mmmayday38
 

Your patience does you even more credit sir. Most of your peers have been generous with their praise, rightly so, and they are the people who really know what you and your crew achieved, but I would like to add my (SLF and interested non aero engineer) appreciation of your actions that day.

Even from day one, when only the sketchiest details were available, I always thought the crew must have been something very special and now I know it. I have to hold my hand up though and admit that I remain strangely unconvinced as to the reasons why and how your engines let you down so badly. Maybe it was an entirely new phenomenon, but the published reason gives this engineer goose bumps.

But that's not your worry. All the very best for you in the future and I really hope I end up flying in very close formation with you one day. :)

Roger.

The salient "hypothesis" has to do with many hours of flight through very cold temps, in this case very cold temps. 038 flew at 38k for some time, and had poured most of its fuel through the engines by the time AT requested high thrust at short final. This high thrust value was attained and maintained for many seconds, so conclusion 1: the narrowest part of the fuel passage even if it was partially occluded by ice, was sufficient to provide fuel for the thrust selected.

Evidence was noted of cavitation concurrent with interruption of fuel flow, suggesting the fuel passage was plugged sufficient to cause rollback, hence conclusion 2: Ice had collected at some point upstream of HP pumps, Preventing flow, though 1.03 and 1.02 epr were noted. The engines continued to run.

Photographic evidence of surface accumulation of "Ice" on the interior of the fuel line was noted post test. Ice packed around the entry port of the HE was also demonstrated.

Hypothesis: Ice accumulation was allowed by a combination of factors suggesting that it was allowable quantities of water contamination of fuel building up over long hours of cruise flight that was responsible for the "plug at the face" of the FOHE which prevented fuel flow.

Having lain dormant as "sticky Ice" right up to throttle refusal, how did it arrive at the Inlet matrix? A number of possibilities come to mind. Warming temps at let down? Sudden increase of flow, lessening of hydraulic pressure? Vibration of pylon tree and FOHE on the shroud at first Increase? Since it was AT throttling up, my 'guess' is that extreme vibration associated with high thrust shook loose the Ice that choked the flow that prevented normal operation. Similar quantities/temps. caused the seeming "simultaneous" loss of power that was initially so startling, but that in hindsight seems reasonable enough.

These are questions that come to mind without assigning any mysterious characteristic to the fuel. Were these tested? Were they assumed? Look, either it is mysterious and more work (much more) needs to be done, or it is actually a straightforward case of a very rare combination of unlikely factors combining to cause starvation.


The major portion of the body of work done by the investigators is misleading, insufficient, inconclusive, and patronizing. The Chinese Fuel could have been crap, but it was shown that in spec fuel was found remaindered in 038. The Trent may need a more thorough re-engineering relative to fuel system (to include the airframe), including HP prior to FOHE, Bypass, Recirculating Spill, etc. How would anybody know? Because Boeing and FAA say so? They've not addressed this. Personally, I like the 757 for my trips to Hawaii.

The bolding is not meant to be aggressive, but I needed something stronger than italics, this is a very frustrating accident.

Then there's DELTA. What if cavitation had caused both FOHE cannisters to collapse over the Rockies?

bear

I just want to add my thanks to Mmmayday38 for the excellent insights he has shared with us along with my admiration for having done so well.

That day looking out the window produced a result that many engineers and pilots on simulators over several months could not improve upon:ok:

Thanks for the support guys...appreciated.
 

Thanks for some great replies to the ‘army of 1’ and although they are very accurate (ta CaptPlaystation #3009 & 3015, Baron Rouge #3131, Pettifogger #3034) with some good insight into the atmosphere in the f/d that day; I feel that SFLY needs me to say it so he can adhere to some other posters’ advise? (CaptPlaystation #3002 and Tima9x #2999 !!) ;)

Again SFLY, Boeing tried all angles of dangles and differing AoAs with differing airspeeds, on the G/S and below it, to try and get further; they couldn’t. So if it appears to you that the a/c staying on the G/S until nearing the stall was wrong, it did not detrement the distance flown at all.

