AF447 wreckage found
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Something here does not seem to add up.
4 minutes is a very long time. How can 3 highly qualified pilots persist in maintaining a stall for so long without someone figuring out that they have got it wrong.
Having 3 idiots in the office is simply not a very credible explanation, this is not a Colgan situation with a low time pilot at low level with little time to correct a mistake, we have 3 highly trained guys with plenty of time.
My guess (and it is ONLY a guess) is that they must have been getting seriously misleading information and/or some form of incapacitation may be involved.
4 minutes is a very long time. How can 3 highly qualified pilots persist in maintaining a stall for so long without someone figuring out that they have got it wrong.
Having 3 idiots in the office is simply not a very credible explanation, this is not a Colgan situation with a low time pilot at low level with little time to correct a mistake, we have 3 highly trained guys with plenty of time.
My guess (and it is ONLY a guess) is that they must have been getting seriously misleading information and/or some form of incapacitation may be involved.
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Hamrah - 'Food for thought:- The blocked pitot system resulted in the autothrust applying thrust to stop the " apparent" speed decay. Similarly, the autopilot applied nose up trim for the reducing speed'
The BEA report states at the top of pg 2 'From 2 h 10 min 05, the autopilot then auto-thrust disengaged and the PF said "I have the controls". The airplane began to roll to the right and the PF made a left nose-up input. The stall warning sounded twice in a row. The recorded parameters show a sharp fall from about 275 kt
to 60 kt in the speed displayed on the left primary flight display (PFD), then a few moments later in the speed displayed on the integrated standby instrument system (ISIS).
Note 1: Only the speeds displayed on the left PFD and the ISIS are recorded on the FDR; the speed displayed on the right side is not recorded.
Note 2: Autopilot and auto-thrust remained disengaged for the rest of the flight.'
The report later on pg 2 goes on to say 'At 2 h 10 min 51, the stall warning was triggered again. The thrust levers were positioned in the TO/GA detent and the PF maintained nose-up inputs.'
My reading of this is, therefore, that the autopilot and autothrust had already disengaged by the point that the aircraft started climbing and were not responsible for either the application of thrust or nose-up inputs; the crew were.
Does the above alter your hypothesis?
The BEA report states at the top of pg 2 'From 2 h 10 min 05, the autopilot then auto-thrust disengaged and the PF said "I have the controls". The airplane began to roll to the right and the PF made a left nose-up input. The stall warning sounded twice in a row. The recorded parameters show a sharp fall from about 275 kt
to 60 kt in the speed displayed on the left primary flight display (PFD), then a few moments later in the speed displayed on the integrated standby instrument system (ISIS).
Note 1: Only the speeds displayed on the left PFD and the ISIS are recorded on the FDR; the speed displayed on the right side is not recorded.
Note 2: Autopilot and auto-thrust remained disengaged for the rest of the flight.'
The report later on pg 2 goes on to say 'At 2 h 10 min 51, the stall warning was triggered again. The thrust levers were positioned in the TO/GA detent and the PF maintained nose-up inputs.'
My reading of this is, therefore, that the autopilot and autothrust had already disengaged by the point that the aircraft started climbing and were not responsible for either the application of thrust or nose-up inputs; the crew were.
Does the above alter your hypothesis?
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ACARS Messages:
02:11:00 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 228300106FLAG ON CAPT PFD FD
02:11:15 - .1/WRN/WN0906010210 228301106FLAG ON F/O PFD FD
Symptoms:
Disappearance of the FPV (bird) on the PFDs, Captain and First Officer sides, and display of the corresponding flag.
Meaning:
This message indicates that the flight path vector (FPV) function is selected but unavailable. In order to lose completely this function, which is elaborated by the three IRs, in a way that is compatible with the CFR, one of the following three conditions must be met for each ADR:
- barometric vertical speed higher, as an absolute value, than 20,000 ft/min,
- true air speed higher than 599 kt,
- measured calibrated airspeed lower than 60 kt.
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The BEA report shocked the entire aviation community and I can sense this thing can do nothing else but snow ball and get huge momentum as very embarrassing questions will be asked.......as they already have above.
