CRM Conundrum
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CRM Conundrum
Background: I received my leadership training in a strategic military environment. In this environment, leaders (Colonels and above) would gather to determine appropriate goals, how available resources would be managed to execute those goals, potential threats to these plans and how these threats would be countered to ensure the mission succeeded. In this environment the unusual was important, the unknown the biggest threat and it was important to keep lines of communication open, to make it possible for individuals with critical information, no matter how low their rank, to get this information to the leaders who required it in a timely manner.
Fast forward to recent years, I work in an aviation-related domain in a position that requires me to lead teams of subject-matter experts as they resolve high-impact, short-notice, time-critical, dynamic events. I have found the strategic style of leadership I had previously learned to be effective; my role as leader it to make sure my teams are composed of the right people, have the resources they need to accomplish the task, keeping members on task and on schedule, putting out fires and clearing any hurdles or roadblocks they encounter, a "how can I help you help me" form of guidance. (Just so you don't think it's all cookies and punch, YES there are time I must assert my authority and the cost of not meeting goals can be very high.)
I recently had the opportunity to sit in on some CRM classes, aimed at undergraduates aspiring to work for the airlines. The professor stated that his objective to reduce the number of accidents where the FO is heard to say "I'm not comfortable with this" or "I knew this would happen." The CRM model taught in this class was "authority with participation, assertiveness with respect." But I noticed that the focus was not really on increasing communication but rather maintaining a heirarchical, more tactical (task, rather than goal focussed)"the Captain is the center of the universe" form of leadership. The students were taught communication strategies such as "never correct a captain in front of others" which are known to increase power distance and reduce communication. Over time it became clear the students were being taught to support and protect the Captain's ego at the cost of the free flow of communication. As I continue to read accident reports containing CVR transcripts where FOs make these statements, it appears to me this is a failed model.
Question: Are we asking too much of CRM training in it's current form? With the technological advances in the cockpit since the origin of CRM, which has shifted the role of the pilot from monitor/controller to system/resource manager, is the current CRM model still valid?
I'd appreciate your thoughts.
Fast forward to recent years, I work in an aviation-related domain in a position that requires me to lead teams of subject-matter experts as they resolve high-impact, short-notice, time-critical, dynamic events. I have found the strategic style of leadership I had previously learned to be effective; my role as leader it to make sure my teams are composed of the right people, have the resources they need to accomplish the task, keeping members on task and on schedule, putting out fires and clearing any hurdles or roadblocks they encounter, a "how can I help you help me" form of guidance. (Just so you don't think it's all cookies and punch, YES there are time I must assert my authority and the cost of not meeting goals can be very high.)
I recently had the opportunity to sit in on some CRM classes, aimed at undergraduates aspiring to work for the airlines. The professor stated that his objective to reduce the number of accidents where the FO is heard to say "I'm not comfortable with this" or "I knew this would happen." The CRM model taught in this class was "authority with participation, assertiveness with respect." But I noticed that the focus was not really on increasing communication but rather maintaining a heirarchical, more tactical (task, rather than goal focussed)"the Captain is the center of the universe" form of leadership. The students were taught communication strategies such as "never correct a captain in front of others" which are known to increase power distance and reduce communication. Over time it became clear the students were being taught to support and protect the Captain's ego at the cost of the free flow of communication. As I continue to read accident reports containing CVR transcripts where FOs make these statements, it appears to me this is a failed model.
Question: Are we asking too much of CRM training in it's current form? With the technological advances in the cockpit since the origin of CRM, which has shifted the role of the pilot from monitor/controller to system/resource manager, is the current CRM model still valid?
I'd appreciate your thoughts.
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Jolly,
When you speak of "CRM training in its current form", you are giving an impression that you are applying a massive broadbrush generalisation to what "CRM training" is.
There are many different trainers out there, carrying out classroom training, line training, and simulator training for many different operators and training organisations. They will all have different methods and ideas. What is very apparent from reading this forum regularly is that there are good trainers and bad trainers. Unfortunately, the bad trainers seem to have a disproportionately negative effect on their trainees, to the extent that bad training is worse than no training at all. This is because people feel patronised, that they are being made to indulge some airy-fairy politically-correct nonsense in place of straightforward common sense. This isnt because the CRM concept is wrong, it is because the trainer's methods are failing to reinforce the basic principles of CRM, which are, largely, commonsense, leadership, management, decision-making. People get very bogged down in the niceties of communication, which ,though important, are really part and parcel of the other skills.
I have trained CRM in each of the current disciplines, and have found that by far the most straightforward is in the simulator. You can stop the simulation as the aircraft is plunging in its death roll towards the earth, and ask the crew to just look again at what they have done to get it there, and how and why it has happened. Usually, they very quickly see for themselves what they have done, and there is a "Eureka" moment. You dont need to state the obvious. The crew can take the experience away as a self-taught lesson.
In the classroom, it is much more difficult to reinforce safety-centered behaviours without stating the bleeding obvious, patronising the experienced people present, and showing them a load of stuff they have seen before. It takes work and effort to be original and challenging and interesting. That is why it often doesnt produce the desired result.
If the training you witnessed was based on how to speak to each other nicely on the flight deck I think the trainer was missing issues which are more relevant today, such as automation complacency, mode awareness, or for helicopter operations situational awareness and decision-making in degraded visual environments.
Perhaps the professor you saw has spent too much time in the classroom, and not much on the flight deck recently.
When you speak of "CRM training in its current form", you are giving an impression that you are applying a massive broadbrush generalisation to what "CRM training" is.
There are many different trainers out there, carrying out classroom training, line training, and simulator training for many different operators and training organisations. They will all have different methods and ideas. What is very apparent from reading this forum regularly is that there are good trainers and bad trainers. Unfortunately, the bad trainers seem to have a disproportionately negative effect on their trainees, to the extent that bad training is worse than no training at all. This is because people feel patronised, that they are being made to indulge some airy-fairy politically-correct nonsense in place of straightforward common sense. This isnt because the CRM concept is wrong, it is because the trainer's methods are failing to reinforce the basic principles of CRM, which are, largely, commonsense, leadership, management, decision-making. People get very bogged down in the niceties of communication, which ,though important, are really part and parcel of the other skills.
