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Airbus crash/training flight

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Airbus crash/training flight

Old 19th Nov 2010, 08:12
  #1521 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Feb 2008
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Translation

As far as I can understand english,

"To perceive something" or "to notice something" are very good translations of the french verb "percevoir".

"To notice" seems however better in the context : to see and become conscious of ...

Il the aoa (wrong) value was indeed displayed, the information was "in sight", but the crew didn't become conscious that it was wrong, showing steady small aoa at the time effective aoa should was increasing while they were slowing down, checking stall related protections. AoA indication is in itself a protection ... And they failed to notice that that protection didn't display a value coherent with the slow speed.

All three crew members? Not cross-checking available information?
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Old 19th Nov 2010, 16:32
  #1522 (permalink)  
 
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CONF iture
the third guy is always suddenly so much 'smarter', you can see so much more by just seating on that third seat.
Unfortunately, the third guy realized the aircraft had entered Direct Law, but I perceive that his announcement, "We are in manual", may have been the wrong words to use in the multi-lingual cockpit.

Bis47

AoA indication is in itself a protection ... And they failed to notice that that protection didn't display a value coherent with the slow speed.
AoA indication is always available, but not normally used in everyday "line ops". The fact that the erroneous AoA position wasn't noted, was essentially because the consequences of what they were proposing to do hadn't been raised, and therefore nor had the relevance of the AoA.


mm43
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Old 20th Nov 2010, 03:39
  #1523 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by mm43
Unfortunately, the third guy realized the aircraft had entered Direct Law, but I perceive that his announcement, "We are in manual", may have been the wrong words to use in the multi-lingual cockpit.
I would see it differently : For him, the test was proceeding normally, the trim stopped as it was supposed to but he didn't know it was actually for another reason, then, some 20 seconds later, he demonstrated some impatience : "stick forward ... alpha floor we're in manual" possibly thinking the pilot was not applying the requested steps to exit alpha floor.
With a fully visible control column, it would have been obvious to all that the PF was already pushing on it ...
He did not mention the trim either, it would have been a wonderful call "trim, trim it forward" or "manual trim" ... is it a indication he didn't see the PFD message ... ?

Originally Posted by NOD
I flew 2 legs in an A319 today, and not sure how differently I would have flown or acted had I been made aware that 1 or more AoA probes were frozen. They are not really used, although they are visible, in normal line ops - they are there for safety "features".
Maybe you would respond to a GPWS warning the 737s way and not put your trust and life in the hands of a sick system.

AoA data are not visible on the PFDs.
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Old 20th Nov 2010, 14:26
  #1524 (permalink)  
bearfoil
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My knowledge of the systems is woefully insufficient, I have been satisfied thus far with the "cyclical" nature of the discussion. For what it is worth, CONF iture's position has been clear from the outset, as he once again frames the essence of this entire thread. When will the AB adherents entertain this most obvious flaw in the ointment?

just sayin'
 
Old 20th Nov 2010, 15:41
  #1525 (permalink)  
 
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One thing that has always bothered me in this accident sequence is the role of the 3rd pilot. He did not re-brief the low speed checks immediately before the maneuver but he apparently held the checklist. This was one of the more complex maneuvers in the sequence. This oversight basically forced the AC into a box checking role. On a normal 2 person cockpit, the PNF would be holding the checklist and briefing the steps as you go (Including the expected limits and recording the results).

If I recall the accident report correctly, The NZ 3rd pilot had to agree not to disclose the checklist to 3rd parties and to hold Airbus harmless for any use of the checklist before he could receive a copy. Was this at the root of his reluctance to share?
Am I missing something here?
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