AF447 wreckage found
Pegase Driver
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GPS will give you Ground speed, not IAS , stall protections are IAS based, not GS. A sudden change in GS could be due to wind/ windshear for instance, not indicating some failure .
A sudden change in GS could be due to wind/ windshear for instance, not indicating some failure .
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I'd be very surprised if the LHS pilot was PF - in our company (also flying A330s, amongst others), if two FOs are upfront, only the RHS pilot can be PF. The reasoning being that an FO in the LHS most likely has no experience of handling that aircraft type from the LHS. Makes sense.
I'd presume the PF role was being done by the RHS pilot.
I'd presume the PF role was being done by the RHS pilot.
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good point ....but can imagine a scenario where the least experienced pilot is in the rhs ..as pf ...but when the proverbial hits the fan ...then the more experienced f/o ,in the lhs , has to take over...hmmm well lets see on friday ...should be a little clearer..
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Camel and Bucket -
Company's SOP is the Captain decides who the PIC is during his absence. If the experience level is similar it's often becomes the FO almost by default.
Had a flight to S. America where the reserve FO had low experience in the a/c and had never flown the a/c at max gross weight or been to S. America. Gave him the leg but the relief pilot was in charge during my absence.
Others have commented on how crew rest periods are done. At my company typically the PF picks first, then CA(if not PF), then the FO (if not PF), then the relief pilot. If the relief pilot is PF he gets to choose his break. All subject to change if difficult conditions are expected enroute, at which point my break will either be before, or after, the area of concern.
Company's SOP is the Captain decides who the PIC is during his absence. If the experience level is similar it's often becomes the FO almost by default.
Had a flight to S. America where the reserve FO had low experience in the a/c and had never flown the a/c at max gross weight or been to S. America. Gave him the leg but the relief pilot was in charge during my absence.
Others have commented on how crew rest periods are done. At my company typically the PF picks first, then CA(if not PF), then the FO (if not PF), then the relief pilot. If the relief pilot is PF he gets to choose his break. All subject to change if difficult conditions are expected enroute, at which point my break will either be before, or after, the area of concern.
Last edited by misd-agin; 25th May 2011 at 17:35. Reason: added text for clarity
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Hi,
I wonder if this will be verified the Friday 27 May .......
hmmm well lets see on friday ...should be a little clearer..
AF 447: What the BEA will not tell!
(Recovery: this note was posted on this blog June 11, 2009)
Those who pay attention to communications from BEA after an accident to know what method to use that body to convey its message.
BEA determines the direct cause of an accident and assigns it a number of contributing parameters. For example, in the report of the crash of the Fokker 28 of the company's Regional Pau January 25, 2007, the BEA said that the crash resulted from a loss of control during takeoff and that may have been contributed to the accident awareness limited risk associated with icing, a lack of awareness among the crew of procedures for checking the surface condition in icing conditions, the ordinary aspect of the flight etc.. In this example, the BEA has overshadowed the fatigue of the crew which was subjected to a short night and therefore insufficient rest.
This archaic method allows to rank the errors and thus give them a greater or lesser extent. In general, the BEA, the main cause is always the one who, chronologically, is the latest. It is the result of the crew. That is what the audience holds.
It is convenient to limit the mistakes in the cockpit. This avoids the question for example the operation of the company and the bodies responsible for control, recurrent defects of aircraft etc..
To explain the tragedy of Flight 447, the BEA will say that the main cause of the accident was the inability of drivers to maintain the A330 in its flight and that may have been contributed to the accident of defects Pitot probes and weather.
It is the sense of first communications from Airbus and EASA and probably "the option" chosen by the political power so that there is a minimum of collateral damage ...
Claim that an accident is the result of one cause is the misinformation. If the drivers make mistakes, no one can deny that they are not the only ones to commit.
Systemic analysis advocated by ICAO is the opposite: we must determine all the barriers that have failed in preventing the accident.
This is the model of REASON. It requires investigators to incorporate the latent causes in the chain of events leading to the accident. That is really annoying when it comes to protecting a manufacturer, administration, industry etc..
