist. An "airworthiness directive" provides an answer to an "unsafe condition". When the manufacturer and EASA detect a problem that is not an "unsafe condition" but that requires a response, EASA must issue a SAFETY INFORMATION BULLETIN
(SIB). To remove the pitot probe Thales AA, EASA issued AD and not a one ILS. there
was therefore an "unsafe condition" that required a response before the accident.
August 31, 2009:
EASA began changing the certification standards of the Pitot probes by the diffusion of NPA 2009-08. It is a "safety priority" (page 3 paragraph AI5). The Agency confirms that it has erred in not modifying these standards before the accident. She had made the finding of the necessity of this change in 2007 after the BFU in 1999 and Airbus
1995
September 4, 2009:
Airbus is trying to influence the FAA so that it specifies in the future as AD
removal of the probe AA is a precautionary measure. The FAA does not comply
September 8, 2009:
The FAA conducts emergency disposal of the AA by the Pitot probe AD 2009-18 -
08 indicating that the response to an "unsafe condition"
October 20, 2009:
Air France officials are belatedly measures they deem necessary to remedy the defect of the Pitot probes
November 30, 2009:
EASA NPA proposes 2009.12 with a change in the CS-25. Among these changes, the loss of all information transmission becomes a catastrophic risk
December 17, 2009:
In its report No. 2, the BEA specifies that the inconsistency of the measured velocities is a major risk classified by EASA. But at the time of the accident, the current document CS25 which deals with the certification states that the loss of primary information speed is a risk that the probability of occurrence must be "Extremely Remote". It is a probability that the risk class
"Hazardous".
December 17, 2009:
In its report No. 2, the BEA dare say that the analysis of events related to the blocking of the Pitot probes conducted after the accident showed that the tests for validation of these facilities did not appear not suitable for high-altitude flights. The BEA wants us to believe that the certification standards of the Pitot probes are "appeared" out of date after the accident of June 1, 2009. It is a lie because the BEA can not ignore that this observation was made by Airbus in 1995 by the BFU in 1999 and by EASA in 2007
May 12, 2010:
Airbus amend the procedure for dropping out and recommends the training of pilots
in this area
January 2011:
In No. 11 of "The Airbus Safety Magazine," says Jacques Rosay display in TOGA initial action and the procedure would stall before its amendment, the A330 can make unrecoverable
July 28, 2011:
In a "Safety Information Bulletin," EASA inform operators that the standards used for certification of aircraft in icing conditions do not take into account phenomena such as ice crystals or freezing rain. In practice, this means that the protective equipment against icing (including Pitot probes) may not be suitable for all conditions as they arise. EASA recommends that airlines reviewing existing procedures and if necessary amend them or develop. See the NTSB's recommendation in August 1996.
July 29, 2011:
BEA removes a recommendation on dropping out in its report No. 3. it
appears that the system STALL WARNING the A330 does not comply with JAR 25 207 (c).
My conclusions
EASA and Airbus have ignored an "unsafe condition" generated by the recurrent failure of the Pitot probes, leaving the pilots with the task of ensuring accountability of the "unsafe condition" by applying a checklist while according to its definition, an "unsafe condition" can lead the crew in a physical distress or excessive workload that does not allow it to perform its tasks accurately or to carry out.
DGAC and BEA have left to do, Air France has not taken the necessary steps.
(updated 14/10/2011) HMC
Original document (French , PDF)
http://henrimarnetcornus.20minutes-b...1271654027.pdf
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Your source is rather biased however, is he not? The blog itself is called "Records of black aviation", and seems to be willing to accept any argument - however tenuous - that the aircraft must have been at fault and the French authorities are covering it up.
It's like that nutter Norbert Jacquet all over again.
It's like that nutter Norbert Jacquet all over again.
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jcjeant,
Could you try to translate your post into English, so we might try to understand your arguments?
In a technical discussion like this, I detest having to first get my mind around what, at first, looks like a Google translation.
And yes, I've read the original French document.
Using an iffy translation as a source for a discussion always leads to nonsense, and long superfluous waffle, as we already have seen before in the other "AF447" threads.
