Would you abort after V1?
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SSG and others, please read "Handling the Big Jets" by Davies, a very humble Test Pilot who explains all this and more... That old gent Newton comes to mind as well - specifically (half mass by velocity squared). 
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Mutt...classroom is finished...schools out...
Anyway, I find it quite amusing that you accuse airlines of endangering the lives of passengers by using Flex Thrust, but yet you are quite happy to takeoff without doing any form of "proper" takeoff analysis that reviews the obstacles in your takeoff path or develop any engine out procedures.
Mutt
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>>I'm afraid I'm not that up on the 748 accident although I am aware of it. On the face of it the Captain made the right decision in my view and is to be applauded.<<
Ashling
I did post it but here it is again :-) but it does show your point of a Captain acting quickly and thinking outside the box In the text the AAIB referred the accident as not being a classic scenario and commended him for not following post V1 Engine fire procedures. Many here argued the fact that with an engine fire you continue the takeoff. But how do you know the severity of the fire, whether it will damage controls or systems and whether you can extinguish it. Its a Hard call .My arguement throughout this thread has been totally directed at " NOT CLASSIC SCENARIOS". and especially at a STOL Citation which I could quite happily plonk back down again at somewhere like Heathrow.
Pace
>>A pilot's unorthodox handling of an engine-fire emergency on a plane carrying the Leeds United football team has been backed by air investigators.
They ruled that the captain made the right decision immediately to re-land the aircraft rather than climb away and land later.
The Leeds United team was returning from a match at West Ham on 30 March 1998 when they were caught up in the drama on the flight from Stansted Airport.
The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) report concluded it had been sensible for the captain to take over the controls from his less-experienced co-pilot.
Evacuation drills
The captain managed to get the Hawker Siddeley 748 turbo-prop aircraft back down on the runway after a fire broke out in the right-hand engine.
All 40 passengers and four crew on the flight escaped safely.
The AAIB report said the crew's actions in getting everyone out of the aircraft without fully completing the evacuation drills were "understandable in view of the severity of the fire".
The accident happened at 2330 GMT when the engine failed just after take-off for Leeds Bradford airport.
The co-pilot was at the controls when he and the captain heard a sharp bang.
The chief stewardess told passengers to sit down and advised the pilots that the right engine was on fire.
The AAIB report said that in a situation of this kind normal procedure would be for the pilot at the controls to take the plane into a climb while the other pilot went through an emergency check list.
Then the plane could be positioned to land at the departure airport or at an alternate spot.
But the report added that the sequence of events involving the Leeds plane was not "a classic scenario" and that the captain had decided to take control and re-land.
Engine fatigue
The AAIB went on: "The decision to re-land had to be made rapidly with the information available to him at that instant.
"This decision was sensible in the circumstances, as was his decision to take control from the competent but far less experienced first officer"
Making 19 safety recommendations, the report said the Dart engine had failed because of fatigue-cracking of the high pressure turbine disc.
Dramatic event
There had been four similar failures of Rolls-Royce Dart engines over 26 years, and one since - in June 2001, said the report.
The captain had said at the April 1998 news conference: "It was a split-second decision. Normal procedure would have been to do a complete circuit, but our judgment was that we did not have the time.
"We landed on the available runway. Unfortunately it was a little too short.
"The plane ran on to the soft ground and the nose wheel detached, making the event seem more dramatic than it probably was."<<
Ashling
I did post it but here it is again :-) but it does show your point of a Captain acting quickly and thinking outside the box In the text the AAIB referred the accident as not being a classic scenario and commended him for not following post V1 Engine fire procedures. Many here argued the fact that with an engine fire you continue the takeoff. But how do you know the severity of the fire, whether it will damage controls or systems and whether you can extinguish it. Its a Hard call .My arguement throughout this thread has been totally directed at " NOT CLASSIC SCENARIOS". and especially at a STOL Citation which I could quite happily plonk back down again at somewhere like Heathrow.
Pace
>>A pilot's unorthodox handling of an engine-fire emergency on a plane carrying the Leeds United football team has been backed by air investigators.
They ruled that the captain made the right decision immediately to re-land the aircraft rather than climb away and land later.
The Leeds United team was returning from a match at West Ham on 30 March 1998 when they were caught up in the drama on the flight from Stansted Airport.
The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) report concluded it had been sensible for the captain to take over the controls from his less-experienced co-pilot.
Evacuation drills
The captain managed to get the Hawker Siddeley 748 turbo-prop aircraft back down on the runway after a fire broke out in the right-hand engine.
