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-   -   BA038 (B777) Thread (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/340666-ba038-b777-thread.html)

TIMA9X 13th February 2010 11:06

Enjoyed you posts - FDR sky9
 
By FDR

In the 35 seconds or so from recognition of any abnormality to impact, you and your crew performed commendably. The action taken in this hectic period was remarkable. The raising of the flaps to F25 in that time frame is quite amazing, and the benefit is identifiable; BA-038 missed a lot of frangible and non frangible objects that would not have otherwise been the case. The trade off of F30 v F25 is highly dependent on the energy transfer available, and on analysis, you guys did the right thing.
Your posts are always a pleasure to read, I was looking forward to hearing from you and your views on this matter.

sky9

When flying the classic 737 I always found that the clanking of the stab trim wheel was a good indication of something happening when the autopilot was engaged that might need my attention, whether it was a minor jet upset or lack of power on the approach. When I converted onto the 767 the ability of the stab-trim to wind on loads of stabiliser without any obvious indication to the crew was, I thought a retrograde step.
Another fantastic point of view which I relate to, and certainly got me thinking!

Thanks for the input guys nice to get some positive informative points, just "great insight for guys like me."

Cheers
timA9x

captplaystation 13th February 2010 11:09

I agree, the trim clanking round on the 737 is a valuable cue. . . . but, it didn't seem to be noticed by the Turkish crew, or indeed the Thomson crew in BOH :rolleyes:

N2NB9H 13th February 2010 13:31


but, it didn't seem to be noticed by the Turkish crew, or indeed the Thomson crew in BOH :rolleyes:
I thought that we shouldn't make any comparison with these incidents/accidents :oh:

The Turkish auto-throttle induced accident resulted in the following Boeing guidelines for non-normal situations:

NON-NORMAL RECOGNITION:
o The crewmember recognizing the malfunction calls it out clearly and
precisely.
• MAINTAIN AIRPLANE CONTROL:
o It is mandatory that the Pilot Flying (PF) fly the airplane.
• ANALYZE THE SITUATION:
o Any further action should only be initiated after the malfunctioning
system has been positively identified.
Link: Flight Crew Monitoring During Automatic Flight

It also says:

Early intervention prevents unsatisfactory airplane performance or a degraded flight path.When the automatic systems as described above do not perform as expected, the PF should reduce the level of automation to ensure proper control of the airplane is maintained.
The application of these recommendations also prevents trim induced issues. AT and AP are quite interdependent systems and the second one will definitely be affected by issues related to the first one.

Keeping one system without the other can be tricky.

holteboy 14th February 2010 10:30

Only one person comes out of this with NO credit
 
Wonder if anyone has tracked down the character who climbed back up the escape chute to get his personal effects ?

OK - I'll be benevolent - shock !

BoeingMEL 14th February 2010 11:29

Yes... good points about the stab-trim..
 
..My log-book shows that it's almost 25 years since I flew a 733... but I always believed that that saw-bench stab-trim wheel spinning by my right thigh was one of the most reliable flight-status/aircraft-configuration indicators on-board.

I'm happy to join those rooting for Pete... he's a thoroughly decent and modest professional. Australia tho?... C'mon Pete..who else is going to share my CabSauv? Cheers bm :ok:

Baron rouge 14th February 2010 14:37

Dear mmmday 038
 
In your long answer to SFLY #3038, you said:


I believe that a pilot handling with his hands on the control column is in control, a/p in or not, as long as the a/c is doing what the pilot wants it to be doing. If it doesn’t, do something about it, using a/p or not! John was in control of the a/c and when it wasn’t doing what he felt comfortable with he did something about it. I have no problems with John’s actions that day. I had half a glance at the picture every now and again and was happy with it (you know what I mean) but would have said something to him if I hadn’t been.
Would you agree then, that as a crew, you deliberately chose, having noticed the reduction in airspeed, to keep the A/C on the glide slope inducing the inevitable drop on the wrong side of the drag curve, and a big big increase in drag.