Could you try to translate your post into English, so we might try to understand your arguments?
In a technical discussion like this, I detest having to first get my mind around what, at first, looks like a Google translation.
And yes, I've read the original French document.
Using an iffy translation as a source for a discussion always leads to nonsense, and long superfluous waffle, as we already have seen before in the other "AF447" threads.
Last edited by ChristiaanJ; 20th Oct 2011 at 21:30.
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OneHundredPercent
Ok. Now we have the Gold Standard, for the A320. Wouldn't you have the FMA in scan, even on autoflight? I would, along with anything else that I may need, so as not to be blindsided, especialy in soupy green. Or do you persist, as the others, in taking at non face the meager data and urban innuendo promoted by BEA?
And, by the way, how are you certain the crew didn't do that?
Because it was not included in this parsed and biased data dump? Because I happen to have a perspective from an unpopular position?
If this pilot did not have a position ahead of the a/c, what level of septic cockpit will you accept for a setting of the stage for being so seemingly unprepared as if a rank amateur? Talk of whiskey and grab ass with the commander seems risky, given the conditions.
I appreciate your reply, it is honest, measured, and instead of biased, it is objective.
Except: PF Did NOT climb like a madman, the a/c did, and to the extent that his misunderstanding contributed, controlled or caused the climb, you claim it was his intention?
You are Houdini, redux?
He WAS trying for wings level, and it is likely he was dealing with some damage, as the a/c had a ND, RollRight bias, clearly.
There was NO BUSS, and losing 10,000 through the weather might not have been wise. If intended, imo.
The picture we have is built on information that is incomplete, cherry picked, and released with bias.
I stand ready to accept a true and complete picture, and frankly, I bet you do too.
French Airline, French A/C, French Pilots, French Investigation. French culture.
French conclusion. C'est la vie.
bonne chance, siecle
Ok. Now we have the Gold Standard, for the A320. Wouldn't you have the FMA in scan, even on autoflight? I would, along with anything else that I may need, so as not to be blindsided, especialy in soupy green. Or do you persist, as the others, in taking at non face the meager data and urban innuendo promoted by BEA?
And, by the way, how are you certain the crew didn't do that?
Because it was not included in this parsed and biased data dump? Because I happen to have a perspective from an unpopular position?
If this pilot did not have a position ahead of the a/c, what level of septic cockpit will you accept for a setting of the stage for being so seemingly unprepared as if a rank amateur? Talk of whiskey and grab ass with the commander seems risky, given the conditions.
I appreciate your reply, it is honest, measured, and instead of biased, it is objective.
Except: PF Did NOT climb like a madman, the a/c did, and to the extent that his misunderstanding contributed, controlled or caused the climb, you claim it was his intention?
You are Houdini, redux?
He WAS trying for wings level, and it is likely he was dealing with some damage, as the a/c had a ND, RollRight bias, clearly.
There was NO BUSS, and losing 10,000 through the weather might not have been wise. If intended, imo.
The picture we have is built on information that is incomplete, cherry picked, and released with bias.
I stand ready to accept a true and complete picture, and frankly, I bet you do too.
French Airline, French A/C, French Pilots, French Investigation. French culture.
French conclusion. C'est la vie.
bonne chance, siecle
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jcjeant,
HMC, really? I'll be cautious, then.
This gentleman continues an (old) battle of attacking any representative of a "system" that put him in default (no judgment here, just an observation).
When HMC is speaking, it is kind of 'automatic' that Airbus, Air France, the DGAC, EASA & co are "guilty".
Sidenote: As provided, the document is really diffult to read. Google translate doesn't do that good, here.
HMC, really? I'll be cautious, then.
This gentleman continues an (old) battle of attacking any representative of a "system" that put him in default (no judgment here, just an observation).
When HMC is speaking, it is kind of 'automatic' that Airbus, Air France, the DGAC, EASA & co are "guilty".
Sidenote: As provided, the document is really diffult to read. Google translate doesn't do that good, here.
