Turbocharged –
I owe you an apology. I was having a bad day, and was snappy as a result.
BelArgUSA (and others) -
Your post confirms my worst suspicions – that the implementation of CRM was not based on science but was rather a subjective, haphazard exercise. I know I will take some flack for this perception, but before you beat me up, yes, I have gone through the U of T research that was the basis of CRM. If I recall correctly, it was all based on survey data (self-reporting is notoriously unreliable) and was followed up by observations of volunteers in the simulator (low n, and volunteers are known to behave differently than the general population). The initial work focused on the correlation between low power distance and lower accident rates, and hung its’ hat on the hypothesis better communication models, rather than other traits of individualistic societies would improve safety. When the initial model did not prove as effective as desired, it was tweeked, and tweeked again until, despite the fact that high uncertainty avoidance (and it’s rule based structures) are correlated with higher accident rates, TEM and its’ strict, rule-based structure were touted as the new solution. It reminds me of early astronomers who insisted the sun and planets revolved around the Earth, and kept revising their theory to accommodate this belief. My thought is maybe it’s not the communication that is the issue in these accidents, maybe it is, as you suggest, a situational awareness issue.
The accident that has me torqued up at the moment is a CFIT in San Diego. A Lear came off Brown Field at night, towards the hills, not on the SID as would be prudent but VFR at night, under the Class Bravo, towards steeply rising terrain.. The (young) copilot was heard to say “I don’t think this is a good idea” but the (seasoned) captain disregarded him. Is the issue here that the copilot didn’t speak up more assertively or rather that the captain was operating with a faulty mental model? And then I read through threads like “Border between assertive or arrogant/rude” and see language such as “little snots,” “incompetent losers,” “prima donnas” and “pillock” used to describe FOs and I ask, in times of trouble how is an FO supposed to break through something like that? What I admire about my friend’s research is the initial segment is designed to observe, to just watch how information is transferred during times of uncertainty, I have not been able to locate a similar effort in the aviation realm. Perhaps in time we will be able to learn from her.
Or maybe it’s not that at all. As I read through the “Assertive/Rude” I was struck by the number of captains who admitted to abdicating their responsibilities and playing the victim (such as the captain who let the FO get behind the aircraft on approach or the other who accepted his FOs decision to only divert 15 miles around CBs instead of 30) saying nothing and justifying their actions by labeling them as effective CRM. I think bucket and spade and simmy are on to something – perhaps we need to rethink this whole thing, recognize that every one and every act in the system is interrelated, that every FO is a captain-in-training, and that every captain is a training captain, that every communication affects the integrity of the system, and that no one person (or position) is more integral to the system than any other.
Fire away.