The latent causes ..., BEA does not know!
Yet there are some in this drama ...
Deficiencies · a supplier Airbus (Pitot probes)
· Deficiencies of feedback (BEA, Airbus, DGCA, EASA, Air France ...)
· Lack of "airworthiness directive" concerning the change of the probes (EASA)
Function of Air France (flight plan, weather parameters)
• Choice of business objectives (Air France)
· Culture of Security (Air)
· Etc..
But that BEA will not tell!
Note added date: Friday, BEA will describe a "context" (read the note of May 21 on this) which increased the workload of pilots and led to a reduction in their ability to control the flight of the A330. These are the terms used by EASA and the others in the AD as of August 10, 2009 he was acting to remove the pitot probe Thales SA in an emergency. So, nothing new that they already knew at the time ...
(Recovery: this note was posted on this blog June 11, 2009)
Those who pay attention to communications from BEA after an accident to know what method to use that body to convey its message.
BEA determines the direct cause of an accident and assigns it a number of contributing parameters. For example, in the report of the crash of the Fokker 28 of the company's Regional Pau January 25, 2007, the BEA said that the crash resulted from a loss of control during takeoff and that may have been contributed to the accident awareness limited risk associated with icing, a lack of awareness among the crew of procedures for checking the surface condition in icing conditions, the ordinary aspect of the flight etc.. In this example, the BEA has overshadowed the fatigue of the crew which was subjected to a short night and therefore insufficient rest.
This archaic method allows to rank the errors and thus give them a greater or lesser extent. In general, the BEA, the main cause is always the one who, chronologically, is the latest. It is the result of the crew. That is what the audience holds.
It is convenient to limit the mistakes in the cockpit. This avoids the question for example the operation of the company and the bodies responsible for control, recurrent defects of aircraft etc..
To explain the tragedy of Flight 447, the BEA will say that the main cause of the accident was the inability of drivers to maintain the A330 in its flight and that may have been contributed to the accident of defects Pitot probes and weather.
It is the sense of first communications from Airbus and EASA and probably "the option" chosen by the political power so that there is a minimum of collateral damage ...
Claim that an accident is the result of one cause is the misinformation. If the drivers make mistakes, no one can deny that they are not the only ones to commit.
Systemic analysis advocated by ICAO is the opposite: we must determine all the barriers that have failed in preventing the accident.
This is the model of REASON. It requires investigators to incorporate the latent causes in the chain of events leading to the accident. That is really annoying when it comes to protecting a manufacturer, administration, industry etc..
The latent causes ..., BEA does not know!
Yet there are some in this drama ...
Deficiencies · a supplier Airbus (Pitot probes)
· Deficiencies of feedback (BEA, Airbus, DGCA, EASA, Air France ...)
· Lack of "airworthiness directive" concerning the change of the probes (EASA)
Function of Air France (flight plan, weather parameters)
• Choice of business objectives (Air France)
· Culture of Security (Air)
· Etc..
But that BEA will not tell!
Note added date: Friday, BEA will describe a "context" (read the note of May 21 on this) which increased the workload of pilots and led to a reduction in their ability to control the flight of the A330. These are the terms used by EASA and the others in the AD as of August 10, 2009 he was acting to remove the pitot probe Thales SA in an emergency. So, nothing new that they already knew at the time ...
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Hi,
Does that date Air France had the contents of black boxes
Premonition ? crystal ball ?
Le Figaro - France : Scurit arienne: Air France rappelle l'ordre ses pilotes
Does that date Air France had the contents of black boxes
Premonition ? crystal ball ?
Le Figaro - France : Scurit arienne: Air France rappelle l'ordre ses pilotes
Safety: Air France call to order its pilots
F.G. (lefigaro.fr)
24/10/2009 | Updated: 21:30 Comments (173)
At the heart of a controversy related to the crash of Flight 447, the management sent a letter to pilots that has increased tensions with the unions.
Drivers, beware of "over-confidence." The management of Air France regrets, in a letter this week to its drivers, incidents of disrespect of the proceedings, The Tribune revealed in its Saturday edition. The letter, entitled "quite controversial and false debates on flight safety," has aroused the ire of unions.