I can’t find the actual post anymore (there have been a few posts deleted by the mod with regards to me!!) but someone mentioned about the lack of throttle usage on the approach. On the BA38 this was my attempt at performing a CDA (continuous descent approach) into LHR... something BA pride themselves for doing well at. On the day, it was fairly gusty below 5000’ with winds in the region of 25-35kts, so the continuous descent was a little more challenging, so as not to level fly at 3000’ over the city to intercept the glide, and of course throttling up in the process! I was pleased with my CDA, as we were spot on the glide on localiser intercept I think. However, in hindsight this was perhaps even more fortuitous, as had we throttled up and the fuel flows had increased, this could well have caused an earlier rollback; this time at 3000’ over London city! Of course being clean we would have glided much further... anyway, I’ve lived through all these scenarios ever since in my dreams, day and night! Anyway, enough of the ‘ifs’....:confused:

On the BA38 approach at approx 1200’, I was PH and at this height the throttles danced around a gust with the usual trend arrow throwing up about a 10kt surge in speed. I mentioned this to John, and said something like “that wasn’t me, it’s the a/t doing there thing”... meaning they’re reacting as usual to the gusts. Then I added, “It might be a good idea to keep the a/p in a bit longer than usual until the wind dies down across the terminal”...”Good idea” came his reply. SA shared and understood.

At about 800’ John took control and said “I have control”...”You have control”, I added.

Between the rollbacks John shared with me his problem with the throttles (splitting at this point), but then as the left engine suffered it’s rollback, the throttles married up again, so would appear normal for a while.... until at 430’ ish, we knew the required power was not being delivered.

“Pete I can’t get any power” from John, “It looks like a double eng failure” from Conor. I was looking at the eng instruments , and , yes it looks like double eng failure but isn’t. The Insts were blank but the demand line was at max. No warnings...that’s very odd, I thought.

I then elected to leave John in control... because he was a competent pilot and could carry on whilst I used the available resourses and managed the situation.

I first of all went for the continuous ignition (I’m sure I said “!!!! it’s a roller”... but never heard it on the CVR) but of course being RR there wasn’t one!! So I turned the switch to ‘start’ anyway seeing as my hand was there. I scanned the fuel panel to check the pumps were still on. Continuing down the panel I checked the fuel gauges ... still over 5 tonnes in each wing, pretty much balanced. Back to the throttles, again pushing them forward manually, they were firewalled. Checked the speed brake lever wasn’t out. Checked the fuel switches were running. Checked the fire handles were down.

As I was pushing down on the fire handles, “Airspeed Low” master caution....nasty sound! :ooh: And the first audible warning that was heard in the flight deck. I sternly said “Airspeed Low” in my best attention grabbing voice, looking over at John he was concentrating hard and was in control. We were on the G/S and the speed had naturally dropped back. The descent rate started to increase and was at 1800 fpm. Looking out the window, we were heading for Hatton Cross and the r/w was flying up the screen! I needed to reduce the drag, as easy as that, otherwise we were all toast. I changed the flaps.

John was in and out of the stick shaker, perfect, he was still controlling the a/c well, and I could see we might actually clear the road. Plane sorted, path sorted (as best I could) and now the people? It was 200’.... I won’t do a “brace”, the passengers are sitting happy and relaxed. Kegworth flashed through my thoughts and the amount of limb breaks produced by bad bracing of the passengers. I’ll do a Mayday to look after them... I might not be able to after we crash, who knows?

That’s roughly how it went... SFLY; but lots lots more thinking in between; but if I wrote it all, it would be quite a bit of my book ! Not that I’d be expecting you to want to read it.

None of us heard the warnings after “Airspeed Low”... the GPWS or the A/P disconnect; it was an intense period of the flight and we didn’t hear ‘useless’ warnings that we knew were non-actionable. I remember wanting to do a g/a instinctively at Airspeed low!! :hmm:

I’m actually pleased the a/p stayed in until it did; it helped to get us as far as we did I think. Boeing didn’t get further from that point doing anything else. I said before, if I’d known we’d not get power back, I’d have selected lower flap sooner, at 500’ I think we’d have greased it on . I love hindsight and now knowing what a rollback is!

I believe that a pilot handling with his hands on the control column is in control, a/p in or not, as long as the a/c is doing what the pilot wants it to be doing. If it doesn’t, do something about it, using a/p or not! John was in control of the a/c and when it wasn’t doing what he felt comfortable with he did something about it. I have no problems with John’s actions that day. I had half a glance at the picture every now and again and was happy with it (you know what I mean) but would have said something to him if I hadn’t been.

