Are we asking too much of CRM training in it's current form? Yes; assuming that ‘current’ CRM implies focus on TEM.
CRM is often seen as the panacea for human error related accidents, whereas in reality it must be part of a larger package, e.g. design, regulation, and organisational issues.
With the technological advances in the cockpit since the origin of CRM, which has shifted the role of the pilot from monitor/controller to system/resource manager, is the current CRM model still valid? Probably not, but has there ever been a consistent model of CRM?
A major problem with CRM is that the concept has not been well explained and even more so, not well applied. In particular, most effort has been placed on the soft interpersonal and social skills to the detriment of cognitive skills. A wider view of HF training (CRM is the application of HF) would include individuals’ thinking skills – awareness and decision making. The latter are more difficult to teach and apply and thus are often deferred to LOFT or elsewhere, if taught at all.
CRM is like a bidet; everyone knows what it is for, but no one knows what it is, - a reversal of a British myth about French culture!
There isn’t really a world standard for CRM. The guidance materials from regulators are diverse and often reflect the social view above.
ICAO publishes a standard position in their HF Training Manual, but this document is not readily available. Furthermore, ICAO adds complexity with new initiatives, many based on academic principles which may still have a research bias, or are too culturally or operationally specific (LOSA, TEM model, SMS).
In accepting that error is unavoidable, training concentrates on avoidance, detection, and correction, with crosschecking / monitoring central to all operations. However, reviewing ‘HF’ accidents, in many cases the crosschecking/monitoring failed. Just as both crew can suffer disorienting illusions simultaneously, so too can their mental models fail simultaneously, their awareness of the developing situation is flawed, thus there is no independence for monitoring, interjection, or advocacy.
The solution, if there is a human one, should start with the individual and teach thinking skills to build on knowledge and help develop know-how from practical experience to enable improved awareness (understanding). The latter being a critical item; experience is in short supply in the modern industry, and rarely developed within the crew – how many Captains participate in helping to ‘train’ - pass on experience to First Officers?
Are these problems of the confrontational cockpit? Possibly; more so where newly qualified pilots arrive with frozen ‘captain’ qualifications and a belief that there is nothing more to learn, only to sit back and get the hours. If this is the case then the weakness in CRM training (and the model) starts with initial training.
For inf see
‘Teaching and Assessing Single-Pilot Human Factors and Threat and Error Management’; this is a recent document which I rate highly for its basic common sense approach to the subject.
Although aimed at single pilot operations, the content applies to everyone – a good team starts with individuals. Also, the instructor aspects can be adapted for self-analysis - self questioning, an important aspect in safety thinking.