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why didn`tthe pnf took controll?me think it maybe a human factor issue.
the cpt had just giveb controll to the younger pilot.bit when all happened
the pnf assumed what was wrong,but wasn`t 100% sure.
so maybe he thougt,when the cpt returned taht he (the pnf) had just took the first opportunity to take controll because he was angry at the cpt decision.
the cpt had just giveb controll to the younger pilot.bit when all happened
the pnf assumed what was wrong,but wasn`t 100% sure.
so maybe he thougt,when the cpt returned taht he (the pnf) had just took the first opportunity to take controll because he was angry at the cpt decision.
The name of this tread is the “final crew conversation” and it would indeed be very interesting to "listen" to how the “climat” was in the cockpit before captain left for his rest and what was said during the briefing before he left. Was there a silent competition going on? Is every crew team working in harmony, at all the time?
A car with dual drivers, dual minds, is not very uncommon. Just ask your ex-wife.
PNF thinking –Just wait until captain gets back and sees what’s going on…..
PF thinking – Me, and only me, have to sort this out…
I´m not a pilot, I just know how humans may react and handle, when under pressure.
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AlphaZuluRomeo
Seem's to me a exact chronology
All inside (facts) is public and verifiable with some research work
Of course comments and conclusion are opinion of HMC
ChristiaanJ (must no be a prob for you with the original PDF as you are located in France !)
The facts are the facts .. the opinions and comments are from HMC .. not from myself
This was posted mainly cause it's seem's to me a complete chronology (my argument)
Anyways ...regarding translations
For those interesting by accurate translations I suggest you to contact:
Translation English, German, Italian, French, Russian, Hungarian, Polish, Romanian
I'm sure you will be satisfied by their professional services
HMC, really? I'll be cautious, then
All inside (facts) is public and verifiable with some research work
Of course comments and conclusion are opinion of HMC
Sidenote: As provided, the document is really diffult to read. Google translate doesn't do that good, here
Could you try to translate your post into English, so we might try to understand your arguments?
This was posted mainly cause it's seem's to me a complete chronology (my argument)
Anyways ...regarding translations
For those interesting by accurate translations I suggest you to contact:
Translation English, German, Italian, French, Russian, Hungarian, Polish, Romanian
I'm sure you will be satisfied by their professional services
Last edited by jcjeant; 21st Oct 2011 at 00:10.
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I think it reads straightforward enough, and there are precious few chronologies, and certainly no complete ones.
If I had the skill, I'd try to put something together like that, with the important posts here listed objectively, though it might put an end to the threads. Repetition produces clicks.
If I had the skill, I'd try to put something together like that, with the important posts here listed objectively, though it might put an end to the threads. Repetition produces clicks.
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Madman? We have the results of controls, we do not know the pilot's intentions.
I have listed several reasons the a/c may not have been purposely directed to the attitude and altitude it reached. Until they are eliminated, it seems rather like piling on to assume this pilot was a madman, bent on STALL. Do you actually believe that was his intent?
His initial inputs may have been inadvertent in Pitch.
Banging on the drum only identifies a lack of circumspection, imho.
I have never heard of a pilot in UAS commanding such a climb.
There are three instances where the a/c did it on her own, in similar. There are also warnings (post 447) not to re-select a/p when speeds return. "The a/c may climb without command."
Do you see this?
I'll wait.
I have listed several reasons the a/c may not have been purposely directed to the attitude and altitude it reached. Until they are eliminated, it seems rather like piling on to assume this pilot was a madman, bent on STALL. Do you actually believe that was his intent?
His initial inputs may have been inadvertent in Pitch.
Banging on the drum only identifies a lack of circumspection, imho.
I have never heard of a pilot in UAS commanding such a climb.
There are three instances where the a/c did it on her own, in similar. There are also warnings (post 447) not to re-select a/p when speeds return. "The a/c may climb without command."
Do you see this?
I'll wait.
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Burnswannabe,
Your comments made me think (always a dangerous thing). Up until AFR447, I said that FBW has done more good than harm (much more). Until AFR447, there had been zero in-service stalls with a FBW equipped transport. Clearly this has been a great safety leap forward.
