Interesting note about AA Airbus crash in NYC
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More proof, not than any more was needed, that books and manuals were changed AFTER this terrible event, to cover weaknesses in the Aircraft.
Effectively these Aircraft are continuing to operate under a de facto MEL, fit to continue flying as long as control inputs are manually limited.
Effectively these Aircraft are continuing to operate under a de facto MEL, fit to continue flying as long as control inputs are manually limited.
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The weakness is in the regulations, not the aircraft. Airliners are not designed for these kinds of manoeuvres.
I believe the NTSB report says the fin failed at twice design load; the actual max may have been higher, but let's assume that the regs get changed to effectively double the design loads requirements. To be consistent, you'd have to follow a "carefree inputs" philosophy in all axes, so let's double ALL the manouvre loads.
Now, manoeuvre loads don't always design the structure, but if they did, doubling the load will generally require twice the thickness or strength. We just, in effect, doubled the structural mass of our design, at least for primary structure.
So we've grounded every existing airliner - because no amount of beefing up will double the design loads - AND ensured we can never design an economically practical one to replace them, because they'll be far too heavy.
As to your last comment; that the plane be operated according to the procedures in the manuals is the only assumption one can make. Every single limitation, caution, warning and procedure in the AFM is a reliance upon the trained people in the pointy end operating, literally, 'by the book'. if you don't then all kinds of nasty things happen.
Suppose you have an engine failure. What prevents you applying full rudder in the wrong sense, causing the aircraft to enter uncontrolled flight? Nothing except training and airmanship. if we restricted the rudder so that you couldn't apply it "the wrong way" we'd end up making the input automatic - the only way to prevent pilot control inputs from potentially catastrophic consequences is to prevent pilot control inputs - PERIOD. FBW envelope protection or full automation. As long as the man is in the loop, and in control, he has the ability to cause a tragic result. It's inevitable.
I believe the NTSB report says the fin failed at twice design load; the actual max may have been higher, but let's assume that the regs get changed to effectively double the design loads requirements. To be consistent, you'd have to follow a "carefree inputs" philosophy in all axes, so let's double ALL the manouvre loads.
Now, manoeuvre loads don't always design the structure, but if they did, doubling the load will generally require twice the thickness or strength. We just, in effect, doubled the structural mass of our design, at least for primary structure.
So we've grounded every existing airliner - because no amount of beefing up will double the design loads - AND ensured we can never design an economically practical one to replace them, because they'll be far too heavy.
As to your last comment; that the plane be operated according to the procedures in the manuals is the only assumption one can make. Every single limitation, caution, warning and procedure in the AFM is a reliance upon the trained people in the pointy end operating, literally, 'by the book'. if you don't then all kinds of nasty things happen.
Suppose you have an engine failure. What prevents you applying full rudder in the wrong sense, causing the aircraft to enter uncontrolled flight? Nothing except training and airmanship. if we restricted the rudder so that you couldn't apply it "the wrong way" we'd end up making the input automatic - the only way to prevent pilot control inputs from potentially catastrophic consequences is to prevent pilot control inputs - PERIOD. FBW envelope protection or full automation. As long as the man is in the loop, and in control, he has the ability to cause a tragic result. It's inevitable.
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This is getting worse.
This terrible tragedy occured to an Aircraft type that was the first to use this kind of technology, and as we know this particular type for various reasons was not maintained as well as it should/could have been, although these maintenance problems have now been corrected, and there are now no types manufactured the same as this one was.
Despite this, you initially jumped on the bandwagon of let's all blame the dead Pilot.
Now you are saying let's blame the Regulators.
What next?
Surely not where the blame really belongs............
This terrible tragedy occured to an Aircraft type that was the first to use this kind of technology, and as we know this particular type for various reasons was not maintained as well as it should/could have been, although these maintenance problems have now been corrected, and there are now no types manufactured the same as this one was.
Despite this, you initially jumped on the bandwagon of let's all blame the dead Pilot.
Now you are saying let's blame the Regulators.
What next?
Surely not where the blame really belongs............
Warning Toxic!
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You have to be joking! What you said cannot be serious. A wake vortex encounter is not an unusual event They happen. This type operated in Australia for years quite happily, having wake encounters. The fin came off because of the unusual pilot reaction to it. I would call it bizarre flying practices because I cannot believe the rudder reaction, the scale of the movements, and the rapidity. I'm quite sure even a 747 fin would come off if you did this to it. The fact that regulatory authorities are satisfied that the aeroplane as it stands is fit to continue operating with pilot 're-education' suggests that the cause is known.