All 40 passengers and four crew on the flight escaped safely.
The AAIB report said the crew's actions in getting everyone out of the aircraft without fully completing the evacuation drills were "understandable in view of the severity of the fire".
The accident happened at 2330 GMT when the engine failed just after take-off for Leeds Bradford airport.
The co-pilot was at the controls when he and the captain heard a sharp bang.
The chief stewardess told passengers to sit down and advised the pilots that the right engine was on fire.
The AAIB report said that in a situation of this kind normal procedure would be for the pilot at the controls to take the plane into a climb while the other pilot went through an emergency check list.
Then the plane could be positioned to land at the departure airport or at an alternate spot.
But the report added that the sequence of events involving the Leeds plane was not "a classic scenario" and that the captain had decided to take control and re-land.
Engine fatigue
The AAIB went on: "The decision to re-land had to be made rapidly with the information available to him at that instant.
"This decision was sensible in the circumstances, as was his decision to take control from the competent but far less experienced first officer"
Making 19 safety recommendations, the report said the Dart engine had failed because of fatigue-cracking of the high pressure turbine disc.
Dramatic event
There had been four similar failures of Rolls-Royce Dart engines over 26 years, and one since - in June 2001, said the report.
The captain had said at the April 1998 news conference: "It was a split-second decision. Normal procedure would have been to do a complete circuit, but our judgment was that we did not have the time.
"We landed on the available runway. Unfortunately it was a little too short.
"The plane ran on to the soft ground and the nose wheel detached, making the event seem more dramatic than it probably was."<<
Last edited by Pace; 19th May 2008 at 20:18.
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Mutt,
If you want more detailed instruction in take off procedures, it can't be done via internet thread. It's $50 /Hr. PM me and we discuss hotel and airfare out here.
If you want more detailed instruction in take off procedures, it can't be done via internet thread. It's $50 /Hr. PM me and we discuss hotel and airfare out here.
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"We landed on the available runway. Unfortunately it was a little too short.
What actually happened...
The HS-748 was cleared for a runway 23 take-off at 23:29. The first officer was the handling pilot and the take-off was to be made with full dry power; the water methanol system was selected to standby. At an airspeed of 111 kt the Commander called 'vee one, rotate', the first officer moved the control column rearwards and the aircraft became airborne. Less than five seconds after the 'rotate' call, at an airspeed of 115 kt and a height of between 30 feet and 100 feet agl, the no. 2 engine suffered a catastrophic failure resulting in a sudden loss of power and an immediate substantial nacelle fire. The aircraft yawed 11deg to the right of the runway heading. The Commander took over control and the crew were told by the senior cabin attendant that the right engine was on fire. Engine power was reduced and the aircraft yawed 14.5° to the left of runway heading. Four seconds later, the sound of the engine fire warning bell was recorded. The aircraft was in the air for a total period of 27 seconds before it touched down.
The aircraft ran off the end of the runway at 62 kt., crossed the perimeter track and came to rest with the collapse of the nose landing gear.
The aircraft ran off the end of the runway at 62 kt., crossed the perimeter track and came to rest with the collapse of the nose landing gear.
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So you've already made fun of TCAS resolutions, believe going below minimums is ok, and that V1 is an irrelevant figure. Do you at least wear your seatbelt?
rcl
You do not have to go ridiculous :-) The going below minimums was an out of the Box situation and not me. It was a KingAir 350 USA to UK past the point of no return with both airports going down in unforecast sea fog.
The pilots landed in 300 metres fog flying the ILS to the ground aided by a radar altimeter for the flare. They landed safely rather than crashing out of fuel.
Where have I implied that V1 is an irrelevant figure? Please read what I am saying
Pace
rcl
You do not have to go ridiculous :-) The going below minimums was an out of the Box situation and not me. It was a KingAir 350 USA to UK past the point of no return with both airports going down in unforecast sea fog.
The pilots landed in 300 metres fog flying the ILS to the ground aided by a radar altimeter for the flare. They landed safely rather than crashing out of fuel.
Where have I implied that V1 is an irrelevant figure? Please read what I am saying
Pace
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There is often a range of V1's.
If the split between them is ~30kts, cognizant of that, whats the problem with aborting post minimum V1 (but less than maximum V1)?
I seem to remember we've had this conversation before....
If the split between them is ~30kts, cognizant of that, whats the problem with aborting post minimum V1 (but less than maximum V1)?
I seem to remember we've had this conversation before....
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There is often a range of V1's.
