Go Back  PPRuNe Forums > Flight Deck Forums > Tech Log
Reload this Page >

AF447 wreckage found

Tech Log The very best in practical technical discussion on the web

AF447 wreckage found

Old 29th Jul 2011, 20:56
  #2281 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: New England
Age: 79
Posts: 40
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Before Landing Check List;

I heartily and sadly agree.
Seen all three types of crew members
since early glass (B757) transition from
"steam gauge" (B727) to retirement (2007).
FBW (Fly by wire) vs. FBP (Fly by pilot)
Ct.Yankee is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 21:11
  #2282 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2000
Location: Phuket
Posts: 297
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Let me further state that the group 2 people are just in for the job. They even may feel a touch intimidated by the aircraft. They really have no interest in sharpening their pilot skills (There is really no need right) however they do take great pains in knowing company SOP’s verbatim (since the SOP’s will cover your butt in all circumstances right? Also knowing them as such will give a little bit of a false sense of security) they also know every note, warning, highlighted and bold print in the FM (not a bad thing at all) however they are not only not capable in keeping the ball centered when yaw damp is taken away on short final but they do not know it is displaced in the 1st place. Tell me there are no captains and crew who do not fit this picture. I dare you.

Examples of this type please? I don't see anyone around here that matches that description at all...
That was quick, I think I hit an exposed nerve there eh?
before landing check list is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 21:42
  #2283 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Oct 2006
Location: Gone Flying...
Age: 63
Posts: 270
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Thanks jcjeant for the full report link. It took a couple of hours to read it. I'm impressed by the notion of confusion sorted out from the transcript of the CVR and for the pilot's actions during those four minutes before impact. But I'm much more impressed by the avalanche of contradicting feelings they went through.

I remember when I was flying "honest" aircrafts. A failure was really a "single" failure. One would continue flying the bird while PNF or FE would sort out the check-list. Today, a "simple failure" may turn a good day into an holocaust.

Those pilots never realized they were in a Stall.
It started out with poor airmanship and ended the way we all know.

All three of them were very confused and unable to "read" what was going on.
The PF, (the first-officer on the RH Seat) even stated so, at least twice: (…)
je n’ai plus le
contrôle de l’avion là
J’ai plus du tout le
contrôle de l’avion
"I don't have control of the airplane, I definitely have no control of the airplane"
and he is still on doubt about what was going on at time: 2h12:04..07
J’ai l’impression qu’on
a une vitesse de fou
non qu’est-ce que vous
en pensez ?
"I have the impression that we have a crazy speed, what do you think about that?"
(Spoilers were even deployed by this time, but the second officer told him not to deploy them).

IMHO contributing factors were:
- the decision of the Captain to take his resting period before crossing ITCZ;
- poor airmanship;
- the Stall Warning logic (intermittent behavior);
- the complexity of the FBW system
- lack of AoA information
- poor handling proficiency

Hope we all learn from that.
Hope been-counters will learn something also.
aguadalte is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 21:56
  #2284 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Texas
Age: 65
Posts: 7,358
Received 544 Likes on 343 Posts
Hope been-counters will learn something also.
Not likely, their actuarial tables will simply have a different entry datum.

Don't get me started ...
Lonewolf_50 is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 22:11
  #2285 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Bedford, UK
Age: 70
Posts: 1,320
Received 39 Likes on 23 Posts
I admit that after a couple of years observation of these threads I value the comments and discussions here more than reading the actual reports and I haven't read today's release. We have a fair knowledge of what the crew did. They did what they did because it relected their appreciation of the situation and following that, their apparently appropriate response. The important thing is surely to understand why they didn't understand the true dynamic state of the aircraft. Without that knowledge nothing that follows is likely to ever be of any use. The upshot is surely that they didn't realise they were stalled. Your question to the technologists is surely how could you design a system that would let that happen ?
Mr Optimistic is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 22:41
  #2286 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: uk
Posts: 857
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by aguadalte

IMHO contributing factors were:
- the decision of the Captain to take his resting period before crossing ITCZ;
- poor airmanship;
Maybe, and yes

- the Stall Warning logic (intermittent behavior);
Not sure I agree - they original warnings appear to have been ignored or discounted. If anything, intermittency might lead to more chance of recognition. It appears they thought they were overspeed and distrusted most or all instruments and did not believe the stall warning. I think there is a good chance they would have disbelieved a continuous warning all the way down too.

- the complexity of the FBW system
Why ? As far as I can see from the info we have now, if they had done the same in conventional controlled a/c the result would ahve been the same.