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Airsupport .. I don't know your background but it appears not to be related to any certification areas.
MFS (who is an aircraft designer chappie) has put the story pretty succintly in my view .. the general idea is that the OEM designs an aircraft to do a job and uses Industry standard techniques (with the occasional push to new technology) to design his bird. Along the way the internal system checks that the design standards (FAR25 and the like) can be satisfied.
Sometimes the OEM will endeavour to design more from the standards than from general practice and that can produce interesting results including both good and bad but, at the end of the day, it is a mix of those who know how to design, designing, with a view to getting the requisite tick in the box from the certification world so that the bird can be sold in the marketplace.
The reality is that the world is competitive .. therefore Brand A doesn't unilaterally make Brand A's product incredibly stronger than Brand B's .. as MFS has indicated .. the result is a steel girder bridge with no commercial value.
The pilot is required to be trained and licensed ... the operating techniques adopted by operator and pilot should be in accordance with the techniques recommended/required by the OEM/Type Certification.
Simply wishing that a transport category aircraft can be treated like an aerobatic machine remains just that .. wishful thinking .. the two animals are very different and the required operating techniques, likewise, are quite different.
It is not a case of the OEM having to second guess everything an enterprising operator or pilot might do ... rather, the OEM states what should be done ... the operator or pilot who wants to do something different without OEM blessing is out on his own.
.. and, then again, every now and again, technological status is challenged for the imperfect animal it is ... as, for instance, with Comet, etc.
Each of us in the game has his/her role to play .. it is a team effort ... except in those rare cases of gross incompetence or wilfully negligent behaviour it is not a case of assigning blame within the confines of the Industry (although the legal system may well do independently and in parallel).
MFS (who is an aircraft designer chappie) has put the story pretty succintly in my view .. the general idea is that the OEM designs an aircraft to do a job and uses Industry standard techniques (with the occasional push to new technology) to design his bird. Along the way the internal system checks that the design standards (FAR25 and the like) can be satisfied.
Sometimes the OEM will endeavour to design more from the standards than from general practice and that can produce interesting results including both good and bad but, at the end of the day, it is a mix of those who know how to design, designing, with a view to getting the requisite tick in the box from the certification world so that the bird can be sold in the marketplace.
The reality is that the world is competitive .. therefore Brand A doesn't unilaterally make Brand A's product incredibly stronger than Brand B's .. as MFS has indicated .. the result is a steel girder bridge with no commercial value.
The pilot is required to be trained and licensed ... the operating techniques adopted by operator and pilot should be in accordance with the techniques recommended/required by the OEM/Type Certification.
Simply wishing that a transport category aircraft can be treated like an aerobatic machine remains just that .. wishful thinking .. the two animals are very different and the required operating techniques, likewise, are quite different.
It is not a case of the OEM having to second guess everything an enterprising operator or pilot might do ... rather, the OEM states what should be done ... the operator or pilot who wants to do something different without OEM blessing is out on his own.
.. and, then again, every now and again, technological status is challenged for the imperfect animal it is ... as, for instance, with Comet, etc.
Each of us in the game has his/her role to play .. it is a team effort ... except in those rare cases of gross incompetence or wilfully negligent behaviour it is not a case of assigning blame within the confines of the Industry (although the legal system may well do independently and in parallel).
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You have to be joking! What you said cannot be serious. A wake vortex encounter is not an unusual event They happen. This type operated in Australia for years quite happily, having wake encounters. The fin came off because of the unusual pilot reaction to it. I would call it bizarre flying practices because I cannot believe the rudder reaction, the scale of the movements, and the rapidity. I'm quite sure even a 747 fin would come off if you did this to it. The fact that regulatory authorities are satisfied that the aeroplane as it stands is fit to continue operating with pilot 're-education' suggests that the cause is known.
I didn't say anything about wake turbulence.
This type did operate in Australia, for a little over 12 months (not years), and yes we did not have this trouble (obviously as this was thankfully a one off), in fact we had very little trouble at all with them, and I had the pleasure of certifying for them for all that time, but they were NOT operating in the same environment as the AA one.
