atakacs makes plain, simple and unemotional statements and immediately gets shot down in flames.

He was asked what he would have done. The point is there was not much could be done given the time and circumstances. Raising the flaps gained 50 metres. It is claimed that Boeing test pilots could do no better but I have seen no details of what they tried and what they achieved. The main contentious issue is the AP being allowed to fly the aircraft to the point of stall before the aircraft hit the ground with insufficient energy remaining to arrest the high rate of descent.

So apart from instinctively raising the flaps with no other ideas or options was there not a great element of luck involved in the outcome?

The accident has, on the face of it, had a detrimental effect on Peter's whole life. It could well have been me in his place having flown that aircraft only a few months previously. I have no idea how I would have reacted no more than anybody else truly knows although we can all imagine how we would want to have reacted having thought about it for 24 months.

Having no real options, no real time and raising the flaps from F30 to F25 in my mind reaffirms my belief that he (Peter) was an experienced and competent captain faced with an unprecedented situation who also had a healthy dollop of luck when he most needed it. Luck that the undercarriage broke off and absorbed so much energy, luck that there was a large grass undershoot, luck that the aircraft on its belly in the soft ground rapidly decelerated, luck that the aircraft hit nothing, luck it stopped before the hard surface, luck that no fire ensued.

Infrequentflyer789
 

:suspect:

"Where's the fix / improvement for the birds ? <deafening silence>
Is there even any research been recommened (like for BA38) ?
Doesn't anyone find that (more) worrying ?"

There are some eloquent master pieces of prose on this subject on this web site and occasionally the odd fling with applied science.

Well YES Infrequentflyer I agree.

It turns out that the academics these days no longer publish UNLESS the sponsor has filed a patent claim.

FAO Pprune moderators: please have the courtesy to inform me if you don't agree with my posts.:suspect:

I know it's a long thread, but need to remember.

A non-normal event on approach, power was ok but less than required, crew had very limited information, aircraft/eicas/cockpit indications were not clear as to problem.

Crew made some very very quick decisions with limited information, they appear to have ended the flight in good shape.

Appears to me this crew did a good job on that day, appears this event will save others.

Max Resepect to all crew and pax on that flight, you saved many others.....

If this situation ever happens again what would have going full flaps right as they were about to hit the ground have done? Just wondering if it would have broke the descent rate.

That elephant!
 

Just great words and from a pilot who flies the same AC type.
Sorry if you felt that I was emotional, it was not intended to come out like this, (it's hard to read into peoples feelings on threads such as this) but atakacs previously made some pretty good points in his posts, it was the last post I just did not understand in the context of his other ones. In all survival accidents there is always an element of luck, some in the high degree category and some in the low degree category. Sully said himself that he was lucky that day the Hudson was flat and calm, it can be a pretty windy rough patch of water more days than not. My post was not just aimed at atakacs but others as well. My reasons are;

1. Since the BA038 incident the British press never left the issue alone, in many cases quoting almost directly from Pprune, sometimes skewing the reasons for the incident towards the crew, it must have been hell at times for Peter and John!

2. Probably the same reason as you, the incident did change Peter and his families lives. I am sure this will be well explained in his book.

3. Every comment (some just plain stupid) from people who tend to cloud the pilot handling issues of that day may contribute the Peter finding it hard to get a new job! I know from many PM's I have exchanged with pilots who know Peter well worry about this issue.


For me one of the best posts for a long time since PB wrote his long informative post after the report came out. The report has not convinced me RR and Boeing have explained enough about their findings, but this has nothing to do with the way PBs crew as pilots handled the situation which they were faced with that day! (as M.MOUSE explained so well in his post.) For me there are two issues that have emerged now,

1.The great handling of the situation the crew were faced with, ending in a great result considering BA038 was an unprecedented situation for all well trained pilots.
2. The murky technical issues neither RR or Boeing have explained to my satisfaction possibly pointing to hidden commercial pressures of some kind.
3. May be it is time to split the thread on these two issues.

Finally,

A good question, but a question of timing, Trippe 7 flap movements take time, so it is my view with all the chaos going on in the cockpit even if the crew decided to go F25 (which they did) then somewhere in the diminishing seconds they had left, go to the full flap settings again is a timing issue that probably would not have changed the outcome too much, only my point view, would be interested in M.Mouse's point of view.

I would have thought that both RR and Boeing have a lot to thank the crew for.

You would have the that RR would have taken them down to Goodwood and asked them what colour they would like. The reputation of RR was saved by the crew that day.

I wonder if they did get a thank you.