If the split between them is ~30kts, cognizant of that, whats the problem with aborting post minimum V1 (but less than maximum V1)?
If the split between them is ~30kts, cognizant of that, whats the problem with aborting post minimum V1 (but less than maximum V1)?
"We'll reject for any malfunction prior to eighty knots. Above eighty knots, we'll reject for engine fire, engine failure, loss of directional control, or any outward opening door only. After that, we'll take it airborne and handle it as an airborne emergency. Unless of course we feel like we really ought to keep it on the ground, then we'll make up our mind on the fly past V1 up to say, 30 more knots, and we might stop or we might go. I'll let you know. If we do elect to reject, I will retard the thrust levers to idle and apply reverse. We will use the takeoff autobrakes. Back me up on the speed brake handle, note the airspeed for brake energy, and notify the tower of our situation. Once airborne..."
Nope...when the precalculated and prebriefed V1 is past, so has the time for stopping. Time to make like an airplane and go fly.
Mach 3
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Seems pretty sensible to me....
But then I've never liked reducing everything to the lowest common denominator...
This business is about keeping your options open however remote they may be....IMHO of course...
But then I've never liked reducing everything to the lowest common denominator...
This business is about keeping your options open however remote they may be....IMHO of course...
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>"We'll reject for any malfunction prior to eighty knots. Above eighty knots, we'll reject for engine fire, engine failure, loss of directional control, or any outward opening door only. After that, we'll take it airborne and handle it as an airborne emergency. Unless of course we feel like we really ought to keep it on the ground, then we'll make up our mind on the fly past V1 up to say, 30 more knots, and we might stop or we might go. I'll let you know. If we do elect to reject, I will retard the thrust levers to idle and apply reverse. We will use the takeoff autobrakes. Back me up on the speed brake handle, note the airspeed for brake energy, and notify the tower of our situation. Once airborne..."<
SNS3Guppy so you do have a sense of humour then ? :-) that was seriously funny :-) No hard feelings
Take care
Pace
SNS3Guppy so you do have a sense of humour then ? :-) that was seriously funny :-) No hard feelings
Take care
Pace
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SSG
I would love to know under whos authority you are allowed to teach perf?
And if you had half a clue what you were talking about you wouldn't be offering to teach people like MUTT.
I would love to know under whos authority you are allowed to teach perf?
And if you had half a clue what you were talking about you wouldn't be offering to teach people like MUTT.
SSG
I'll believe your idea about aborting after V1, IF you compute a refusal speed for each take-off, ensure it is less than or equal to maximum brake energy speed under the conditions. AND brief your crew as to your intentions, the conditions justifying an abort at the speed range between V! and Vr, assuming Vr is less than refusal speed. And inform your crew and passengers on this take-off "I have deemed the engineering data by Cessna (insert manufacturer here) to be inappropriate and will do as I deem right." Otherwise, you are just guessing your way through a dynamic physics problem by the seat of your pants.
Opinion now, your juvenile, insecure, supercilious posts are invariably written so that you can, in your own mind, belittle, denigrate professional pilots whose actions and methods have been proven over millions of flight hours and the huge efforts of experienced engineers by enterprises who are singular in their fields. These businesses, along with airlines, absolutely must, under pain of being swept aside in an accident, operate their equipment in a responsible way. Every day!!
OR they should just step aside and let you train them!
I'll believe your idea about aborting after V1, IF you compute a refusal speed for each take-off, ensure it is less than or equal to maximum brake energy speed under the conditions. AND brief your crew as to your intentions, the conditions justifying an abort at the speed range between V! and Vr, assuming Vr is less than refusal speed. And inform your crew and passengers on this take-off "I have deemed the engineering data by Cessna (insert manufacturer here) to be inappropriate and will do as I deem right." Otherwise, you are just guessing your way through a dynamic physics problem by the seat of your pants.
Opinion now, your juvenile, insecure, supercilious posts are invariably written so that you can, in your own mind, belittle, denigrate professional pilots whose actions and methods have been proven over millions of flight hours and the huge efforts of experienced engineers by enterprises who are singular in their fields. These businesses, along with airlines, absolutely must, under pain of being swept aside in an accident, operate their equipment in a responsible way. Every day!!
OR they should just step aside and let you train them!