I have trained CRM in each of the current disciplines, and have found that by far the most straightforward is in the simulator. You can stop the simulation as the aircraft is plunging in its death roll towards the earth, and ask the crew to just look again at what they have done to get it there, and how and why it has happened. Usually, they very quickly see for themselves what they have done, and there is a "Eureka" moment. You dont need to state the obvious. The crew can take the experience away as a self-taught lesson.
In the classroom, it is much more difficult to reinforce safety-centered behaviours without stating the bleeding obvious, patronising the experienced people present, and showing them a load of stuff they have seen before. It takes work and effort to be original and challenging and interesting. That is why it often doesnt produce the desired result.
If the training you witnessed was based on how to speak to each other nicely on the flight deck I think the trainer was missing issues which are more relevant today, such as automation complacency, mode awareness, or for helicopter operations situational awareness and decision-making in degraded visual environments.
Perhaps the professor you saw has spent too much time in the classroom, and not much on the flight deck recently.
Are we asking too much of CRM training in it's current form?
Yes; assuming that ‘current’ CRM implies focus on TEM.
CRM is often seen as the panacea for human error related accidents, whereas in reality it must be part of a larger package, e.g. design, regulation, and organisational issues.
With the technological advances in the cockpit since the origin of CRM, which has shifted the role of the pilot from monitor/controller to system/resource manager, is the current CRM model still valid?
Probably not, but has there ever been a consistent model of CRM?
A major problem with CRM is that the concept has not been well explained and even more so, not well applied. In particular, most effort has been placed on the soft interpersonal and social skills to the detriment of cognitive skills. A wider view of HF training (CRM is the application of HF) would include individuals’ thinking skills – awareness and decision making. The latter are more difficult to teach and apply and thus are often deferred to LOFT or elsewhere, if taught at all.
There isn’t really a world standard for CRM. The guidance materials from regulators are diverse and often reflect the social view above.
ICAO publishes a standard position in their HF Training Manual, but this document is not readily available. Furthermore, ICAO adds complexity with new initiatives, many based on academic principles which may still have a research bias, or are too culturally or operationally specific (LOSA, TEM model, SMS).
In accepting that error is unavoidable, training concentrates on avoidance, detection, and correction, with crosschecking / monitoring central to all operations. However, reviewing ‘HF’ accidents, in many cases the crosschecking/monitoring failed. Just as both crew can suffer disorienting illusions simultaneously, so too can their mental models fail simultaneously, their awareness of the developing situation is flawed, thus there is no independence for monitoring, interjection, or advocacy.
The solution, if there is a human one, should start with the individual and teach thinking skills to build on knowledge and help develop know-how from practical experience to enable improved awareness (understanding). The latter being a critical item; experience is in short supply in the modern industry, and rarely developed within the crew – how many Captains participate in helping to ‘train’ - pass on experience to First Officers?
Are these problems of the confrontational cockpit? Possibly; more so where newly qualified pilots arrive with frozen ‘captain’ qualifications and a belief that there is nothing more to learn, only to sit back and get the hours. If this is the case then the weakness in CRM training (and the model) starts with initial training.
For inf see ‘Teaching and Assessing Single-Pilot Human Factors and Threat and Error Management’; this is a recent document which I rate highly for its basic common sense approach to the subject.
Although aimed at single pilot operations, the content applies to everyone – a good team starts with individuals. Also, the instructor aspects can be adapted for self-analysis - self questioning, an important aspect in safety thinking.
Yes; assuming that ‘current’ CRM implies focus on TEM.
CRM is often seen as the panacea for human error related accidents, whereas in reality it must be part of a larger package, e.g. design, regulation, and organisational issues.
With the technological advances in the cockpit since the origin of CRM, which has shifted the role of the pilot from monitor/controller to system/resource manager, is the current CRM model still valid?
Probably not, but has there ever been a consistent model of CRM?
A major problem with CRM is that the concept has not been well explained and even more so, not well applied. In particular, most effort has been placed on the soft interpersonal and social skills to the detriment of cognitive skills. A wider view of HF training (CRM is the application of HF) would include individuals’ thinking skills – awareness and decision making. The latter are more difficult to teach and apply and thus are often deferred to LOFT or elsewhere, if taught at all.
CRM is like a bidet; everyone knows what it is for, but no one knows what it is, - a reversal of a British myth about French culture!
ICAO publishes a standard position in their HF Training Manual, but this document is not readily available. Furthermore, ICAO adds complexity with new initiatives, many based on academic principles which may still have a research bias, or are too culturally or operationally specific (LOSA, TEM model, SMS).
In accepting that error is unavoidable, training concentrates on avoidance, detection, and correction, with crosschecking / monitoring central to all operations. However, reviewing ‘HF’ accidents, in many cases the crosschecking/monitoring failed. Just as both crew can suffer disorienting illusions simultaneously, so too can their mental models fail simultaneously, their awareness of the developing situation is flawed, thus there is no independence for monitoring, interjection, or advocacy.
The solution, if there is a human one, should start with the individual and teach thinking skills to build on knowledge and help develop know-how from practical experience to enable improved awareness (understanding). The latter being a critical item; experience is in short supply in the modern industry, and rarely developed within the crew – how many Captains participate in helping to ‘train’ - pass on experience to First Officers?
Are these problems of the confrontational cockpit? Possibly; more so where newly qualified pilots arrive with frozen ‘captain’ qualifications and a belief that there is nothing more to learn, only to sit back and get the hours. If this is the case then the weakness in CRM training (and the model) starts with initial training.
For inf see ‘Teaching and Assessing Single-Pilot Human Factors and Threat and Error Management’; this is a recent document which I rate highly for its basic common sense approach to the subject.
Although aimed at single pilot operations, the content applies to everyone – a good team starts with individuals. Also, the instructor aspects can be adapted for self-analysis - self questioning, an important aspect in safety thinking.
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Thank you for your posts they provide some good insight.
However, I keep coming back to this:
CRM was developed (in part) in response to the UAL DC8 at Portland where the FO kept reminiding the CA of their low fiel condition to no avail. But I continue to read accident reports with FO statements such as "I'm not confortable with this." Since it has been 30 years since the advent of CRM I can only assume it is a failed exercise, at least in the aviation realm.