The engine behaved as designed and specified. No need for a thanks.

There is an interface issue between the design of the engine and the design of the aircraft which is being attended to by the airplane design regulator through research.

All the issues here are mostly chance and pilot skill. Whether it's extraordinary skill or average pilot skill is in the eye of the beholder. I suspect that based on the lessons learned so far that most of the like equipment pilots reading this thread will do as well

A previous posting asks if selecting more flap just before contact may have been better.

History shows us that vertical and forward speeds plus pitch and roll and gear and flaps config were on the numbers in this event.

We can talk around the houses as to "what ifs" and "buts" however we can't change the outcome of this event, a super result, Max respect to crew and pax.

There certainly was luck here
 

Given the uncertainties over the mechanics of the build up to failure, no reason to suppose it couldn't have happened 30 seconds earlier. The crew must have nightmares about that.

Don't think it would have made so much difference. It was the demand for "more" thrust , and lack of response to that demand, that alerted them to the problem.

If, as the PIC has said, he hadn't flown a half-decent CDA however, well, whoops, additional thrust would have been required earlier, probably over a populated bit of W London.

You can imagine the rest, I would rather not.

Just in response to the posts on previous page...questioning what they would have done.

Speaking as SLF of course...

Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but given this had never happened before, they could not have known what was causing the failure to command thrust, and they had only seconds to react I think they did a damn good job. An outstanding sign of airmanship is surely the ability to fly the aircraft primarily when its all going t*ts up around you. They did that even if it was with autopilot or whatever.

I'd be happy for both of them to be sat at the front of any aircraft I'm on any day of the week. In my humble opinion they are a credit to your profession.


RP

Then it's more like a Gimli / Terceira scenario, but with some little thrust available and full hydraulic. All about managing the drag out at the right time to reach but not overfly the 12000 feet runway ... I believe the crew would have loved that challenge compared to what they had to face.

In any case I would find an actual study of glide performances - and subsequent recommendations as of how to best manage it most interesting. Be it bird strike, fuel leak or incomprehensible ice creation there have been a non negligible count of cases where a modern airliner had to glide. As far as I can tell these are so far considered exotic circumstances and not trained in sim or even mentioned in performance charts. It might be worth (re)visiting.

atakacs;
Perhaps. We might first acknowledge the data already available on the PFD's of most later glass airplanes; the best L/D ratio is presented on the PFD in the Airbus A320/A330/A340 (and I suspect the A380) series as "Green dot" speed. I am unsure if there is such a presentation for the B777, (My manual doesn't seem to indicate any). Unless it's changed the B767 does not have such an indication. So some types provide the crew with immediate best lift-drag speed information.

This information would be for an undamaged, clean (uncontaminated) wing with different slat-flap configurations but not with landing gear extended or partial slats/flaps (abnormal config).

The Gimli crew relied upon timing their rate of descent (by timing how long it took to loose 1000ft) as there is no IVSI in the standby group. They then used radar distance to the drag strip to judge the rate of descent. The aircraft was kept intentionally slightly high and when they knew they could make the strip, the captain side-slipped the aircraft just like a Piper Cub.

Not sure how the Azores A330 was flown as I'm not sure the data is available in any report, (anyone?). The A330 fuel leak trouble-shooting procedures were changed after that incident.

What needs revisiting perhaps is what caused the requirement to glide in the first place and I think the Gimli and Azores incidents have been addressed. I know the SAS MD80 accident was a dead-stick but can't recall the details. The DC9 in Florida was dual engine damage if I recall - not much to be done there except the usual caution regarding staying away from thunderstorms. Other than the present incident and the Pinnacle RJ which suffered core-lock after the engines flamed out at 410, (crew messing with the airplane on a non-rev flight - both killed), what other dual engine failures have we seen?

I agree, the crew did a perfect job of reconfiguring to a cleaner approach configuration and added 50 meters to their impact point. The last three second flap addition would only possibly help the flair lowering the stall speed and increasing lift. Adding them before the flair would have been detrimental. If they didn't get all the way to full maybe what ever they got would help some. Since nobody trains for this situation because it never happens now that it happened why not put ourselves in their position and think of the alternatives available?

I don't mean to be pedanic here and only hope to continue contributing possible facts for whatever discussion points folks want to make.

The DC9 you mention I suspect was SO242 in Georgia and it could have been landed if the crew had known about the closest airstrip.

Then there was the Avanca B707 near JFK .that almost landed except for rising terrain and trees.

There was The Ethiopian B737 in Bar har dar. That was landed in a swamp off airport but caught a ditch on the skid out.

