I am just a PPL so there are quite a few things I don’t understand about flying big jets however I have mentioned before a belief that some of the fundamentals of flying training that I learned back in the early 60’s seem to be passed over or changed for spurious new ideas in the last thirty or so years. I do understand that in a big aircraft some actions, for instance the use of throttle and attitude on approach are different. I have a few questions regarding flying big jets, maybe someone can help.
1) A reduction in speed from 0.82M to 0.80M seems very small for turbulence. I understand stall speed is right up there at that altitude but is the effect of speed reduction proportional to the difference between stall and max speeds? Ie. If the difference is 50 knots and you reduce speed by 20 knots is that the equivalent in a small aircraft at 3,000 ft of reducing speed from 120 knots to 70 knots?
2) Is the Airbus stall warning a light and buzzer which can get confused in all the warnings etc going off or is it a voice saying “Stall . . . . . . “
3) The report does not mention rudder input. Was the rudder used to control the dropping wings or were ailerons used? If rudder was used it would appear to indicate that the pilot(s) understood they were in a stalling condition. (When I was learning it was stressed that one used rudder to control wing drop approaching the stall so that one did not stall the wing by increasing tha AoA with aileron, is it different in big jets?)
4) With steam gauges it is fairly hard to miss the indications that you are going UP while speed is decaying. Is it less clear in a glass cockpit?
5) There are indications that pitot speeds didn’t agree, and the change to alternate law also indicates that, but are there also clear indications that pitot speeds have become reliable again?
6) Just from memory the original reports on the V stabiliser indicated that it was attached till impact. If the aircraft was in alternate law at 250 knots (and the limiter was disengaged) was the air thin enough at 35,000ft not to cause a separation if rudder was applied (ie, the crew recognised approaching stall and used rudder to control roll at some stage.) Could the initial reports have been wrong?
7) Bearing in mind the Buffalo accident, did any of the crew receive training that mandated other actions besides stick forward in an apparent stall situation?
8) Does the Airbus have ‘stick’ shaker and ‘stick’ forward pressure during stall approach. (I do know they are side controls.)
9) I can understand carrying out wrong actions in ‘coffin corner’ especially if suddenly faced with an unusual situation during an otherwise normal flight but surely someone must have recognised the unwinding altimeter and slow speed indications in two or three minutes, that’s an awful long time to be holding stick back in those conditions.
I understand this is a preliminary report to damp down the wild speculation a little, but as already mentioned it raises more questions than answers, for me at least. I have passengered nine times in the last five weeks and the report scares me, a lot.