You were perfectly aware that your A/C needed less drag, hence the flaps reduction, but your copilot let the speed decay to stick shaker speed, this is neither coherent nor safe for a pilot flying a then glider.

But in the end he was right as everybody walked out from that landing.

sky9 14th February 2010 14:50

Baron rouge,

I think you are being a little unfair, the crew were placed in unfamiliar territory with only about a 5 sec window to do anything that would have allowed the aircraft to reach the runway and no help from previous experience other than the experience of knowing what happens to an aircraft with idle thrust and full flap. In my view the only thing they could have done was immediately bring the flaps up to G/A flap to reduce drag, otherwise there but by the grace of God go I.

As I wrote before the elimination of the stab trim wheel in Boeing aircraft (and the total lack of flight control feed back and throttle movement in Airbus aircraft) was a retrograde step as it makes monitoring an aircraft totally dependent on visual clues.

barit1 14th February 2010 14:54

An 'umble question
 
I've oft been known to stick my foot in my mouth - and this is no exception:

Assuming (we all know what that means) that one has a choice of speeds at which to touch down off-runway, would you not prefer to do so in a minimum energy state, rather than at Vref? In other words (to quote my father, a WWII F/I) run out of airspeed and altitude at the same time?

Granted - there is a technique to doing so, best practiced more than a few times on the aircraft in question.

Purely hypothetical, no flames please.

Baron rouge 14th February 2010 15:11

Barit 1, You are right, this is called flare the A/C, and if done correctly you touch wheels just above stalling speed and as in the case of Ba 038 when you have full HYD power you can even use full flaps just before touching down;)

barit1 14th February 2010 16:28

Of course it's called the flare. I was just being a mite academic.

And I suppose a tailstrike would be the least of your worries.

Thanks for the confirmation, anyway, BR.

MathFox 14th February 2010 16:43

I think that finding an area that allows for a smooth shedding of landing energy also is of importance to keep damage to passengers, crew and plane down. Touching down in the safety zone of a runway, avoiding major obstacles (or picking a nice, obstacle free stretch of water, like Sully did), helps to keep injuries down.

Heidhurtin 15th February 2010 12:02

I'm not a pilot by any stretch of the imagination (barely able to control a car ;)) so I'm not qualified to comment on the technical matters here. I've been in the British Army for 28 years though, and am familiar with situations which are unexpected, sudden, require an immediate decision with rapid assimilation of data, would have catastrophic consequences if made wrongly and have many dependant souls. In such circumstances a combination of training and experience kick into play very quickly, and it's this combination that gives one confidence and allows one to think outside the (SOP) box if required. I'm gratified that, in this button-pushing age, some pilots still have the "gut knowledge" to take the correct action. (I know this debate continues elsewhere and although I have an opinion, I don't really want to get involved so please be gentle).

My real point though is this - Capt B sir, if you managed to get through those 30-odd seconds without uttering a single expletive, then you are, truly, a better man than I. :D

Cap doffed

RatherBeFlying 15th February 2010 17:04

Change as little as possible
 
Decreasing the flaps from 30 to 25 got the a/c an extra 50 m. which avoided hitting the ILS (localiser) antenna array.

There have been suggestions that go-around flaps instead of 25 could have obtained a better result and doubtless simulator trials could establish whether that would have helped or not.

In the abbreviated time available to the crew, any such results were not available.

There is a conflict between obtaining good enough and the best possible. The danger in trying to improve upon good enough in a limited information context is that you might go too far. It's well known that every decrease in flaps increases stall speed, but less well known is that flap retraction can call for lowering the nose to regain the correct speed -- the ground can get in the way of that as the experience with flapped gliders has shown.

Alaska Airlines Flight 261 is instructive in this context. The crew had regained control from loss of stabiliser control and began to vary the flaps. The initial selection of slats and flaps had fortuitously worked well, but retraction put the a/c into a degrading control situation as the already heavily stressed jackscrew gave way.