In this letter, acquired by the business daily, the director of flight operations, Pierre-Marie Gautron, and the director of security for Air France, Etienne Lichtenberger, "point to recent major incidents attributable to non-compliance procedures for flights some drivers. " It cites several recent examples of "deviations" that "have generated risk" as a takeoff continued despite a warning "Config" ["forbidden", ed] before takeoff. For management, "the mere application of procedures would have prevented these events."
"We thought we had control of these risk elementary (...) that the current situation would encourage everyone to be extra vigilant. It is clear that this is not the case, "say the authors of the letter by warning against" over-confidence "drivers. Moreover, speculation about the crash of the AF447 "throw into confusion the minds of some drivers by making them doubt the correctness of our doctrine, our procedures and those of the manufacturer," which should not be the case, said the management of Air France.
Threat of strike
For their part, unions complain that management does not jeopardize its procedures, while a house expertise has been accepted. "How can we launch an audit to change the rules of operation while ensuring that they are infallible?" Asks Erick Derivry, spokesman of the majority union SNPL.
The union representing Air France pilots (SPAF) and Alter, two organizations of minority drivers waved Tuesday threatened a strike if management of the airline persisted in not taking into account their proposals on flight safety . Following the crash of the Airbus A330 of Air France on 1 June between Paris and Rio, which killed 228 people, the SPAF and Alter asking a series of measures, including that of being associated with the study of Air Safety Reports (ASR), written reports by pilots due to incidents.
F.G. (lefigaro.fr)
24/10/2009 | Updated: 21:30 Comments (173)
At the heart of a controversy related to the crash of Flight 447, the management sent a letter to pilots that has increased tensions with the unions.
Drivers, beware of "over-confidence." The management of Air France regrets, in a letter this week to its drivers, incidents of disrespect of the proceedings, The Tribune revealed in its Saturday edition. The letter, entitled "quite controversial and false debates on flight safety," has aroused the ire of unions.
In this letter, acquired by the business daily, the director of flight operations, Pierre-Marie Gautron, and the director of security for Air France, Etienne Lichtenberger, "point to recent major incidents attributable to non-compliance procedures for flights some drivers. " It cites several recent examples of "deviations" that "have generated risk" as a takeoff continued despite a warning "Config" ["forbidden", ed] before takeoff. For management, "the mere application of procedures would have prevented these events."
"We thought we had control of these risk elementary (...) that the current situation would encourage everyone to be extra vigilant. It is clear that this is not the case, "say the authors of the letter by warning against" over-confidence "drivers. Moreover, speculation about the crash of the AF447 "throw into confusion the minds of some drivers by making them doubt the correctness of our doctrine, our procedures and those of the manufacturer," which should not be the case, said the management of Air France.
Threat of strike
For their part, unions complain that management does not jeopardize its procedures, while a house expertise has been accepted. "How can we launch an audit to change the rules of operation while ensuring that they are infallible?" Asks Erick Derivry, spokesman of the majority union SNPL.
The union representing Air France pilots (SPAF) and Alter, two organizations of minority drivers waved Tuesday threatened a strike if management of the airline persisted in not taking into account their proposals on flight safety . Following the crash of the Airbus A330 of Air France on 1 June between Paris and Rio, which killed 228 people, the SPAF and Alter asking a series of measures, including that of being associated with the study of Air Safety Reports (ASR), written reports by pilots due to incidents.
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instant consultants
Those who insist GPS is the way to go have no clue as to what they are talking of .. or maybe they are shy to make money on their invention of how GPS will save the day ..
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Quote "One FO was 37, had 6600 hrs TT, qualified on the 330/340 in 2002, and had 2600 hrs on type."
According to the BEA report, the number of flight hours on type was 4479 and not 2600. He was the most experienced of the crew on A330.
According to the BEA report, the number of flight hours on type was 4479 and not 2600. He was the most experienced of the crew on A330.
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So, the pilots misread the weather radar, flew into bad weather, airspeed indicators failed, automation degraded to the point of unusability, plane got hard to fly, pilots could not handle the workload and the plane met the sea - that is the conjecture so far.
