QANTAS A380 Uncontained failure.
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firstfloor
This is from Flightglobal/Insight:
Qantas disclosed in an affidavit on 2 December that there are three modification standards - designated A, B and C - for the HP/IP support structure on the Trent 900 series. The document specified the failed engine as an 'A' modification powerplant.
According to Rolls-Royce's engine manual, the life of the 'A' support structure was limited to 2,000 cycles, said the airline. The 'B' modification was issued in December 2007 and its life limit extended to 14,800 cycles. The latest 'C' modification standard was introduced in April 2009 and has unlimited life, says Qantas.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau declared its investigation was concentrating on 'A' and 'B' standard engines.
Powerplants with the 'C' modification status are not affected, because they do not have the same oil feed stub pipe installation, which is considered central to the engine failure chain.
Investigators believe that the stub pipe developed a fracture in a section with a small wall thickness, which led to an oil leak and fire in the HP/IP structure cavity. This thin wall section has been confirmed as a result of the manufacturing process.
EASA issued the revision of the second emergency directive this week, stating: "Manufacturing and inspection data, and stress analysis performed by Rolls-Royce, now confirm that oil feed tubes with a defined minimum thin wall section feature a higher life and lower risk of fracture." This would allow longer service periods for respective engines before the inspections.
The "A" Mod Qantas #2 engine (677 cycles total) didn't quite make it to the 2000 cycle limitation.
Turbine D
This is from Flightglobal/Insight:
Qantas disclosed in an affidavit on 2 December that there are three modification standards - designated A, B and C - for the HP/IP support structure on the Trent 900 series. The document specified the failed engine as an 'A' modification powerplant.
According to Rolls-Royce's engine manual, the life of the 'A' support structure was limited to 2,000 cycles, said the airline. The 'B' modification was issued in December 2007 and its life limit extended to 14,800 cycles. The latest 'C' modification standard was introduced in April 2009 and has unlimited life, says Qantas.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau declared its investigation was concentrating on 'A' and 'B' standard engines.
Powerplants with the 'C' modification status are not affected, because they do not have the same oil feed stub pipe installation, which is considered central to the engine failure chain.
Investigators believe that the stub pipe developed a fracture in a section with a small wall thickness, which led to an oil leak and fire in the HP/IP structure cavity. This thin wall section has been confirmed as a result of the manufacturing process.
EASA issued the revision of the second emergency directive this week, stating: "Manufacturing and inspection data, and stress analysis performed by Rolls-Royce, now confirm that oil feed tubes with a defined minimum thin wall section feature a higher life and lower risk of fracture." This would allow longer service periods for respective engines before the inspections.
The "A" Mod Qantas #2 engine (677 cycles total) didn't quite make it to the 2000 cycle limitation.
Turbine D
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Re: The GE90 incidents: From Flightglobal
Angolan carrier TAAG is working with General Electric to determine the root cause of two engine events on the airline's Boeing 777-200ERs.
One event, according to the US National Transportation Safety Board, was on 6 December. The board says the GE90-powered aircraft suffered a low-pressure turbine failure in the number two engine after take-off from Portuguese capital Lisbon. The flightcrew performed a turnback and landed without any injuries.
The NTSB says turbine blades were reportedly expelled from the rear of the engine over a populated area.
Turbine D
Re: The GE90 incidents: From Flightglobal
Angolan carrier TAAG is working with General Electric to determine the root cause of two engine events on the airline's Boeing 777-200ERs.
One event, according to the US National Transportation Safety Board, was on 6 December. The board says the GE90-powered aircraft suffered a low-pressure turbine failure in the number two engine after take-off from Portuguese capital Lisbon. The flightcrew performed a turnback and landed without any injuries.
The NTSB says turbine blades were reportedly expelled from the rear of the engine over a populated area.
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Turbine D firstfloor
Reading that second last entry I stumbled across the quoted report from FlightGlobal/Insight and especially this sentence:
Quote:
Powerplants with the 'C' modification status are not affected, because they do not have the same oil feed stub pipe installation, which is considered central to the engine failure chain.
At once I rembered to have read also somewhere - unfortunately I canīt find it where it was, therefore I ommitted to refer to it - that this special wording "oil feed stub pipe installation" was used. To be correct it was in German language and therefore I thought that this phrasing was just a thought or bad translation that came off some reporters brain, but as it looks it is not. In that information I read it was said that the different trials to correct / change the mounting/ installation of the feed stub pipe was undertaken to overcome constant oil leak problems. The hack with it, that I cannot find it back !!
