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AF447 wreckage found

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AF447 wreckage found

Old 27th May 2011, 08:30
  #481 (permalink)  
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Automation is fine as long as the human operator is sufficiently trained in it's use and is capable of controlling it. This is not confined to Aviation alone. Robotic surgery on critical anatomical areas and procedures involving Prostectomy for example, have a much higher success rate than manual intervention. Sorry for the thread creep, but automation is here to stay.
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Old 27th May 2011, 08:41
  #482 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by SC
this may be the FIRST time ever ALL 3 pitot systems failed.
- do we know that? I thought the computers simply rejected the readings due to 'disagreement' thus possibly cascading events on the crew?
Originally Posted by SC
Don't go near storms.
- shows how much you know about aviation. Have you heard of the ITCZ for example? It kind of 'gets in the way' of your advice. What is 'near' in your mind, by the way - up, down left, right, 10nm, 20nm, 50nm, 100nm? Clarification of your 'answer' eagerly awaited by interested aviation people.
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Old 27th May 2011, 08:51
  #483 (permalink)  
 
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hello again BOAC.

I said "may" be the first time regarding the probes. There is already enough weather information out there to "suggest" they shouldn't have been where there were. Just as in previous Air France incidents there are justifiable questions to be asked about events.

Canada A340, a B747 in the far east which killed a passenger in turbulence.

The BEA has decided to publish a note with information on the first facts established, based on analysis of the data from the flight recorders. This note will be put on line on Friday 27 May at the beginning of the afternoon and will be available in English, French, German and Portuguese. There will be no press briefing.

Last edited by Safety Concerns; 27th May 2011 at 09:13.
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Old 27th May 2011, 08:58
  #484 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by GlueBall
the pitot & static ports were taped when the airframe was washed.
Which is what was supposed to happen - the critical failure is that they didn't remove the tape afterwards

The Perpignan airbus crashed because they didn't tape stuff up (AoA sensors in that case) when the airframe was washed [although it shouldn't have been fatal if the flight tests had been done properly]
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Old 27th May 2011, 09:01
  #485 (permalink)  
 
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Which is what was supposed to happen
Tape? Can you get 'tape' with 'REMOVE BEFORE FLIGHT' streamers?
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Old 27th May 2011, 10:31
  #486 (permalink)  
 
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Latest BEA factual report, of Frid May 27th (in English):

http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol....mai2011.en.pdf

AGB


which - rather oddly - is markedly dissimilar to the official French-language version...

http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol....mai2011.fr.pdf

AGB

Last edited by Gary Brown; 27th May 2011 at 11:03. Reason: Link to French version added
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Old 27th May 2011, 11:34
  #487 (permalink)  
 
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which - rather oddly - is markedly dissimilar to the official French-language version...
"As accurate as the translation may be, the original text in French should be
considered as the work of reference."

I just re-read them side to side and I failed to see any "marked dissimilarity". May be they updated the translation?

Last edited by WilyB; 27th May 2011 at 11:45.
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Old 27th May 2011, 11:42
  #488 (permalink)  
 
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New findings

At this stage of the investigation, as an addition to the BEA interim reports of 2 July and 17 December 2009, the following new facts have been established:

ˆˆ The composition of the crew was in accordance with the operatorís procedures.

ˆˆ At the time of the event, the weight and balance of the airplane were within the operational
limits.

ˆˆ At the time of the event, the two co-pilots were seated in the cockpit and the Captain was
resting. The latter returned to the cockpit about 1 min 30 after the disengagement of the
autopilot.

ˆˆ There was an inconsistency between the speeds displayed on the left side and the integrated
standby instrument system (ISIS). This lasted for less than one minute.

ˆˆ After the autopilot disengagement:

„„the airplane climbed to 38,000 ft,

„„the stall warning was triggered and the airplane stalled,

„„the inputs made by the PF were mainly nose-up,

„„the descent lasted 3 min 30, during which the airplane remained stalled.

The angle of attack increased and remained above 35 degrees,

„„the engines were operating and always responded to crew commands.

ˆˆ The last recorded values were a pitch attitude of 16.2 degrees nose-up, a roll angle of 5.3 degrees left and a vertical speed of -10,912 ft/min.
There are some parts of the CVR on the report too.
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Old 27th May 2011, 11:59
  #489 (permalink)  
 
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the stall warning was triggered and the airplane stalled,
the inputs made by the PF were mainly nose-up,
the descent lasted 3 min 30, during which the airplane remained stalled.
The angle of attack increased and remained above 35 degrees,
I think that pulling up the nose of a stalling plane is not exactly what can take it out of a stall - but then I'm not a pilot. Maybe I am not the one who should be taking flying lessons? Maybe stall recovery should be taught at airline pilot school?