The only way this can and will get handled is by improving the automatic systems on board - at this stage pilots with rudimentary flying ability have become the industry standard - and retraining *all* of the existing pilots to better handle the workload of actually flying the planes is hopeless. The people who design the automation are the ones who really fly these complex and much exported aircraft.
Edmund
The only way this can and will get handled is by improving the automatic systems on board - at this stage pilots with rudimentary flying ability have become the industry standard - and retraining *all* of the existing pilots to better handle the workload of actually flying the planes is hopeless. The people who design the automation are the ones who really fly these complex and much exported aircraft.
Edmund
The reasoning being that an FO in the LHS most likely has no experience of handling that aircraft type from the LHS. Makes sense.
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Centaurus,
it's got nothing to do with ability (or competency) and everything to do with regulation. It is the CAA (and it's overseas equivalents) that dictate who can operate from which seat. It is the same reason that Captains have to undergo a 'Right Hand Seat Check' once a year in the sim to enable them to operate as an FO if required.
As FO's don't undergo a 'Left Hand Seat Check' (at least until they get a command!) they are not 'qualified' in the regulatory sense to operate from that seat.
I can't think of any Long Haul First officer who would not be able to fly the aircraft just as competently from the LHS as from the right. It's simply that we are not *legally* allowed to.
HTH!
it's got nothing to do with ability (or competency) and everything to do with regulation. It is the CAA (and it's overseas equivalents) that dictate who can operate from which seat. It is the same reason that Captains have to undergo a 'Right Hand Seat Check' once a year in the sim to enable them to operate as an FO if required.
As FO's don't undergo a 'Left Hand Seat Check' (at least until they get a command!) they are not 'qualified' in the regulatory sense to operate from that seat.
I can't think of any Long Haul First officer who would not be able to fly the aircraft just as competently from the LHS as from the right. It's simply that we are not *legally* allowed to.
HTH!
it's got nothing to do with ability (or competency) and everything to do with regulation.
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ecureilx:
Way to go? What or where?
Perhaps you could shed some logic on your negative, but quite vague statement.
Those who insist GPS is the way to go have no clue as to what they are talking of .. or maybe they are shy to make money on their invention of how GPS will save the day ..
Way to go? What or where?
Perhaps you could shed some logic on your negative, but quite vague statement.
His comment seemed to refere to some suggestions, above, to use GPS to emulate or temporarliy sub for airspeed data.
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As I understand it, Backup Speed Scale (available for real since 2006 btw., standard on A380, as an option for A330/A340) uses GPS only for altitude, and AoA for speed.
Airbus backs up speed and altitude displays-28/03/2006-Toulouse-Flight International
Airbus backs up speed and altitude displays-28/03/2006-Toulouse-Flight International
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So, the pilots misread the weather radar, flew into bad weather, airspeed indicators failed, automation degraded to the point of unusability, plane got hard to fly, pilots could not handle the workload and the plane met the sea - that is the conjecture so far.
The only way this can and will get handled is by improving the automatic systems on board - at this stage pilots with rudimentary flying ability have become the industry standard - and retraining *all* of the existing pilots to better handle the workload of actually flying the planes is hopeless. The people who design the automation are the ones who really fly these complex and much exported aircraft.
The only way this can and will get handled is by improving the automatic systems on board - at this stage pilots with rudimentary flying ability have become the industry standard - and retraining *all* of the existing pilots to better handle the workload of actually flying the planes is hopeless. The people who design the automation are the ones who really fly these complex and much exported aircraft.
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The answer seems to be simple.... Pilots are no longer trained to interpret AoA indications.
Concorde had an AoA indicator.
I take it from several posts here: so do Navy (carrier-based) aircraft.
I doubt the average A or B pilot would be able to get any usable info (SA or otherwise) from it.
CJ
Concorde had an AoA indicator.
I take it from several posts here: so do Navy (carrier-based) aircraft.
I doubt the average A or B pilot would be able to get any usable info (SA or otherwise) from it.
CJ