If they really talk about a change in stub pipe installation - and they do - that means change of one or more parts in the oil feeding system, correct ?? Still the question remains where is the location of that changed installation / bearing chamber ??
Quote:
Powerplants with the 'C' modification status are not affected, because they do not have the same oil feed stub pipe installation, which is considered central to the engine failure chain.
At once I rembered to have read also somewhere - unfortunately I canīt find it where it was, therefore I ommitted to refer to it - that this special wording "oil feed stub pipe installation" was used. To be correct it was in German language and therefore I thought that this phrasing was just a thought or bad translation that came off some reporters brain, but as it looks it is not. In that information I read it was said that the different trials to correct / change the mounting/ installation of the feed stub pipe was undertaken to overcome constant oil leak problems. The hack with it, that I cannot find it back !!
If they really talk about a change in stub pipe installation - and they do - that means change of one or more parts in the oil feeding system, correct ?? Still the question remains where is the location of that changed installation / bearing chamber ??
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The Oil Stub Pipe "Installation" was affected directly and profoundly by vibration overlooked in testing.
By reference to the Report, it is "an OIL SUPPLY tube". Not a scavenge, not a vent. The image of the "offending" tube shows damage caused by a poor (read loose) coupling and/or vibration. Whether an atomizer, or a coupling in one of the ten radial struts that support the Bearing Structure between the IPT and the HPT roller bearings. Apparently. No location is reported, but that is ok, the OIL FIRE is almost certainly not the cause of the Destruction, but an effect. There is no apparent evidence of fire in the LPT Drum. There is evidence (soot) at the forward portion of the LP Shaft (the aft stub). Damage was limited to missing Blades from LPT #1.
The IPT Blades efface the "Platform" of the NGV's of the Stator behind it. The Vanes were located at the forward portion (in the 700, Edelweiss) and generally acknowledged as preventing the Burst of the IP Disc, having slowed it in shearing its Blades. In QF32, the slide of the IPT into the platform likely heated the IP Disc Rim, fir trees, and the IPT lost its blades in this manner. It would explain a loss of P30 forward, first through the Gas Path, and then at the Splines at LP and IP Ball Bearing case. The immense reversal of torque would certainly serve to explain the IP (Shaft) sever, the Overspeed of the IPT, and the sequence of sounds reported. The reversal of Gas Path would explain sound #1, and the second sound would of course be the Explosive Burst of the IPT out the case (IP case).
As BigG22 has said, to conclude that the Burst was unrelated to the AD's is a bit of a stretch.
Nothing that has been released to the public, by way of explanation is wrong. Neither is it in any way even partially explanatory of the events on board 32Whale. The releases are beyond cautious, they are misleading in their content. If the Gas Path had reverted to forward of the IPT, it would overwhelm the seals of the bearings, and the Labyrinthines on the shafts. it could have even entered the Plenum and after the IPT exited, the continuing fire would be explained (Note the sooty streaks on the LPC guide Vane Cowl).
By reference to the Report, it is "an OIL SUPPLY tube". Not a scavenge, not a vent. The image of the "offending" tube shows damage caused by a poor (read loose) coupling and/or vibration. Whether an atomizer, or a coupling in one of the ten radial struts that support the Bearing Structure between the IPT and the HPT roller bearings. Apparently. No location is reported, but that is ok, the OIL FIRE is almost certainly not the cause of the Destruction, but an effect. There is no apparent evidence of fire in the LPT Drum. There is evidence (soot) at the forward portion of the LP Shaft (the aft stub). Damage was limited to missing Blades from LPT #1.
The IPT Blades efface the "Platform" of the NGV's of the Stator behind it. The Vanes were located at the forward portion (in the 700, Edelweiss) and generally acknowledged as preventing the Burst of the IP Disc, having slowed it in shearing its Blades. In QF32, the slide of the IPT into the platform likely heated the IP Disc Rim, fir trees, and the IPT lost its blades in this manner. It would explain a loss of P30 forward, first through the Gas Path, and then at the Splines at LP and IP Ball Bearing case. The immense reversal of torque would certainly serve to explain the IP (Shaft) sever, the Overspeed of the IPT, and the sequence of sounds reported. The reversal of Gas Path would explain sound #1, and the second sound would of course be the Explosive Burst of the IPT out the case (IP case).
