AF 447 Thread No. 6
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@Svarin:
Question - if there is no feedback through the rudder pedals of an A330, how come pilots reported a significant difference in feel between the earlier A330/340 (200-300) models and the later A340 models (500-600)?
And by "barely came into it", I mean that it came into it after control was lost, and was very much secondary to the pitch and roll inputs that went through the sidesticks.
One thing that I find interesting in the traces is that the sidestick traces are based on a graph where left stick input relates to values > 0, whereas roll traces say that values > 0 relate to right wing down. If this is that case then PIO/APC needs to be looked into, as the traces of roll vs. sidestick show the precise opposite.
PS. I like the term "dared" - it makes me sound like a far more "caution-to-the-wind" guy than I actually am.
Question - if there is no feedback through the rudder pedals of an A330, how come pilots reported a significant difference in feel between the earlier A330/340 (200-300) models and the later A340 models (500-600)?
And by "barely came into it", I mean that it came into it after control was lost, and was very much secondary to the pitch and roll inputs that went through the sidesticks.
One thing that I find interesting in the traces is that the sidestick traces are based on a graph where left stick input relates to values > 0, whereas roll traces say that values > 0 relate to right wing down. If this is that case then PIO/APC needs to be looked into, as the traces of roll vs. sidestick show the precise opposite.
PS. I like the term "dared" - it makes me sound like a far more "caution-to-the-wind" guy than I actually am.
Adverse yaw
DozyWannabe
One thing that I find interesting in the traces is that the sidestick traces are based on a graph where left stick input relates to values > 0, whereas roll traces say that values > 0 relate to right wing down. If this is that case then PIO/APC needs to be looked into, as the traces of roll vs. sidestick show the precise opposite.
One thing that I find interesting in the traces is that the sidestick traces are based on a graph where left stick input relates to values > 0, whereas roll traces say that values > 0 relate to right wing down. If this is that case then PIO/APC needs to be looked into, as the traces of roll vs. sidestick show the precise opposite.
Might be the same here. That would also explain the nosedrop in addition with the max bank angle points and the nose rise when by use of rudder the bank reversed.
As i don´t know it, others comments more than welcome.
F4 flight characteristics High AOA
With high AOA the down going aileron (in our case on the right wing) produces a lot of drag (the down gong aileron stands nearly 90° to the FPA). That produces a yaw into the low right wing. We had the spoiler on the other side go up, but that one was blanked out at high AOA. The wings are swept back as we know. Due to the yaw to the right the right low wing looses lift, as it is now more swept back in relation to the relative wind, wheras the left wing is moved forward and is less swept back in relation to relative wind. The right low wing therefore produces less lift than the left high wing, minimizing, equalizing or even overcoming (dependent on AOA) the upforce of the deflected aileron on the right wing. Live expierience: Full left aileron and the ship rolls to the right. Only help is use of rudder in the same direction as rolling is intended. In our F4 best was to roll with rudder alone and keep the ailerons at neutral.
The laws called ”Alternate” are engaged when the protections related to the normal laws (ALPHA 1, VM01) are lost. The laws called ”Direct” are engaged when the Nz law is lost.
The other functions available are :
- speedbrake function
- ground spoiler function
- MLA (except in direct laws)
- rudder travel limitation
- sideslip estimation (except in alternate 2 or direct laws)
- computation of characteristic speeds (except in direct laws)
The other functions available are :
- speedbrake function
- ground spoiler function
- MLA (except in direct laws)
- rudder travel limitation
- sideslip estimation (except in alternate 2 or direct laws)
- computation of characteristic speeds (except in direct laws)
Yaw alternate law
This law, elaborated in the FCPCs and FCSCs, is engaged in the event of
loss of the lateral normal law. Its characteristics are as follows:
- The roll control is direct, an order on the side stick directly commands a
deflection, according to a kinematic.
- The yaw control is achieved from the pedals, through a mechanical linkage.
- A Dutch roll damping function using limited yaw rate data is introduced
via the yaw damper servoactuators.
In the event of loss of the inertial data from the ADIRUs, the yaw rate data
for Dutch roll damping are provided to the FCPCs via a unit comprising 2
rate gyros. In case of 3 FCPCs loss, the Dutch roll damping is achieved by
the FCSCs with yaw rate data coming from the rate gyro unit.