Later when with an identical Aircraft based in NY, and operating identical routes to the AA Aircraft, was when we had all the maintenance problems with the composite tail, not in Australia.
I do not know about the possibility of a tail coming off a B747, B737 or any other Airbus, and would never comment on such, however no matter how much you all ridicule me, I do KNOW that with an identical Aircraft (A300-600), operating out of the same Airport (JFK) and operating the same routes (down through the Caribbean), we had lots of maintenance problems with the tail, and I honestly feel this is a hell of a coincidence IF as you all say, this could not have possibly played a part in it.
However, I bow to your superior knowledge, even though you weren't there as I was, and will comment no more.
Save it for the picnic.
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Hey MFS – Thanks for keeping on keeping on. I gave up. Your voice and that of a few others, has been one of reason, professionalism, and expertise. I very much appreciate not only your comments, but the manner in which you provide them.
I don’t believe anyone here has ever “jumped on the bandwagon to blame the dead pilot.” The unfortunate fact is that the PF was the pilot flying, and, as such, has to bear at least some of the burden. Was there inadequate information available on the airplane? Probably. Inadequate regulations? Maybe. There certainly was inadequate understanding of what the regulations said. Inadequate training? An interesting question, given what was known, what was thought to be known, and what was not considered about the rules, and considering how those rules play out in an airplane with the kinds of controller deflection amounts and forces yielding the kinds of control surface deflections achieved on the accident airplane. But no matter what the proper answers are for these concerns, I have yet to understand why anyone would think that maximum control deflection, and repeated reversals, in all three axes, at the same time, was anything close to expected professional aviation behavior - below, at, or above design maneuvering speed.
I don’t believe anyone here has ever “jumped on the bandwagon to blame the dead pilot.” The unfortunate fact is that the PF was the pilot flying, and, as such, has to bear at least some of the burden. Was there inadequate information available on the airplane? Probably. Inadequate regulations? Maybe. There certainly was inadequate understanding of what the regulations said. Inadequate training? An interesting question, given what was known, what was thought to be known, and what was not considered about the rules, and considering how those rules play out in an airplane with the kinds of controller deflection amounts and forces yielding the kinds of control surface deflections achieved on the accident airplane. But no matter what the proper answers are for these concerns, I have yet to understand why anyone would think that maximum control deflection, and repeated reversals, in all three axes, at the same time, was anything close to expected professional aviation behavior - below, at, or above design maneuvering speed.
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...
Later when with an identical Aircraft based in NY, and operating identical routes to the AA Aircraft, was when we had all the maintenance problems with the composite tail, not in Australia.
I do not know about the possibility of a tail coming off a B747, B737 or any other Airbus, and would never comment on such, however no matter how much you all ridicule me, I do KNOW that with an identical Aircraft (A300-600), operating out of the same Airport (JFK) and operating the same routes (down through the Caribbean), we had lots of maintenance problems with the tail, and I honestly feel this is a hell of a coincidence IF as you all say, this could not have possibly played a part in it.
Later when with an identical Aircraft based in NY, and operating identical routes to the AA Aircraft, was when we had all the maintenance problems with the composite tail, not in Australia.
I do not know about the possibility of a tail coming off a B747, B737 or any other Airbus, and would never comment on such, however no matter how much you all ridicule me, I do KNOW that with an identical Aircraft (A300-600), operating out of the same Airport (JFK) and operating the same routes (down through the Caribbean), we had lots of maintenance problems with the tail, and I honestly feel this is a hell of a coincidence IF as you all say, this could not have possibly played a part in it.
Airsupport, it seems that your case is a subcase of the general potential problem and that is flying outside of design envelope.
Both ground and flight test are there to prove that design is within the required cert requirements. If for any reason these loads are exceeded (either by pilot input or by other means i.e. engine malfunction, weather etc) structure may (and probably will) fail.
In some fortunate cases when OEM designed structure based on conceptual loads which after the test turn to be far too big (one would think of some older aircraft, like most of the 747 structure) these exceeding loads can be sustained but I think that in that case pilots are required to report overloading.
Only case I know of in which structure is submitted to deliberate failure is the wing breaking after the ground tests are completed. Even in that case, from my experience, several times before the test few tries are made in order to predict the exact load at which the wing will break. This looks good when the real breaking is performed in front of selected guests. A good show off and a huge amount of useful data as well.