The SAS MD80 was pretty much a controled landing save for some tree tops, at least they missed the large rock in the field.

The Tacca B737 on a levey

And the Austrian F100 in a snow covered field.

I have no message myself, so pick and choose from these survivable accidents yourselves to make a point.

None of the above were ETOPs operations and engine reliability had nothing to do with them. They all involved being overwhelmed with common cause problems , birds, rain-hail-ice, or fuel starvation.

Thank you, lomapaseo; I knew there were more but am focussed on other things at the moment. cheers, - PJ2

United Flight 173 in PDX in 1978
 

Four engines, no fuel.

lomapaseo wrote:

Correction. It was an Austrian F70 that landed in a snow covered field. Although the long flight duration in moderate icing in connection with low engine thrust was a factor, the main cause was that the bonded joints of the ice impact panels of both engine cases failed. The ice impact panels detached, due to poor bonding, and became trapped in front of the outlet guide vanes of the low pressure compressor. This affected the airflow in the by-pass duct in such a way that the engines produced little thrust.

With regards to the BA038 incident, hats off to Peter Burkill and his crew. 30 seconds to impact with no time to reconsider the choices made, to me indicates they made the right choices and all aboard survived. All other options discussed remain theory.

Just as many others, I am interested in Peter's upcoming book and will certainly buy a copy.


Regards,

Green-dot

PJ2, to the list add Ryanair in Ciampino (birdies) & 2 or, was it 3 ? 737 classics a few years back who lost both in heavy rain/hail.
1 restarted & resulted in new underwear (UK? ) the other (Indonesia? ) ended up in a field. The third (? ) was the Taca refered to by a previous poster methinks. Normally :rolleyes: CFM solved that one with new procedures & higher flight idle speeds . . . but .

Lost all four.
 

I'm not sure if this is relevant, but didn't a BA 742 have all four donks choked by pumice dust from a volcano in Jakarta? In the eighties? I accept that actual total loss of thrust was not the whole period of the incident and may thus disqualify it from the terms of this discussion. I believe the engines where shut down or flamed out of their own accord, one at a time until there were none. Then, after huge effort on the part of the crew and the fact that the aeroplane had flown out of the plume, engines were restarted one by one.

From memory, the incident happened at FL370 and they got one engine - the one they shut down at the beginning of the incident - restarted at around 12,000 which slowed the descent to about 300ft/min.

Digressing only slightly to the engines themselves, this incident demonstrated, to me at least, just how bomb proof modern High Bypass Fan jets are. I recall seeing photographs of one of those engines after partial tear down and the damage from accreated pumice was massive.

Anyway, I offer all four engines out - BA??? 747 198x?

Roger.

BA009, 747-236B G-BDXH 'City of Edinburgh' June 24, 1982.

The aircraft was at 13,500 ft when the first engine, engine No. 4, burst back to life. Towards 12,000ft the second engine, engine No. 3 restarted. Soon after engines No, 1 and No. 2 relit.



Green-dot

Old V New Technology
 

The most unfortunate elements common to this and the Concorde crash is that they both nearly made it to a runway. Perhaps looking back at history we may find that systems such as JATO and RATO, necessitated by the lack of technology two manufacture large by pass fan jet engines producing huge power, were effective in assisting heavy metal off the ground. Why such a concept cannot be applied to modern aircraft design. Had these been available I am sure the BA crew would not have had the desperate need to look for assistance from the APU and the AF Concorde would have had that small but crucial burst of energy to give them a fighting chance to make it to Le Bourget. I think in these days of two powerplants and ETOPS, manufacturers ought perhaps consider some form of emergency power back up system that may provide a short but vital source of energy when all else has failed.

Only data from the radar. Early in the process, they had the runway lights in sight. They crossed the extended runway center line, 8 NM final at 13000 feet, so opted for a kind of 360 degrees turn but were still 8000 feet 9 NM final. The only drag available was one set of slats and the landing gear. Not sure about that, but I think they opted for aggressive S turns to dissipate energy. The target speed was 170 knots but had still an extra 30 over the threshold.

A movie on its way …

Most interesting

I guess would not be much of an effort to integrate those factors... Good to know anyway :)

atakacs;
The calculation of best L/D speed would be done from standard formulae using specific engineering data regarding the wing, power plant performance data, air data, weight, CofG, etc and presentation is a matter of design and/or convention as glass presentations developed. The basis for the construction of performance tables would be taken out of the books and into the FMGC for real-time presentation on the primary flight displays - that's the 10,000ft, (perhaps 100,000ft!) view.