This law, elaborated in the FCPCs and FCSCs, is engaged in the event of
loss of the lateral normal law. Its characteristics are as follows:
- The roll control is direct, an order on the side stick directly commands a
deflection, according to a kinematic.
- The yaw control is achieved from the pedals, through a mechanical linkage.
- A Dutch roll damping function using limited yaw rate data is introduced
via the yaw damper servoactuators.
In the event of loss of the inertial data from the ADIRUs, the yaw rate data
for Dutch roll damping are provided to the FCPCs via a unit comprising 2
rate gyros. In case of 3 FCPCs loss, the Dutch roll damping is achieved by
the FCSCs with yaw rate data coming from the rate gyro unit.
If i read the TTM correct, automatic countering of yaw/sideslip would not be available in ALt2.
Are you discussing the control of the aircraft when stalled ? If so, surely the control characteristics are markedly different from what anyone is used to in normal flight, and the aircraft response ditto. Aircraft seems to have been very well behaved given the situation.
Originally Posted by Diagnostic
I was only replying to (what I believe) Clandestino was saying, where he seemed to be saying that if 32 other crews could manage clogged pitots successfully, then AF447 was the exception.
Number 32 was often quoted in threads referring to AF447. I was able to trace it as far as PBS show "Crash of flight 447". Interim report #2 refers to 33 cases preceding AF447 and four occurring afterwards. In those cases that could be further analyzed, crew pushed forward when faced with stall warning, CM2 of AF447 pulled and kept pulling. My entirely subjective criterion of exception is thus met.
Originally Posted by Svarin
Read the report in full, including page 1xx where you will find the rudder traces
Originally Posted by Svarin
There is a definite APC event in this instance, in roll and yaw. Rudder played a huge part, as a fast-moving, oscillating control surface with zero feedback to the pilots.
To have PIO/APC you have to start with pilot's oscillatory input. Rudder starts to oscillate without pilot's input at about 2:11:45 (following yaw damper commands) when the aeroplane is so deeply stalled that high AoA and low speed make it pretty inefficient. There's fast pedal movement to the left at approximately 2:13:05, followed by sharp reversal to the right and return to neutral over next minute. No oscillatory inputs. No APC. Just an aeroplane gently mushing in stall.
Originally Posted by Svarin
Yes, looking at the traces is dull work. But as long as we take these recorders for the truth of the matter, the traces are all we have as unbiased data, along with the ACARS messages. Unless one is prepared to use and study them carefully, one can only follow pre-made conclusions written under careful supervision by interested parties. Such should not satisfy an inquiring mind.
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: California
Age: 55
Posts: 203
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Reasons to ignore stall warnings:
Originally Posted by rudderrudderrat
Hi Clandestino,
Quote:
And what bearing on AF447 does it have?
The most important warning on that flight deck was "Stall Stall" - which appears to have been ignored / not acknowledged / not heard. (Similar to the You Tube "What's that Beeping?")
If their human auditory channel was filled to capacity with previous flight deck audio noises, (Cavalry Charge, ECAM Dings, ALT Alert etc), and the crew are attempting to verbally communicate whilst they trouble shoot - what is the point of having the only stall warning alert simply another verbal "Stall Stall"?
Even my iPhone has both audio ring plus Vibrator to get my attention.
Do most other aircraft have a stick shaker as a stall warning? If Apple can fit one into my phone, why was it not possible to fit something similar into the side sticks?
Before AF447 event, there was NO Stall Warning QRH procedure. The previous procedure was buried in FCOM.
The new QRH procedure emphasises reducing angle of attack, and does NOT recommend the use of TOGA power. (as the old FCOM procedure did)
Quote:
And what bearing on AF447 does it have?
The most important warning on that flight deck was "Stall Stall" - which appears to have been ignored / not acknowledged / not heard. (Similar to the You Tube "What's that Beeping?")
If their human auditory channel was filled to capacity with previous flight deck audio noises, (Cavalry Charge, ECAM Dings, ALT Alert etc), and the crew are attempting to verbally communicate whilst they trouble shoot - what is the point of having the only stall warning alert simply another verbal "Stall Stall"?
Even my iPhone has both audio ring plus Vibrator to get my attention.
Do most other aircraft have a stick shaker as a stall warning? If Apple can fit one into my phone, why was it not possible to fit something similar into the side sticks?
Before AF447 event, there was NO Stall Warning QRH procedure. The previous procedure was buried in FCOM.