As BigG22 has said, to conclude that the Burst was unrelated to the AD's is a bit of a stretch.
Nothing that has been released to the public, by way of explanation is wrong. Neither is it in any way even partially explanatory of the events on board 32Whale. The releases are beyond cautious, they are misleading in their content. If the Gas Path had reverted to forward of the IPT, it would overwhelm the seals of the bearings, and the Labyrinthines on the shafts. it could have even entered the Plenum and after the IPT exited, the continuing fire would be explained (Note the sooty streaks on the LPC guide Vane Cowl).
Last edited by bearfoil; 5th Jan 2011 at 16:41.
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Shame
EASA, FAA, NTSB, ATSB
Relative to the recent release of important info re: Rolls Royce and the scandalous and incestuous relationship they have with EASA, I thought it would be extremely important to engage in technical discussions of failed protocol, a defiance of traditional Mission, and where one thinks the engineering might recapture its former sheen.. Someone named Ben has posted a swell recap of this thread here. Pla ne Talk ing..Give us a read, eh?
Relative to the recent release of important info re: Rolls Royce and the scandalous and incestuous relationship they have with EASA, I thought it would be extremely important to engage in technical discussions of failed protocol, a defiance of traditional Mission, and where one thinks the engineering might recapture its former sheen.. Someone named Ben has posted a swell recap of this thread here. Pla ne Talk ing..Give us a read, eh?
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Close Call, no Worries.
I think a thread involving all in Aviation who value a commitment to Safety in the Air, and open dialog between the Principal players would serve a good purpose, hopefully to include a recommitment to the values of honesty, straight shooting, and a personal commitment to the Flying Public, and ourselves.
The Rumour is: Rolls is busted, big-time. Qantas and Airbus have some bones, as should we all. Hopefully the Firm will rededicate itself to Quality and leadership instead of Greed and Deceit.
just sayin'
The Rumour is: Rolls is busted, big-time. Qantas and Airbus have some bones, as should we all. Hopefully the Firm will rededicate itself to Quality and leadership instead of Greed and Deceit.
just sayin'
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Rolls-Royce engines cleared for LA take-off | The Australian
QANTAS has been given the green light by engine-maker Rolls-Royce to operate its A380 aircraft at full payload on the Los Angeles route.
QANTAS has been given the green light by engine-maker Rolls-Royce to operate its A380 aircraft at full payload on the Los Angeles route.
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Engine maker Rolls Royce is being sued for undisclosed amounts by Qantas, as the airline, keen on re-entering overwater service LA SYD, has a thick file on Rolls' dereliction in modifying the Aircraft in service with new mods. The Airline is not restarting the service as yet, as it is Rolls' statements alone that "CLEAR" the powerplant to re-enter service. Having been screwed on several counts by Rolls, Qantas has said 'it is not up to Rolls, obviously, there is the matter of clearance from the authorities, and for that matter, our own engineers, pilots, and attorney's.........' We'll wait.
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Obviously, Qantas have dug themselves a very deep hole. But what is fairly clear by now is that there was never at fault anything fundamentally more serious that a badly formed stub pipe connection.
Previous speculation about vibration, splined couplings and the rest have always been unfounded imo and still are.
Previous speculation about vibration, splined couplings and the rest have always been unfounded imo and still are.
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point taken, let's wait, then. I would say, however, that Rolls' decisions have been abominable, and relying on them further is risky. It also should underline the need to put some stones back in the pack at EASA.
Permission to fly at full weight from LAX? Without cycles limit? Don't you at least wish to hear from the regulator?? Qantas might be....
Rolls972/oil pipe
Cold/Aspirin
Permission to fly at full weight from LAX? Without cycles limit? Don't you at least wish to hear from the regulator?? Qantas might be....
Rolls972/oil pipe
Cold/Aspirin
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I think the AD inspections and established intervals will remain in force for some time to verify findings if nothing else. The final report is awaited of course but it may be that RR have effectively concluded their investigation.
It looks as though the precautionary high thrust/cycles limitation has been lifted - not that we know much about the restriction directly.
I think that whatever gremlin might be dreamt up by we speculators, RR, their peers and the accademics with whom they collaborate will have most likely written the book on the subject many yeas ago. So I am not a skeptic.
It looks as though the precautionary high thrust/cycles limitation has been lifted - not that we know much about the restriction directly.
I think that whatever gremlin might be dreamt up by we speculators, RR, their peers and the accademics with whom they collaborate will have most likely written the book on the subject many yeas ago. So I am not a skeptic.
