Concorde question

[CliveL]

The ORIGINAL design for the reheat was done by SNECMA, but due to them getting into all sorts of trouble with the fuel injection system and flame stabilisation, Rolls-Royce baled them out, and it became a Rolls-Royce/ SNECMA design.
ref heritageconcorde.com

Does anyone have any details on the 'joint' development alluded to above?

Attended a Powerplant Design Group reunion earlier, so I thought I would try to get an answer from somebody who really knows ....

The problem apparently was that flame stabilisation operating in "contingency" rating was sensitive to the point that every engine had to be checked, so there was a lot of engine plus reheat testing, most of which was done at Patchway. The solution was addition of some form of 'spike' at various points on the spray bar (my informant wasn't very specific). It sounded like a sort of vortex generator cum chine that gave the flame somewhere to latch onto. The development process was, as you suggested, a joint activity.

[Chris Scott]

PJ2 reminds us of the way the airframes of other a/c queuing for take-off would resonate as Concorde departed. Whether it was the responsibility of SNECMA or Rolls Royce (or even Bristol Siddeley? ), the reheat was certain to set off a random sprinkling of car alarms on the airfield, which used to make my day when lucky enough to be returning to the car park around midday at LHR.

Even without reheat, however, the engine had a distinctly military sound - quite unlike other civil turbojets I can remember. The sound of it in the descent at about 4000ft over my house at 5 pm daily was unmistakeable. On the approach, if you weren't expecting it, it could be quite unnerving. One night in the late 1970s, during a long car journey, I stopped for a call of nature at a well-known public house near Hatton Cross (about a mile from touchdown on LHR 27L). It was pitch dark, and I decided that the hedge at the side of the car park would be a suitable venue. Never having heard Concorde on the approach before, I became increasingly nervous as the sound, initially unidentified, got progressively louder. And then the landing lights were switched on...

[peter kent]

New Concorde book

Just out ..

CONCORDE - A Designer's Life by Ted Talbot

I've just found an earlier pprune post educating me on the author

QUOTE]If I may, I would now like to mention the 'some oil lamps and diesel oil' story. This is a true story told to me by Dr Ted Talbot, the father of the Concorde Intake, brilliant aerodynamicist and all round amazing gentleman.[/QUOTE]

Can't wait for it to arrive in my mail box.

[CliveL]

Peter

I've just started reading it, and it's pure Ted (and Ann)

Do buy it - it is probably the most amusing (and human) book on Concorde you will ever read. Best seven quids worth I have spent for a long time.

Update: I have now finished it - I couldn't put it down. Definitely autobiographical, but worth buying for the Concorde bits alone. Maybe I'm biased as I share many of his memories. Perhaps UK readers will appreciate the non-Concorde bits more.

[Dont Hang Up]

To my eternal regret, I never had a chance to get close to the old girl in her "lifetime", but I'll never forget the day she overflew my Mum's house at what can't have been more than a couple of thousand feet on her way back from Farnborough.

You can still get up close and personal with G-BOAA at the National Museum of Flight in East Fortune. I know it is a bit out of the way, but if you are ever in that region I can thoroughly recommend a visit. The old girl has her own exhibition hall and looks magnificent.

(The rest of the museum isn't bad either - a good day out).

[NineEighteen]

I wondered if any Concorde flight crew had a favourite airframe and why? I understand Alpha Foxtrot was somewhat lighter than her sisters. Maybe that made for a sportier option?

[Daxon]

From another thread:

BA 2 JFK-LHR 23.08.1992


Could I please ask if someone can tell me which aircraft flew this flight?

The Captain was Stack Butterley. Any other information concerning the other flight deck crew would be gratefully received.

Many thanks in advance.

[tdracer]

Many years ago, I'd flown into Heathrow (after a horrible flight - a 6+ hour delay after pushback at JFK due to weather). I was in line to pick up my rental car when suddenly there was this horrendous noise - a "can't hear yourself think" noise. The strange part was no one else even seemed to notice . I turned and looked outside, and there was a Concord on it's takeoff run in full afterburner . It was the only time I was able to see a Concord moving under it's own power .

No idea what tail number it is, but there is a Concord at the Seattle Museum of Flight. First time I walked inside I was stunned at how small it was. The windows are tiny, and the seats would not appear out-of-place in economy on todays international flights. The cockpit is blocked off with clear Plexiglas, but looked decidedly primitive by todays (or even 1980's) standards. No doubt the cabin service was top notch, and there is definitely a luxury in making a six hour flight in two hours. But it's also not hard to understand why it wasn't a commercial success .

But I sure wish I'd had the opportunity to fly on one

[ksjc]

G-BOAG lives in Seattle now. And so you know it's Concorde with an " e". Very important.