The new QRH procedure emphasises reducing angle of attack, and does NOT recommend the use of TOGA power. (as the old FCOM procedure did)
Reasons
1. Both FOs overloaded for 4 minutes and did not hear it.
2. Both FOs heard it and ignored it as being false (as per recent QF72 etc malfunction.) But why not verbalize that?
3. Both FOs didn't understand it/unfamiliar "<Stall><Stall>. What's that?". Would the french décrochage or flat line tone been better warning? Were they verbalizing that they did not understand it. Perhaps confused in the heat of the moment. Or did "What's that?" refer to something else.
4. Both FOs heard it and accepted it and did not know what to do. Again why not verbalize that?
Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: The land of the Rising Sun
Posts: 187
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The case for cognitive overload is by no means proven I am afraid. Iain W's reference to Wickens was somewhat simplified and didn't really offer a suitable explanation. It does sound seductive but is only a small part of what is a complex theory. Once more parts of the theory are included cognitive overload falls by the wayside. I highlight the states of panic and shock as more likely causes for the PF acting as he did because the characteristics of those states better fit his actions than cognitive overload. This also ties in much more effectively with the apparent lack of professionalism in the aircrew.
It might be that stall warnings via a different cognitive route do offer an aid in the future but we have to think about the situation as it is and as Diagnostic mentions it is possible that a stick shaker might not have saved the day. We have to look at the situation as it is and try to understand why the crew acted as they did. Then we can start to look at possible solutions which might indeed include a stick shaker. But this accident is about professionalism, training, culture, CRM and SOPs all mixed togther and above all knowing your machine. It is not about failings in the machine. I would say, a big shake up in how AF and probably other airlines train their pilots would seem to be necessary.
It might be that stall warnings via a different cognitive route do offer an aid in the future but we have to think about the situation as it is and as Diagnostic mentions it is possible that a stick shaker might not have saved the day. We have to look at the situation as it is and try to understand why the crew acted as they did. Then we can start to look at possible solutions which might indeed include a stick shaker. But this accident is about professionalism, training, culture, CRM and SOPs all mixed togther and above all knowing your machine. It is not about failings in the machine. I would say, a big shake up in how AF and probably other airlines train their pilots would seem to be necessary.
Last edited by Old Carthusian; 1st Sep 2011 at 23:13.
The examples of cognitive overload discussed seem to focus on someone who's focused on a specific task they believe is going normally, to the exclusion of an input that would have warned them it wasn't.
I wonder how well the theory applies to someone who realizes something's wrong but doesn't know what it is. It seems to me that when you go into troubleshooting mode, as the AF 447 pilots apparently did, you're more likely to step back and look/listen for clues that might explain what's wrong.
I wonder how well the theory applies to someone who realizes something's wrong but doesn't know what it is. It seems to me that when you go into troubleshooting mode, as the AF 447 pilots apparently did, you're more likely to step back and look/listen for clues that might explain what's wrong.
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: Florida and wherever my laptop is
Posts: 1,350
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Attentional Tunneling
ChuChu
The effect that is repeatedly observed is that the human finding something difficult starts to enter 'attentional tunneling'. This may be called several things 'the pilot's scan broke down', he had 'tunnel vision' etc.
The pilot with cognitive tunneling may concentrate on entirely the incorrect stimulus - it is not something that lends itself to logical decomposition.
Ideally, simulation rides should be set up to initiate attentional tunneling then the ride frozen or rerun in playback and the tunneling pointed out to the 'subject'. It was found that using this approach with military pilots reduced susceptibility to tunneling.
Yet again it is back to training.
The examples of cognitive overload discussed seem to focus on someone who's focused on a specific task they believe is going normally, to the exclusion of an input that would have warned them it wasn't.
I wonder how well the theory applies to someone who realizes something's wrong but doesn't know what it is. It seems to me that when you go into troubleshooting mode, as the AF 447 pilots apparently did, you're more likely to step back and look/listen for clues that might explain what's wrong.
I wonder how well the theory applies to someone who realizes something's wrong but doesn't know what it is. It seems to me that when you go into troubleshooting mode, as the AF 447 pilots apparently did, you're more likely to step back and look/listen for clues that might explain what's wrong.
The pilot with cognitive tunneling may concentrate on entirely the incorrect stimulus - it is not something that lends itself to logical decomposition.
Ideally, simulation rides should be set up to initiate attentional tunneling then the ride frozen or rerun in playback and the tunneling pointed out to the 'subject'. It was found that using this approach with military pilots reduced susceptibility to tunneling.