In BA's case the crew wisely restrained themselves from explorations better confined to a simulator once a good enough result had been assured.

Dave Gittins 16th February 2010 08:56

As has been explained most precisely, eloquently and at great length by the man himself, Capt B, (try post 2964) even Boeing's best in the sim trying every possibility couldn't improve on the distance that 30 reduced to 25 gave.

Baron rouge 16th February 2010 12:10

Dear DAVE Gittings

Do you really believe that ?

Do you think an A/C flying at VSS, on the wrong side of the drag curve, could land as far as one flying at VREF and using the surplus energy to flare and make a controled landing?

You have a poor opinion about our American friends.

Dont Hang Up 16th February 2010 14:01


Do you think an A/C flying at VSS, on the wrong side of the drag curve, could land as far as one flying at VREF and using the surplus energy to flare and make a controled landing?

Looks like we're going round the argument yet again.

Isn't the point that they were already on the back of the drag curve by the time it became clear they were landing with little or no power? Trying to retrieve Vref from there would surely result in the ground getting in the way.

Theoretical conjecture about what may have been achieved by a crew in full readiness for double engine failure at 600ft seems pointless.

infrequentflyer789 16th February 2010 14:05


Originally Posted by Baron rouge (Post 5515620)
Dear DAVE Gittings

Do you really believe that ?

Do you think an A/C flying at VSS, on the wrong side of the drag curve, could land as far as one flying at VREF and using the surplus energy to flare and make a controled landing?

So, do you believe that Capt B lied on this forum - because that is what you seem to be implying ?

The results might be counterintuitive, and there might be interesting reasons why no one got further, but to simply deny that the results were as stated (because you find them odd) is a serious accusation.

TIMA9X 16th February 2010 15:38

Here we go again!
 
By Don't Hang Up

Looks like we're going round the argument yet again.
I have to agree!:ugh:

The report is out, this thread has been over and over this sort of stuff to the point it just does not matter anymore, or just plain meaningless!

There have been too many current pilots with a lot of combined commercial flying hours flying the heavies who have praised the crew for their actions. If Boeing could not simulate a better result then why are people at this point of the thread still banging on about the same old stuff!

The 777 is roughly 270 tons and I am convinced the crew did the right thing by raising the flaps back to 25 (pretty quick thinking don't you think considering the time they had) probably a major factor that got the AC over the fence and those ILS antennas etc. This crew did know the feel of 777 when it goes against what it is usually supposed to be doing, and got the thing down with no power and with no deaths. Can't we give them some credit for this instead of returning the thread to all the what if's! IT'S LIKE SAYING THE CREW DID NOT KNOW THE DIABOLICAL SITUATION THEY WERE IN ( A FEW SECONDS TO FIGURE IT ALL OUT) ON APPROACH TO LHR R27L THEIR HOME BASE!

Blythy

it makes sense to have as little flaps as possible
puts it well. In this case it is really that simple!

EBMissfit 16th February 2010 15:53

Lets put this one to bed - The decision to go to flaps 25 was the right one - and got them further than staying at 30 would have done. Pete himself said had he realised earlier that the power wasn't coming back he would have gone earlier and possibly to 20. What SFLY & others are arguing and what PB would probably agree with is that if at the very moment the second engine rolled back, they had configured to 20 and pitced for best glide, they may have got further, possibly even to the rwy. What they are ignoring is that this could only happen if you were expecting that. People also keep talking as if they "lost" the engines. The engines were producing thrust above flight idle the whole way - there would be none of the usual indications of an engine out - no bells, whisltes, flashing lights screaming at you that you had an engine out situation. As it is in very short order (within 30 seconds of the first rollback) they had identified that something was wrong at they were down on thrust. Within 30 seconds of that they had reconfigured the plane at got it as for as possible in that timeframe.