However, I agree with my colleagues that pilot skills have atrophied. Pilots have (indeed humans have) great difficulty sorting out multiple failure indications.
It's not just Airbus. Just read about NWA 6231 flown by a colleague. When the report came out, I said "how could he be so dumb!." I few months later, I found out just how dumb I could be. Fortunately, I came out of the clouds fairly quickly and it was just an incident.
We need to rethink our training. We hardly get any handflying, and then the autopilot hands us a handfull of airplane, in turbulence, with a lot of flashing lights. I'd like to think I could, but seriously, I don't know.
Your comments made me think (always a dangerous thing). Up until AFR447, I said that FBW has done more good than harm (much more). Until AFR447, there had been zero in-service stalls with a FBW equipped transport. Clearly this has been a great safety leap forward.
However, I agree with my colleagues that pilot skills have atrophied. Pilots have (indeed humans have) great difficulty sorting out multiple failure indications.
It's not just Airbus. Just read about NWA 6231 flown by a colleague. When the report came out, I said "how could he be so dumb!." I few months later, I found out just how dumb I could be. Fortunately, I came out of the clouds fairly quickly and it was just an incident.
We need to rethink our training. We hardly get any handflying, and then the autopilot hands us a handfull of airplane, in turbulence, with a lot of flashing lights. I'd like to think I could, but seriously, I don't know.
Lyman/Bearfoil,
Are you for real?
You asked what a normal joe would do in this situation. As an Airbus pilot I thought I'd grace you with this information, and gave you a simple list of what I would do. I made no reference to the AF accident in that list.
But your imagination gets the better of you, and you conjured up stuff in your mind.
Yes, but when you have an FMA change in the Airbus, you should read it out. It's important to dwell on FMA changes, as many errors have occurred when both pilots are not fully aware of those changes. It's SOP.
What?
I have no idea what the crew did, you just asked what I would do.
Hello?
As others have said, he pulled back and the aircraft pitched up. I consider that to be the fundamental error. Maintaining cruise pitch and thrust would have been a much better option.
I made no claims.
I have asked numerous seneca to sidestick FOs what the pitch is in the cruise, and the majority have no idea at all, not even enough of a clue to make a guess. All, though, can recite the various UAS (low level) recovery drills.
Only the dead pilot knew why he pitched up. We will only ever be able to guess, and subsequently train around all those guesses.
Are you for real?
You asked what a normal joe would do in this situation. As an Airbus pilot I thought I'd grace you with this information, and gave you a simple list of what I would do. I made no reference to the AF accident in that list.
But your imagination gets the better of you, and you conjured up stuff in your mind.
Wouldn't you have the FMA in scan, even on autoflight? I would, along with anything else that I may need
Or do you persist, as the others, in taking at non face the meager data and urban innuendo promoted by BEA?
And, by the way, how are you certain the crew didn't do that?
what level of septic cockpit will you accept for a setting of the stage for being so seemingly unprepared as if a rank amateur?
Except: PF Did NOT climb like a madman, the a/c did,
you claim it was his intention?
You are Houdini, redux?
He WAS trying for wings level, and it is likely he was dealing with some damage, as the a/c had a ND, RollRight bias, clearly.
There was NO BUSS, and losing 10,000 through the weather might not have been wise. If intended, imo.
The picture we have is built on information that is incomplete, cherry picked, and released with bias.
I stand ready to accept a true and complete picture, and frankly, I bet you do too.
He WAS trying for wings level, and it is likely he was dealing with some damage, as the a/c had a ND, RollRight bias, clearly.
There was NO BUSS, and losing 10,000 through the weather might not have been wise. If intended, imo.
The picture we have is built on information that is incomplete, cherry picked, and released with bias.
I stand ready to accept a true and complete picture, and frankly, I bet you do too.
Only the dead pilot knew why he pitched up. We will only ever be able to guess, and subsequently train around all those guesses.
HundredPercentPlease
Thank you for a good dose of simple common sense!
Thank you for a good dose of simple common sense!