I flew on G-BOAG, BA 2 JFK- LHR, 6 months before the program was shut down in 2003. The experience is hard to describe and only a Concorde fan would appreciate it anyway.

[tdracer]

And so you know it's Concorde with an " e". Very important.

Sorry, I blame spell check

[EXWOK]

The windows are tiny

If you see a prototype, you will note that the cabin windows are bigger; the windows shrank due to a certification requirement. In the course we were informed that, with all four a/c groups working, cabin pressure could be maintained with two windows missing at 60 000'.

cockpit is blocked off with clear Plexiglas, but looked decidedly primitive by todays (or even 1980's) standards

Possibly so, on first glance. In reality it was considerably more sophisticated than its contemporaries (e.g. 747-200), and the systems behind those switches immeasurably more so.

There's not a lot of space for the necessary controls in the front of a pointy aeroplane, and this was done in era when the appearance of the flt deck was inconsequential compared to its efficiency, utility and safety. It's only from the beige cockpit Boeings and onwards that the trend has emerged to for all these swoopy trim panels to be fitted for cosmetic reasons.

As for commercial failure - that may be true for the constructors but I can assure you that there's no way BA would have been flying them if they didn't contribute to the bottom line, let alone invest in the return to service programme.

It always pays to remember the context of operation of this machine when making comparisons with conventional aircraft,as that's what drove much of the design.

[DozyWannabe]

Originally Posted by tdracer

No idea what tail number it is, but there is a Concord at the Seattle Museum of Flight. First time I walked inside I was stunned at how small it was. The windows are tiny, and the seats would not appear out-of-place in economy on todays international flights. The cockpit is blocked off with clear Plexiglas, but looked decidedly primitive by todays (or even 1980's) standards. No doubt the cabin service was top notch, and there is definitely a luxury in making a six hour flight in two hours. But it's also not hard to understand why it wasn't a commercial success...

Following on from what EXWOK was saying, you've got to remember that the spec was hammered out in the late '60s - so it's not surprising that the flight deck could *appear* antiquated by 1980's standards. But in this case, as alluded to, appearances are deceptive. While the gauges and switches are very definitely of that vintage, the systems behind them were very much bleeding-edge technology (by aviation standards) in a contemporary sense. Even when Concorde entered production, the most complex digital displays available to aviation were of the 7-segment LED type (as used in the Apollo Guidance Computer), and they were both wildly expensive and of limited use. The flight and engine controls were in fact a pioneering kind of analogue FBW - way in advance of any other type, even those making their debut at the start of the '80s (though FADEC was becoming more widespread by then - with the advent of the B757 and 767).

Ergonomically speaking, both engineers and pilots of the era write of Concorde's flight deck being the best possible balance of form and function available at the time - sure it looks cluttered to the modern eye, but everything was placed in a logical manner and the sheer number of systems used in the aircraft made the accessibility of all that information a basic requirement. It's worth bearing in mind that even those not particularly well-disposed to Airbus will grudgingly admit that the flight deck ergonomics on those types are extremely good - and a lot of the lessons learned were from cramming all that information into Concorde's limited space.

As for the cabin, again appearances are deceptive - I have sat in one of those seats and they are extremely comfortable for the size. Also one must bear in mind that unlike the subsonic Atlantic crossings, these were happening in about 3 hours - so no need to be particularly wide or convert into a bed like we see in Business and First today - not to mention less chance of a queue for the WC!

I have to thank EXWOK for explaining the windows - but I'll add the more prosaic reason that you don't need a particularly large window to see the curvature of the Earth in all its splendour - which is for the most part all you'd be seeing during the flight!

[EDIT : I should also confirm that EXWOK is also correct in stating that BA had Concorde turning a profit from the early-'80s onward, and it took a combination of a financial downturn and the fallout from the terrorist attacks of September 2001 to end the service.

While Concorde herself never recouped the development money granted by the governments of the UK and France, the infrastructure and R&D her development put in place paved the way for the Airbus project which, as we know, ended up becoming a leading player in airliner design and manufacture in the West. ]

[CliveL]

Dozy

Even when Concorde entered production, the most complex digital displays available to aviation were of the 7-segment LED type (as used in the Apollo Guidance Computer), and they were both wildly expensive and of limited use.

Yeah, well when we put a digital computer to generate the AICS laws that was NEW man!

Ergonomically speaking, both engineers and pilots of the era write of Concorde's flight deck being the best possible balance of form and function available at the time - sure it looks cluttered to the modern eye,

Again, no digital multifunction displays on offer in those days

It's worth bearing in mind that even those not particularly well-disposed to Airbus will grudgingly admit that the flight deck ergonomics on those types are extremely good - and a lot of the lessons learned were from cramming all that information into Concorde's limited space.