Basically this is what a lot of the other posts have said this afternoon, but I’ve added some frilly bits! :ok:

Info for 'Suninmyeyes'... I can't post any links about it (cos that would be advertising) but the book's hopefully out in approx 6-8 weeks? As we are having to self publish, as no publisher wanted it, it will be sold mostly through my website (again can't 'URL' it here cos of adverts) but some of you might have found it? I'll have to buy the books upfront, and am thinking of about 500. I've got a few requests off my site, so I'm guesstimating ;)

any idea of price of the book
 

just roughly.

We definitely want it below £10. We think it could be around the £9 mark.

The manuscript is with the publishers now and they could only give us a rough idea for how much it costs to print a 5x8 book with 73000 words, paperback, approx 20 b+w photos. Until they have prepared a full layout they cannot say for definite how much per book to print, so until that point we don't have a definite cost but a ball park figure.

This book was written for our sons to give them a factual account of why their little lives have changed so drastically. I am sure when they are old enough to want to know, we would have been a bit hazy on events. We are not wanting to make a huge profit and would love to make enough to cover out costs.

We didn't want to put a huge mark up on this as some people will be interested in the aviation part and not much else, others will be interested in all of it. Either way if people are wanting to buy a copy then we are honoured that you could be that interested.

The Book
 

Hey Mods!

Would it be possible to freebie an ad for PB's book -- or make a deal for each copy sold via PPRuNe?

Well, I shall be buying a copy !

Congrats on a job well done my good man :ok: Don't listen to the old women on here, they're only jelous ;)

If it sells a few million I'll be looking for a cut if you quote from my "posts", well , jeez I am Scottish. ;)

Cheers, well done for everything, keep your spirits right up there & good luck wherever you end up flying next, but for chrissake never say " at my last airline" := :D

count me in for ten copies, please!
 

P.B. I've done 2 books self publishing. The hard part for me is selling the books, believe me, you will have no trouble with that at all. A lot of people will want to read your story, so if I were you don't underestimate demand.
And a tenner a book usually works well, be sure and cover your costs.

The detail on your recent post that most amused me was "the runway was flying up the screen!" When my dear departed husband was flying an early solo in his K-8 at the age of 65, we watched in horror as he just barely managed to hop over the hedge. Said he, " I was told that I was undershooting if the reference point was moving up the canopy.....EVERYTHING was moving up the canopy......!"

If you'd like any help with the book, PM...

Mary

What is obvious from the last couple of day's posts that not only is Captain Burkill a consummate professional*, he's also a complete gentleman. :ok:

Haven't you, just. :D Thank you, Peter.

I'm yet another punter for the book - no question.




*As are SFO Coward, FO Magenis, the ATCO (whose name I've failed to Google - sorry), Heathrow RFFS, AAIB and, clearly, many others.

Anyone know how 'the poor bloke with the gear in his leg' is faring?

Entirely agreed. Also worth noting (from section 1 of the report):
The comment I've put in italics appears (to me) to confirm that PF was indeed still following the glideslope well below 600ft, whether (as you say) assisted by autopilot or not. He knows there's a thrust problem and that PNF is troubleshooting.

According to the report it's not until about 7secs later (300ft ?) that speed drops below Vref, and even then PF is probably still thinking/hoping thrust will kick in any second now...

Guys.

The reason we discuss stuff like this on pprune is that it is informative.

Plainly, due to this accident, peeps have learned that pulling the flaps in will, in certain circumstances, get them nearer to where they're going.

No bad thing.:ok:

Hopefully they have also learned that if you lose all your thrust on final, like FR did at Rome, the a/c will stall in unless you take the autopilot off.

No bad thing.:ok:

Pprune is many things. But it's not a 'love in'.

NO shame at all to the crew, but a 777 is a 777.

And £160m is just that.

As someone above posted. Fly the aircraft. Yourself.

though 1.03 and 1.02 epr were noted. The engines continued to run

Peter, the EPR data is interesting. On my ac type we fly N2 RPM as the main power parameter on our approaches. Typically, with flap 45 and engines spooled up this would typically be 83 - 84 % N2.
What would have been a `normal` spooled up EPR value for the B777 at 750` AGL? In other words, in percentage terms, how much thrust was `missing`?

Stanley Eevil,

Interesting you use N2? Assuming you are flying a type with hi-bypass fan engines, you use a parameter for a section of the engine that produces around only 20% of total thrust? I assumed most operators use N1 for a GE or EPR for a PW/RR? Obviously not. You learn something every day on here.