At this point I will continue to fly Airbus as an SLF, but I think I will not fly Air France ever again. There is no reason to have pilots in a plane if they don't get taught to hand-fly the aircraft. I think US airlines have really bad catering and unpleasant overage cabin staff, but they often have pilots who are ex-military or enthusiasts and who are natural pilots.

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Old 27th May 2011, 12:07
  #490 (permalink)  
 
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As I said elsewhere, I don't understand why the PF continued making nose-up inputs in a stall environment. A suicidal thing to do, and elementary for anyone who's flown an aircraft. The results are plain (and very sad) to see, but how on earth does a proffessional qualified pilot with hundreds of lives in his hands make such a mistake?

Perhaps I'm jumping the gun, perhaps there's more to it and someone might put me in my place, and I don't mean to be disrespectful to a person who's no longer with us, or his family. I'm just shocked by the reading.

Should airline pilots have a yearly 'refresher' in a light aircraft to remind them of the basic principles of flying?
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Old 27th May 2011, 12:24
  #491 (permalink)  
 
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The Airbus has built-in protections that will 'prevent' it from stalling when all systems and computers are working, giving the pilot the 'idea' that even pulling all the way on the stick is probably the best response to a situation where altitude/speed are compromised. We are taught to do this in a CFIT scenario.
In the scenario of AF447, they lost the protections due to the airspeed being unreliable, and as per the information we have, never recovered Normal Law, however, the airspeed indication apparently came back to normal, but the airplane was already in a stall condition. my thinking the pilot was pulling to recover thinking he had the protections, or this is the natural reaction to the automation in the Airbus.
Angle of Attack is mentioned repeatedly in the report, yet this information is not provided to the pilot!
Airbus, PLEASE GIVE US AN ANGLE OF ATACK INDICATOR AND STOP BLAMING PILOTS!
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Old 27th May 2011, 12:27
  #492 (permalink)  
 
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I mean no disrespect to the pilots of AF447 but I really don't understand how experienced pilots with thousands of hours of flying can keep pulling on the stick from 38,000ft to 0ft without ever realizing that they killing themselves! Planes sometimes stall, it's a fact of life, so how come pilots do not receive the adequate training for such an emergency and are often taken by surprise by something as basic as a stall? Also, is there no training to rid the pilots of the pull on the stick "reflex"?
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Old 27th May 2011, 12:30
  #493 (permalink)  
 
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As I said elsewhere, I don't understand why the PF continued making nose-up inputs in a stall environment. A suicidal thing to do, and elementary for anyone who's flown an aircraft. The results are plain (and very sad) to see, but how on earth does a proffessional qualified pilot with hundreds of lives in his hands make such a mistake?

Perhaps I'm jumping the gun, perhaps there's more to it and someone might put me in my place, and I don't mean to be disrespectful to a person who's no longer with us, or his family. I'm just shocked by the reading.

Should airline pilots have a yearly 'refresher' in a light aircraft to remind them of the basic principles of flying?
Yes, you are "jumping the gun". My suggestion is that we wait for a clear report on exactly what the crew was given to react to the situation in terms of displays, indications and warnings. A well meaning bunch of engineers attempting to automate an airliner to the maximum extent possible in order to provide the lowest training costs can create a confusing disaster when problems occur, especially when different systems start conflicting. The QA A380 comes to mind.

I once experienced a subtle airspeed failure at night in a B767 on takeoff with a slew of warnings at rotation. Both of us simply fell back to power, pitch, and a quick look at the runway length remaining which was normal. It was very confusing and cannot imagine a low time crew processing the problem along with the seat-of-the-pants feel that comes from 6000 hours in type. What would be even more confusing would be yokes/sticks or throttles that didn't offer feedback as to what the other pilot/autopilot or autothrottles were attempting to accomplish.
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Old 27th May 2011, 12:30
  #494 (permalink)  
 
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First of all both links provide on here fail to open. Perhaps there is too much traffic on the server.

Now if I go by the excerpt of the report I see on the forum, Air France is in a lot of trouble. There are simply too many things going wrong at that airline lately.