Sad occasion when an aircraft fails in flight test (few of Bombardier's examples come to mind, right MFS?) is a good proof of a statement about necessity of staying within the loads envelope.
IMHO one's experience with a specific model in a specific situation (A300-600 flying from JFK to Caribbean) is necessary for a conclusion but not sufficient, to borrow the expression. I can stand behind this statement from the certification standpoint (OEM side, Stress/Structure in particular).
... But no matter what the proper answers are for these concerns, I have yet to understand why anyone would think that maximum control deflection, and repeated reversals, in all three axes, at the same time, was anything close to expected professional aviation behavior - below, at, or above design maneuvering speed.
There are NO COMBINATIONS, otherwise you will have a hell of a certification task. Quite impossible even if you try. I've seen that tried only once long time ago, and in an environment that was not exposed to cert requirements used in civilian/commercial use (military project). Namely, someone thought of running two loadcases for the structure simultaneously and guess what happened? Total failure and consequent postponement of a project for several months.
You always assume a discreet set of load cases, defined on requirements from relvant FAR/JAR or other document required by local CAA. So, applying simultaneous maneuvers in this case or simultaneous loadcases, in general, is not acceptable.
I fully agree that under circumstances any structure would behave the same as the one on A300-600. You are maybe right when you pinpoint the characteristics of A300 fin design (I am not familiar with it appart from what was published based on this accident) but I do not think this was decisive.
In fact, just to support that statement I know of at least one case of analysis done for new or modified structure bearing in mind this specific accident. Result was failure. By the way, it was a metallic structure, in use for several years.
Cheers
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Only case I know of in which structure is submitted to deliberate failure is the wing breaking after the ground tests are completed. Even in that case, from my experience, several times before the test few tries are made in order to predict the exact load at which the wing will break. This looks good when the real breaking is performed in front of selected guests. A good show off and a huge amount of useful data as well.
These are tests done on new build structures, yes they put them through simulated cycles, but not (obviously) actual flights.
I do not even really understand, or want to understand what this Pilot did, I am not a Pilot and don't really care IF you blame him or not.
However, after working on these A300-600s out of JFK, I cannot help but wonder if the problems I mentioned before played a part in it, that is no matter who caused what on that tragic day, it was a disaster waiting to happen.
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Knowing all that I've come to know about this whole situation, including reading the transcripts of all the public hearings - from a mainly engineering standpoint, I have to say that I have always been perplexed and worried about the direction in which fault was placed.
As would have become apparent to the board during the progression of the investigation - the A300 had more than it's fair share of exceedances of limit load for the vert stabiliser. Strange considering what Limit load is supposed to mean!
The issue of how control pressure/deflection is varied with speed on the A300 has always smacked of the illogical (to say the least IMO) when compared with the usual Boeing method. When the issue of 'harmonisation' of all control responses through speed changes is used to justify the approach used by Airbus - it just begs the response in my mind - but B' managed it without making a particular control input ridiculously OVERsensitive. Why could airbus not go down the same route of load limiting?
As far as AA's pre-accident upset training is concerned - (with reference esp. to evidence given during the public hearings): I personally could never have had any other impression from that material than the use of rudder was only to be made in a smooth and progressive manner AND only after aileron inputs(up to full) had made no impression on 'wayward' roll. Furthermore, I fail to see how anyone "exposed" to that training could have had the impression that rudder was being described as a primary means of roll control - quite the contrary IMHO. I think the suggestion by the board that this first officer or any other pilot could have learned to 'play footsie' with the rudder after this training is an insult to anyone's intelligence, and disingenuous to say the least.
As suggested during the course of the investigation, the lack of totally reliable/continuous data about the actual accelerations and perceptions which the flight crew experienced, call into question the confidence with which control inputs can be criticised. I believe in the face of the available evidence we cannot know whether ANY rudder inputs were justified - or whether the crew even knew that, for example, in trying to counter pilot induced adverse yaw after a first reaction - full oscillations were in fact being made (IMHO due to the oversensitive mechanism).
I just hate the fact that I think the pilot was unfairly blamed.
As would have become apparent to the board during the progression of the investigation - the A300 had more than it's fair share of exceedances of limit load for the vert stabiliser. Strange considering what Limit load is supposed to mean!