By way of explanation in re integrating abnormal configurations into speed presentations for crew information with an apology for the return to FMGC (Flight Management Guidance Computer) basics and the thread diversion for a moment, the notion of "prediction" is necessarily based upon known performance quantities such as speed/altitude/rate-of-descent-pilot-entered speed/altitude contraints and so on, - in short, the energy level of the airplane as affected by known configuration changes and the required altitude and/or speed constraints at pilot-entered or FMGC-database waypoints. Because these other quantities are known, FMGC predictions include fuel usage/fuel remaining and ETAs over programmed waypoints as well as at destination and alternate.

Such predictions work extremely well when all is normal. At present and to my knowledge, (the B787 may do so), such information as may be available now, does not take into account the following:

- extended landing gear
- abnormal slat or flap configuration
- engine out
- contaminated wing
- aircraft damage, such as loss of a winglet, etc

The moment an abnormality occurs which affects lift/drag, FMGC predictions regarding times, fuel usage, the achievment of altitude and/or speed constraints etc, are all unreliable and as the FMGC manual states, must not be used. That is when the crew must go back to the books or the QRH.

Bear in mind that this is complex stuff and there will be exceptions/subtleties which we can delve into but which won't change this basis understanding a great deal. I ask others to leap in here if there is something missed, however.

Abnormal slat/flap configurations or extended landing gear will, depending upon configuration, more than double fuel flow and as such, all fuel, time, altitude and speed predictions are lost - rather, they assume a "normal" airplane. This would include the presentation of the best L/D speed so in abnormal circumstances, one returns to the books.

I am guessing when I say that such predictions are certainly possible but computer constraints, (memory, calculating power, cost), actual testing and then certification of same may be part of the constraints in creating new designs which present this kind of data to the crew. There would certainly be a cost-benefit analysis and given that such events are rare, it is probably better to go to the books.

FMGC information, like automation itself, it is tempting to believe all the time what the FMGC is telling the crew but in fact even the FCOM/AOM tells the crew that the FMGC is a guide and not THE performance indicator. The only tool that the crew should rely upon is the official flight plan which is (and must be) the most accurate information for prediction even though it is not in real time. In fact, data in real-time can be very misleading and should be taken in context of the entire flight.

Sorry for the thread-walk.

PJ2

PJ2

No disagreement here, only a philosophical muse relative to the topic you bring to the fore. Appreciating how dynamic and challenging flight can be, I see a trend toward solutions that involve further refinement of problems not solved by automation, but instead caused by them. Reliability is the fulcrum of any solution to an aerodynamic challenge.

Historically, extremely odd and cataclysmic events have shown up to shake the confidence one develops in systems in a lifetime of relying upon them. In BA038, we see one of these (actually two). I deplore the fascination with the flight crew's responses to these two simultaneous events. Their handling was superb, by any measure.

We are left with equipment failure, and evidently having a second engine is not enough. Who'd have predicted dual failure of these two powerplants in simultaneous fashion?

Delta survived a similar (?) occurrence, though the failure happened at altitude, affording a human solution to an engineering (?) problem. At some point, and to the relief of most of us, I would say, a better understanding of systems and piloting relating to how the two work together is needed.

447? Who needs an old fashioned horizon when there are three computers? Pitots? BA038? Who can entertain the "maybe" relative to thrust loss further away from the runway? Was Delta lucky in recovering the one instead of losing the second? As safe as it is, I don't believe stuffing the computer with solutions to oddball scenarios is the way to go. I'd say the pilot part of the process is just fine. What of the mechanical?

More deadsticks,

DL 767 that shutdown the engines departing LAX. Restart worked. :eek:

DC-9 diverting from SXM to STX.

'Dead idle stall issues on 757's'. Yes, the engines were still running be they just increased the plane's glide ratio.

Gimbli(sp?) glider. Air Canada 767.

SAS MD-80 with FOD onto frozen lake.

MD-80 with dual compressor stalls, unrecoverable, after takeoff.

A310 enroute from Turkey(?) to N. Germany. Unable to retract gear...deadsticked in Salzburg(?). Believe the fuel gauges, not the FMC computations!

Best dual engine failure best glides speeds SWAGS(Scientific, Wild *ss Guesses)

757/767 - Vref 30 + 90

737 - Vref 15 + 60

Perfect? No. Sometimes 'good enough' is just right until you get the checklist(if you have time).

I was told at that time the saving grace for the BA crew was that the engines were RR (triple spool) and if they had been US manufacturers then probably not restartable under any circumstances due to pumice damage.
Anyone else heard this?