Peter

Send Adrian Swire and Rod Eddington a copy of the book with a note. :ok:

If you need their addresses, PM me.

All the best and look forward to seeing you out this way.

Turn a deaf ear to the naysayers, you have been closer than any of us to the edge and proved that line guys can get the job done.

There is no way I would have taken the a/c off the F/O in a situation like yours either, unless I was working for an outfit that puts 500hr people in the RHS.

Good luck .. you and Sully are in the same class.

BTW, where can I buy 10 copies?

mmmayday
 

It looks like the order for 500 copies might be on the lean side........

Peter's Book
 

I will be buying a copy as well.

It will be a pleasure to buy it
 

...shall hunt down your web site

Peter's book
 

Me too!
Where can it be ordered?

me too- BTW I flew with your father on 707's a looong time ago - how is he, is he still around?

For the book try Peters website = his name dot com or google it.

I look forward to reading you book too Peter. I'm sure your book will be a "laster" and through the years will sell consistently as it is the type of book most aviators and some other curious folk will be very interested in. After all, you will forever be etched in Aviation History and held in such high regard.

Also, it is the kind of book that all aspiring/new pilots coming into the aviation world wil want to read.

I'm sure most Libraries around the country would also want to stock it.

Sales may take time to gather pace, but I'd be surprised if it didn't sell well into the thousands. Aviation disaters are a global subject/interest and all English speaking countries for starters are potential markets.

Further out, next christmas should be a great time for ramping up Sales. There are alot of retired pilots, ex Military guys, aviation enthusiasts that would love getting your book as a gift.

In the world of the internet and very quick word of mouth and easy global courrier services, good things can surely happen for your book.

I take note though, that you have written this book for your Children first and foremost.

Best of luck with everything,
JJ

Regarding all this back-and-forth about autopilot and having control, let me see if I've got this straight:

- AP was engaged on approach, FO was PF from 800' onwards
- Due to worsening situation, FO did not explicitly disconnect the AP - entirely forgiveable in the circumstances
- FO had hands on the yoke at all times and as soon as the AOA looked iffy provided corrective action

So, the PF was hands-on-yoke, monitoring AOA and providing corrective action, which sounds pretty "in control" to me. Far more importantly, the AAIB considered he was in control and his captain also considered he was in control. At the end of the day that's all that should matter - anything else is just nitpicking to the level of those complaining that Sullenberger and Skiles didn't hit the "ditch" button, even though the structural damage rendered the effectiveness moot.

Great result, and what a thoroughly good bloke to boot.

Seat 30k
 

Bill G Kerr:
Yes, I've tracked him down. He's made of Australian stuff, and he's OK. :D

Peter ...

After the accident, what happened with all the pax / you and your crew ?

Did they open the survivors reception centre you hear about, by old stand C18 ?

Well done again !

Your Great mate!
 

You see, Peter even cares enough to track down an injured PAX, as an Aussie myself I am sure he would appreciate the thought. V Australia have 777's I am sure that the Aussies would love to have Peter as a 777 Captain fly the Pacific for them.
Come on Aussie come on!

Good one Pete!

Tima9x

TIMA9X
Yep, application in and talking to the CEO; also being helped by another pruner not too far away on this thread. :ok:

Sorry about the brick hut.
 

I spent quite a few Hatton Cross restaurant breakfasts at the engineering base wondering why they built that brick shed that took off the u/c just where they did. I guess if I had said anything at the time no one would have listened to a 16 year old engineering apprentice. I'd like to see areas before the threshold reserved and clear.
Looking forward to the book Pete! Hopefully one day you will feel like giving a talk about your experiences with an audience of friends...

Posted in memory of KL who sadly died recently after a very long struggle, an engineer at BA who I had the great privilege of working with.

Not all that long ago a Captain lost an engine over the Midwestern US, (one of three). Fortunately an additional Captain was aboard, and between the three crew, the star crossed DC-10 crashed short of Sioux City, but on the airport. Many died. Acclaimed a hero, Captain Haynes humbly said, "too many died.....so many". He went on to retirement and travelled widely, speaking to many many people as the hero he was.

Without available power, Captain Burkill and F/O Coward brought a two hundred ton glider safely to rest at the threshold of his cleared r/w.

One person was badly hurt, has recovered, and the rest are safe and sound. Both equipment failures (another thread), with dedicated crew and quick thinking action.

