LH A320 Rough Landing @ Hamburg

[sevenstrokeroll]

something you don't expect

dear diaz:

if you are sitting in your home and a meteor hits it, that is something you might not expect.

If Raquel Welch showed up at your front door, that is something you might not expect.

BUT FOR A PILOT in a storm condition that was making headlines all across europe TO NOT BE READY FOR A WIND CHANGE is NUTS.

YOU EXPECT the worst until you have parked the plane and someone else has the watch. IF NOT, YOU ARE NOT DOING YOUR JOB AS A PILOT.

[asva]

M.me la Pilote

A proposito del mancato incidente di Amburgo, ecco cosa penso come passeggero, ripetendo anche quello che altri hanno detto e cioč:
L'uragano che imperversava su tutta l'Europa NON era un evento imprevisto, di conseguenza se il pilota non aveva previsto un improvviso colpo di vento all'atterraggio č un(a) irresponsabile o un(a) ******** (a).

[pixpax]

Look at the video. Wind from the right. On approach ailerons seem to be at roll right position for flying back to runway centerline. At time 00:38 ailerons are still at roll right position (correct), then touchdown with left gear slightly before right gear and then aircraft bounced off. Then at time 00:39 ailerons seem to be at neutral or slightly roll left position, what allowed for gust of wind to roll the aircraft to the left so that wingtip touched runway. Then was the last moment to go around and it went well.

[sweeper]

an inept attempt at a crosswind landing.
a successful recovery.
if the attention and ability shown in the recovery had been applied to the landing...........
started with a cock up, then got lucky!

[keltic]

As a fearfull passenger, I thought it was a bit hysterical my not flying every time I checked that the wind speed and weather conditions in my route could be bad. I have cancelled many times, lose money. Now I donīt mind my being a bit whimp.

A pilot once told me, donīt watch the weather forecast, someone will do it for you. Iīve followed his advises but now I go back to check the weather myself everytime I fly.

After seeing these landings in the limit. I will continue canceling my fights in nasty weather conditions. I donīt feel particularly safe, and I feel somehow that sometimes limits are pushed too far.

I think this will be devastating for LH image, I am affraid. Did I say I will be flying FRA-DRS in ten days time?

[J.O.]

keltic:

This may sound condescending, but do you drive a car or ride in one as a passenger from time to time? If so, then given the carnage on the roads that kills hundreds daily all around the world, I don't know how you do it!

What I am trying to say is that thousands of successful flights are completed every day, whereas events like this one are very rare indeed, which is why it gets so much coverage. Could it have been done better? Most certainly, and as you should have noticed by now, many professional pilots on this and other forums are talking about it, and believe me, they are learning from it too. That's what's great about our industry. We learn from the errors and accidents from the past so that we can work hard to prevent them in the future. If only our roads and highways got the same level of attention to detail. Countless families would benefit every day.

So, relax and enjoy your next flight.

Jeff

[alf5071h]

Chris, re your #307, the paper is well worth reading. ‘ ‘Safety aspects of aircraft operations in crosswind’

It covers:

• The basics of flying in crosswinds; – aircraft are relatively easy to fly within the manufacturers and operational limits, although experience and currency are required in more extreme conditions.
• The report continues with a review of wind measurement and reporting; – there are many errors which pilots must be aware of and should consider in their decision making.
• The overview of certification and test requirements probably covers your point in #307, again the industry makes many assumptions about the ‘demonstrated limits’.
• Finally there is a review of N American crosswind related accidents (1983-95), the contributory causes and risks involved in crosswind operation are examined.

Of interest 70% of accident events involved wing or pod strike; given these statistics then the option of a GA might be ill advised – fly with a damage aircraft?
This would strengthen the argument for an early decision to avoid the hazard, minimise risk, and not getting boxed into a situation where there is no ‘undo’ option.

We should be concerned that many operations are increasingly occurring in marginal conditions; this is not so much the fault of individual misjudgement than the increasing external pressures of inappropriate industry norms.
In a very safe, highly reliable industry, and with the use of safety enhancing technologies, we appear to be continually pushing the margins of safety. Then when someone inadvertently crosses ‘the edge’, we are surprised; there is great concern and there is lengthy discussion in hindsight.
What we need is a bit more foresight, which should include training and briefing as well as basic systems and operational knowledge; good rule making and SOP formulation would also help.

[Perigaeum]

For the analytical minds out here,
a motion compensated version of the critical seconds.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hAl1IJYx0C8

[Chris Scott]

Quotes from alf5071h:
We should be concerned that many operations are increasingly occurring in marginal conditions; this is not so much the fault of individual misjudgement than the increasing external pressures of inappropriate industry norms. ......
What we need is a bit more foresight, which should include training and briefing as well as basic systems and operational knowledge; good rule making and SOP formulation would also help.
[Unquote]

Thanks, I'll try to do justice to that Paper, when I get the chance.
You may have a point about the "press-on" pressure from management, in a world where the accountant is respected, but mother nature is taken for granted.
I am pleased that CRM was introduced during my career, and by my generation (we flew, in our rookie days - didn't we - with an older generation that included some press-on-regardless merchants, who thought they were still on "Ops"). But, before my retirement, I saw signs that (AIRCRAFT) HANDLING skills were already in decline in the 1990s. And many rookie pilots (straight out of flying school on to a Ģ30m-jet) expected to be humoured when they acted like they were the bee's knees... Is that just old-fart syndrome?