Yet again it is back to training.
Join Date: Aug 2011
Location: Near LHR
Age: 57
Posts: 37
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@Clandestino:
Thanks for the clarification.
Indeed - I was just quoting your mention of that number, without detailing the variations around it.
But that only addresses one reaction - to the stall warning. Other crews made different errors, which the crew of AF447 did not make (e.g. re-engaging the A/P during the UAS event). So depending on what specific criterion is considered, other crews were exceptions and not AF447. That's exactly why I agree with you about the subjectivity - thanks again for your clarification.
@xcitation:
Absolutely - I said something very similar earlier. The lack of apparent recognition of the stall warnings, but also the lack of explicit verbal reasons for ignoring them, is a puzzle.
How are we ever going to know the reason(s)? I can only think that the BEA Human Factors folks will eventually give us their best guess, which will be based on more info than we have e.g. intonation used on the CVR recording.
@Old Carthusian:
Thanks for the summary.
Agreed - many factors indeed. I also believe that there is a large dose of the "Ironies of Automation" [Bainbridge] in there too - humans monitoring machines (any) don't do very well when they have to take over completely and suddenly, with no prior warning. That seems to be a human "failing", and not something that we can (should?) expect to "train out of people".
That's why I've been following with interest the comments here about the advantages of designing some kind of "ATT Hold" autopilot in the event of UAS - something to gradually ease the transition from A/P to manual control, and lessen that "shock factor" (which is my currently favoured reason, from everything I've read so far, for the NU inputs from the PF - just muscular tension from the shock of having the plane "dumped in his lap". That's why he didn't know he was causing the climb, as it wasn't a conscious input).
I've learned here some of the difficulties of implementing something like that, especially if (as in this case), the plane is in some turbulance when it is engaged, and we may not want the current attitude (which could be momentarily significantly NU or ND in turbulance) to be the one which is held by the ATT Hold system. That requirement for the PF to control the plane in the turbulance immediately, prevented PJ2's lovely phrase of "don't just do something, sit there" (IIRC) after the A/P disconnect.
If the onboard systems had given the crew time to think & get up to speed, instead of immediately forcing them to react, in a state of shock from their "cruise state", I wonder if we would have had a better outcome. The Human Factors analysis of the final accident report will make facinating reading, I expect.
Thanks for the clarification.
Originally Posted by Clandestino
Number 32 was often quoted in threads referring to AF447.
Originally Posted by Clandestino
In those cases that could be further analyzed, crew pushed forward when faced with stall warning, CM2 of AF447 pulled and kept pulling. My entirely subjective criterion of exception is thus met.
That's exactly why I agree with you about the subjectivity - thanks again for your clarification.@xcitation:
Originally Posted by xcitation
Indeed, a major puzzle why ignore the stall warnings for 3 or 4 minutes?
The lack of apparent recognition of the stall warnings, but also the lack of explicit verbal reasons for ignoring them, is a puzzle.How are we ever going to know the reason(s)? I can only think that the BEA Human Factors folks will eventually give us their best guess, which will be based on more info than we have e.g. intonation used on the CVR recording.
@Old Carthusian:
Thanks for the summary.
Originally Posted by Old Carthusian
But this accident is about professionalism, training, culture, CRM and SOPs all mixed togther and above all knowing your machine.
That's why I've been following with interest the comments here about the advantages of designing some kind of "ATT Hold" autopilot in the event of UAS - something to gradually ease the transition from A/P to manual control, and lessen that "shock factor" (which is my currently favoured reason, from everything I've read so far, for the NU inputs from the PF - just muscular tension from the shock of having the plane "dumped in his lap". That's why he didn't know he was causing the climb, as it wasn't a conscious input).
I've learned here some of the difficulties of implementing something like that, especially if (as in this case), the plane is in some turbulance when it is engaged, and we may not want the current attitude (which could be momentarily significantly NU or ND in turbulance) to be the one which is held by the ATT Hold system. That requirement for the PF to control the plane in the turbulance immediately, prevented PJ2's lovely phrase of "don't just do something, sit there" (IIRC) after the A/P disconnect.
If the onboard systems had given the crew time to think & get up to speed, instead of immediately forcing them to react, in a state of shock from their "cruise state", I wonder if we would have had a better outcome. The Human Factors analysis of the final accident report will make facinating reading, I expect.