The issue of how control pressure/deflection is varied with speed on the A300 has always smacked of the illogical (to say the least IMO) when compared with the usual Boeing method. When the issue of 'harmonisation' of all control responses through speed changes is used to justify the approach used by Airbus - it just begs the response in my mind - but B' managed it without making a particular control input ridiculously OVERsensitive. Why could airbus not go down the same route of load limiting?
As far as AA's pre-accident upset training is concerned - (with reference esp. to evidence given during the public hearings): I personally could never have had any other impression from that material than the use of rudder was only to be made in a smooth and progressive manner AND only after aileron inputs(up to full) had made no impression on 'wayward' roll. Furthermore, I fail to see how anyone "exposed" to that training could have had the impression that rudder was being described as a primary means of roll control - quite the contrary IMHO. I think the suggestion by the board that this first officer or any other pilot could have learned to 'play footsie' with the rudder after this training is an insult to anyone's intelligence, and disingenuous to say the least.
As suggested during the course of the investigation, the lack of totally reliable/continuous data about the actual accelerations and perceptions which the flight crew experienced, call into question the confidence with which control inputs can be criticised. I believe in the face of the available evidence we cannot know whether ANY rudder inputs were justified - or whether the crew even knew that, for example, in trying to counter pilot induced adverse yaw after a first reaction - full oscillations were in fact being made (IMHO due to the oversensitive mechanism).
I just hate the fact that I think the pilot was unfairly blamed.
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Knowing all that I've come to know about this whole situation, including reading the transcripts of all the public hearings - from a mainly engineering standpoint, I have to say that I have always been perplexed and worried about the direction in which fault was placed.
As would have become apparent to the board during the progression of the investigation - the A300 had more than it's fair share of exceedances of limit load for the vert stabiliser. Strange considering what Limit load is supposed to mean!
The issue of how control pressure/deflection is varied with speed on the A300 has always smacked of the illogical (to say the least IMO) when compared with the usual Boeing method. When the issue of 'harmonisation' of all control responses through speed changes is used to justify the approach used by Airbus - it just begs the response in my mind - but B' managed it without making a particular control input ridiculously OVERsensitive. Why could airbus not go down the same route of load limiting?
As far as AA's pre-accident upset training is concerned - (with reference esp. to evidence given during the public hearings): I personally could never have had any other impression from that material than the use of rudder was only to be made in a smooth and progressive manner AND only after aileron inputs(up to full) had made no impression on 'wayward' roll. Furthermore, I fail to see how anyone "exposed" to that training could have had the impression that rudder was being described as a primary means of roll control - quite the contrary IMHO. I think the suggestion by the board that this first officer or any other pilot could have learned to 'play footsie' with the rudder after this training is an insult to anyone's intelligence, and disingenuous to say the least.
As suggested during the course of the investigation, the lack of totally reliable/continuous data about the actual accelerations and perceptions which the flight crew experienced, call into question the confidence with which control inputs can be criticised. I believe in the face of the available evidence we cannot know whether ANY rudder inputs were justified - or whether the crew even knew that, for example, in trying to counter pilot induced adverse yaw after a first reaction - full oscillations were in fact being made (IMHO due to the oversensitive mechanism).
I just hate the fact that I think the pilot was unfairly blamed.
As would have become apparent to the board during the progression of the investigation - the A300 had more than it's fair share of exceedances of limit load for the vert stabiliser. Strange considering what Limit load is supposed to mean!
The issue of how control pressure/deflection is varied with speed on the A300 has always smacked of the illogical (to say the least IMO) when compared with the usual Boeing method. When the issue of 'harmonisation' of all control responses through speed changes is used to justify the approach used by Airbus - it just begs the response in my mind - but B' managed it without making a particular control input ridiculously OVERsensitive. Why could airbus not go down the same route of load limiting?
As far as AA's pre-accident upset training is concerned - (with reference esp. to evidence given during the public hearings): I personally could never have had any other impression from that material than the use of rudder was only to be made in a smooth and progressive manner AND only after aileron inputs(up to full) had made no impression on 'wayward' roll. Furthermore, I fail to see how anyone "exposed" to that training could have had the impression that rudder was being described as a primary means of roll control - quite the contrary IMHO. I think the suggestion by the board that this first officer or any other pilot could have learned to 'play footsie' with the rudder after this training is an insult to anyone's intelligence, and disingenuous to say the least.