- lack of AoA information
Would they have looked at it ? Would they have trusted it (remembering it would have gone invalid at some points) ?

- poor handling proficiency
System failed the pilots by a lack of training - or at least BEA seem to think so.
infrequentflyer789 is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 23:03
  #2287 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2011
Location: here
Posts: 131
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Your question to the technologists is surely how could you design a system that would let that happen ?
So what should the aircraft have done differently? One frequent point of criticism is the deactivation of the stall warning at low speeds. That's arguably not a very good idea, yet it should be noted that the pilots managed to ignore nearly a minute of continuous stall warning without the message sinking in...
Another point also picked up by BEA is the lack of an AoA display. Would it have helped? Maybe. But they seem to have looked at only very few indications at all and could make sense of even fewer. My hunch is those who would know what an AoA gauge was telling them in a situation like this wouldn't need one in the first place to figure out 10000fpm down + nose up = oh sh.t.

The transcript is so depressing. It reads like PF didn't only not recognize the stall, but at that moment (I'm sure sitting at is desk, browsing PPRuNe things would have been quite different) he seemed to be totally oblivious to even the concept of stall:

"Qu’est-ce qu’y… comment ça se fait qu’on continue à descendre à fond là?"

"Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l’heure"

"Je cabre ?" - "Ben il faudrait on est à quatre mille pieds"

Last edited by Zorin_75; 29th Jul 2011 at 23:34.
Zorin_75 is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 23:29
  #2288 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: East of eden
Age: 80
Posts: 151
Likes: 0
Received 2 Likes on 1 Post
pitch and power

I said it a while back and I'll say it again.
Pitch and power.
The PFD or whatever you want to call it in your EFIS aircraft is 2 separate instruments. Pitot-static tapes and IRS center. If the speed tape is telling you overspeed and the altitude is climbing what is your attitude?
If the PF had only put the thing on the horizon with cruise thrust would they not had a chance of recognising the nature of the failure?
Who needs AOA if they just understand this very basic concept?
flown-it is offline  
Old 29th Jul 2011, 23:46
  #2289 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by before landing check list
Tell me there are no captains and crew who do not fit this picture. I dare you.
Apologies, I presumed by "here" you meant "on this forum". I have to say I've never encountered anyone who was, or claimed to be, a pilot on here who was completely happy with letting the automation take all the strain and letting their basic piloting skills atrophy.

That was quick, I think I hit an exposed nerve there eh?
Not at all sir. I suggest you read what I'm actually saying (and have said consistently on here for 5 years) before tarring me with that brush. I have always said it is *imperative* that basic stick-and-rudder skills be maintained and that pilots should have a knowledge base relating to the type or types they are operating that is as complete as humanly possible. I think it's dispiriting and borderline scandalous that the airline industry sometimes treats its crews with so little respect and that it is as engaged in the "race to the bottom" as any other industry you care to name - see a rant I made on this very topic here:

http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/43780...ml#post6183737

Ultimately the aeronautical, mechanical and software engineers who design and build the aircraft you fly in and the systems that make them tick have at least as much professional pride in their work as you do. The concept of computers replacing pilots in our lifetime has only ever come from press hyperbole, and I think you'd be hard-pressed to find the engineers who would want to take on that responsibility. In short, we're on the same freakin' side.

Originally Posted by Zorin_75
It reads like PF didn't ... recognize the stall
Neither did the Birgenair PF, who was not only a senior captain, but an ex-military jock to boot. This is all about how the human brain reacts under pressure and stress, and the truth is that none of us can know how we'll react in a situation that perilous until we're confronted with it. The hope is that training for this kind of upset will be reinforced and expedited, along with proper CRM procedures to follow.
DozyWannabe is offline  
Old 30th Jul 2011, 00:45
  #2290 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Newcastle
Age: 53
Posts: 614
Received 1 Like on 1 Post
[QUOTE][The PF made a nose-up left input on the sidestick to the
stop that lasted around 30 seconds./QUOTE]

If I was in a right hand turn nose down, think I might try that.
MATELO is offline  
Old 30th Jul 2011, 00:50
  #2291 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2006
Location: US
Posts: 2,205
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
#1 airspeed indicator was unreliable for 29 seconds.