Baron rouge 16th February 2010 16:06

We have yet to read any official information about Boeing simulator trials on this case, but my little finger tells me that certain Airline 777 captains, flying speed instead of glide slope managed to grease it just on the runway or slightly before with a much better controlled rate of descent.

Nobody is lying here, maybe some information is a tad incomplete.

Great job from the Captain thinking about reducing the flaps setting, but is it wrong to question why, as aware as he was, thirty seconds before touch down, of decaying speed, why he elected to let his copilot fly the glide slope to VSS.

Knackered Nigel 16th February 2010 19:53

To glideslope or not to glideslope?
 
Baron Rouge,

What other options to following a 3 degree glide 30 seconds out over London with little power from the engines, were there?

Shallow the path, the speed decays even more quickly, increase rate of descent and you end up in Hatton Cross.

I take it you are not familiar with the LHR 27L undershoot.

Why am I bothering to reply to your post anyway.....:ugh:

Is this really a Professional Pilots Forum? It seems to be armchair assassination of supposed colleagues. I despair and will now flounce off here for a while..:rolleyes:

atakacs 16th February 2010 21:03

Just to clarify something I might have missed reading the report and the 3000+ messages here (yes): there is a clear understanding that flap 25 vs 30 was beneficial. Is there any further official analysis (be it manufacturer, AAIB, etc) of what could have been achieved in those circumstances ?

I'm also somewhat surprised by the little mention in this discussion of what I believe to be the main factor in the relative benign consequences of this accident, namely luck...

atakacs 17th February 2010 07:48


i'm staggered at the comments regarding what 'could' have been done. This crew did bloody well, and the flight simulator and light aircraft pilots should perhaps keep their ignorance to themselves.
Again given the circumstances (completely unexpected - and to be frank still unexplained - failure, very little time to react, no specific training) I would say that the outcome was the result of sheer luck. In my view the flap reduction was mostly instinctive (good call btw) and they where spectators of a once in a lifetime event. Don’t think anyone could fault them with anything but on the other hand I don’t see exceptional airmanship either. At best job well done – it’s a sad testimony of the state of the industry if this deserve such high praise.

I respectfully have some concerns about the apparent taboo discussing actual facts and figures – if available – about what was the best possible outcome. If nothing else this might be helpful should this unlikely black swan show it’s ugly head again…

Landroger 17th February 2010 09:32

Elephants and living rooms?
 
And while the big boys squabble about the unarguable, the elephant in the living room is being ignored. For the most part and with a few, notable exceptions, the discussion as to why two, high bypass fan jets with enviable reliability records, mounted in the same world class aeroplane with an enviable safety record, suddenly decided not play in BA038's garden - probably. :eek:

Roger. (Puzzled of south London)

atakacs 17th February 2010 10:06


For the most part and with a few, notable exceptions, the discussion as to why two, high bypass fan jets with enviable reliability records, mounted in the same world class aeroplane with an enviable safety record, suddenly decided not play in BA038's garden - probably
good point. I'm afraid this will stay a mystery for the foreseeable future :(

Flatspin_Fumble 17th February 2010 17:40

Barbiesboyfriend,

you presented your case very well, and for what it's worth, I think you are spot on with your comments, but what do I know
:sad: - not a lot some would say, but I assure you a lot more than most.

I am surprised you have not made a contribution to the Cabin Crew Forum regarding the BA Ballot, but perhaps like me, you feel there is no point. Their union's cause is wasted. Their case has no substance and is complete and utter tosh. I have not met one single member of the travelling First and Clubworld public, who has any sympathy, whatsoever. It will be interesting to see what next week brings.

bearfoil 17th February 2010 18:28

Landroger

You are not alone. "Wait for the Final Report". Ad Nauseum. My reply then, as now, WHY? "We'll just snip off these little tubes a little shorter, right, then, done. Oh, and if they roll back (THEY, mind), throttle up, better still, throttle up every once in a while just to keep the oil hot so's to melt the mystery away in the name of safety. In other words, the fix we ordered doesn't (may not) work as advertised when it is critical, like, when the oil is cool in descent or high cruise." The identified (Boeing) problem for the Trent, the lack of spill (!) and the lack of any heating or cavitation bypass isn't important enough, and it certainly isn't the Fuel. How could it be the Fuel? All that's ordered (?) is some "research". "Simultaneous binary engine failure in ETOPS?" IMPOSSIBLE. Except for the two times it's happened?

