If your captain is going to botch the landing....

[jonesthepilot]

Javelin, if your company often fly 2 captains together, do they swap seats down route or is the right seater allowed to operate from the right seat or is he/she just a radio operator?

[northwing]

In the 60's BA lost a Trident, Papa India, when the captain had a heart attack on takeoff. Subsequently their co-pilots were intensively briefed to watch for signs of subtle incapacitation. The story goes that during a particularly hairy approach a young co-pilot leaned across to his captain and said, "Excuse me, Sir, but are you having a subtle incapacitation?"

[javelin]

Jones,

As about all the Capts are now checked RHS, we usually swap down route. We can't operate from the RHS unless the person in the LHS is a Trainer - then it gets weird frankly and I don't like it !

[120.4]

I am an ATCO and not qualified to make any technical point but surely, any captain who is going to react badly to being questioned by his FO, or even makes his FO feel uncomfortable about doing that, should not be a captain.
I think back to Tenerife all those years ago. If I remember correctly, the first officer felt that having questioned his captain once he couldn't do it a second time. Without wishing to be judgemental in any way... that he felt this way is an indication of the captain's human failing. But there but for the grace of the Almighty go I.
I was once in the cockpit of an American Airlines MD11 during take of out of LHR going to KORD. During his briefing the captain said "if anybody sees anything they don't like, they call 'Stop'." And turning to me he said "And that includes you". I felt humbled by his CRM. I feel that all captains need to be capable of the same.
Point 4

[jonesthepilot]

Javelin. Why is it wierd and why don't you like it? Surely you just adopt the role of a line FO and get on with the job. Maybe there is a CRM issue? Interesting.....

[Down Three Greens]

jonesthepilot - What are you saying about Javelin???? Knowing the character involved I'm sure that he is mature/competent enough to 'get on with the job'.....mind you if he had concerns from any seat I am sure he'd voice it! I am also sure he expects the same from his F/O's when he's in the LHS.

[haughtney1]

the captain said "if anybody sees anything they don't like, they call 'Stop'." And turning to me he said "And that includes you". I felt humbled by his CRM. I feel that all captains need to be capable of the same

In my opinion, the best guys to work with..make noises like that

Just as an aside..another comment..particularly after the skipper thumps it in..."hey capt did you see Al Queda on short final?..I think they shot us down!!"

[BOAC]

if anybody sees anything they don't like they call 'Stop'." And turning to me he said "And that includes you".

- no disrespect to 120.4, but that is one of the craziest things I have seen on PPRune for while.

The very thought of a non-qualified person issuing a MANDATORY stop call - at any speed, including above V1 - brings shivers to my spine.

CRM is one thing, madness another.

[haughtney1]

The very thought of a non-qualified person issuing a MANDATORY stop call - at any speed, including above V1 - brings shivers to my spine

Whilst I dont disagree with you BOAC, I dont believe that was in the "spirit" in which the comment was intended It also wasn't what was actually typed..nor was there anything to say 120.4 was conveying what was said verbatim.

You and I both know that Boeing have undertaken extensive studies of highspeed rejects above 80kts...and the corresponding findings. I would also hope that you are not suggesting that 3 sets of eyes are not at least as good as 2 sets, and that an ATCO although not qualified, is still a professional observer and perfectly capable of bringing an abnormality to the crews attention.

You also know full well that the commander makes the ultimate decision to stop or continue..so in that regard you've confused me with your comments

[ecj]

Some operators say that only the captain can call STOP, with the FO only identifying the problem.

Others allow either pilot to call STOP.

I just wonder what the views of others are on these two SOPs.

[BOAC]

I dont believe that was in the "spirit" in which the comment was intended It also wasn't what was actually typed..nor was there anything to say 120.4 was conveying what was said verbatim

- we read that post differently!

You also know full well that the commander makes the ultimate decision to stop or continue..so in that regard you've confused me with your comments

- now you are confusing me!

We are trained, are we not, to react instantly to a STOP call? Such force it carries that several airlines, including BA, have actually aborted above V1 on an incorrect stop call. I appreciate we work to different SOPs, but BA's and my current brief (and where you came from!) is "On the call of STOP! I will close the thrust levers etc etc" - not - "on the call of STOP! I'll look at it and decide what I do". I then go on to say - "advise me of any other ( ie other than the agreed 'STOP' items) malfunction and I will decide whether to STOP or CONTINUE." What do your SOPs say? I'd be interested to know. I grant you that it is not inconceivable that I might over-ride a stop call one day but it would be most unlikely!