Chris

[Rananim]

The co-pilot flew the approach,not the Captain..
I have to reference this to what I know,which is Boeing.If during/after landing,no right-roll input is made by co-pilot,this would be clearly and instantly apparent to the Captain(before the wing has a chance to rise).On the Boeing.However,on the Airbus,he cant see/feel what the co-pilot is commanding so he can only react until/when the upwind wing starts coming up.Plus he has to press an override button for his sidestick to take control.Am I right?
On the Boeing he can follow through with what the co-pilot commands just by resting his hand on the control column.He has tactile feedback,not to mention visual.
If this is the case,the Captain's skill level was indeed very high.The recovery(apart from the obvious fact that it came just an instant too late)was very nice.

Commendable that the Captain let the co-pilot fly the approach.However,in the case of a rising wing during a x-wind landing you have to take control
instantly and how can you do that if theres no tactile/visual feedback
to warn you of any omission by the other pilot?You're forced to take action after it occurs.Too late.

On reflection,there is more good than bad to this whole incident.

[galaxy flyer]

At the liveleak video of the LH landing is a BA 747 landing in similar winds. It is crystal clear example of how do a crosswind landing. Simply beautiful

GF

[KC135777]

wow, good point. now, I believe I remember reading about how the AB sidestick does NOT move, but that the pilots actually put pressure on it? is this correct? if so, like you said, as the 'decrabbing' rudder is inputted by one pilot, the pilot not flying can't tell (in time) whether the appropriate 'wing low' aileron is being 'fed in'. No visual/tactile feel of stick (aileron) control inputs. This is INDEED bad during conditions approaching limitations of the aircraft.

For these (challenging) type landings, the pilot flying (for all practical purposes) is flying solo. BAD- in a crew aircraft.

[NOR116,20]

Side stick motion

Maybe it would be a better design if the side stick shows motion for any control inputs.
Then both pilots are aware of any control inputs which would be very helpful in difficult landing conditions.

[Roadtrip]

I'm glad I'm flying a real airplane (Boeing) with real flight controls.

[admiral ackbar]

I'm glad I'm flying a real airplane (Boeing) with real flight controls.

Yes because those darn foreign airplanes keep falling out of the sky everyday due to faulty flight controls...

You must be concerned that your whole USAF will crash land when the foreign tankers that will replace your good old American tankers fall out of the sky as well.

Its amazing you sleep at night.

[Bobbsy]

After a bit of searching, I think galaxy flyer was referring to http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=766_1196775900 this video on Live Leak.

To my amateur SLF eye, it is an impressive example of flying skill.

Bobbsy

[212man]

Some Airbus guidance here:

http://www.airbus.com/store/mm_repos...LAND-SEQ05.pdf

[Dream Land]

YOU EXPECT the worst until you have parked the plane and someone else has the watch. IF NOT, YOU ARE NOT DOING YOUR JOB AS A PILOT By sevenstrokeroll

Excellent post and I fully agree with this philosophy!

Commendable that the Captain let the co-pilot fly the approach. By Rananim

Have to disagree here, although as a captain you must give an opportunity to FO's to gain experience, the number one responsibility is to the passengers and crews safety as sevenstrokeroll points out. In this severe wind case it would have been prudent to brief a point in the approach where control was transfered to the captain rather than assuming you could save any botched attempt made by the junior FO.

I'm glad I'm flying a real airplane (Boeing) with real flight controls.

Get real!

[Ricky1]

LH A320 Landing

Hi everyone,
I have been keeping a close eye on this thread and have found it very interesting. However I havn't seen anything on here with regards an offcial report from LH or airbus. I have looked at both websites and have found nothing related to this event.

Looking at the video over and over, it is shocking the outcome of the landing was not worse than what happened. Safety is number one right... So what happened to the pilots decision making? Should they have gone around? maybe chose rwy 33? But even after all that it looks to me that the pilot flared a little to early and that the wrong portion of landing gear touched down first. Now I am only a fresh out of school commercial pilot here, I have been tought to keep that into wind wing down to aviod what happened in this situation. Looks to me the wing lifted up and a gust cought the underside, leading to the chain of events after. I know things are a lot different on the 320, but are the fundimentals of dicision making and flying along the same lines?

For everyone that has watched the video on YouTube, you will see that there is a related video section on the right side of the video. I tought you's guys should have a look at this video of the event. Might put a smile on your faces. A little bit of humor for you's. apparently it's the real truth behind the landing. lol

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8rbZg...eature=related

Take care all,
Rick

[CONF iture]

Rananim, you're absolutely right in your comments.

On a FBW airbus the PNF is always one step further behind.
He can only monitor airplane attitude and trajectory, but except from the rudder pedals inputs, he knows nothing from the PF flight controls inputs.
Therefore it is much harder to properly evaluate a situation and the tolerance margin must be largely reduced.

For the PF, a direct stick to ailerons connection would be so much more appropriate for the flare in gusty cross wind ... Toulouse could still do something about that … but regarding the side stick philosophy it is obviously too late.
It could have been an excellent option for a single crew operation, but to this day multi crew is still the way to go !