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: W of 30W
Posts: 1,916
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
AoA Vane #1
Originally Posted by mm43
In any case, it wasn't an issue in ALT 2B as the SW used the highest AoA value.
Due to the AoA discrepancy, it is very probable that the following STATUS message was displayed on ECAM to the AF447 crew :
RISK OF UNDUE STALL WARNING
I believe blue to be the color but cannot positively find that information for now.
But once again, the real issue is that BEA didn't say yet a single word about it ...
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@CONF iture
The QRH would have told them to disregard that message though - if indeed it appeared (the PNF did not call it out). At any rate, I suspect that message referred to the short-term SW that could be expected while the systems sorted out what sensors were valid and which ones weren't. I'd be surprised if any of the designers in the early '90s thought maintained application of full back stick would be the response to UAS.
WRT the BEA, give them time. They're a very different organisation these days from what they were 23 years ago.
The QRH would have told them to disregard that message though - if indeed it appeared (the PNF did not call it out). At any rate, I suspect that message referred to the short-term SW that could be expected while the systems sorted out what sensors were valid and which ones weren't. I'd be surprised if any of the designers in the early '90s thought maintained application of full back stick would be the response to UAS.
WRT the BEA, give them time. They're a very different organisation these days from what they were 23 years ago.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: uk
Posts: 857
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
3. Both FOs didn't understand it/unfamiliar "<Stall><Stall>. What's that?". Would the french décrochage or flat line tone been better warning? Were they verbalizing that they did not understand it. Perhaps confused in the heat of the moment. Or did "What's that?" refer to something else.
The exclamation "shut up gringo" might ring a bell for some readers... (in that case, clearly time for the brain to process the race/language of the speaker and prepare and verbalise corresponding insult - but not to process the message content).
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: W of 30W
Posts: 1,916
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by Dozy
F-GZCP was an A330-203. As far as I know, they didn't retrofit design changes from later models to later production runs of earlier models because of the training issues that would ensue (pilots reported a significant difference in feel between the old system and the new). So for the moment let's assume that F-GZCP was of the old design when it came to the rudder controls.
There is no training issue between both versions, at most a PDF document to log on.
You simply don't retrofit an earlier model in newer Enhanced one. Enhanced is much much more than a design change in the rudder engineering, starting with the size of rudder + fin.
Join Date: Jun 2011
Location: Devonshire
Age: 96
Posts: 297
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Training
PF had practiced the UAS out of Rio on the Simulator three months ago (with this PNF ?) which was a 15 degree climb and TOGA, ( for lower levels). He may have tried to do just this. He was slow in increasing his thrust to TOGA on AF447. But he may have decided that this was the correct drill. His mind was set.
I have mentioned earlier one fleet in the sixties, where, in the Crew Room it was joked "that it did not matter which Drill you did... so long as you did it quickly."
More training ? Garage Years #644, says that his simulators are in use 20 hours a day with 4 hours for maintenance. One of AB's sales lines was that conversion from one AB to another AB was simpler..
I have mentioned earlier one fleet in the sixties, where, in the Crew Room it was joked "that it did not matter which Drill you did... so long as you did it quickly."
More training ? Garage Years #644, says that his simulators are in use 20 hours a day with 4 hours for maintenance. One of AB's sales lines was that conversion from one AB to another AB was simpler..
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: NNW of Antipodes
Age: 81
Posts: 1,330
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally posted by RetiredF4 ...
If I read the TTM correct, automatic countering of yaw/sideslip would not be available in ALt2.
If I read the TTM correct, automatic countering of yaw/sideslip would not be available in ALt2.
Check Post #373 and you will note that the second group of traces is a compilation of pitch, roll and rudder input. I don't think the yaw damper was helping with the roll as lateral stability decreased.
@CONF iture
Re AOA Vane #1
RISK OF UNDUE STALL WARNING
As with the STALL STALL, the lack of verbalization between the PNF and PF is a problem. No wonder the BEA want a cockpit camera.
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: W of 30W
Posts: 1,916
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The QRH would have told them to disregard that message though
Regarding the BEA, the only thing that has changed is that corporations are getting more powerfull than ever ...