At V1-8 the F/O shouts STOP! Do you or don't you? Obviously in your airline you are going to say "What's up, Doc?". I'm also envisaging the F/O handling, sensing a control freeze, calling STOP! and the Captain saying - "what's up mate? Just pull back a bit, old boy" - I don't think so! Could you also PM me with your airline name!

In the situation as described by 120.4, my brief (normally) would be to ask 120.4 (yes, a useful pair of eyes) to tell me of anything he sees that concerns him, NOT to call STOP. When I have carried other j/seat pax I have often asked for silence during the take-off roll. If I have a training captain on a check ride on the j/seat I MAY include him in the F/O's permitted STOP calls, and if by chance he were actually a/c Captain, in all calls. Would you expect a j/seater to know that an aft pax or cargo door light does not necessarily need a STOP call whereas a forward one may, or that a pitot heater failure in CAVOK or generator at V1-10 is not necessarily a STOP?

[pakeha-boy]

Nick 1......yeah mate ,have been in that situation where the capt gave me the silient treatment....so I removed myself from the flight...called the duty officer,explained the situation and plead my case as a "safety of flight" issue...was removed,and flight pay protected......the abiltiy to recognize when you are unable to work with another crew member,especially upfront is paramount to the safety of the operation.

We now have in place a "no fly" list(and yes it is abused) but it,s initial intent is to stop crew members who cannot fly with one another not fly together,thus removing the breakdown of safety and CRM...

We are all supposed to a little more professional when is comes to workingwith one another,but situations do arise,sometimes over the most minute and stupid issues.....my pet peeve are the f/o,s who dont like listen to Split Enz,full blast,singing ...3 mths in a leaky boat....on short final.....cheeky baastards

[haughtney1]

We are trained, are we not, to react instantly to a STOP call? Such force it carries that several airlines, including BA, have actually aborted above V1 on an incorrect stop call. I appreciate we work to different SOPs, but BA's and my current brief (and where you came from!) is "On the call of STOP! I will close the thrust levers etc etc" - not - "on the call of STOP! I'll look at it and decide what I do". I then go on to say - "advise me of any other ( ie other than the agreed 'STOP' items) malfunction and I will decide whether to STOP or CONTINUE." What do your SOPs say? I'd be interested to know. I grant you that it is not inconceivable that I might over-ride a stop call one day but it would be most unlikely!

Back up a second............

My point was that 120.4 was probably relaying his story/information in laymans rather than in technical terms..and didnt convey the information "verbatim"

As far as how this relates to SOP's I couldnt agree more but I stand by what I said relating to the commanders decision...certainly its ideally supposed to be an immediate decision (beyond 80kts) but up until that point you still have the time to make a brief assessment and hence a less hurried decision.

120.4's comments I believe conveyed the inclusive nature of what the MD11 skipper was after..i.e. a spare pair of eyes..and I would be very surprised to discover a widebody driver who had not yet grasped the descipline of a decent take off briefing

Having said all that..if the skipper did just say "if you see anything you dont like..shout STOP!! then yep hes a muppet"

[pakeha-boy]

h1 ...ditto mate......in my briefing,it includes the "sterile" cockpit briefing and depending who is in the jumpseat(s)....the words....."if you see or hear something that concerns you,please bring it to my attention"....."now shaaaadup and enjoy the spectacle we are about to produce"

[captain_jeeves]

Originally Posted by BOAC

-
We are trained, are we not, to react instantly to a STOP call? Such force it carries that several airlines, including BA, have actually aborted above V1 on an incorrect stop call.

I’m not sure if I entirely agree with this. But, I will agree that most training programs can cause some to react exactly as you have explained. Since we’ve defined this as a Training issue, let me offer these thoughts.

I’m going to use the Generic Airbus Flight Crew Training Manual FCTM as an example, since that is the aircraft that I am most familiar with.

That manual dictates that the Captain will make the decision to RTO, and if that is in fact his/her decision, he/she will say “stop’!

Would anyone dispute that this would be a much easier decision is he/she (the captain) is the Non-flying pilot? Why? Simple, their function during the take-off is to monitor. They should see the problem before the flying pilot.

However, when the Captain is the Flying Pilot, things become a little more complicated. As the Flying Pilot, the first priority is to “fly the aircraft”, and during the ground roll phase of the take-off, that means visually navigating along a length of pavement ( I’m over-simplifying of course).

Should a failure occur during this time, the Flying Pilots attention would not be best served examining an ECAM display? However, the FCTM only discusses various ECAM warnings and Caution messages, with few exceptions like tires, etc. So, based on these ECAM messages, the captain must make a decision. (Keep reading before you pounce on me).

That said, some airlines SOP more clearly define the handling of occurrences prior to V1. But, some airlines don’t.

When the SOP does not clearly define this issue, the Captain’s RTO briefing becomes the only clear answer.