I have a friend who does CRM research (not the professor in question), but in the medical field rather than aviation. Her current research is focussing on "communication bottlenecks," their structure and mechanics and what strategies can be developed/utilized to counter/reduce thir occurance and impact. It has me thinking that perhaps we (aviation) have been getting a bit complacent about CRM, that we got to a certain point and just stopped.
Thoughts?
However, I keep coming back to this:
CRM was developed (in part) in response to the UAL DC8 at Portland where the FO kept reminiding the CA of their low fiel condition to no avail. But I continue to read accident reports with FO statements such as "I'm not confortable with this." Since it has been 30 years since the advent of CRM I can only assume it is a failed exercise, at least in the aviation realm.
I have a friend who does CRM research (not the professor in question), but in the medical field rather than aviation. Her current research is focussing on "communication bottlenecks," their structure and mechanics and what strategies can be developed/utilized to counter/reduce thir occurance and impact. It has me thinking that perhaps we (aviation) have been getting a bit complacent about CRM, that we got to a certain point and just stopped.
Thoughts?
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Another conundrum for you
Hola Jolly -
xxx
CRM - a conundrum - is it an understatement...?
I got thrown into the CRM zoology in its early days, the mid-1970s, as I was an instructor for PanAm during a layoff as line pilot. While I was happily making an idiot of myself in classrooms, CPT and simulators, teaching the knowledge of the 707s and 727s to flight crews (who often knew much more than I did myself), a pilot training manager threw a booklet on my desk, called CRM. He asked me to teach something along the lines of that subject. The booklet had been stolen from UAL, apparently they were the precursors of CRM among the USA airlines to try to analyse CRM. I also received a 16mm movie reel coming from Finnair, who apparently were the first in Europe with early forms of the CRM.
xxx
Back then, we dealt with recurrent training of god-captains and cockpit-nazis. PanAm had, being the "world's most experienced airline" was also the "world's most experienced" in notorious crashes of 707s. Most accidents were actually more because of lack of situation awareness, inexistant ATC, and number of CFIT circumstances, not necessarily a lack of CRM.
xxx
CRM came in full bloom with, you cited, the UAL DC8 crash, when running out of fuel and ideas in PDX. Then the FAA started to require actual CRM training. I became "CRM Facilitator" (the instructors do not instruct CRM...!). Parallel to that, the wording SOP became in fashion as well, where crews follow blind, a certain procedure of an emergency check-list failing to understand the consequence of what becomes "inoperative" when i.e. you pull a certain CB, or shut down a valve in the fuel or hydraulic system...
xxx
There are crews whose only concern in life, is to call any sentence in a cockpit as a form of CRM, who sneeze with strict (and blind) SOP, and disregard limitations in name of "superior" airmanship. All that started in the 1980s, got fully implemented in the 1990s, and what do we have now in this new century...? Shall I volunteer to say a lack of certain piloting skills...?
xxx
Being now an outsider, in South America, and ending my pilot career, I laugh or cry to see what happens with the airline crews of the first world. Pardon me to say, I can put a tag on the origin of each crew groups, by their concepts of CRM, SOP and pilot skills or airmanship. And I am personally not exempt of such.
xxx
You do not give a prescription of CRM to pilots. They are born, or not with the CRM aptitudes. An "Initial" CRM course is valid up to a point. CRM should not be a subject of "recurrent classroom training" but merely be a part of simulator training, combined with intelligent use of SOPs tailored to circumstances.
xxx
You will not see South American pilots having CFIT in Colombian mountains, it is the place where North Americans (or Europeans) will run into troubles. African airline pilots know how to handle an airspace devoid of ATC, and the Japanese or other Asians try to figure how to say to their captain that they are "too low" on the ILS without being required to commit hara-kiri.
xxx
The old PanAmigos like myself kept in touch with each other for long when we went to other airlines and we exchanged notes of "how it was like" to give dual of oceanic flights to the Delta "professional" captains, or explaining to a Korean first officer how to make a position report in... is it Engliche...?
xxx
Yes, Jolly Girl, we need some CRM, some amount of SOP, above average aircraft system knowledge (too bad, but I had plenty of that when I learned to fly airlines as a flight engineer prior to be a first officer) and we need, above all good "common sense". Like I mention to many friends, I had to survive captains ex-DC6 who had no idea how to handle a 727 jet, and now my first officer had to give me dual on the FMS while they zap entries on a keyboard that is not "Qwerty" (while I pilot an old 747 which they occasionally fail to do).
xxx
In other terms, my retirement was definitely warranted. I miss my old days with real pilots. By chance, I was able to maintain much of these concepts as a training manager... but now, since they will be an "all Airbus" fleet soon, I can only pass along the good words of wisdom to the few who still respect the past "steam power gages", manual ILS approach and full length runways for takeoff, even flying into MNPS airspace...! I know I will be missed at my airline. At least I made them laugh in the classrooms or simulators. Must be the reason they will keep me as a "training consultant"...
xxx
If you fly, Jolly Lady, read some of my posts. They will get you asleep. Yet, all are meant for one purpose only... avoid accidents. When you line up on that runway, repeat after me - trims, flaps, spoilers. I guarantee the plane will get into the air safely. The rest is up to you.
xxx
Happy contrails
xxx
CRM - a conundrum - is it an understatement...?
I got thrown into the CRM zoology in its early days, the mid-1970s, as I was an instructor for PanAm during a layoff as line pilot. While I was happily making an idiot of myself in classrooms, CPT and simulators, teaching the knowledge of the 707s and 727s to flight crews (who often knew much more than I did myself), a pilot training manager threw a booklet on my desk, called CRM. He asked me to teach something along the lines of that subject. The booklet had been stolen from UAL, apparently they were the precursors of CRM among the USA airlines to try to analyse CRM. I also received a 16mm movie reel coming from Finnair, who apparently were the first in Europe with early forms of the CRM.
xxx
Back then, we dealt with recurrent training of god-captains and cockpit-nazis. PanAm had, being the "world's most experienced airline" was also the "world's most experienced" in notorious crashes of 707s. Most accidents were actually more because of lack of situation awareness, inexistant ATC, and number of CFIT circumstances, not necessarily a lack of CRM.
