Airbus crash/training flight
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Here is where a recognition of training and performance must be addressed. This was a commercial flight, not a test flight, it was flown by demonstrably qualified crew. Perhaps "overqualified". There were conditions at play here that cannot be made comfortable, and foreclose the "old bold" pilot from success. Lack of preparation is rampant, the need to please the customer is an unnecessary companion, etc.
One wonders if it was a low time Captain who was flying, mightn't he decline the manouveur? Something like, "You're kidding, right?". Artificial pressure is dangerous, Always dangerous.
bear
One wonders if it was a low time Captain who was flying, mightn't he decline the manouveur? Something like, "You're kidding, right?". Artificial pressure is dangerous, Always dangerous.
bear
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Originally Posted by guiones
All valid points, but it comes to knowing what they were doing and what to expect, if they had ONLY calculated the minimum speed for the conditions of the test like the Airbus Test Pilots do and NEVER go below it, they would have never needed any of that.
What a waste, I hope Airbus learned something too ... ?
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Bearfoil:
I strongly disagree with you; this was not a commercial flight. They set out to do tests, to transfer the aircraft from one airline to another. The crew was qualified (or overqualified) for other flights; but the way this flight was conducted, certainly not for this one.
CONF:
They should have never proceeded with the test at that altitude, without knowing what to expect and without calculating minimum speed.
Can't speak for Airbus on changes!
G
I strongly disagree with you; this was not a commercial flight. They set out to do tests, to transfer the aircraft from one airline to another. The crew was qualified (or overqualified) for other flights; but the way this flight was conducted, certainly not for this one.
CONF:
They should have never proceeded with the test at that altitude, without knowing what to expect and without calculating minimum speed.
Can't speak for Airbus on changes!
G
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Again, this is why when conducting tests there are different procedures to follow. Perhaps (a/c dependent) you need to check status pages to confirm no faults, or be alert for messaging that would normally be dismissed, or for characteristics that are usually benign but not in these circumstances.
That the ADIRUs didn't deduce from the stuck values that the AOAs were erroneous but valid is unfortunate, but "erroneous but valid" - especially from multiple independent (even if similar) sources - is a horrible failure case to defend against.
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As I have said before, there are very good reasons why Airbus specify that this test MUST be carried out at FL140 and not less than 10000 ft AGL. They tried to do it at low level and suffered the consequences.
They simply were not qualified to conduct a test flight and did not understand what they were doing and it bit them on the
.
Any sane test pilot expects any test to fail, they expected to tick a box.
They simply were not qualified to conduct a test flight and did not understand what they were doing and it bit them on the
.Any sane test pilot expects any test to fail, they expected to tick a box.
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Hi,
Why they will learn now .. when they don't learn before ??
Yes indeed .. what a waste ....
Somebody say's "Retour d'expérience" ? (feedback?)
What a waste, I hope Airbus learned something too ... ?
Excerpts from the BEA report:
"The circumstances of this event were determined from maintenance records, the minutes of the aircraft equipment and the testimony of the copilot. The test probe 1 indicated a blocked probe to 5 degrees. Blockage of the probe 3 was found in the manual verification of freedom of movement. The record review indicates that icing residues and muddy water has probably led to the blocking probes on the flight.
During this flight, the alpha floor function did not activate. The PF found that the speed was less than ten knots in the V max expected alpha. The crew felt the aircraft sink and the captain decided to discontinue the investigation. The PF made a maneuver similar to a recovery stall. There was no stall warning.
On another A320 from the same operator, abnormal values of incidence were also found during a check flight. The three probes have been examined in the workshop, which revealed the presence of fluid in the bodies of two of them. "
"The circumstances of this event were determined from maintenance records, the minutes of the aircraft equipment and the testimony of the copilot. The test probe 1 indicated a blocked probe to 5 degrees. Blockage of the probe 3 was found in the manual verification of freedom of movement. The record review indicates that icing residues and muddy water has probably led to the blocking probes on the flight.
During this flight, the alpha floor function did not activate. The PF found that the speed was less than ten knots in the V max expected alpha. The crew felt the aircraft sink and the captain decided to discontinue the investigation. The PF made a maneuver similar to a recovery stall. There was no stall warning.
On another A320 from the same operator, abnormal values of incidence were also found during a check flight. The three probes have been examined in the workshop, which revealed the presence of fluid in the bodies of two of them. "
Somebody say's "Retour d'expérience" ? (feedback?)
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There really is no point in those posters constantly reminding us that the crew were wrong to try and incorrectly prepared to do this test where they did. Surely that is accepted? May I ask that we stop offering this established fact as the sole 'reason' for the crash?
What this thread needs to focus on is why the 'perfect/infallible' system was not. jcjeant's post now highlights 3 incidences where the root protection system did not function correctly. We should ignore also the 'why's and wherefore's' regarding pressure washing etc. It is apparent that what everyone thought was foolproof was not, and unfortunately the world is not short of fools to test this. How many other anomalies are lurking in the software? When and how will they bite? Will they only bite fools?