The french pilot community is going to have a very hard time swallowing this and no doubt the plot theory will be milling full speed.
Now, the good question is why ? Does it have to do with training ? Or what else ?
What does " experienced pilot " mean today ? Hours and hours of boring cruise at night doesn't really season you.......if you take the whole game for granted.
In this business, one has to remember that despite the sometimes utter boredom, one is still responsible for lives and this alone should keep you on edge.
We are in a job where our brain should never stop asking " what if..... " this keeps you awake for one thing but more important, reduces the gap between normal and wtf is happening when the dung hits the fan. That's the difference beween surprised and not surprised.
That's the difference between life and death.
AF is going to go through some very very testing times and some people will have to open their eyes.....or else.
We haven't seen the unpleasant side of this YET. There will be a civil trial somewhere down the line and some people will demand explainations.
The french pilot community is going to have a very hard time swallowing this and no doubt the plot theory will be milling full speed.
Now, the good question is why ? Does it have to do with training ? Or what else ?
What does " experienced pilot " mean today ? Hours and hours of boring cruise at night doesn't really season you.......if you take the whole game for granted.
In this business, one has to remember that despite the sometimes utter boredom, one is still responsible for lives and this alone should keep you on edge.
We are in a job where our brain should never stop asking " what if..... " this keeps you awake for one thing but more important, reduces the gap between normal and wtf is happening when the dung hits the fan. That's the difference beween surprised and not surprised.
That's the difference between life and death.
AF is going to go through some very very testing times and some people will have to open their eyes.....or else.
We haven't seen the unpleasant side of this YET. There will be a civil trial somewhere down the line and some people will demand explainations.
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Has anything being mentioned regarding ice buildup on the airframe ie. leading edges, THS. and so on? The conditions they must have been in, was W/A.Ice selected at any stage? It will take seconds to build up enough ice at that altitude to reduce your speed buffer margin to the point of an imminent stall in level flight regardless of attitude and power.
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" So in my opinion the solution to the situation these two pilots found themselves in was:
- Nail the attitude at 2 degrees nose up
- Fix the throttles at the known cruise EPR
- Switch to FPV and keep the symbol on the horizon...
Simples Messieurs! "
The next step in computerized airliner.
A big red panic button in front of the pilots that tells the autopilot to ignore all sensors and pilot inputs exept an independent gyrosystem and achieve the above
. When certain parameters are stable suggest that the pilot "tries again"
- Nail the attitude at 2 degrees nose up
- Fix the throttles at the known cruise EPR
- Switch to FPV and keep the symbol on the horizon...
Simples Messieurs! "
The next step in computerized airliner.
A big red panic button in front of the pilots that tells the autopilot to ignore all sensors and pilot inputs exept an independent gyrosystem and achieve the above
. When certain parameters are stable suggest that the pilot "tries again"
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"How can 3 highly qualified pilots persist in maintaining a stall for so long without someone figuring out that they have got it wrong."
Probably because they were overwhelmed by the repetitive ecam messages,bells and lights.
I had something as simple as an IDG Low Oil Pressure warnings at rotation on the 320 and it was a major distraction. Every time I cnx the warning it came right back on until I leveled out and the oil covered the sensor. Lights, bells, trying to communicate with each other and ATC was problematic.
I can only imagine how difficult it was to decipher just what was going on in the heat of the battle. I am very reluctant to label this as pilot error at this point.
Springer
Probably because they were overwhelmed by the repetitive ecam messages,bells and lights.
I had something as simple as an IDG Low Oil Pressure warnings at rotation on the 320 and it was a major distraction. Every time I cnx the warning it came right back on until I leveled out and the oil covered the sensor. Lights, bells, trying to communicate with each other and ATC was problematic.
I can only imagine how difficult it was to decipher just what was going on in the heat of the battle. I am very reluctant to label this as pilot error at this point.
Springer
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coffin corner
Do you remember, yeaaaaars ago of an aircraft (I think DC10) got to the coffin corner and entered a deep stall ?