xxx
CRM came in full bloom with, you cited, the UAL DC8 crash, when running out of fuel and ideas in PDX. Then the FAA started to require actual CRM training. I became "CRM Facilitator" (the instructors do not instruct CRM...!). Parallel to that, the wording SOP became in fashion as well, where crews follow blind, a certain procedure of an emergency check-list failing to understand the consequence of what becomes "inoperative" when i.e. you pull a certain CB, or shut down a valve in the fuel or hydraulic system...
xxx
There are crews whose only concern in life, is to call any sentence in a cockpit as a form of CRM, who sneeze with strict (and blind) SOP, and disregard limitations in name of "superior" airmanship. All that started in the 1980s, got fully implemented in the 1990s, and what do we have now in this new century...? Shall I volunteer to say a lack of certain piloting skills...?
xxx
Being now an outsider, in South America, and ending my pilot career, I laugh or cry to see what happens with the airline crews of the first world. Pardon me to say, I can put a tag on the origin of each crew groups, by their concepts of CRM, SOP and pilot skills or airmanship. And I am personally not exempt of such.
xxx
You do not give a prescription of CRM to pilots. They are born, or not with the CRM aptitudes. An "Initial" CRM course is valid up to a point. CRM should not be a subject of "recurrent classroom training" but merely be a part of simulator training, combined with intelligent use of SOPs tailored to circumstances.
xxx
You will not see South American pilots having CFIT in Colombian mountains, it is the place where North Americans (or Europeans) will run into troubles. African airline pilots know how to handle an airspace devoid of ATC, and the Japanese or other Asians try to figure how to say to their captain that they are "too low" on the ILS without being required to commit hara-kiri.
xxx
The old PanAmigos like myself kept in touch with each other for long when we went to other airlines and we exchanged notes of "how it was like" to give dual of oceanic flights to the Delta "professional" captains, or explaining to a Korean first officer how to make a position report in... is it Engliche...?
xxx
Yes, Jolly Girl, we need some CRM, some amount of SOP, above average aircraft system knowledge (too bad, but I had plenty of that when I learned to fly airlines as a flight engineer prior to be a first officer) and we need, above all good "common sense". Like I mention to many friends, I had to survive captains ex-DC6 who had no idea how to handle a 727 jet, and now my first officer had to give me dual on the FMS while they zap entries on a keyboard that is not "Qwerty" (while I pilot an old 747 which they occasionally fail to do).
xxx
In other terms, my retirement was definitely warranted. I miss my old days with real pilots. By chance, I was able to maintain much of these concepts as a training manager... but now, since they will be an "all Airbus" fleet soon, I can only pass along the good words of wisdom to the few who still respect the past "steam power gages", manual ILS approach and full length runways for takeoff, even flying into MNPS airspace...! I know I will be missed at my airline. At least I made them laugh in the classrooms or simulators. Must be the reason they will keep me as a "training consultant"...
xxx
If you fly, Jolly Lady, read some of my posts. They will get you asleep. Yet, all are meant for one purpose only... avoid accidents. When you line up on that runway, repeat after me - trims, flaps, spoilers. I guarantee the plane will get into the air safely. The rest is up to you.
xxx
Happy contrails
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CRM a busted flush?
JG
It's maybe wrong to conclude that CRM has failed just because we hear the same things being said on CVR transcripts - each generation has to repeat the faults of its fathers.
And maybe your friend needs to look at all the research that has been done on communications in aviation. Medicine came late to 'crm' despite the fact they more people die in iatragenic events than ever die in aircraft losses.
Amazingly, medicine seems to want to repeat all the mistakes made in CRM,
I suspect that you maybe expect more from CRM than it has been able to deliver. The same frustration has given rise to TEM ... another false dawn if ever there was one.
:-)
It's maybe wrong to conclude that CRM has failed just because we hear the same things being said on CVR transcripts - each generation has to repeat the faults of its fathers.
And maybe your friend needs to look at all the research that has been done on communications in aviation. Medicine came late to 'crm' despite the fact they more people die in iatragenic events than ever die in aircraft losses.
Amazingly, medicine seems to want to repeat all the mistakes made in CRM,
I suspect that you maybe expect more from CRM than it has been able to deliver. The same frustration has given rise to TEM ... another false dawn if ever there was one.
:-)
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BelArgUSA -
Excellent post. I will need some time to ponder it.
Turbocharged -
If you read my post you will see I stated she is "doing research" which means (at least in domains where valid research is performed) hypothoses with observation. What amazes me about her work is she is gathering data in the OR prior to developing any remedy - as far as I can tell naturalistic observation in the cockpit (at least by impartial researchers) has never been performed in aviation, and aviation seems to follow a "propose treatment, apply treatment, then see if treatment is even relevant" protocol.
And if you read my original post closely, I had been specifically taught in the class that CRM had been designed to preclude this one specific type of accident. Am I incorrect to assume that a treatment which has been designed and applied to remedy a specific ailment, and then after 30 years has been demonstrated not to have the desired effect has failed? Would you have the same attitude/response if this was en engineering/metallurgy issue?
-Jolly
Excellent post. I will need some time to ponder it.
Turbocharged -
If you read my post you will see I stated she is "doing research" which means (at least in domains where valid research is performed) hypothoses with observation. What amazes me about her work is she is gathering data in the OR prior to developing any remedy - as far as I can tell naturalistic observation in the cockpit (at least by impartial researchers) has never been performed in aviation, and aviation seems to follow a "propose treatment, apply treatment, then see if treatment is even relevant" protocol.
And if you read my original post closely, I had been specifically taught in the class that CRM had been designed to preclude this one specific type of accident. Am I incorrect to assume that a treatment which has been designed and applied to remedy a specific ailment, and then after 30 years has been demonstrated not to have the desired effect has failed? Would you have the same attitude/response if this was en engineering/metallurgy issue?
-Jolly
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Turbocharged –
I owe you an apology. I was having a bad day, and was snappy as a result.