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If I understand this correctly, when the IPT rotor went aft (coupling slippage), the blades started to disappear, therefore there was nothing driving the IP compressor and it began to slow. Then, since there is less and less air entering into the HP compressor, which is running at a N3 of 98%, the P30 drops (stall?) and fuel to the combustor is reduced, but maybe not cutoff completely. Now if the high speed HPC stalls for lack of air, what happens? It is running in the opposite direction of the IP spool.
Also, what do you mean by reversal of gas path and reversal of torque? The direction of rotation of the IP spool reverses? If this happened instantaneously, perhaps the shaft would shear, I don't know as I can't envision this complete process at the moment without a clearer explanation.
In QF32, the slide of the IPT into the platform likely heated the IP Disc Rim, fir trees, and the IPT lost its blades in this manner. It would explain a loss of P30 forward, first through the Gas Path, and then at the Splines at LP and IP Ball Bearing case. The immense reversal of torque would certainly serve to explain the IP (Shaft) sever, the Overspeed of the IPT, and the sequence of sounds reported. The reversal of Gas Path would explain sound #1, and the second sound would of course be the Explosive Burst of the IPT out the case (IP case).
Also, what do you mean by reversal of gas path and reversal of torque? The direction of rotation of the IP spool reverses? If this happened instantaneously, perhaps the shaft would shear, I don't know as I can't envision this complete process at the moment without a clearer explanation.
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First, I rely on lomapaseo's astute observation that metal to metal at differing RPM is causative of heat sufficient to melt the masses.
If the Blades were leaving the IPT, (obviously at some point they do), then things can go wrong that have disastrous consequences. First, to potentiate a Gas Path Reversal (The Drums loss of pressure due partial IPT blade failure) the Dynamic Seal at the IP needs to be compromised. Ongoing blade loss covers this, and as it proceeds, the IPC would reverse their Stress (not their direction) such that the IPT is now 'Driven', not Driving?? It is at this point the already worn Spline joint scrubs smoothe. Now the IPT has nothing to do but 'coast' down, the HPC has lost pressure from IPC, and it has ceased driving the HPT which speeds on burning fuel the EEC has not had time to halt as yet. Now the IPC, The HPC, and the LPC/LPT are done, they roll stop. The remainder of P30 blows past the Bladeless IPT, (First Bang). The Wheel overspeeds or not, but has sufficient energy to Disintegrate, having lost the Drive Arm due Friction Heat and possibly P30 blowout. The fact that There is no discolouration and very little damage evident in the LPT Drum. suggests that everything that disintegrated, Blades, Vanes, Disc, Platform, etc. was blown forward out the chasm created by the First Bang, the exit of the contents responsible for the second Bang.
Obviously conjecture here. The timetable wants more precision. (Or deletion).
If the Blades were leaving the IPT, (obviously at some point they do), then things can go wrong that have disastrous consequences. First, to potentiate a Gas Path Reversal (The Drums loss of pressure due partial IPT blade failure) the Dynamic Seal at the IP needs to be compromised. Ongoing blade loss covers this, and as it proceeds, the IPC would reverse their Stress (not their direction) such that the IPT is now 'Driven', not Driving?? It is at this point the already worn Spline joint scrubs smoothe. Now the IPT has nothing to do but 'coast' down, the HPC has lost pressure from IPC, and it has ceased driving the HPT which speeds on burning fuel the EEC has not had time to halt as yet. Now the IPC, The HPC, and the LPC/LPT are done, they roll stop. The remainder of P30 blows past the Bladeless IPT, (First Bang). The Wheel overspeeds or not, but has sufficient energy to Disintegrate, having lost the Drive Arm due Friction Heat and possibly P30 blowout. The fact that There is no discolouration and very little damage evident in the LPT Drum. suggests that everything that disintegrated, Blades, Vanes, Disc, Platform, etc. was blown forward out the chasm created by the First Bang, the exit of the contents responsible for the second Bang.
Obviously conjecture here. The timetable wants more precision. (Or deletion).
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Engine reliability is not only a critical part of ETOPS, it is life and death. No matter the pronouncements of the EASA re: ADs and compliance, the Manufacturer does have the last word. Now that RollsRoyce has bestowed reliability on the 972, we breathe relief and climb aboard ??