Now I say if there was no actual problem with the aircraft except for a momentary discrepancy between the LH airspeed and the standby airspeed (what about the RH airspeed), I canít believe the two pilots in control stalled this aircraft and flew it into the ocean from 38,000 feet in a stalled configuration when it seems everything was working properly including the engines which seemed to respond to pilot inputs.

Why was the autopilot ďOFFĒ for 90 minutes?
Were they just hand flying it for fun?
Did they have a technical problem with the AP?
Why wasnít the captain advised immediately about the AP problem if indeed there was a problem?
Regardless while in RVSM airspace without auto flight shouldnít they have advised ATC of the problem and either climb above RVSM airspace (doubtful the A-330 can) or descent below which means they would have had to divert back most likely to the main land.

Too many things that just donít add up to a proper operation of an aircraft and to think the pilot flying was pulling on the yoke instead of pushing, what the hell was he thinking. People couldnít believe the two pilots stalled a Dash 8/400 in Buffalo a couple years ago but you could always point to a piss poor commuter airline with lack of training, low time pilots with bad pay and bad working conditions but here we are talking a major world known airline with supposedly good training and pilots with experience. They are extremely well paid with very good working conditions and yet they canít even recognise a stall and fly it into the ocean?!
I just donít get it!

I go to the simulator 3 times a year (because Iím qualified on 2 types) and I can assure you that not only does our company train us on stalls but it is mandated by TC to do so. These include stalls at low altitude while levelling off at MDA in a landing configuration, stalls on departure in takeoff configuration with an engine out and high altitude stalls. We also practice for unusual attitudes which will be extreme at times in conjunction with the lost of the PFD, HUD or both PFDs where one as to revert to the STBY attitude indicator. I donít understand why this wouldnít be part of any airline training.

Iíll repeat myself again and I say if in the final report it comes down to a pilot error in which the 2 pilots stalled the aircraft and flew into the ocean from 38,00 feet a major clean up at Air France is warranted.

In the mean time Iím glad to have reserved by airline ticket on Air Canada to Paris next month and not on Air France (too bad I could have deadheaded on the A-380).
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Old 27th May 2011, 12:35
  #495 (permalink)  
 
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Airbus do have a stall recovery procedure, its in the QRH as are procedures for ADR failure etc. These are all things that are trained or should be. If your confused about pulling or pushing in a stall then you shouldn't be doing the job. Its basic.

Maybe they did not recognise they were in a stall or were confused/distracted by the discrepancy in airspeed. Yet again it raises questions about selection and training.
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Old 27th May 2011, 12:36
  #496 (permalink)  
 
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You could ague that we do have AOA indication: the STALL warning is based on AOA.
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Old 27th May 2011, 12:37
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Sigh. I'm afraid the reaction of the whole SLF community is likely to be similar to the SLF posts above. AF now has the worst accident rate in Europe - see Airline accident ratings - and it will take a lot more than its flight attendants wearing badges with "Securite" (Safety) written on them to improve their image...

There are two major European airlines I try to avoid as pax on safety grounds - TK and AF - and today's BEA release doesn't change my views on AF.

It looks like:

- The PF may have believed that the plane was still in some Airbus law-state which should automatically prevent a stall even if inputs are nose-up;

- An AoA indicator would have disabused him of this notion pretty quickly.
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Old 27th May 2011, 12:42
  #498 (permalink)  
 
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Even if this pilot's response to the stall warning was inappropriate, there was another pilot and later even the captain who would have seen what was happening. Puzzling. Did they enter a deep stall which they could not get out of?
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Old 27th May 2011, 12:53
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Even if this pilot's response to the stall warning was inappropriate, there was another pilot and later even the captain who would have seen what was happening.
Puzzling.
Did they enter a deep stall which they could not get out of?
Related to this question is whether or not PF saw or sensed a decrease in airspeed which would cue him to a corrective attitude.
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Old 27th May 2011, 12:56
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My experience is strictly VFR in a spamcan, but one thing I think that is very ill-advised about this statement is there is no information at all with regard to what the chaps up front were seeing - the story as is totally confusing, unless they were massively disorientated.

So much information is missing. I would much rather wait, and can't help but feel this has stitched the late crew up a little bit. Presumably this scenario is well-covered in their training regime? I just don't understand. Something happened that meant they were not able to apply what they knew.

Edit: DT has report that PFD and standby ASI disagreeing: Pilots battled with controls of Air France crash plane for four minutes - Telegraph
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