I think if I have a verified engine separation--I MAY abort after V1 if i have excess RWY as you can't really be sure if the plane is still flyable as the DC-10 incident took other critical systems with it---though not likely--- as how would I verify that exactly?---also if I don't do a proper preflight and don't remove gust locks or tie down spoilers-it has happened-- so that I'd be alive for the license revocation hearing with the FAA
Oh yeah and will not even begin to argue with the thread's originator -unless I'm attacked myself- I prefer to read the suggestions/ opinions and advice of the industry professionals-stupid me
Oh yeah and will not even begin to argue with the thread's originator -unless I'm attacked myself- I prefer to read the suggestions/ opinions and advice of the industry professionals-stupid me
Last edited by Pugilistic Animus; 20th May 2008 at 02:35.
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What if what happens wasn't briefed?
Thanks Animas - You hit it...kind of...more simply...let's say you don't know what exactly happened...
If I see a fire light, the plane yaws over, serious vibration, heavy opposite control aeleron and rudder mputs to stay aligned with the runway...my gosh...what will the plane do when rubber isn't on the runway?
A quick glance to see 7000 ft of remaining runway left...might be an easy choice...pull the levers back, add brakes...
Who cares what the problem was..your stopped, you get the passengers out...you can now take a look...a departing C152 just put his landing gear into your left engine and tail....Glad you stopped?
If I see a fire light, the plane yaws over, serious vibration, heavy opposite control aeleron and rudder mputs to stay aligned with the runway...my gosh...what will the plane do when rubber isn't on the runway?
A quick glance to see 7000 ft of remaining runway left...might be an easy choice...pull the levers back, add brakes...
Who cares what the problem was..your stopped, you get the passengers out...you can now take a look...a departing C152 just put his landing gear into your left engine and tail....Glad you stopped?
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Originally Posted by pace
SNS3Guppy so you do have a sense of humour then
a) Has to be right
b) Has to justify the actions
As an aside, if any airline selectors are reading PPRune, I fear that ssg has seriously worsened the odds of ANY corporate pilot getting an airline job....just in case..........
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ssg
Would you care to respond to my earlier post? Here it is again...
TP
Would you care to respond to my earlier post? Here it is again...
ssg
Fifty-one people died in the Spantax accident at Malaga. If the Captain had continued the take-off, dumped fuel, and landed below MLW they would have been alive that evening, and some of them would still be alive today.
TP
Fifty-one people died in the Spantax accident at Malaga. If the Captain had continued the take-off, dumped fuel, and landed below MLW they would have been alive that evening, and some of them would still be alive today.
TP
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.......
The Malaga accident showed that a pilot decided the plane was possibly unflyable, he made a descision. No sense arguing the point, the commission found that he made the right descion based on the info at hand...
Last edited by ssg; 20th May 2008 at 07:35.
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No SSG your the one out of step.
I doubt anyone here would say there are no circumstances in which they would stop above V1 however those circumstances would be extreme and outside of what their briefing covered.
The scenario you gave was an engine fire between V1 and V2 (VR comes after V1 by the way). You did not give more detail. So everyone here quite rightly said that they would go. That is what is briefed so that is what you do. The aircraft is designed to survive the event and we are trained to deal with it.
You then berate people for not being able to make a decision and acting like robots when in fact they made their decision calmly at the briefing stage as they should. There is one correct answer to your scenario and that is to go.
Now if you accepted that and then asked "so guys are their any circumstances in which you would stop beyond V1" you would open up a very interesting discussion. My view is that their are indeed situations were you may have no choice such as blocked runways, multiple engine failure/fire or control restriction/jam.
You have your own agenda which is every bit as blinkered as you claim us to be. If there are any recuiters out there they may well be picking up the phone to Alaskan and trying to find out who you are so they can too can make a decision.
I doubt anyone here would say there are no circumstances in which they would stop above V1 however those circumstances would be extreme and outside of what their briefing covered.
The scenario you gave was an engine fire between V1 and V2 (VR comes after V1 by the way). You did not give more detail. So everyone here quite rightly said that they would go. That is what is briefed so that is what you do. The aircraft is designed to survive the event and we are trained to deal with it.
You then berate people for not being able to make a decision and acting like robots when in fact they made their decision calmly at the briefing stage as they should. There is one correct answer to your scenario and that is to go.
Now if you accepted that and then asked "so guys are their any circumstances in which you would stop beyond V1" you would open up a very interesting discussion. My view is that their are indeed situations were you may have no choice such as blocked runways, multiple engine failure/fire or control restriction/jam.
You have your own agenda which is every bit as blinkered as you claim us to be. If there are any recuiters out there they may well be picking up the phone to Alaskan and trying to find out who you are so they can too can make a decision.