For example, XYZ Airways does not clearly define the RTO decision in their SOP. So, the Captain of XYZ Fight 123 – during his departure briefing with his crew – says, “if we experience an abnormal condition during the take-off, and I am the Flying Pilot, you call out the failure. Then, I will say “Go” or “Stop”. “If I am the non-flying pilot, I will simply say “Go” or “Stop” (followed by remaining briefing items). Then, that captain could give an overview of the items affecting his RTO decision making thoughts, so that the other crewmembers can anticipate what to expect should things “go south” during the take-off.

So far as the Observer is concerned, they can be either a help or a hindrance. The captain has to make that determination prior to, and during, that RTO briefing, but should include all cockpit occupants in the briefing.

Obviously, if the observer is a current, qualified pilot, from within the same fleet at the same airline; should that observer call a “non-normal’ occurrence during the take-off (or any other phase of flight) the captain could place a greater amount of – immediate - merit to it, than he would someone from a different fleet, etc.

The remaining issue becomes, “What do you RTO the aircraft for?” In other words, what non-normal events will cause a captain to RTO a take-off?

There isn’t a pilot anywhere that doesn’t understand that a Rejected Take-off is a potentially hazardous maneuver, and there are times when continuing the take-off is the much safer choice.

Most of us – without really thinking about it - tend to think of the take-off in 4 distinct phases.

The first phase begins upon the activation of take-off thrust. At that time we have a laundry list of things that would cause us to RTO, and few things that would cause us to continue.

Things start to drop off the RTO list until 80 knots. At this point, the decision becomes items of a greater severity until 100 knots.

After 100 knot - until V1 - the list of RTO items becomes very well defined and only includes about 8 items.

However, the important issue is this, if we (as Captains) have failed in the CRM aspect (RTO briefing) the other crewmembers (F/O, observers, etc) may not understand our thought process, at a time when they truly should. But, if they do understand, the likelihood of someone – inadvertently - calling “Stop” after V1 is greatly reduced.


Looking forward to the pending discussion….

Cheers /cj

[BOAC]

Looking forward to the pending discussion

- not from me. My issue was to do with a STOP! call, and a possible false STOP! call BEFORE V1 at that, not a 'maybe' decision based on ECAM, so I will not comment here on SOPs outside my experience. I'm also amazed that you have 'about 8' items for a ?mandatory? high-speed stop. 9 times out of 10 it is better to GO with most failures. Would you not be better having a computer make the stop decision in that case? (thinks - must retire soon )

Suffice it to say the SOPs I have 'grown up' with are clear and understood by all crews with whom I have flown and will fly. That, to me, is the nutshell - a difficult and critical time for decisions, so make them easy and train the crews accordingly. I'm beginning to feel really old-fashioned

[Chesty Morgan]

aborted above V1 on an incorrect stop call

Of course, if both pilots hands are NOT on the throttles then this wouldn't happen.

Admittedly a LOT of discipline is needed, but hey, that's why we're there.

I remember a sim ride with a very experienced F/O, on a command assessment and was, therefore, to be PF for the detail. Sim setup was for an icing departure with a contaminated, shortish, runway. Performance dictated a 25kt V1 - Vr split. Very shortly after V1, as expected and thoroughy briefed beforehand, we had a critical engine failure. First off he called STOP and tried to close the throttles (didn't take his hands off at the V1 call you see). Which he couldn't as my hands were firmly planted behind them. I shouted GO and then he tried to rotate about 10 knots before Vr. Which he couldn't do because my other hand was covering the column.

It was quite amusing afterwards. But sitting in the bar a while later, mulling over this with a pint or two, I though Sh*tty death. If that scenario was for real, and that guy was the skipper all hell would have let loose...Scary!

[javelin]

Down Three Greens,

Thank you for your support !

The original post was somewhat tongue in cheek, as oft I am prone to do !

But, if the guy wants to splat it on, I do feel that a meaningful and positive conversation would be on going at the point of impact

[120.4]

BOAC: No offence taken.
As I sat there having been empowered this way I wondered how I could possibly be qualified to make such a call. And it didn't take me many seconds to come to the decision that there is no way I could ever say 'stop'. I also decided that the only event which could even make attract his attention at such a critical time would be a runway incursion, which I would clearly have been able to see. It would then be his decision on an appropriate course of action.

Really my point was that a captain who is prepared to humble himself and openly empower those around him like this removes potential psycological barriers to safety management. I absolutely applaud his decision although I accept it may have been better to say 'alert me' or something like that. I would hope that a pilot watching me at LTCC would alert me if he felt I had apparently missed something.

Point 4

[BOAC]

With you 100%.