They recovered by pulling heavy g's and landed the airplane which suffered structural damages due to the g's.
Just trying to get back to that event details...
They recovered by pulling heavy g's and landed the airplane which suffered structural damages due to the g's.
Just trying to get back to that event details...
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So in my opinion the solution to the situation these two pilots found themselves in was:
- Nail the attitude at 2 degrees nose up
- Fix the throttles at the known cruise EPR
- Switch to FPV and keep the symbol on the horizon...
Simples Messieurs!
- Nail the attitude at 2 degrees nose up
- Fix the throttles at the known cruise EPR
- Switch to FPV and keep the symbol on the horizon...
Simples Messieurs!
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There is one more glue the aircraft was in a stalled condition and that is aerodynamic buffet. That thing must have been shaking itself to bits on the way down. Surely that must have got their attention, as I am quite sure it would have got mine!
Every aircraft I have flown there is a marked aerodynamic buffet at the approach to the stall and there after.
I haven't flown the A330 and never will but I cant imagine it being any different from the many aircraft I have flown.
Every aircraft I have flown there is a marked aerodynamic buffet at the approach to the stall and there after.
I haven't flown the A330 and never will but I cant imagine it being any different from the many aircraft I have flown.
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At over 10,000 ft/min rate of descent, surely they'd have felt it along with the very rapid change of pressure in the cabin?
How many clues did they need that they had stalled?
What are the A330 stall characteristics anyway? Has FBW removed the pilot so far from the basic airframe that he doesn't even have the seat-of-the-pants feeling for the aircraft?
ECAM Actions.
How many clues did they need that they had stalled?
What are the A330 stall characteristics anyway? Has FBW removed the pilot so far from the basic airframe that he doesn't even have the seat-of-the-pants feeling for the aircraft?
ECAM Actions.
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ECAM Actions wrote:
SLF here with no idea on flying an aircraft. What I would like to speculate on, however, is what kind of physiological effects such a rate of descent would have had on the flight deck crew?
We can surmise that the crew was already disoriented by inaccurate instrument readouts, audible alarms and flashing lights. Compounded by 10000ft/min rate of descent is it conceivable that even if the crew been able to reestablish control of the aircraft they could not due to incapacitation or even more disorientation?
At over 10,000 ft/min rate of descent, surely they'd have felt it along with the very rapid change of pressure in the cabin
We can surmise that the crew was already disoriented by inaccurate instrument readouts, audible alarms and flashing lights. Compounded by 10000ft/min rate of descent is it conceivable that even if the crew been able to reestablish control of the aircraft they could not due to incapacitation or even more disorientation?
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I had something as simple as an IDG Low Oil Pressure warnings at rotation on the 320 and it was a major distraction. Every time I cnx the warning it came right back on until I leveled out and the oil covered the sensor. Lights, bells, trying to communicate with each other and ATC was problematic.
Surely that warning would be suppressed during take-off?
And why not use the Emer Canc button if it wasn't?
I am just a PPL so there are quite a few things I don’t understand about flying big jets however I have mentioned before a belief that some of the fundamentals of flying training that I learned back in the early 60’s seem to be passed over or changed for spurious new ideas in the last thirty or so years. I do understand that in a big aircraft some actions, for instance the use of throttle and attitude on approach are different. I have a few questions regarding flying big jets, maybe someone can help.
1) A reduction in speed from 0.82M to 0.80M seems very small for turbulence. I understand stall speed is right up there at that altitude but is the effect of speed reduction proportional to the difference between stall and max speeds? Ie. If the difference is 50 knots and you reduce speed by 20 knots is that the equivalent in a small aircraft at 3,000 ft of reducing speed from 120 knots to 70 knots?
2) Is the Airbus stall warning a light and buzzer which can get confused in all the warnings etc going off or is it a voice saying “Stall . . . . . . “
3) The report does not mention rudder input. Was the rudder used to control the dropping wings or were ailerons used? If rudder was used it would appear to indicate that the pilot(s) understood they were in a stalling condition. (When I was learning it was stressed that one used rudder to control wing drop approaching the stall so that one did not stall the wing by increasing tha AoA with aileron, is it different in big jets?)