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maxJack,
thank you very much for understanding what i meant to say.
me think,the human interactions and feelings inthe cp before the event are a reason for the behavior of the PNF.
thank you very much for understanding what i meant to say.
me think,the human interactions and feelings inthe cp before the event are a reason for the behavior of the PNF.
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jcjeant, I agree that it seems to be an accurate chronology.
However, as a once-trained historian, I learned that knowing the author is at last as important as understanding what is written.
In this case, I don't know:
- if the presented facts are true
- if all the relevant facts are reported, or only those "in favour" of some theory
- (having not done the research work, I confess) if the facts are public and verifiable
I do know however:
- what HMC's battle is
- that HMC's report of the accident is biased/partisan
As said above, I didn't take the time to do the "research work". I have then no definite answers. Just a "be cautious" advice, as I know the source for:
- not being impartial/non-partisan
- not having really something to loose if proven wrong (unless, for exemple, an aircraft manufacturer)
-----
I read french better than english, translation issues were for other readers.
However, as a once-trained historian, I learned that knowing the author is at last as important as understanding what is written.
In this case, I don't know:
- if the presented facts are true
- if all the relevant facts are reported, or only those "in favour" of some theory
- (having not done the research work, I confess) if the facts are public and verifiable
I do know however:
- what HMC's battle is
- that HMC's report of the accident is biased/partisan
As said above, I didn't take the time to do the "research work". I have then no definite answers. Just a "be cautious" advice, as I know the source for:
- not being impartial/non-partisan
- not having really something to loose if proven wrong (unless, for exemple, an aircraft manufacturer)
-----
I read french better than english, translation issues were for other readers.
Respectfully suggest that this thread be renamed "AF447 Hamster Wheel."
That is all.
That is all.
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Hi 100.
I was not asking for a normal Joe to respond, I was asking a "Hero" to answer. The type that reads what others post, rolls it around, appoints himself Ace Bogie, and tries to come off as somehow superior to our PF here, 447.
You are a fresh air type, and I have commented on your reasonableness, so, yeah, I am for real, and my question stands......
One thing. You say we will never know what the PF's intentions may have been re: the climb. You suggest we will train around these guesses.
You say only the dead pilot will ever know why he pitched up. I disagree, and I am disappointed with your readiness to accept this "finality".
The stick traces are enough for you? Hmm.
Let's say the a/c has a chronic desire to PITCH DOWN, and roll to the right. Let's say that after the climb established, it kept trying to drop the NOSE. Without knowing the a/c attitude, each "recovery" would repeat his initial one, and each one incrementally raise the PITCH. BTW, the final flight path shows just such a predilection.
His side was not recorded. Was he seeing.......what? And why did he not ask PNF re: the other screens? In the conversation, I get that the PNF DID have better data, but that he assumed the position of scold, or ad hoc teacher.
This does not go down a treat with a Frenchman, and it may be that this deal can be put down to petulance as well as other things. Your sound judgment is plain in your response, I am a little surprised you have closed the book.
I was not asking for a normal Joe to respond, I was asking a "Hero" to answer. The type that reads what others post, rolls it around, appoints himself Ace Bogie, and tries to come off as somehow superior to our PF here, 447.
You are a fresh air type, and I have commented on your reasonableness, so, yeah, I am for real, and my question stands......
One thing. You say we will never know what the PF's intentions may have been re: the climb. You suggest we will train around these guesses.
You say only the dead pilot will ever know why he pitched up. I disagree, and I am disappointed with your readiness to accept this "finality".
The stick traces are enough for you? Hmm.
Let's say the a/c has a chronic desire to PITCH DOWN, and roll to the right. Let's say that after the climb established, it kept trying to drop the NOSE. Without knowing the a/c attitude, each "recovery" would repeat his initial one, and each one incrementally raise the PITCH. BTW, the final flight path shows just such a predilection.
His side was not recorded. Was he seeing.......what? And why did he not ask PNF re: the other screens? In the conversation, I get that the PNF DID have better data, but that he assumed the position of scold, or ad hoc teacher.
This does not go down a treat with a Frenchman, and it may be that this deal can be put down to petulance as well as other things. Your sound judgment is plain in your response, I am a little surprised you have closed the book.