BelArgUSA (and others) -
Your post confirms my worst suspicions – that the implementation of CRM was not based on science but was rather a subjective, haphazard exercise. I know I will take some flack for this perception, but before you beat me up, yes, I have gone through the U of T research that was the basis of CRM. If I recall correctly, it was all based on survey data (self-reporting is notoriously unreliable) and was followed up by observations of volunteers in the simulator (low n, and volunteers are known to behave differently than the general population). The initial work focused on the correlation between low power distance and lower accident rates, and hung its’ hat on the hypothesis better communication models, rather than other traits of individualistic societies would improve safety. When the initial model did not prove as effective as desired, it was tweeked, and tweeked again until, despite the fact that high uncertainty avoidance (and it’s rule based structures) are correlated with higher accident rates, TEM and its’ strict, rule-based structure were touted as the new solution. It reminds me of early astronomers who insisted the sun and planets revolved around the Earth, and kept revising their theory to accommodate this belief. My thought is maybe it’s not the communication that is the issue in these accidents, maybe it is, as you suggest, a situational awareness issue.
The accident that has me torqued up at the moment is a CFIT in San Diego. A Lear came off Brown Field at night, towards the hills, not on the SID as would be prudent but VFR at night, under the Class Bravo, towards steeply rising terrain.. The (young) copilot was heard to say “I don’t think this is a good idea” but the (seasoned) captain disregarded him. Is the issue here that the copilot didn’t speak up more assertively or rather that the captain was operating with a faulty mental model? And then I read through threads like “Border between assertive or arrogant/rude” and see language such as “little snots,” “incompetent losers,” “prima donnas” and “pillock” used to describe FOs and I ask, in times of trouble how is an FO supposed to break through something like that? What I admire about my friend’s research is the initial segment is designed to observe, to just watch how information is transferred during times of uncertainty, I have not been able to locate a similar effort in the aviation realm. Perhaps in time we will be able to learn from her.
Or maybe it’s not that at all. As I read through the “Assertive/Rude” I was struck by the number of captains who admitted to abdicating their responsibilities and playing the victim (such as the captain who let the FO get behind the aircraft on approach or the other who accepted his FOs decision to only divert 15 miles around CBs instead of 30) saying nothing and justifying their actions by labeling them as effective CRM. I think bucket and spade and simmy are on to something – perhaps we need to rethink this whole thing, recognize that every one and every act in the system is interrelated, that every FO is a captain-in-training, and that every captain is a training captain, that every communication affects the integrity of the system, and that no one person (or position) is more integral to the system than any other.
Fire away.
I owe you an apology. I was having a bad day, and was snappy as a result.
BelArgUSA (and others) -
Your post confirms my worst suspicions – that the implementation of CRM was not based on science but was rather a subjective, haphazard exercise. I know I will take some flack for this perception, but before you beat me up, yes, I have gone through the U of T research that was the basis of CRM. If I recall correctly, it was all based on survey data (self-reporting is notoriously unreliable) and was followed up by observations of volunteers in the simulator (low n, and volunteers are known to behave differently than the general population). The initial work focused on the correlation between low power distance and lower accident rates, and hung its’ hat on the hypothesis better communication models, rather than other traits of individualistic societies would improve safety. When the initial model did not prove as effective as desired, it was tweeked, and tweeked again until, despite the fact that high uncertainty avoidance (and it’s rule based structures) are correlated with higher accident rates, TEM and its’ strict, rule-based structure were touted as the new solution. It reminds me of early astronomers who insisted the sun and planets revolved around the Earth, and kept revising their theory to accommodate this belief. My thought is maybe it’s not the communication that is the issue in these accidents, maybe it is, as you suggest, a situational awareness issue.
The accident that has me torqued up at the moment is a CFIT in San Diego. A Lear came off Brown Field at night, towards the hills, not on the SID as would be prudent but VFR at night, under the Class Bravo, towards steeply rising terrain.. The (young) copilot was heard to say “I don’t think this is a good idea” but the (seasoned) captain disregarded him. Is the issue here that the copilot didn’t speak up more assertively or rather that the captain was operating with a faulty mental model? And then I read through threads like “Border between assertive or arrogant/rude” and see language such as “little snots,” “incompetent losers,” “prima donnas” and “pillock” used to describe FOs and I ask, in times of trouble how is an FO supposed to break through something like that? What I admire about my friend’s research is the initial segment is designed to observe, to just watch how information is transferred during times of uncertainty, I have not been able to locate a similar effort in the aviation realm. Perhaps in time we will be able to learn from her.
Or maybe it’s not that at all. As I read through the “Assertive/Rude” I was struck by the number of captains who admitted to abdicating their responsibilities and playing the victim (such as the captain who let the FO get behind the aircraft on approach or the other who accepted his FOs decision to only divert 15 miles around CBs instead of 30) saying nothing and justifying their actions by labeling them as effective CRM. I think bucket and spade and simmy are on to something – perhaps we need to rethink this whole thing, recognize that every one and every act in the system is interrelated, that every FO is a captain-in-training, and that every captain is a training captain, that every communication affects the integrity of the system, and that no one person (or position) is more integral to the system than any other.
Fire away.
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Originally Posted by BelArgUSA
When you line up on that runway, repeat after me - trims, flaps, spoilers (snip) The rest is up to you.
Mate, that is a ripper. I have followed some of your earlier posts and thought, incipient old fart --- but I take that back. Well said.
For me, you have summed up what Tony Kern took several thousand words to say in his Flight Discipline texts.
We have a responsibility. Every day, hundreds of people put their safety in our hands. We can choose not to fly, but once we push those throttles forward ...... It is up to us.
"Repeat after me - trims, flaps, spoilers. The rest is up to you"
With your permission, I shall use that line in the future. Gen Y need to hear it.
Originally Posted by Jolly Girl
Fire away.
I cant help but think if you and BelArgUSA should find yourself working the same flight deck/same layover, that you would find yourselves in 'violent agreement' with each other. I detect the same seriousness of purpose in both your posts.
To take you to task on one matter...
.... many years ago, in another discipline, I was privileged to be invited to hear one of the worlds leading businessmen discuss what he believed to be the essential element in being a true entrepreneur. Not an asset stripper, but an entrepreneur. He believed that the essential element was in building small teams, each member bringing a high level of specialist knowledge, and imagination, to the team.
As he described the ideal profile of such a teammember, he remarked that university education was useful, but that one should be careful of selecting anyone that had any degree or award higher than an MBA. In particular, PhD's should be avoided!
The conference convenor, himself a PhD in applied psych, could not hold back -- 'but that excludes so much expertise and thinking, why not a PhD?'
The answer -- PhD are great contributors to society, but most have worked within rules too long, and no longer think from first principles.