4) With steam gauges it is fairly hard to miss the indications that you are going UP while speed is decaying. Is it less clear in a glass cockpit?
5) There are indications that pitot speeds didn’t agree, and the change to alternate law also indicates that, but are there also clear indications that pitot speeds have become reliable again?
6) Just from memory the original reports on the V stabiliser indicated that it was attached till impact. If the aircraft was in alternate law at 250 knots (and the limiter was disengaged) was the air thin enough at 35,000ft not to cause a separation if rudder was applied (ie, the crew recognised approaching stall and used rudder to control roll at some stage.) Could the initial reports have been wrong?
7) Bearing in mind the Buffalo accident, did any of the crew receive training that mandated other actions besides stick forward in an apparent stall situation?
8) Does the Airbus have ‘stick’ shaker and ‘stick’ forward pressure during stall approach. (I do know they are side controls.)
9) I can understand carrying out wrong actions in ‘coffin corner’ especially if suddenly faced with an unusual situation during an otherwise normal flight but surely someone must have recognised the unwinding altimeter and slow speed indications in two or three minutes, that’s an awful long time to be holding stick back in those conditions.
I understand this is a preliminary report to damp down the wild speculation a little, but as already mentioned it raises more questions than answers, for me at least. I have passengered nine times in the last five weeks and the report scares me, a lot.
1) A reduction in speed from 0.82M to 0.80M seems very small for turbulence. I understand stall speed is right up there at that altitude but is the effect of speed reduction proportional to the difference between stall and max speeds? Ie. If the difference is 50 knots and you reduce speed by 20 knots is that the equivalent in a small aircraft at 3,000 ft of reducing speed from 120 knots to 70 knots?
2) Is the Airbus stall warning a light and buzzer which can get confused in all the warnings etc going off or is it a voice saying “Stall . . . . . . “
3) The report does not mention rudder input. Was the rudder used to control the dropping wings or were ailerons used? If rudder was used it would appear to indicate that the pilot(s) understood they were in a stalling condition. (When I was learning it was stressed that one used rudder to control wing drop approaching the stall so that one did not stall the wing by increasing tha AoA with aileron, is it different in big jets?)
4) With steam gauges it is fairly hard to miss the indications that you are going UP while speed is decaying. Is it less clear in a glass cockpit?
5) There are indications that pitot speeds didn’t agree, and the change to alternate law also indicates that, but are there also clear indications that pitot speeds have become reliable again?
6) Just from memory the original reports on the V stabiliser indicated that it was attached till impact. If the aircraft was in alternate law at 250 knots (and the limiter was disengaged) was the air thin enough at 35,000ft not to cause a separation if rudder was applied (ie, the crew recognised approaching stall and used rudder to control roll at some stage.) Could the initial reports have been wrong?
7) Bearing in mind the Buffalo accident, did any of the crew receive training that mandated other actions besides stick forward in an apparent stall situation?
8) Does the Airbus have ‘stick’ shaker and ‘stick’ forward pressure during stall approach. (I do know they are side controls.)
9) I can understand carrying out wrong actions in ‘coffin corner’ especially if suddenly faced with an unusual situation during an otherwise normal flight but surely someone must have recognised the unwinding altimeter and slow speed indications in two or three minutes, that’s an awful long time to be holding stick back in those conditions.
I understand this is a preliminary report to damp down the wild speculation a little, but as already mentioned it raises more questions than answers, for me at least. I have passengered nine times in the last five weeks and the report scares me, a lot.
I just find it very hard to believe that for the duration of the stall (Recovery attempt ?) the stick was held all the way back ? 
It's very easy to blame the pilots (3 experienced pilots) but could it be something else such as a computer malfunction ? The stick may have been pushed forward but the computer decided to send an elevator up command.....and therefore the DFDR data recorded seems to point to a pilot input rather than a computer command ( I think there has been a few similar incidents). There is much much more to discover...