LASHUP.

bear, not impressed

woodpecker 17th February 2010 21:01


Shallow the path, the speed decays even more quickly, increase rate of descent and you end up in Hatton Cross.
Knackered Nigel, I think you have got it totally wrong. Personally having flown into LHR for 35 years, the last 6 on the B777, I feel if they had thrown the glidepath away and held onto the speed there is now way they would have got any where near Hatton Cross. They would have had the speed, all be it with a high rate of descent, to complete the flare but would it have been on a level surface? Most certainly not!

infrequentflyer789 17th February 2010 21:42


Originally Posted by bearfoil (Post 5518520)
"Simultaneous binary engine failure in ETOPS?" IMPOSSIBLE. Except for the two times it's happened?

Three, recently, that I can think of (discounting those who went in for gliding practice by runing out of fuel).

BA38, and two birdies (Sully and FR at Rome - either of those could have gone very wrong had captain not taken charge and taken unconventional decisions, breaking SOPs etc.). Have I missed any ?

Note that N862DA rolled back like BA38, but only one engine. It was not "simultaneous binary engine failure".

To me, the birds are the bigger problem.
  • We know the exact cause (have the smoking gun / remains)
  • Incidents not type specific (bird or plane).
  • Larger number of (dual engine loss in twin) incidents
  • BA38 rollbacks have a recovery procedure (if you have the height) - wheras the best engineer in the world isn't going to get sully's engines going again.
  • BA38 rollback could occur anywhere (N862DA at cruise) - birdies are most likely when you are low in critical flight phase
There's an engineering improvement (I won't say "fix" since there is only a probable cause not a proven, or reproducible, one to test against) for BA38 - engineered to make the plubming more robust to ice/slush blockage.

Where's the fix / improvement for the birds ? <deafening silence>
Is there even any research been recommened (like for BA38) ?
Doesn't anyone find that (more) worrying ?

xcxpx 18th February 2010 01:25

BA038: pilot appreciation
 
I think it was great work by both Peter and John, saved a lot of lives that day...

lomapaseo 18th February 2010 02:49


Where's the fix / improvement for the birds ? <deafening silence>
Is there even any research been recommened (like for BA38) ?
Doesn't anyone find that (more) worrying ?
The recommendations haven't been published yet.

Just what did you have in mind?

something practical I trust.

It's a little bit like designing over-run areas at the ends of runways ... just how far beyond the airport property should they extend?

How needed are they compared to other places to put your research effort like pilot training, enhanced ground proximity systems, etec. etc.

Mmmayday38 18th February 2010 23:00

1st Post
 
xcxpx;

I notice you've been an observer Pprune for a while now, and I appreciate your first post.
:ok:

Brian Abraham 19th February 2010 11:48

Have only been dipping in and out of this thread so not aware if this has been noted. Came across it accidentally while looking for other info. Seems like a lot of water called out in (c). Interesting how this after all these years of turbine high altitude operations an apparent curve ball brings an aircraft undone. BZ Peter, John and crew.

FAR § 25.951 General.

(a) Each fuel system must be constructed and arranged to ensure a flow of fuel at a rate and pressure established for proper engine and auxiliary power unit functioning under each likely operating condition, including any maneuver for which certification is requested and during which the engine or auxiliary power unit is permitted to be in operation.

(b) Each fuel system must be arranged so that any air which is introduced into the system will not result in—

(1) Power interruption for more than 20 seconds for reciprocating engines; or

(2) Flameout for turbine engines.