That really resonated with me. At the time, because I was not nearly disciplined enough to complete a university degree of any kind, and I had not considered that perhaps being 'educated' also equated to being captured by a style of thinking, to some extent.
What is my point?
As pilots, we work with elemental forces, everyday. If we delve too far into intellectual constructs, and move away from first principles of the world around us and the people we work with, we invite trouble.
For many pilots, CRM training and instruction is fertile ground on which to make a contribution and to exercise some intellectual capacity outside the daily grind of line flying.
It is important to acquire and develop NOTECH skills. However, one should not lose sight of their place as being alongside systems knowledge, procedural knowledge, meteorology, principles of flight, etc. Another tool to be kept sharp and ready for use in the professional pilot 'toolkit.' Not a new religion or doctrine by which all aspects of our profession is ruled and measured.
A tool, an essential component of flight discipline and a professional skill to be honed, along with others. Not valued above, or less than, other skills. Equal in importance.
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ITCZ,
Interesting you should bring up “avoid PhD’s.” Lately I’ve been exposed to some very interesting cutting-edge aviation projects seeking team members. When I ask whether I can share these opportunities with students, more and more frequently I am hearing “Yes, please do, in fact we are deliberately seeking participants without a lot of aviation experience,” the thought being that those who are entrenched in the current systems can only see the issues through the lens of the current structure and do not have the imagination to solve these new puzzles. I think we are at the point where we have to seriously consider the “we can’t get ourselves out of trouble using the same thinking/logic that got us in to trouble,” and “the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over expecting different results” points of view.
But at the same time I work with subject matter experts and have come to value what they bring to the table. They know what worked in the past, what was tried and did not work, and what shouldn’t have worked but did. I think a big part of it is ego – I always say there are two types of pilots, pilots who learned to fly because they loved flying, those who seek out anything and everything they can on the subject because they love it and want to know more, who love to just go up and fly the wing and feel the wind in their hair, and then there are pilots who learn to fly to pick up chicks – and I can see this with PhDs and other SMEs as well. Did they get the PhD out of curiosity and love of the subject, or did they get it for the status the credential will bring? Do they view interactions with their students and/or other team members as opportunities to further explore a subject or issue, or opportunities to assert the dominance of their knowledge or position? Does someone feel they or their thinking is “better” than someone else’s because of their education, job title or work experience? This is something I struggle with as I acquire additional credentials – how can I retain open-mindness and flexibility of thought as I gain further exposure to systems with very rigid procedural and hierarchical structures? How can I retain “beginner’s mind” (always looking at things as if seeing them for the first time) in the light of new knowledge? And how can I help others cultivate and retain this frame-of-mind as well?
But back to CRM – thank you to all who sent me references to study; I am already familiar with most who were cited. Perhaps it would be helpful if I put it this way: During my studies of the social aspects of commercial flying, I was dismayed to see the same pattern over and over again: someone in a position of authority (normally a senior captain) would define an issue and then offer their opinion as to what the solution should be. Since this person was perceived as the group as a 9the?) master, this subjective response was implemented as a solution without question. Follow-up was spotty at best. It would be much easier for me to see CRM in a more beneficial light if someone could direct me to the following: The research describing the original observations and how the CRM protocols were developed; descriptions of the initial trials where a strict protocol was applied to a randomly-selected group of participants and quantitative measurements of their effectiveness were gathered; and the subsequent studies performed by other researchers/bodies (using the original/modified protocol) that replicated the initial findings and followed the participants longitudinally (over time) to determine the long-term efficacy of the CRM treatment. I have been looking for it for some time with no luck.
Happy Flying!
Interesting you should bring up “avoid PhD’s.” Lately I’ve been exposed to some very interesting cutting-edge aviation projects seeking team members. When I ask whether I can share these opportunities with students, more and more frequently I am hearing “Yes, please do, in fact we are deliberately seeking participants without a lot of aviation experience,” the thought being that those who are entrenched in the current systems can only see the issues through the lens of the current structure and do not have the imagination to solve these new puzzles. I think we are at the point where we have to seriously consider the “we can’t get ourselves out of trouble using the same thinking/logic that got us in to trouble,” and “the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over expecting different results” points of view.
But at the same time I work with subject matter experts and have come to value what they bring to the table. They know what worked in the past, what was tried and did not work, and what shouldn’t have worked but did. I think a big part of it is ego – I always say there are two types of pilots, pilots who learned to fly because they loved flying, those who seek out anything and everything they can on the subject because they love it and want to know more, who love to just go up and fly the wing and feel the wind in their hair, and then there are pilots who learn to fly to pick up chicks – and I can see this with PhDs and other SMEs as well. Did they get the PhD out of curiosity and love of the subject, or did they get it for the status the credential will bring? Do they view interactions with their students and/or other team members as opportunities to further explore a subject or issue, or opportunities to assert the dominance of their knowledge or position? Does someone feel they or their thinking is “better” than someone else’s because of their education, job title or work experience? This is something I struggle with as I acquire additional credentials – how can I retain open-mindness and flexibility of thought as I gain further exposure to systems with very rigid procedural and hierarchical structures? How can I retain “beginner’s mind” (always looking at things as if seeing them for the first time) in the light of new knowledge? And how can I help others cultivate and retain this frame-of-mind as well?
But back to CRM – thank you to all who sent me references to study; I am already familiar with most who were cited. Perhaps it would be helpful if I put it this way: During my studies of the social aspects of commercial flying, I was dismayed to see the same pattern over and over again: someone in a position of authority (normally a senior captain) would define an issue and then offer their opinion as to what the solution should be. Since this person was perceived as the group as a 9the?) master, this subjective response was implemented as a solution without question. Follow-up was spotty at best. It would be much easier for me to see CRM in a more beneficial light if someone could direct me to the following: The research describing the original observations and how the CRM protocols were developed; descriptions of the initial trials where a strict protocol was applied to a randomly-selected group of participants and quantitative measurements of their effectiveness were gathered; and the subsequent studies performed by other researchers/bodies (using the original/modified protocol) that replicated the initial findings and followed the participants longitudinally (over time) to determine the long-term efficacy of the CRM treatment. I have been looking for it for some time with no luck.
Happy Flying!