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@CONF iture:
With all due respect, I'm well aware of how long it takes to pull out a QRH in an emergency situation, don't think I havent borne that in mind. However, right now we know neither
What we do know is that it was never called out, and that the PNF seems to have been increasingly concerned about the way the aircraft was being handled. Unfortunately there's nothing on the CVR excerpts to confirm or deny "Hey - that's a Stall Warning" - "ECAM says disregard it", but I'm pretty sure that if such a thing was said then it would have been included (if the BEA are so big on protecting corporations like Airbus, why have the DGAC already mandated a software change?). You're clearly an intelligent guy - if you stopped fighting 24-year-old windmills and applied yourself fully to the facts we could really use you.
With all due respect, I'm well aware of how long it takes to pull out a QRH in an emergency situation, don't think I havent borne that in mind. However, right now we know neither
- whether that ECAM message appeared
- whether it was noted by either pilot
What we do know is that it was never called out, and that the PNF seems to have been increasingly concerned about the way the aircraft was being handled. Unfortunately there's nothing on the CVR excerpts to confirm or deny "Hey - that's a Stall Warning" - "ECAM says disregard it", but I'm pretty sure that if such a thing was said then it would have been included (if the BEA are so big on protecting corporations like Airbus, why have the DGAC already mandated a software change?). You're clearly an intelligent guy - if you stopped fighting 24-year-old windmills and applied yourself fully to the facts we could really use you.
Quote:Xcitation:
Indeed, a major puzzle why ignore the stall warnings for 3 or 4 minutes? In the entire transcript of the incident not once was "stall" or "décrochage" ever mentioned by any of the 3 pilots.
Reasons
1. Both FOs overloaded for 4 minutes and did not hear it.
2. Both FOs heard it and ignored it as being false (as per recent QF72 etc malfunction.) But why not verbalize that?
3. Both FOs didn't understand it/unfamiliar "<Stall><Stall>. What's that?". Would the french décrochage or flat line tone been better warning? Were they verbalizing that they did not understand it. Perhaps confused in the heat of the moment. Or did "What's that?" refer to something else.
4. Both FOs heard it and accepted it and did not know what to do. Again why not verbalize that?
Indeed, a major puzzle why ignore the stall warnings for 3 or 4 minutes? In the entire transcript of the incident not once was "stall" or "décrochage" ever mentioned by any of the 3 pilots.
Reasons
1. Both FOs overloaded for 4 minutes and did not hear it.
2. Both FOs heard it and ignored it as being false (as per recent QF72 etc malfunction.) But why not verbalize that?
3. Both FOs didn't understand it/unfamiliar "<Stall><Stall>. What's that?". Would the french décrochage or flat line tone been better warning? Were they verbalizing that they did not understand it. Perhaps confused in the heat of the moment. Or did "What's that?" refer to something else.
4. Both FOs heard it and accepted it and did not know what to do. Again why not verbalize that?
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: somewhere
Posts: 451
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@CONF:
Hi CONF iture,
An *e-rudder* version is not equipped with a rudder travel limiter unit.
Since a RTLU is found with the VS, the F-GZCP was a *m-rudder* version.
I would rather think, according to the serial number, that F-GZCP was the Enhanced version of the 330.
I believe airfrance has or had 16 A330, 4 of them being A330E.
F-GZCP was also the newest in the fleet.
As you may have more accurate information ... please, let me know.
I believe airfrance has or had 16 A330, 4 of them being A330E.
F-GZCP was also the newest in the fleet.
As you may have more accurate information ... please, let me know.
An *e-rudder* version is not equipped with a rudder travel limiter unit.
Since a RTLU is found with the VS, the F-GZCP was a *m-rudder* version.
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Germany
Age: 67
Posts: 1,777
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hi,
Interesting
Do you have any information about the change from 23 years ago
A historic of the change .. the new status ?
So far I do not find any change in the BEA organization along those 23 years...
Indeed it was only some "professional" call out on the beginning of the event AF447
From the PF
I have the conrols
Ignition start
From PNF
Alternate law protection
Wing anti-ice
The other CVR words .. are more like a discussion between Laurel and Hardy .. as I write sometime ago
WRT the BEA, give them time. They're a very different organisation these days from what they were 23 years ago.
Do you have any information about the change from 23 years ago
A historic of the change .. the new status ?
So far I do not find any change in the BEA organization along those 23 years...
What we do know is that it was never called out
From the PF
I have the conrols
Ignition start
From PNF
Alternate law protection
Wing anti-ice
The other CVR words .. are more like a discussion between Laurel and Hardy .. as I write sometime ago
Last edited by jcjeant; 2nd Sep 2011 at 07:17.