As suggested during the course of the investigation, the lack of totally reliable/continuous data about the actual accelerations and perceptions which the flight crew experienced, call into question the confidence with which control inputs can be criticised. I believe in the face of the available evidence we cannot know whether ANY rudder inputs were justified - or whether the crew even knew that, for example, in trying to counter pilot induced adverse yaw after a first reaction - full oscillations were in fact being made (IMHO due to the oversensitive mechanism).
I just hate the fact that I think the pilot was unfairly blamed.
Finally some more commonsense, and another open mind at least.
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but B' managed it without making a particular control input ridiculously OVERsensitive. Why could airbus not go down the same route of load limiting?
Another thing worth bearing in mind is that the A300 was specified in the late 1960s, around about the same time as Boeing were developing the first generation of aircraft that would use the load-limiting method you refer to. Airbus may not even have been aware of the development of the variable-feedback method.
I just hate the fact that I think the pilot was unfairly blamed.
Ah, so for you 'commonsense' and 'open minded' means "Everyone who agrees with me".
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Seems to me that:
1) The FO's actions may have been consistent with his training; and
2) That training was not appropriate for the Airbus rudder system.
Thus while the fin failure might be classified as pilot-induced, the system failure occurred at a much higher level; and I'm not inclined to point my finger at the crew.
1) The FO's actions may have been consistent with his training; and
2) That training was not appropriate for the Airbus rudder system.
Thus while the fin failure might be classified as pilot-induced, the system failure occurred at a much higher level; and I'm not inclined to point my finger at the crew.
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His training was a day course which we were paid for and did not change the way we flew an airplane, just to make sure we knew at high angle of attack upsets we also had the rudder to help recover. Nobody was taught to agressively use rudder input unless aileron input wasn't working in a roll situation. It didn't change my method of flying at all. Just added another way of getting out of a bad situation.
The Airbus supporters would like to blame that crash on the FO because of that program but I took the same program and still know what the rudders are for and never used them after the program when I had the occasional wake turbulence event. I thought I was done and getting out of this thread because we will never convince the other side ever. We are not robots and one "How to fly" course is not going to make us misuse flight controls like that. I still think the tail broke off because they delivered it to us patched with rivets along the break line because of delamination in the factory. How accurate is that animated video of the flight controls in the last minutes? Maybe as accurate as that TWA 800 animation of that amazing climb after the cockpit separated from the fuselage? Reminds me of those satellite pictures of weapons of mass destruction when Bush decided to start the war in Iraq.
The Airbus supporters would like to blame that crash on the FO because of that program but I took the same program and still know what the rudders are for and never used them after the program when I had the occasional wake turbulence event. I thought I was done and getting out of this thread because we will never convince the other side ever. We are not robots and one "How to fly" course is not going to make us misuse flight controls like that. I still think the tail broke off because they delivered it to us patched with rivets along the break line because of delamination in the factory. How accurate is that animated video of the flight controls in the last minutes? Maybe as accurate as that TWA 800 animation of that amazing climb after the cockpit separated from the fuselage? Reminds me of those satellite pictures of weapons of mass destruction when Bush decided to start the war in Iraq.
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Ah, so for you 'commonsense' and 'open minded' means "Everyone who agrees with me".
As opposed to the ones here who just blindly go along with the findings.
I have NEVER said that my theories on this (although gained from personal experience) are definitely the cause of this tragic accident, just I sincerely believe they MAY be contributory factors at least.
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OK, so what kind of cognitive dissonance is going on here to derive this...
from what barit, myself and a host of others actually said, which is this:
(Emphasis mine)
It's not just about the training though, it is about how training is interpreted by the trainee. We have evidence that the FO had been known to use aggressive rudder inputs, whether as a result of - or prior to that training we do not know, and that the FO seemed nervous around wake encounters. We have evidence that the control inputs as recorded (not the actual rudder deflection, the inputs) would have placed a load on the vertical stabiliser well in excess of the ultimate design load, which would result in the same situation regardless of who made the aircraft.
No, but it may have validated in his mind his way of doing things, which was incorrect for an A300.
Then why did the thing fail well aft of that line?
Again, while a lot of people (especially Boeing fans) are wont to say that the Airbus use of composites must be to blame, and that Airbus make aerial Citroens that don't stand up to punishment like Uncle Sam's product, the fact remains that the only airliner to land safely after a missile encounter was an A300, so they've got to be reasonably sturdy.