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OK, now I know you are not serious
"It would be much easier for me to see CRM in a more beneficial light if someone could direct me to the following: The research describing the original observations and how the CRM protocols were developed; descriptions of the initial trials where a strict protocol was applied to a randomly-selected group of participants and quantitative measurements of their effectiveness were gathered; and the subsequent studies performed by other researchers/bodies (using the original/modified protocol) that replicated the initial findings and followed the participants longitudinally (over time) to determine the long-term efficacy of the CRM treatment. I have been looking for it for some time with no luck".
And, of course, you know you are not going to find it. You assume 'crm' is a treatment or intervention and a comparative trial could then be set up to compare the subject group against a control. But CRM is nothing of the sort. CRM is no more than a recognition that there is more to safe commercial flying than simply being competent at manipulating aircraft controls. The weakness with CRM is that it has tried to be reductionist - but humans are too variable and the domain too broad.
And, of course, you know you are not going to find it. You assume 'crm' is a treatment or intervention and a comparative trial could then be set up to compare the subject group against a control. But CRM is nothing of the sort. CRM is no more than a recognition that there is more to safe commercial flying than simply being competent at manipulating aircraft controls. The weakness with CRM is that it has tried to be reductionist - but humans are too variable and the domain too broad.
jg, ‘looking for the original research on CRM’ … I doubt that there is anything specific; thus there may be little scientific justification for CRM or the means of checking the effectiveness of training. Many references point back to NASA/NTSB.
However, the document Crew Resource Management: An Introductory Handbook (FAA 1992), and its references (CRM aspects from the 80s, but supported with psychology) might help your quest.
Note that this differentiates between the philosophy and the application of CRM – an often overlooked and confusing aspect.
Also note the balance between the team and individual. It’s the individuals who require the skills. Most of these skills have a cognitive basis (page 10); thus we need to teach the skills of ‘thinking’ – if for no other reason, to avoid ‘the thinking/logic that got us into this trouble’.
However, the document Crew Resource Management: An Introductory Handbook (FAA 1992), and its references (CRM aspects from the 80s, but supported with psychology) might help your quest.
Note that this differentiates between the philosophy and the application of CRM – an often overlooked and confusing aspect.
Also note the balance between the team and individual. It’s the individuals who require the skills. Most of these skills have a cognitive basis (page 10); thus we need to teach the skills of ‘thinking’ – if for no other reason, to avoid ‘the thinking/logic that got us into this trouble’.
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Turbocharged,
Now it is you who disappoint me, is “ridicule” one of the tools you hand out in your CRM kits?
I have to be honest, your statement “CRM is no more than a recognition that there is more to safe commercial flying than simply being competent at manipulating aircraft controls” threw me. Every CRM instructor I’ve had (academic, service provider and airline captain) has touted CRM as an accident reduction tool, that if I used the “assertiveness communication model” it would save my life. Which raises the question, have I been receiving “bad” CRM training for the last 16 years? And with the apparently “bad” CRM training I have received, am I better or worse off than if I had received none at all? Unfortunately (as you well know) the data to answer this question was never collected and by now the participant pool is too tainted to do a valid study.
And what is it that makes me not serious? That I question the status quo? That I want a little scientific method behind behavioral interventions in the cockpit? That I don’t agree with you? Because trust me, I have been to enough funerals to be deadly serious about anything to do with accident prevention. Please know I appreciate this open discourse. But also know that I am worried that, perhaps out of fear of setting the bar too high and failing, we set the bar too low and have become complacent with the results.
Now it is you who disappoint me, is “ridicule” one of the tools you hand out in your CRM kits?
I have to be honest, your statement “CRM is no more than a recognition that there is more to safe commercial flying than simply being competent at manipulating aircraft controls” threw me. Every CRM instructor I’ve had (academic, service provider and airline captain) has touted CRM as an accident reduction tool, that if I used the “assertiveness communication model” it would save my life. Which raises the question, have I been receiving “bad” CRM training for the last 16 years? And with the apparently “bad” CRM training I have received, am I better or worse off than if I had received none at all? Unfortunately (as you well know) the data to answer this question was never collected and by now the participant pool is too tainted to do a valid study.
And what is it that makes me not serious? That I question the status quo? That I want a little scientific method behind behavioral interventions in the cockpit? That I don’t agree with you? Because trust me, I have been to enough funerals to be deadly serious about anything to do with accident prevention. Please know I appreciate this open discourse. But also know that I am worried that, perhaps out of fear of setting the bar too high and failing, we set the bar too low and have become complacent with the results.
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Not so-JG
e-mail and forum posts are great ways to guarantee miscommunication. Just as you did not mean to offend, I certainly did not mean to ridicule.... or maybe you did. Just joking. Anyway...
CRM is really a default safety improvement device. If HF/CRM/whatever was implicated in unsafe practices, then by tackling the topic directly, through ground training, we must ipso facto be 'safer'. There is little tangible evidence that this is the case and it is probably fair to say that TEM has its roots in the failure of the previous CRM to deliver a return on investment. Interestingly, despite TEM being around now for 15 years, I haven't seen any attempts to demonstrate any step change in safety arising from this shift in acronyms.
Have you been receiving 'bad' CRM? Well I cannot tell. What I can say is that you seem to have been exposed to a subset of possible CRM themes and one that is rooted in the earliest attempts to deliver groundschool. The simple prescription approach and the idea that CRM is a 'toolkit' is too simplistic to accommodate the variability of the operational world.
Why did I say you were not serious? Because I assumed your question was rhetorical and that you'd taken such a stance to throw the futility of much CRM training into stark relief. I have often said to clients that if they do not let me attempt to measure the benefits of the training I deliver on their behalf, then their investment is little more than an act of faith. In which case, it would be cheaper to pay me not to turn up. Simply pay me and I will stay away. The effect will be the same and it will be cheaper in the long run as crew will not need to be off-line to attend class. However, show me a crew training manager who even understands the concept of evaluation. Compliance at least cost is the watchword of most airline training.
e-mail and forum posts are great ways to guarantee miscommunication. Just as you did not mean to offend, I certainly did not mean to ridicule.... or maybe you did. Just joking. Anyway...
CRM is really a default safety improvement device. If HF/CRM/whatever was implicated in unsafe practices, then by tackling the topic directly, through ground training, we must ipso facto be 'safer'. There is little tangible evidence that this is the case and it is probably fair to say that TEM has its roots in the failure of the previous CRM to deliver a return on investment. Interestingly, despite TEM being around now for 15 years, I haven't seen any attempts to demonstrate any step change in safety arising from this shift in acronyms.
