The case for cognitive overload is by no means proven I am afraid. Iain W's reference to Wickens was somewhat simplified and didn't really offer a suitable explanation. It does sound seductive but is only a small part of what is a complex theory. Once more parts of the theory are included cognitive overload falls by the wayside. I highlight the states of panic and shock as more likely causes for the PF acting as he did because the characteristics of those states better fit his actions than cognitive overload. This also ties in much more effectively with the apparent lack of professionalism in the aircrew.
It might be that stall warnings via a different cognitive route do offer an aid in the future but we have to think about the situation as it is and as Diagnostic mentions it is possible that a stick shaker might not have saved the day. We have to look at the situation as it is and try to understand why the crew acted as they did. Then we can start to look at possible solutions which might indeed include a stick shaker. But this accident is about professionalism, training, culture, CRM and SOPs all mixed togther and above all knowing your machine. It is not about failings in the machine. I would say, a big shake up in how AF and probably other airlines train their pilots would seem to be necessary.
Last edited by Old Carthusian; 1st Sep 2011 at 23:13.