Stby airspeed indicator was unreliable for 54 seconds.
misd-agin is offline  
Old 30th Jul 2011, 01:49
  #2292 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Paris
Posts: 691
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by Bearfoil
just this once, then I'am off for vacation
takata is offline  
Old 30th Jul 2011, 02:50
  #2293 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Argentina
Age: 66
Posts: 38
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Posted by Doze
This is all about how the human brain reacts under pressure and stress, and the truth is that none of us can know how we'll react in a situation that perilous until we're confronted with it.
Humans… Rare entities are those… Aren´t they Doze?
Anyhow… I´m overwhelm with the grace society degrades…
We all degrade in the same graceful way. Economy degrades graceful pulling everybody in its way down, with its poor philosophy and short-minded short-term get it all, get it fast! dogma.
“Graceful degrading systems” and their redundancy have shown that they aren´t able to cope with nature… They all kicked off and gave the “bad trained pilots” the joystick… Very graceful degrade strategy indeed… A mirror of the self made, bad communication and … culture.
Radar catching-up bad weather (way before bad weather becomes an issue), becomes degraded, certainly at the moment an ETOPS ops is going on. Super Cold water? What is that? Satellites monitoring and pitot tubes designed to cope with… What? What was their task? Well, I would say awesome performance in graceful degrade!
Graceful companies and developers all the way down, which keep pilots as slaves afraid to talk?
Just give me a graceful break will you!
Nobody here is against automation and development methinks. Rather we all are seeking for an answer. The answer which came from BEA nevertheless, is more than I´d expected…
I truly hope ALL pilot unions around the world will discuss this event deeply in order to improve aviation to it best.
It isn´t only an AF issue… It seems to me a worldwide policy instead…


I´m thankful to all of you, which during this long passing years, kept their minds sharp and were seeking for an answer. Also thanks to this forum which made it possible!
TioPablo is offline  
Old 30th Jul 2011, 03:33
  #2294 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2000
Location: Phuket
Posts: 297
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Not at all sir. I suggest you read what I'm actually saying (and have said consistently on here for 5 years) before tarring me with that brush. I have always said it is *imperative* that basic stick-and-rudder skills be maintained and that pilots should have a knowledge base relating to the type or types they are operating that is as complete as humanly possible. I think it's dispiriting and borderline scandalous that the airline industry sometimes treats its crews with so little respect and that it is as engaged in the "race to the bottom" as any other industry you care to name - see a rant I made on this very topic here:
DW you are right about this and I apologize for my comment. I also do not mean to come across that the pilots on flight 447 were in anyway incompetent. That would not be fair at all since I was not there and whom am I to judge. I do not like the system nor the training department. You have to know that throughout the whole incident those pilots used every ounce of their collective knowledge and experience and this one time it was not enough.
Could I have done any better? I am 53 years old and still flying. Luckily I have reached the point to be able to say I am not as good as one time I pretended to be. I know now the system (training department) does not and cannot cover all the bases and since we know this we must try to cover the gaps the best that we can. That is our responsibility we have to ourselves, each other and to the passengers who fly with us.
No, maybe I could not or would not have done better. We are only speculating here and that is not really bad since we are learning still (whether we admit it or not) from each other. I have never been in an unknown situation (flying or not) for that long amount of time with all those insidious conflicting information, we really do not know how we would have reacted especially when you throw in the "dark and stormy" bit with several hundred people in the back. Sometimes simulators do not simulate very well since that cannot simulate real fear other then the fear of your loss of ticket. Not the same at all is it?
Until bean counters quit ruling the earth which I do not think is going to happen anytime soon we have to stick together and do the best we can with the crap we are given.

Good day gentlemen.
before landing check list is offline  
Old 30th Jul 2011, 03:50
  #2295 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2000
Location: Phuket
Posts: 297
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
If you had old style fixed wing military pilots the aircraft would never have been lost. All these aircraft need a magic switch that, when it is turned on, the aircraft turns into a basic stick handling machine.
I do not think this is a totally fair statement. Fortunately I have about have my time divided between military and civilian flying. I have seen gross muck ups on both sides. The military does seem to lack in imagination (as a very general rule so don't yell at me) and the civilians (Again as a very general rule so don't yell at me) sometimes lack in consistency in training.
It is our job as individuals as we mature is to see these faults in ourselves and fix them the best as we can. We need to take recurrent (even initial) courses ourselves from outside sources, try your hand at another type of flying (not as a job mind you but with a friend or just pay out of your own pocket. We should try to see outside of our ruts and think about what we see.

Last edited by before landing check list; 30th Jul 2011 at 07:45.
before landing check list is offline  
Old 30th Jul 2011, 07:33
  #2296 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2011
Location: Over Chibougamau
Posts: 53
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Takata, pardon ma inexpérience: is that a flap actuator or a stabilizer one?