It's very easy to blame the pilots (3 experienced pilots) but could it be something else such as a computer malfunction ? The stick may have been pushed forward but the computer decided to send an elevator up command.....and therefore the DFDR data recorded seems to point to a pilot input rather than a computer command ( I think there has been a few similar incidents). There is much much more to discover...
ECAMS:
ECAMS, considering the human "stimulus - response - conclusion" chain, did the pilot think he was dealing in a high speed stall? (As I don't know the difference in "feel" that may be an idiotic question. Some weeks ago the difference between the two was described in one of the other threads).
That said, based on how FDR records info (??) will anyone know what the PF was looking at? It is possible (not sure how likely) that his display and the PNF display were not showing the same information ... at some point control of acft changes hands, perhaps display anomalies contributed to that?
(Used to fail other pilot's gyro during instrument checks during a turn to see what people did. Was very, the variety of reaction, but I never had to take control back ... though had to talk a few folks back to wings level ... )
@ torquelink: significant difference being quite a bit more altitude and time, and experience, available in this scenario. In Colgon case A/S unreliable did not figure into the scenario, IIRC.
I don't see why the AP pitched UP due to reducing airspeed. Worse still, it seems clear to me that the pilots had several STALL warnings after AP disengagement and prior to it actually dropping like a brick. What is even more perplexing is given that the pilot arrested the 7000 ft rate of climb, why he then proceeded to apply aft stick input and raise the nose?
That said, based on how FDR records info (??) will anyone know what the PF was looking at? It is possible (not sure how likely) that his display and the PNF display were not showing the same information ... at some point control of acft changes hands, perhaps display anomalies contributed to that?
(Used to fail other pilot's gyro during instrument checks during a turn to see what people did. Was very, the variety of reaction, but I never had to take control back ... though had to talk a few folks back to wings level ... )
@ torquelink: significant difference being quite a bit more altitude and time, and experience, available in this scenario. In Colgon case A/S unreliable did not figure into the scenario, IIRC.
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The stick may have been pushed forward but the computer decided to send an elevator up command.....and therefore the DFDR data recorded seems to point to a pilot input rather than a computer command
In the report they mention that at one point both pilots were making control inputs. That would have been seen on the DFDR.
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I just find it very hard to believe that for the duration of the stall (Recovery attempt ?) the stick was held all the way back ? It's very easy to blame the pilots (3 experienced pilots) but could it be something else such as a computer malfunction ? The stick may have been pushed forward but the computer decided to send an elevator up command.....and therefore the DFDR data recorded seems to point to a pilot input rather than a computer command ( I think there has been a few similar incidents). There is much much more to discover...
It's very easy to blame the pilots (3 experienced pilots) but could it be something else such as a computer malfunction ? The stick may have been pushed forward but the computer decided to send an elevator up command.....and therefore the DFDR data recorded seems to point to a pilot input rather than a computer command ( I think there has been a few similar incidents). There is much much more to discover... We are going to have to await more information because it makes no sense why 3 pilots nose dived a 330 into the ocean.
10,000 feet/minute dive- you dont need a vertical speed indicator, or any instrument for that matter to feel that and know your only going in one direction -down.
Hi there Whatsalizad, thanks for your reply. I suspected someone might take issue with my comments, and I have no problem with your reply. I've never flown a commercial airliner, but did fly in the military, and as you mentioned, Power + Attitude = Performance was king of my world.
Yes, the QA A380 incident was alarming / frightening, but they stuck to basics and got it right.
I agree that we don't know what indications the aircrew received, which is why I admitted that my comments might be jumping the gun. Apologies if they annoyed you.
Yes, the QA A380 incident was alarming / frightening, but they stuck to basics and got it right.
I agree that we don't know what indications the aircrew received, which is why I admitted that my comments might be jumping the gun. Apologies if they annoyed you.
I agree going to the basics that work rather than trying to solve an automation Rubiks Cube is the way to go. I still can't believe guys who spend time heads down at less than 3000 AFL typing for a simple VFR runway change. My preference in handling any automation confusion is to downgrade to the lowest level of automation, AP and AT off if neccessary and retrace the programming steps. I've found it's easier to ask "what it did" instead of "what's it doing now".