(c) Each fuel system for a turbine engine must be capable of sustained operation throughout its flow and pressure range with fuel initially saturated with water at 80 °F and having 0.75cc of free water per gallon added and cooled to the most critical condition for icing likely to be encountered in operation.

(d) Each fuel system for a turbine engine powered airplane must meet the applicable fuel venting requirements of part 34 of this chapter.

MATELO 19th February 2010 12:23


Again given the circumstances (completely unexpected - and to be frank still unexplained - failure, very little time to react, no specific training) I would say that the outcome was the result of sheer luck. In my view the flap reduction was mostly instinctive (good call btw) and they where spectators of a once in a lifetime event. Don’t think anyone could fault them with anything but on the other hand I don’t see exceptional airmanship either. At best job well done – it’s a sad testimony of the state of the industry if this deserve such high praise.

I respectfully have some concerns about the apparent taboo discussing actual facts and figures – if available – about what was the best possible outcome. If nothing else this might be helpful should this unlikely black swan show it’s ugly head again…
So, you reckon it was luck, but still compliment the crew on their "instinctive" reactions?? Is that really luck or years of experience making a good call.

Also, yes a job well done worthy of such high praise, if according to you there was little time to react and no specific training.

Cant have it both ways:=

atakacs 19th February 2010 13:25


Also, yes a job well done worthy of such high praise, if according to you there was little time to react and no specific training.
Well I guess nobody can claim that luck wasn't the biggest factor on that day. Everybody involved was extremely fortunate to walk off this one.

In my book there is a difference between a job well done and sheer brilliance. At this stage I don't see any evidence of the latter but I would be the first to change my mind should I come across any hard evidence.

Global Warrior 19th February 2010 14:59

Every passenger on board that plane had a ticket stating the destination was LHR. The boys in the front got them to LHR!!! Awesome job. Well done.

GW

MathFox 19th February 2010 15:26


Every passenger on board that plane had a ticket stating the destination was LHR. The boys in the front got them to LHR!!! Awesome job. Well done.
Yeah, let's blame BAA for not providing busses quick enough so that passengers could connect to their scheduled flights. :) And for the late luggage delivery!

Whiskey Papa 19th February 2010 15:36

It's funny isn't it? The more you train and the more experience you accumulate, the luckier you get!


WP

TIMA9X 19th February 2010 16:10

I don't know why I am bothering replying
 
by atakacs

In my book there is a difference between a job well done and sheer brilliance. At this stage I don't see any evidence of the latter but I would be the first to change my mind should I come across any hard evidence.
I don't know what book you are reading, but with respect you are rather harsh with your post and possibly setting the standard a little too high.
In Ba 038's case are you implying you could do it better? If so what would you have done to make it "sheer brilliance."

Hell what have I done, I have started the flap settings guys, the when the AP should have been switched off guys, the angle of attack guys, and the why did PB let the FO keep flying the AC salivating! I don't know how many times on this thread all of this kind of stuff has been discussed, even by the PIC himself.

Many pilots with thousands of hours flying the heavies have deserted this thread because I am sure they are simply fed up with this rather repetitive style of posts.

I will always maintain that what they did in the time they had was "sheer brilliance." We are down to the low depths of semantics between the words "sheer brilliance" and "a job well done," for me it is all the same, everyone survived that day! Can't we just leave it, and possibly look at some other interesting threads which still don't have answers? PpruNe is full of them.

Again atakacs I write this with my understanding of the word respect.
Tima9x

Global Warrior 19th February 2010 16:15

Well im not sure the BAA are negligent for that.......... more for not building a remote stand at the threshold of of 27L as a result of recent airport expansion. I think the DOT's involvement in placing Hatton Cross Tube Station where they have is highly contentious and its typical in situations like this that something as innocuous as an ILS antenna is vying for publicity. Im sure the most famous ILS antenna on the planet is currently in talks with Max Clifford to sell its side of the Story.


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