QF32 happened to a four engine ship, and it barely escaped a ditch or crash. Keep in mind that N3 continued past Burst, and fed a fire. The EEC may have had problems similar to Number One. Remember Number One was impossible to shut down, and with sound internals, (until swallowing canal mud), it ran on two hours.
If Number Two hadn't ultimately shut down, the engine fire that resulted may have ignited the sloshing puddles of fuel in the wing. One can imagine easily a more tragic outcome than loss of Face, Money, and RepCred. 1000 is not yet certificated for ETOPS, and the Dreamliner can ill afford more doubts and delays. On top of the mechanical issues, serious enough on their own, the absurd and selfish, dare one say criminal and clumsy attempts at keeping things quiet, puts in question three decades of Twin reliability. I like the 757 ETOPS, but the 737 gives me the willies.
The OIL SYSTEM is no doubt deeply involved in this uncontained failure, but unwinding the true cause is inevitable. Given a clean bill of health at this point would not restore Faith in the Firm, IMO.
The EEC has two channels, each one an independent system that is dormant when the other operates. At ignition, the EEC determines randomly which channel to activate, and which to isolate. With certain parameters extant, the EEC switches channels, and recovers control. The random selection exists to alleviate a dormant fault from being unidentified in one channel, allowing the EEC to operate essentially with only one channel reliability. The EEC was removed from the engine's Fan Cowl before the image was taken, noticeable are the fifteen cables wrapped in plastic bags left on the cowl, and the four mounting towers of the EEC. To me, imo, the actual vibratory environment of this unit's area suggests a rather brave decision. The mounts are snubbed with rubber, missing in the picture.
Engine reliability is not only a critical part of ETOPS, it is life and death. No matter the pronouncements of the EASA re: ADs and compliance, the Manufacturer does have the last word. Now that RollsRoyce has bestowed reliability on the 972, we breathe relief and climb aboard ??
QF32 happened to a four engine ship, and it barely escaped a ditch or crash. Keep in mind that N3 continued past Burst, and fed a fire. The EEC may have had problems similar to Number One. Remember Number One was impossible to shut down, and with sound internals, (until swallowing canal mud), it ran on two hours.
If Number Two hadn't ultimately shut down, the engine fire that resulted may have ignited the sloshing puddles of fuel in the wing. One can imagine easily a more tragic outcome than loss of Face, Money, and RepCred. 1000 is not yet certificated for ETOPS, and the Dreamliner can ill afford more doubts and delays. On top of the mechanical issues, serious enough on their own, the absurd and selfish, dare one say criminal and clumsy attempts at keeping things quiet, puts in question three decades of Twin reliability. I like the 757 ETOPS, but the 737 gives me the willies.
The OIL SYSTEM is no doubt deeply involved in this uncontained failure, but unwinding the true cause is inevitable. Given a clean bill of health at this point would not restore Faith in the Firm, IMO.
The EEC has two channels, each one an independent system that is dormant when the other operates. At ignition, the EEC determines randomly which channel to activate, and which to isolate. With certain parameters extant, the EEC switches channels, and recovers control. The random selection exists to alleviate a dormant fault from being unidentified in one channel, allowing the EEC to operate essentially with only one channel reliability. The EEC was removed from the engine's Fan Cowl before the image was taken, noticeable are the fifteen cables wrapped in plastic bags left on the cowl, and the four mounting towers of the EEC. To me, imo, the actual vibratory environment of this unit's area suggests a rather brave decision. The mounts are snubbed with rubber, missing in the picture.
Last edited by bearfoil; 6th Jan 2011 at 15:44.
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gas path
Like I say, the manufacturer, (and the operator) have the last say. No conflicts there!!
The regulators sign off on anything approved by the Manufacturer, the Line has no vested interest in the other?? You are a trifle naive, Sir.
The AD was relaxed on the 900 in August, two months prior to the Burst. Based on what information?? Inspections performed by the Manufacturer's agents!!
Does one have a copy of the contract?? Thought not.
Like I say, the manufacturer, (and the operator) have the last say. No conflicts there!!
The regulators sign off on anything approved by the Manufacturer, the Line has no vested interest in the other?? You are a trifle naive, Sir.
The AD was relaxed on the 900 in August, two months prior to the Burst. Based on what information?? Inspections performed by the Manufacturer's agents!!
Does one have a copy of the contract?? Thought not.
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DERG
Fumigation melts the plastic? SCARY! I've flown more on 2 engine ETOPs overseas than on 4 engine in recent times, all with good results, fortunate I guess.