Captain Haynes had some time to plan his controlled crash, Captain Burkill had forty seconds, with his F/O at the controls when things went quiet.

I can understand a few in the flying community picking nits about 038, but I am astonished that Captain Burkill isn't enjoying the same attention and plaudits as Haynes in the public arena. I am drawing a blank here; both heavies were even BLUE for goodness' sake. Sully had far longer to set up.

:D

bear

I agree entirely, I think there has also been a distinct lack of appreciation of the pilotage shown by my erstwhile colleague in Ryanair, who sucessfully (except once again from an insurers viewpoint ) converted a single engined go-around he was handed by his colleague , into a deadstick landing on a not terribly long runway.
Well done Fred :ok: Glider pilots Eh ?

Playstation,

Thank goodness the 'good' engine chucked it more or less straight away..............otherwise?

Land the f$cker!:ok:

Come on, be fair all round. Haynes didn't just lose one engine of three, the shrapnel took out all his hydraulics to boot. He didn't make a "controlled" crash - he had no control surfaces. That they made it back to anywhere near an airport, let alone a runway, is amazing. I fully expect that Haynes would have traded all his engines for working control surfaces on that day.

[just to be clear, none of the foregoing is intended to diminish the achievements of BA38 crew].

Ken (if I may foreshorten you ;) )
Lots more to say on that one me old mucker, I understand that cojo, who was PF ,said "go around flap 15" or such-like, entirely correct as regards Boeing /RYR after an eng failure on app (although I believe that both would allow that in a time /height limited situation a landing would be an acceptable alternative)

I believe the Capt possibly thought " Oh Alfred Hitchcock" (or something ryhming with) & would have possibly taken the opportunity to put the thing on the ground given the impressive flying display nature had afforded him.
However, by this stage our steely young chap in the RHS had done all the good stuff & skyward they went.
No doubt one could analyse the cost/benefit of the energy they gained by pushing TOGA & launching skyward followed by sudden silence & the need to aggresively change to an attitude required for a no-engine landing fairly far down the RW vs a slightly more forward thinking " Oh Sh1t" that was a LOT of birdies , one is gone , maybe better to land , approach.

All I will offer here, is my profound thanks that the "live" engine didn't function for an additional 10 seconds or so more . . . that would NOT have been helpful.
As always, some hindsight employed here, but I feel, had I been PIC , that G/A call may have been responded to INSTANTLY with " I HAVE CONTROL", followed by a landing, but then again, I am now guilty of what I accused you of on the BA038 thread, who knows EH? Good weekend me man :ok:


P.S , I didn't at any stage mention that the copilot was Dutch, and that his dad was on here instantly shaying how good he did, did I ? ? :D

Count me in for a book. As a simple SLF, I think I would pick 'Peter':ok: as my crew if the same thing were to happen to any plane I was flying in.

Book...ing?
 

Dear M'day38,

Please print sufficient copies on your 1st run to allow for me to purchase 2 x copy please.

In the 35 seconds or so from recognition of any abnormality to impact, you and your crew performed commendably. The action taken in this hectic period was remarkable. The raising of the flaps to F25 in that time frame is quite amazing, and the benefit is identifiable; BA-038 missed a lot of frangible and non frangible objects that would not have otherwise been the case. The trade off of F30 v F25 is highly dependent on the energy transfer available, and on analysis, you guys did the right thing.

In all honesty, I think BA and the BA-038 passengers and crew could not have asked for a better performance than was demonstrated on the day. I remain thankful that my 777's (PW's & GE's) apparently weren't susceptible to the same anomaly.

The problem facing your flight and the timing of the event is fortunately rare, so much so that it is not even in general terms trained by any civil organisation I am aware of, so you and your crews actions stand as an example of the ability of the human to adapt and react in a time of critical stress and uncertainty, where heuristic based solutions are not readily forthcoming due to the nature of the abnormality (see refs).

With respect to S.F.L.Y. and similar viewpoints on this forum, your responses have been refreshing and thankfully tolerant. Given the process you have had to endure since the event, tolerance is an attribute that could be reasonably seen as being diminished, yet that is not the case. Your actions stand in the full light of day, and do not cast any shadow of doubt on the performance of the crew.

If any criticism is felt to be forthcoming from this open forum, be assured that such views only reinforce the fact that the event you experienced was remarkable, and that the remarkable outcome stands in mute testament to the crew's performance.