Merci
Poire is offline  
Old 30th Jul 2011, 07:43
  #2297 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: Marion, South Australia
Age: 80
Posts: 183
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Image at 2286

Is that screw shaft bent?
mmciau is offline  
Old 30th Jul 2011, 09:27
  #2298 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 1999
Posts: 541
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
The copilots had received no high altitude training for the "Unreliable IAS" procedure and manual aircraft handling
BEA

I am only repeating what has already been discussed but the thread is so long,its hard to find the fundamentals and keep your bearings.AeroCaraibe suffered an almost identical incident(s) just prior to AF447 and a lengthy report was issued.Same Aircraft,same pitots,same icing encounter,same language.Why then was it not disseminated,digested and trained on?

The key line in the AeroCaraibe report(French language only) says:
"En effet,le 'PF' est intimement persuade que les deux alarmes 'STALL' sont inappropriees.C'est volontairement qu'il ne tient pas compte de la phrase 'RESPECT STALL WARNING AND DISREGARD RISK OF UNDUE STALL WARNING STATUS MESSAGE IF DISPLAYED ON ECAM."

The AeroCaraibe pilot used a KNOWLEDGE-BASED response to loss of airpseed and spurious STALL warning associated with pitot icing.Fly pitch and power,2.5 deg ANU and 82% N1.My question is that even if the AF PF was unable to disbelieve his instruments and ignore any spurious warning,why did he pitch the aircraft to 10deg+ ANU?At FL350???Would not the instinct be to fly TOGA and 0-2.5 ANU pitch?And then find himself in overspeed after the icing clears(only 50 seconds)?This is very confusing.Someone said that FBW pilots apply TOGA and full ANU on the stick in response to stall.Now he acknowledges ALT LAW(ie.a/c can stall unprotected..is that right?) yet goes for 10+ANU pitch at 35000 feet?
Pitot-static anomalies are not easy for pilots;you have to ignore your instruments affected by the blocked sensor and maintain concentration on pitch/power through a cacophony of aural/visual alerts,some valid,some not.Experienced crews have been flummoxed by conflicting information as seen in Aeroperu and Birgenair.Use a rule-based response at your own peril.But those crews did exactly that.And there was a Captain sitting in the left seat on both flights,although an umbrella of suspicion is certainly cast over the quality of the Birgenair crew(he continued the takeoff with an AS disagree).

The two Airbus anomalies here(THS stuck at 13ANU and stall inhibited below 60),although contentious,should never ever have come into play.Lets assume that we cant expect two co-pilots to apply a KNOWLEDGE-BASED response to a high altitude unreliable airspeed event at night over the Atlantic.They are fooled by the conflicting information despite the fact that they knew they were flying at M.8 just moments prior.They now believe they're in a stall.They believe whats presented in front of them.Then there should not have been any ANU pitch command and hence no auto trim to 13 degrees,no speed(real) decay and no possibility whatsoever of stall inhibit.They should have found themsleves in an overspeed condition after the pitot unblocked which may/may not have led to inflight break-up.This would have been plausible,even forgiveable.All they had to do was do what the AeroCaraibe crew did.Set 81% N1 and put the nose just above the horizon.It was flying before with those settings,it will continue to do so.
Rananim is offline  
Old 30th Jul 2011, 09:51
  #2299 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2011
Location: Australia
Age: 63
Posts: 200
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Please look at the BEA website.
There is a new press statement/synthesis of the accident. There is also some recommendations regarding pilot training for high alt stalls, and a recommendation that all aircraft display A of A data.

Personally, I'm concerned at the absence of comment on pilot/aircraft interface factors- in particular, regarding the loss of speed data resulting in a situation where correct stall recovery actions appear to have led to a reactivation of the stall warning. At that moment, it seemed to be the last chance for these poor people.

My friends in the industry none the less assure me that fyling attitude strictly, with minimal changes to any control inputs, would have saved the day.

I would also be interested in any comments as to how the alarm/alert system may interact with a disorientated pilot to produce responses that generate additional risk in emergency situations.
Mimpe is offline  
Old 30th Jul 2011, 10:31
  #2300 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Paris
Posts: 691
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Hi Poire,
Originally Posted by Poire
Takata, pardon ma inexpérience: is that a flap actuator or a stabilizer one?
THS screw and actuator... and it was a test in order to verify that Bearfoil was really off for vacation. (He could not have refrained from posting as he is quite obsessed with this piece of metal).
takata is offline  

Thread Tools
Search this Thread

Contact Us - Archive - Advertising - Cookie Policy - Privacy Statement - Terms of Service

Copyright © 2024 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.