Have you been receiving 'bad' CRM? Well I cannot tell. What I can say is that you seem to have been exposed to a subset of possible CRM themes and one that is rooted in the earliest attempts to deliver groundschool. The simple prescription approach and the idea that CRM is a 'toolkit' is too simplistic to accommodate the variability of the operational world.
Why did I say you were not serious? Because I assumed your question was rhetorical and that you'd taken such a stance to throw the futility of much CRM training into stark relief. I have often said to clients that if they do not let me attempt to measure the benefits of the training I deliver on their behalf, then their investment is little more than an act of faith. In which case, it would be cheaper to pay me not to turn up. Simply pay me and I will stay away. The effect will be the same and it will be cheaper in the long run as crew will not need to be off-line to attend class. However, show me a crew training manager who even understands the concept of evaluation. Compliance at least cost is the watchword of most airline training.
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Originally Posted by JG
(such as the captain who let the FO get behind the aircraft on approach or the other who accepted his FOs decision to only divert 15 miles around CBs instead of 30) saying nothing and justifying their actions by labeling them as effective CRM
I welcome your arrival on the scene and the questions you are asking. I have to say, however, that as I said earlier, CRM will never, in my opinion, eliminate human error accidents and it is incorrect to anticipate that. Look only at the 'Darwin' awards for proof of human frailty in self-preservation. It has resulted in a dramatic change in cockpit managenent (in the western world anyway) in the last 30 years or so, and as such can, I think, be quantified in a subjective way (if that is not a non-sequitor).
Keep us posted please!.
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The best definition of CRM I have ever heard is "airmanship with communication"
Simple effective and true. Cuts all the bullsh*t waffle about CRM to which we have been inflicted. (Not the concept but the stuff that is meant to describe what we do eg DODAR)
Simple effective and true. Cuts all the bullsh*t waffle about CRM to which we have been inflicted. (Not the concept but the stuff that is meant to describe what we do eg DODAR)
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Jolly - something you may wish to consider in your deliberation is that 'CRM' is not JUST about being warm, fluffy, Mr/Mrs Nice Guy/Girl and holding forums on decisions. It is about RESOURCE management, and sometimes things need to be done, particularly in the aviation timeframe, without the 'let's have your inputs here' ideal.
I first came across 'CRM' after leaving the military (where it was just basic good leadership
) when it was Cockpit RM, then it became Crew RM. What about extending your project to Company Resource Management which is where I'm sure a lot of benefit would be gained? One sees daily horrendous mis-use of good resources and consultation in companies and there can be big safety issues in that.
I first came across 'CRM' after leaving the military (where it was just basic good leadership
) when it was Cockpit RM, then it became Crew RM. What about extending your project to Company Resource Management which is where I'm sure a lot of benefit would be gained? One sees daily horrendous mis-use of good resources and consultation in companies and there can be big safety issues in that.
In general, factual accuracy in our society is science based; an aspect can be tested and the result observed. Yet with CRM there is an underlying reluctance to involve science (avoid PhDs).
CRM and many CRM related safety programmes are supposedly based on research, but few, if any of these are testable in a way that provides material to support a proactive safety programme.
jg, you would like data to conduct a scientific test of CRM; yet with a sufficiently large data-set, almost any conclusion could be reached. Isn’t this the basis of our reluctance to involve PhD’s, - because of the many differing points of view in HF science, or their failure to produce practical material for use in training, or both?
CRM training may have contributed to safety; the industry’s accident rate has fallen and remains low. However, the HF content of accidents appears to be constant, possibly from before the advent of CRM.
Is this because the limit of HF training has been reached, or alternatively CRM has been successful and is now squeezing other HF problems into the open; I suspect that the real position is somewhere in between the two.
The main problem is with ‘us’ – humans. Behaviour is a highly complex, chaotic interaction with the world, which is difficult to observe, let alone analyse. To some observers much of the behaviour is irrational, but it is what we do every day.
Given this, then how can we expect to teach those aspects which will ‘cure’ our ‘errant’ behaviour? At best we might minimise the occurrence, detect error, and recover from adverse outcomes (TEM).
We should not stop what we are doing or continue to seek improvement as errant behaviour might resurface very quickly, and we need to identify and address the emerging HF problems anyway.
This small effort (CRM/HF training), in conjunction with other safety initiatives, should provide a continuing margin of safety above that required by public opinion. The main concern for the CRM practitioners might be the status of the other, complementary safety programs. Where is the HF training for senior management, the regulators (operational and certification), or the wider range of HF training in the design process?
CRM and many CRM related safety programmes are supposedly based on research, but few, if any of these are testable in a way that provides material to support a proactive safety programme.
jg, you would like data to conduct a scientific test of CRM; yet with a sufficiently large data-set, almost any conclusion could be reached. Isn’t this the basis of our reluctance to involve PhD’s, - because of the many differing points of view in HF science, or their failure to produce practical material for use in training, or both?
CRM training may have contributed to safety; the industry’s accident rate has fallen and remains low. However, the HF content of accidents appears to be constant, possibly from before the advent of CRM.
Is this because the limit of HF training has been reached, or alternatively CRM has been successful and is now squeezing other HF problems into the open; I suspect that the real position is somewhere in between the two.
The main problem is with ‘us’ – humans. Behaviour is a highly complex, chaotic interaction with the world, which is difficult to observe, let alone analyse. To some observers much of the behaviour is irrational, but it is what we do every day.
Given this, then how can we expect to teach those aspects which will ‘cure’ our ‘errant’ behaviour? At best we might minimise the occurrence, detect error, and recover from adverse outcomes (TEM).
We should not stop what we are doing or continue to seek improvement as errant behaviour might resurface very quickly, and we need to identify and address the emerging HF problems anyway.
This small effort (CRM/HF training), in conjunction with other safety initiatives, should provide a continuing margin of safety above that required by public opinion. The main concern for the CRM practitioners might be the status of the other, complementary safety programs. Where is the HF training for senior management, the regulators (operational and certification), or the wider range of HF training in the design process?
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Originally Posted by alf
Where is the HF training for senior management