at almost identical local angles of attack and consistent with the cruise angle of attack, without the crew noticing it.
It is obvious that this expression aims to release Airbus responsibilities where we should read :
without the crew being informed]
Given the crew self appointed themselves as test pilots, and set out to test the AoA systems, then one would have thought they would look at and understand the effective AoA displays on each of their PFDs... and had they done so then they would "have been informed" they were not working.
I flew 2 legs in an A319 today, and not sure how differently I would have flown or acted had I been made aware that 1 or more AoA probes were frozen. They are not really used, although they are visible, in normal line ops - they are there for safety "features".
I am not saying the Airbus is perfect, far from it. But when people act, either by themselves or by inappropriate tasking, with such disregard for the basic rules of aviation, should the aeroplane really be designed to protect them from whatever they (try to) do? The designers have enough trouble trying to protect crews from the hazards they might encounter in line operations.
Also witness the posters on the QF thread discrediting the A380 for "producing 58 ECAM messages". Where do you draw the line?
NoD