His training was a day course which we were paid for and did not change the way we flew an airplane, just to make sure we knew at high angle of attack upsets we also had the rudder to help recover. Nobody was taught to agressively use rudder input unless aileron input wasn't working in a roll situation. It didn't change my method of flying at all. Just added another way of getting out of a bad situation.
We are not robots and one "How to fly" course is not going to make us misuse flight controls like that.
I still think the tail broke off because they delivered it to us patched with rivets along the break line because of delamination in the factory.
Again, while a lot of people (especially Boeing fans) are wont to say that the Airbus use of composites must be to blame, and that Airbus make aerial Citroens that don't stand up to punishment like Uncle Sam's product, the fact remains that the only airliner to land safely after a missile encounter was an A300, so they've got to be reasonably sturdy.
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the fact remains that the only airliner to land safely after a missile encounter was an A300, so they've got to be reasonably sturdy.
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Maybe they had pilots who didn't use extraordinary and incomprehensible rudder pedal movements..... like a pilot documented as having done it before for no valid reason.
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Why should they? It's not like everything Boeing makes becomes a de facto standard!
Another thing worth bearing in mind is that the A300 was specified in the late 1960s, around about the same time as Boeing were developing the first generation of aircraft that would use the load-limiting method you refer to. Airbus may not even have been aware of the development of the variable-feedback method.
Another thing worth bearing in mind is that the A300 was specified in the late 1960s, around about the same time as Boeing were developing the first generation of aircraft that would use the load-limiting method you refer to. Airbus may not even have been aware of the development of the variable-feedback method.
As for why should they? Maybe to avoid the ridiculous situation of having a 10lbs force difference and pedal displacment of 1.2 inches between breakout force and rudder full to the stop at 260 kts!! As opposed to a difference of 43lbs and pedal displacment of 4 inches at 136kts.
Apparently some "other people" have at least a similar opinion :
"The Safety Board concludes that, because of its high sensitivity (that is, light pedal forces and small pedal displacements), the Airbus A300-600 rudder control system is susceptible to potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at higher airspeeds."
I just hate the fact that I think the pilot was unfairly blamed.
Again, he wasn't.
Well....To quote the Probable Cause from the NTSB report:
"......created by the first officer’s unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs. "
Seems a lot like blame to me.
"......created by the first officer’s unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs. "
Seems a lot like blame to me.
I do not wish to give a blanket defence to the PF in this case - or to comment on how poor or otherwise his airmanship was. My original point being that I personally believe the evidence on that one issue is inconclusive - a point which even the official report moots. However, for all the critical comments qouted about a previous wake encounter - there are just as many quotes that could be made from former colleagues describing him as "excellent", "well above the norm" and that he flew "smoothly and accurately".
As for anyone who still insists that the aircraft is fit to fly (despite the NTSB recommending changes) - and that some or more of the blame should have rested with the PF - I can only draw your attention to the following 2 crucial factors:
1) Bearing in mind the definition of Limit Load - the A300-600 and A310 (with almost identical systems and characteristics) have had SEVEN exceedances of Limit load, some of which actually exceeded Ultimate Load, on the fin - not all of which involved pilot rudder inputs. To quote Mr. Henry Offerman Aerospace engineer, FAA regarding Limit loads:"limit load is the maximum load expected in service" and "it is fairly safe to say that the data that was used to develop that envelope would yield a once in a lifetime event", and regarding Ultimate Load;"An aircraft is not expected to experience ultimate load in service."
The A300 B2/B4(variable ratio),A320 and A330 have had none(reported). This is also true for Boeing(again reported).
2) During the course of the investigation, simulator testing showed that "most" of the 6 testees used some rudder input in combination with aileron when using their own "prefered method" of recovery. When this is read with the following statement regarding ground testing, the conclusion should be obvious!:
"Tests were also conducted in which the subjects were instructed to move the control wheel and rudder pedal to 50 percent of their available range. The tests showed that the pedal force applied during the 50-percent condition resulted in full rudder travel, even though that force was one-half of the force applied at the 100-percent condition. The tests also showed that the control wheel force applied during the 50-percent condition resulted in reduced aileron motion."
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Interesting if so, but I still don't think you can blame them entirely - because no matter the system used and no matter how sensitive it is, you don't apply opposite rudder to aileron in a sideslip and then reverse it multiple times.