But on to the point: All is well with the Trents, problems solved, Total Care works.
I am always reminded of a statement years ago from a large US aircraft customer directed at both US engine suppliers that went something like this: "You guys design the engine, develop it and have it certified as being flightworthy. Then we put it on our aircraft as a fully developed engine, but your development continues, that is to say development that should have been completed before certification that wasn't. This is unacceptable and must be changed."
I guess not much has changed...
Fumigation melts the plastic? SCARY! I've flown more on 2 engine ETOPs overseas than on 4 engine in recent times, all with good results, fortunate I guess.
But on to the point: All is well with the Trents, problems solved, Total Care works.
Rolls-Royce and British Airways have finally signed a long-awaited contract for Trent 900 and 1000 engines to power the carrier's forthcoming Airbus A380 and Boeing 787 fleets.
It covers Trent 900s to power 12 A380s (plus seven options) and 24 Boeing 787s (plus 18 options) and is worth more than $5 billion at list prices if all the options are exercised. One new aspect of the contract is the inclusion of the powerplant manufacturer's TotalCare long-term support package.
"We are delighted to have concluded these contracts, which position British Airways strongly for the future," says BA CEO Willie Walsh. "We believe the support of the TotalCare package will significantly benefit British Airways' operations."
His opposite number at Rolls-Royce, Sir John Rose, adds: "We are pleased that British Airways continues to put its trust in our world-class Trent engine technology and service provision."
The agreement was originally announced in September 2007 but has only now been completed: "It's a very complex and detailed contract, especially given the fact that the aircraft haven't been in the fleet when they were due to be in the fleet, for a variety of reasons," says a BA spokesman.
It covers Trent 900s to power 12 A380s (plus seven options) and 24 Boeing 787s (plus 18 options) and is worth more than $5 billion at list prices if all the options are exercised. One new aspect of the contract is the inclusion of the powerplant manufacturer's TotalCare long-term support package.
"We are delighted to have concluded these contracts, which position British Airways strongly for the future," says BA CEO Willie Walsh. "We believe the support of the TotalCare package will significantly benefit British Airways' operations."
His opposite number at Rolls-Royce, Sir John Rose, adds: "We are pleased that British Airways continues to put its trust in our world-class Trent engine technology and service provision."
The agreement was originally announced in September 2007 but has only now been completed: "It's a very complex and detailed contract, especially given the fact that the aircraft haven't been in the fleet when they were due to be in the fleet, for a variety of reasons," says a BA spokesman.
I guess not much has changed...
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The discussion becomes one of "Certificate Amendment", a process called "Continuing Airworthiness" (lomapaseo). It is arguably sufficient, but recent events have brought its weaknesses to the fore. We are treated to Press (RR) that certifies that the engine had no unmitigable problems in test, and was worhty of commercial service. That will out as a downright lie, not anything covered under "we'll fix that later". The Locomotive is stuck full throttle, and the bridge is out.
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derg:
unfortunately i am fully in support for these statements.
So have we reached the point where the globalisation and production concentration has practically killed competition and responsibility towards customers?
Looks like the AT&T antitrust break-up be a good example to follow as with just 2 competing companies which are too big to fall there is no real choice.
As regulators they do no more than RUBBER STAMP what the manufacturers tell them. THE DOCUMENTS THEY PRODUCE ARE IMPENETRABLE AND INCORRECT.
They are not independent.
They are not independent.
So have we reached the point where the globalisation and production concentration has practically killed competition and responsibility towards customers?
Looks like the AT&T antitrust break-up be a good example to follow as with just 2 competing companies which are too big to fall there is no real choice.
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AT&T? How about Standard Oil?? Or are the collective constraints extra corporeal, and merely a tacit Warfare on the Public in Carriage??
Tech nugget for qualification: Vibration issues are patent on the TRENT 700, The GE90, and now the 900. Can I repair the engine's glaring blunders and call it Airworthiness compliance on the "FLY?" Can I beef up the Shafts and call it recurrent maintenance? Thanks, how about Deferred?
here's some dough, and....Golf next week, James?? Alan?
Tech nugget for qualification: Vibration issues are patent on the TRENT 700, The GE90, and now the 900. Can I repair the engine's glaring blunders and call it Airworthiness compliance on the "FLY?" Can I beef up the Shafts and call it recurrent maintenance? Thanks, how about Deferred?
here's some dough, and....Golf next week, James?? Alan?