We still have 447 'unsolved'.
What this thread needs to focus on is why the 'perfect/infallible' system was not. jcjeant's post now highlights 3 incidences where the root protection system did not function correctly. We should ignore also the 'why's and wherefore's' regarding pressure washing etc. It is apparent that what everyone thought was foolproof was not, and unfortunately the world is not short of fools to test this. How many other anomalies are lurking in the software? When and how will they bite? Will they only bite fools?
We still have 447 'unsolved'.
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Was this recoverable at any stage prior to the second pitch up?
It was recoverable right up until they ran out of altitude.
Cancel TOGA power, trim down, normal stall recovery.
The Airbus instructions specify making the test at not less than 10000 ft AGL because recovery could involve losing a lot of height. They tried to do it at low level. Simple.
Lessons to be learned :-
1) Do not allow ground staff to pressure wash sensors.
2) Assess possible improvement to sensor seals.
3) Do not conduct test flights without proper training and briefing.
It was recoverable right up until they ran out of altitude.
Cancel TOGA power, trim down, normal stall recovery.
The Airbus instructions specify making the test at not less than 10000 ft AGL because recovery could involve losing a lot of height. They tried to do it at low level. Simple.
Lessons to be learned :-
1) Do not allow ground staff to pressure wash sensors.
2) Assess possible improvement to sensor seals.
3) Do not conduct test flights without proper training and briefing.
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A "conventional" aircraft without envelope protection would have crashed in the same way if allowed to reach the same configuration. The only difference is that the envelope protection could have saved the day if it had worked.
So maybe one more lesson for ALL pilots, not only Airbus drivers.
Do not allow the aircraft to stall or in any other way exceed the limits of the flight envelope. Bad things can happen. Simple basic piloting skills.
Leave the exploration of limiting corners of the envelope to professional test pilots, they know how to do it safely.
Envelope protection is essentially an add-on to an otherwise normal aircraft which can, in many foreseeable circumstances, mitigate the effects of a bl**dy idiot doing something stupid. There will always be possible unforeseen complex multiple failure modes which the protection cannot handle and the system did not make matters worse, it simply did not make it better. All of which is probably academic because however idiotproof you make any system, the world will deal you a better idiot.
So maybe one more lesson for ALL pilots, not only Airbus drivers.
Do not allow the aircraft to stall or in any other way exceed the limits of the flight envelope. Bad things can happen. Simple basic piloting skills.
Leave the exploration of limiting corners of the envelope to professional test pilots, they know how to do it safely.
Envelope protection is essentially an add-on to an otherwise normal aircraft which can, in many foreseeable circumstances, mitigate the effects of a bl**dy idiot doing something stupid. There will always be possible unforeseen complex multiple failure modes which the protection cannot handle and the system did not make matters worse, it simply did not make it better. All of which is probably academic because however idiotproof you make any system, the world will deal you a better idiot.
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Hi,
A little remind:
Actually (mainly for economics reasons ...) all FBW planes are cruising very near the "coffin corner" and any little "trouble" can put those planes out of their flight envelope.
The AF447 case come to mind (until the contrary is proved)
So ... maybe the FBW planes must be piloted by "professional test pilots" only ??
Do not allow the aircraft to stall or in any other way exceed the limits of the flight envelope. Bad things can happen. Simple basic piloting skills.
Leave the exploration of limiting corners of the envelope to professional test pilots, they know how to do it safely.
Leave the exploration of limiting corners of the envelope to professional test pilots, they know how to do it safely.
Actually (mainly for economics reasons ...) all FBW planes are cruising very near the "coffin corner" and any little "trouble" can put those planes out of their flight envelope.
The AF447 case come to mind (until the contrary is proved)
So ... maybe the FBW planes must be piloted by "professional test pilots" only ??
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jcjeant
Most aircraft at altitude are close to coffin corner it does not matter that it is FBW or conventional. You are not supposed to fly FBW aircraft expecting the protections to save you.
As for AF447 we will never know unless they find the "orange-box" and are able to decode it. So don't conclude that it is a FBW design fault, that is just pure speculation on your part without any evidence to support it.
BOAC
Why are you concerned about T A G "lessons" being the only ones?
Most aircraft at altitude are close to coffin corner it does not matter that it is FBW or conventional. You are not supposed to fly FBW aircraft expecting the protections to save you.
As for AF447 we will never know unless they find the "orange-box" and are able to decode it. So don't conclude that it is a FBW design fault, that is just pure speculation on your part without any evidence to support it.
BOAC
Why are you concerned about T A G "lessons" being the only ones?
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I thought it was obvious, iceman - there are significant questions in a lot of minds on the philosophy of the 'ultimate protection' system voting out and not telling. They are all here on this thread. If you are to have a 'foolproof' system is has to be.