Errrr no, I don't think so. Concorde's flight deck was done at Filton and we had no involvement in the Airbus designs in that area.

I have to thank EXWOK for explaining the windows - but I'll add the more prosaic reason that you don't need a particularly large window to see the curvature of the Earth in all its splendour - which is for the most part all you'd be seeing during the flight!

Exwok's remark is not quite right IIRC. Certainly the window size was dictated by pressurisation failure, but one couldn't maintain cabin pressure with two windows failed - the design case was to get to a breathable altitude before you killed too many passengers! Also, there is very little to see when you have a delta wing under you.

While Concorde herself never recouped the development money granted by the governments of the UK and France, the infrastructure and R&D her development put in place paved the way for the Airbus project

Ummm - most participants reckoned that the Concorde infrastructure showed the way not to do it, and besides the early Airbuses were developed in parallel with the later stages of Concorde development. You have a point where R&D is concerned though - several technologies developed for Concorde found their way onto the subsonic fleet, not the least being the probability approach to system certification.

[DozyWannabe]

Hey Clive - nice to see you!

Originally Posted by CliveL

Errrr no, I don't think so. Concorde's flight deck was done at Filton and we had no involvement in the Airbus designs in that area.

I was thinking more "indirectly" - in general UK/Euro flight deck layouts were more in line with improving ergonomics than those on the other side of the pond for a long time. Later work may not have been done at Filton as Concorde's was, but the Airbus folk would have been foolish in the extreme not to use the fundamental principles as a basis for that work!

Ummm - most participants reckoned that the Concorde infrastructure showed the way not to do it.

Hence the catch-all term "paved the way" - whereby lessons in how not to do it are as useful as those which were a positive example!

[tdracer]

BA was able to make money on Concorde as in positive cash flow. But they were basically given the airplanes. The commercial failure aspect comes from the simple fact that no one wanted them to build any more (what I've heard is that at least one production Concorde was built but never put into service - basically becoming a donor for spares - not sure if that's true). I also suspect it was too much of a point design - it didn't have the range to be useful in the Pacific.

If BA (and Air France) honestly thought Concorde was a profit center (rather than brand prestige), they would have wanted more .

BTW, my comments about the flight deck were not intended as criticism - no doubt it was state of the art when it was designed. I was just commenting on how much things have changed since then.

I don't mean to dispute that the Concorde was an incredible airplane and engineering achievement. Just saying that it never really had a chance to be successful. The same thing would have applied to the Boeing SST if it hadn't been cancelled (I knew a guy that worked on the Boeing SST inlet control system - talk about complex ). Cancelling the SST is probably the best thing that ever happened to Boeing - it likely would have bankrupted the company.

[DozyWannabe]

Originally Posted by tdracer

BA was able to make money on Concorde as in positive cash flow. But they were basically given the airplanes. The commercial failure aspect comes from the simple fact that no one wanted them to build any more (what I've heard is that at least one production Concorde was built but never put into service - basically becoming a donor for spares - not sure if that's true).

Not as far as I know - the first UK "production" Concorde intended for testing rather than line flying (G-BBDG) did end up as a donor for spares, but it wasn't a case of an aircraft without a home - it was just the way things turned out - they never intended to sell it to an airline. In fact that very airframe is the one now living at Brooklands. Several things kiboshed Concorde as a going concern in the '70s - not least of which was the protest movement in the US making US airlines shy away. Above all it was not an issue with the project itself, but the early '70s oil crisis which had the most drastic effect. In fact, while the UK government effectively wrote off the cost in the '70s, the profits BA ended up making could have made a sizeable dent in the development costs.

I also suspect it was too much of a point design - it didn't have the range to be useful in the Pacific.

There was a B model on the drawing board which could very well have been capable in that arena.

CONCORDE SST : CONCORDE B

If BA (and Air France) honestly thought Concorde was a profit center (rather than brand prestige), they would have wanted more .

In fact, BA significantly underestimated what customers would be willing to pay for Concorde service at first - it was this realisation that enabled them to turn a profit!

The same thing would have applied to the Boeing SST if it hadn't been cancelled (I knew a guy that worked on the Boeing SST inlet control system - talk about complex ). Cancelling the SST is probably the best thing that ever happened to Boeing - it likely would have bankrupted the company.

Well, that was kind of the crux of the issue. Boeing had already effectively bet the company on the 747 project, and the 2707 still had technical issues on paper that the Concorde project had already solved. As far as my reading suggests, the runaway success of the 747 in fact owed a lot to the issues that ended up swamping the DC-10 and L-1011 - essentially gifting Boeing a market leading position and rescuing the company from the abyss - the 2707 was cancelled long before that became a reality though. In effect, before the success of the 747 was a done deal, Boeing couldn't stretch to doing both.