"Character is like a tree and reputation like it's shadow. the shadow is what we think of it; the tree is the real thing".

Abraham Lincoln (1805 -1865), Lincoln's Own stories



Cheers,

FDR
Warm Springs

References:

Paul Anand, "Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk", Oxford, Oxford University Press 1993 repr 1995 2002

Clemen, Robert. Making Hard Decisions: An Introduction to Decision Analysis, 2nd edition. Belmont CA: Duxbury Press, 1996.

De Groot, Morris, Optimal Statistical Decisions. Wiley Classics Library. 2004. (Originally published 1970)

North, D.W. (1968). "A tutorial introduction to decision theory". IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics 4 (3): 200–210.

Peterson, Martin, An Introduction to Decision Theory. Cambridge University Press 2009.

Raiffa, Howard Decision Analysis: Introductory Readings on Choices Under Uncertainty. McGraw Hill. 1997.

Robert, Christian (2007). The Bayesian Choice (2nd ed.). New York: Springer.

Shafer, Glenn and Pearl, Judea, editors. Readings in uncertain reasoning. Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1990.

Smith, J.Q. Decision Analysis: A Bayesian Approach. Chapman and Hall. 1988.

Donald Davidson, Patrick Suppes and Sidney Siegel (1957). Decision-Making: An Experimental Approach. Stanford University Press.

F. Bacchus and A. Grove, Graphical models for preference and utility, Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI-95), pp.3-10, 1995

C. Boutilier, T. Dean and S Hanks. Decision Theoretic Planning: Structural Assumptions and Computational Leverage. JAIR 11:1--94 (1999)

C. Boutilier, R. Patrascu, P. Poupart, and D. Schuurmans (2006). Constraint-based Optimization and Utility Elicitation using the Minimax Decision Criterion, Artificial Intelligence 170(8--9), pp.686-713.

A. Doucet, N. de Freitas and N.J. Gordon (eds), Sequential Monte Carlo Methods in Practice, Springer-Verlag, 2001.

Itzhak Gilboa, Theory of Decision under Uncertainty Series: Econometric Society Monographs Cambridge 2009.

G. Lankriet, L. El Ghaoui, C. Bhattacharyya, and M. I. Jordan, Minimax Probability Machine, CS- Berkeley, Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 14, 2001.

R. Mateescu, R. Dechter and K. Kask, Tree-Decomposition Approximations for Belief Updating, American Association for Artificial Intelligence, 2002.

Matthijs T. J. Spaan and Nikos Vlassis. Perseus: Randomized Point-based Value Iteration for POMDPs. JAIR 24, pp.195-220 (2005). [Partially-Observable Markov Decision Processes]

J. Pearl., Direct and Indirect Effects, Proceedings of the Seventeenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 2001.

Roland W. Scholz (ed), Decision Making Under Uncertainty, Advances in Psychology 16, Elsevier Science Pub 1987 (2nd Ed)

Xavier Boyen and Daphne Koller. Tractable inference for complex stochastic processes. UAI-98

RR TRENT in B777
 

"I remain thankful that my 777's (PW's & GE's) apparently weren't susceptible to the same anomaly."

lets wait and see...

There is a common thread between this accident and other earlier ones and that is the lack of awareness in the cockpit of what is happening with the largest flight control on the aircraft.

On Boeing 75,76 and 77 aircraft the control column and rudder pedals show you what is happening to all the flying controls except the stabiliser that goes on it own merry way with the only indication a small green indicator out of the pilot's field of view.

When flying the classic 737 I always found that the clanking of the stab trim wheel was a good indication of something happening when the autopilot was engaged that might need my attention, whether it was a minor jet upset or lack of power on the approach. When I converted onto the 767 the ability of the stab-trim to wind on loads of stabiliser without any obvious indication to the crew was, I thought a retrograde step.

This isn't the first time that a proper stab trim wheel would have alerted the crew to a problem (still engaged A/P and falling AS) and increased their awareness of the situation.


It is a shame that Mr P A Sleight & Mr R D G Carter didn't add another Safety Recommendation to the Accident Report: Bring back the Stab trim wheel to increase aircrew awareness of what is happening with the Stab Trim during all phases of flight.
They might also have added another. Double engine failure on finals:...........G/A flaps. We could call it the PB recall item. Well done mate, it wasn't just you that was able to speak to your wife afterwards.