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There can never be an ultimate protection system, the best that can be achieved is a system which protects against the known risks. There will always be rare cases involving multiple failures, in these cases the system should stay out of the way, not add additional risk, and leave the human to sort it out.
Now that we understand the bee in your bonnet perhaps it is time for the moderators to put this long and tedious thread to bed.
Now that we understand the bee in your bonnet perhaps it is time for the moderators to put this long and tedious thread to bed.
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To put a finer point on the matter, the FBW/Conventional argument will never die so long as two or more people miss the point. The point is: either, (and both) types perform quite well, and the safety record doesn't suggest anything else. 757s fall out of the sky when a hornet makes a mess in the #1 pitot, and 320s experience a problem with discrepant AoA vanes.
The salient concern, imo, is the interface between the a/c and the Pilots. Whether the downfall is mistaken reliance on pitot or AoA, or a lapse in airmanship, the question remains, How well does the airman know his a/c, and its characteristics of flight in challenging domain, regardless the challenge. Did 447's crew rely on a/p too long?
Is that a human factors/training issue? Here, did the FP perform incorrectly? These aircraft are not sentient beings, they are complex machines, machines that deal out dreadful consequences when operated in less than correct ways. "Blame" as apportioned to the mechanical, seems almost completely unwarranted in any one of the recent outcomes.
The salient concern, imo, is the interface between the a/c and the Pilots. Whether the downfall is mistaken reliance on pitot or AoA, or a lapse in airmanship, the question remains, How well does the airman know his a/c, and its characteristics of flight in challenging domain, regardless the challenge. Did 447's crew rely on a/p too long?
Is that a human factors/training issue? Here, did the FP perform incorrectly? These aircraft are not sentient beings, they are complex machines, machines that deal out dreadful consequences when operated in less than correct ways. "Blame" as apportioned to the mechanical, seems almost completely unwarranted in any one of the recent outcomes.
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Hi,
I then returned again to the "coffin corner"
As you said the greater part of commercial aircrafts are flying very close to the coffin corner.
The reason is mainly for reasons of economy.
But we know very well that when a trouble occurs (FBW or not) the margin is very close to not pass into the coffin corner.
Now they say that everything is constantly put out the flights to take place safely.
But .. airplanes are flying near a danger zone......
It seems to me that there is a paradox .....
But is that the airlines are still airlines?
Are they not become air transport industries (which is different from an airline) and thus are only obsessed with the maximum benefit?
Most aircraft at altitude are close to coffin corner it does not matter that it is FBW or conventional. You are not supposed to fly FBW aircraft expecting the protections to save you.
As you said the greater part of commercial aircrafts are flying very close to the coffin corner.
The reason is mainly for reasons of economy.
But we know very well that when a trouble occurs (FBW or not) the margin is very close to not pass into the coffin corner.
Now they say that everything is constantly put out the flights to take place safely.
But .. airplanes are flying near a danger zone......
It seems to me that there is a paradox .....
But is that the airlines are still airlines?
Are they not become air transport industries (which is different from an airline) and thus are only obsessed with the maximum benefit?
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Originally Posted by The AG
There can never be an ultimate protection system,
Trying to condense 48 years of raising my backside from the ground is not easy, but I guess I could say that I have always sought two things:-
1) An aeroplane that lets me know when it is about to let go or has lost the plot
2) The basic flying ability to sort it out when it does.
My flying ability has been adequate, but I have never been easy with an aeroplane that pretends that it knows what is happening but does not - and does not tell me until it dumps in my lap.
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Originally Posted by jcjeant
all FBW planes are cruising very near the "coffin corner"
regards,
HN39
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Hi,
Seem's the "know datas" about AF447 put the flight very near "coffin corner" and the margins for speed or altitude were very thin .. at least.
Wy emphasize on FBW ?
Cause FBW is know for keep the plane flying (more easy than a full manual flying plane) on the limits or to not go of the limits
So as it will be very difficult to fly near "coffin corner" manually .. FBW make it more easy and pilots are more confidents to tease with this dangerous zone.
FBW is not only a help for piloting it's also allowed to build aircrafts differently and use them differently (more economical)
So even the cost of the FBW plane his higher than a non FBW .. air transport industry had understand the economic return of such investissement.
Methink FBW is a good move to more secure flight but this is eroded by the (sometime) use made of FBW by the air transport industry.
and how near is "very near"?
Wy emphasize on FBW ?
Cause FBW is know for keep the plane flying (more easy than a full manual flying plane) on the limits or to not go of the limits
So as it will be very difficult to fly near "coffin corner" manually .. FBW make it more easy and pilots are more confidents to tease with this dangerous zone.
FBW is not only a help for piloting it's also allowed to build aircrafts differently and use them differently (more economical)
So even the cost of the FBW plane his higher than a non FBW .. air transport industry had understand the economic return of such investissement.
Methink FBW is a good move to more secure flight but this is eroded by the (sometime) use made of FBW by the air transport industry.