[tdracer]

The Concorde and Boeing SST business cases were built on a couple flawed assumptions.

First, jet fuel would remain dirt cheap and the higher fuel burn of supersonic travel not contribute significantly to cost of operation - which was blown out of the water by the first Arab oil embargo.

Second, that the majority of demand for air travel would remain for the 'premium' product - basically that the majority of people would happily pay a premium to get there faster. This assumption applied to most people who flew on jets in the 1960's - either business travelers or well to do people that weren't that worried about what it cost.
Reality was it went the opposite direction - a shift that started with the 747 and other widebodies. The economies of the wide body aircraft lowered the cost of air travel to the 'everybody' level. Suddenly there was a whole new class of air traveler - people for whom an extra $100 airfare meant they just wouldn't go, never mind that they'd get there in half the time. In short, they didn't foresee air travel becoming just another commodity - the low cost trend that continues today.

The reality was, both the Concorde and the SST needed to sell hundreds of copies to even begin to justify the development costs. The evolution of air travel into a low cost commodity, combined with the rising costs of jet fuel, insured that would never happen.

[DozyWannabe]

Originally Posted by tdracer

The Concorde and Boeing SST business cases were built on a couple flawed assumptions.

First, jet fuel would remain dirt cheap and the higher fuel burn of supersonic travel not contribute significantly to cost of operation - which was blown out of the water by the first Arab oil embargo.

Well, the 2707 project never advanced to the point where such practicalities were considered - but it's certainly the case that part of the Concorde "B" spec was intended to do away with reheat (afterburner) entirely, and be much more fuel-efficient as a result.

Second, that the majority of demand for air travel would remain for the 'premium' product - basically that the majority of people would happily pay a premium to get there faster. This assumption applied to most people who flew on jets in the 1960's - either business travelers or well to do people that weren't that worried about what it cost.

Not necessarily - supersonic travel as a "premium" product was always intended to co-exist with subsonic offerings, much as it ended up doing. There's a revisionist narrative that has the USA betting on mass transit with the 747 versus Europe betting on supersonic transit with Concorde - but all the contemporary material I've read indicates no such thing. Even setting aside the protests within the US against the Concorde, the simple fact is that SST was never going to be a viable domestic solution, so that limited the market for the 2707. Whereas a transatlantic SST was very much a viable proposition due to the transoceanic nature of the journey. It could be argued that even with the oil crisis and the subsequent drop in orders, the UK and French governments gave up on the Concorde project too soon.

Reality was it went the opposite direction - a shift that started with the 747 and other widebodies. The economies of the wide body aircraft lowered the cost of air travel to the 'everybody' level. Suddenly there was a whole new class of air traveler - people for whom an extra $100 airfare meant they just wouldn't go, never mind that they'd get there in half the time. In short, they didn't foresee air travel becoming just another commodity - the low cost trend that continues today.

If that were genuinely the case, then there would have been no Airbus project or consortium. As Clive correctly points out, the A300 project started taking shape while Concorde was undergoing her proving flights. While there's no doubt that the Concorde project was completed for political reasons most of all, the idea that she was a forlorn hope before she went into service is grossly unfair.

The reality was, both the Concorde and the SST needed to sell hundreds of copies to even begin to justify the development costs. The evolution of air travel into a low cost commodity, combined with the rising costs of jet fuel, insured that would never happen.

Yet, as alluded to before, the R&D gains and technological knowledge coming from the project helped to lay the foundations of a pan-European aircraft maker which would eventually go toe-to-toe with the best the USA had to offer. The sidestick technology which led to an unprecedented level of commonality between short-haul and long-haul types was first tested on a Concorde airframe (Google "concorde minimanche"). Added to which is the fact that in Concorde, for all the project's problems, an airliner was produced which - on a technological level at least - left every competitor in the world in the dust. That is something that can never be taken away.

[Chu Chu]

It seems to me that if Concorde "failed," it's only because it did not usher in an era of supersonic flight. The significance of airplanes like the DC-3 and the 707 isn't so much that they were great airplanes (though they may have been), but that they were copied and improved upon. That didn't happen with Concorde, and I think the only reason can be that the time just hadn't come for supersonic passenger flight. I guess we'll see if it ever does.

[ruddman]

I've never seen it fly or even static. Hopefully one day. Would be a huge thrill. Thank goodness for youtube. And I'd pay more to halve the time to travel by aircraft if I could!



Maybe, just maybe, the Concorde was so far ahead of its time nobody has caught up to it yet?


One awesome aircfraft.