Pumice is really nasty stuff, saw a military plane sand blasted to bare metal after a young pilot wanted to find out what it would be like to fly through a plume from one of NZ'zzzzz volcanoes.

KLM's Volcanic incident near Anchorage a few years later (Nearly new 744) certainly didn't have RR engines...they landed with a few of them running after multiple flameouts...:8

KLM 867, 15/12/1989

There are a lot of old wifs tales being told arround ... all of them just speculation.

restarting is mostly a case of setting the right air speed and altitude conditions. Acceling the engine above idle is another thing. There is no such thing as "rugged" when it comes to fine ash sticking to stuff in the hot section.

You're surely not going to hear bragging from the engine manufacturers about running into volcanic ash any more than encountering birds, rain and hail.

Each Trent 8 selected for the 777 instead of GE saves 2200 pounds. Together, that is 4400 pounds. Weight is everything, where did it go?
Draw one's own conclusions.

bear

Sir Richard

The KLM 747 at ANC report is NTSB ANC90FA020. I can lend a bit of insight - the volcanic ash ingestion eroded the compressor, and upon passing through the burner, melted into glass droplets that tended to "plate" the nozzle guide vanes of the HP turbine. The combination of these two effects robbed the stall (surge) margin of the HP compressor system, and compressor stalls occurred. Some engines flamed out.

The shock cooling from the flameout caused crazing/cracking of the glass coating on the NGV's, and some of the glass flaked off and exited the tailpipe.

This had the effect of restoring some of the stall margin, and it was possible to restart all engines after that.

This effect has been observed on other engines, notably in test bench ops subjected to dust- or sandstorms. I have little doubt this was the scenario in the BA 747 case.

Do we really need to guess when in a hurry?

From the very beginning of flight training "airspeed" is drummed into us, so perhaps we should be forgiven for having developed into a breed that seems to place so much emphasis on this one data input that is absolutely meaningless when considered on its own. We use reams of charts presenting us with PA, OAT and Weights to determine "speeds" that in reality correspond to an "angle of attack," the value of which is displayed on what I am sure is one of the least used and least understood instruments on a flight deck. As I don't fly either the 777 or A320, I have no idea if they are even fitted with an AOA indicator, but I'll bet few posters have received the benefit of much, if any, instruction on the use of this valuable little dial. I certainly hadn't, until I was fortunate to meet an instructor who knew more than a little bit about how the AOA indicator could help me. For a given aircraft type (and config) the AOA indicator will guide one swiftly to fly at the correct corresponding "speed" for a variety of flight regimes, irrespective of the WAT. Vref and V2 are perhaps the easiest examples to quote as we all know the values to look for; and further the configs are of no relavence (for these two examples). Similarly, in crusing flight (gear and flaps retracted), if one knows the angle of attack values for a given aircraft, calculations are of secondary priority when "speeds" for drift down, holding and even more importantly best glide (for max range in still air) may be needed in a hurry. Even during more leisurely moments, when perhaps ATC might ask if we can make another 2000 feet up, this magic little dial can guide us to an answer in an instant. I am not suggesting for one moment that the BA777 crew should or could have done anything at all different to change the outcome, in fact I congratulate and admire them for doing exactly what they did, especially the flap reduction. Knowing any AOA values for the config they were in at the time, and with the height available would not, I suspect, have made any difference to the outcome.
I am however sure that the outcome of at least twoother major hull losses could have been prevented if the crew had been able to make use of an AOA indicator, if indeed fitted, to either the Birgenair 301that departed with blocked pitot tubes, or the Aero Peru 603 with taped up static vents. (both Boeing 757's).

AOA
 

Clive, I've been thinking for sometime that I should jump in here and mention Angle of Attack. Glad you did. Flying the correct AoA allows you to forget about a whole host of things and simply concentrate on one. The U.S. Navy has been making aircraft carrier approaches using AoA for decades. They never have to worry about weight, temperature, or anything else. Just fly the specified AoA for the configuration (which usually is simply gear down and flaps full down) and you will be at the optimum approach speed. (That, by the way, is not necessarily the best glide speed.) These guys did a fantastic job of making the best out of a truly horrendous situation but we could give the next crew encountering such a situation some help by teaching them a bit about AoA (and providing an AoA indicator).

BTW, AoA at cruise speeds is not very useful. At cruise it's awfully hard to fly an accurate AoA since the faster you go the less AoA changes with speed changes.

Thanks Ed,

I agree that the AOA changes are of lesser magnitude in cruising flight, but similarly so are the "speed" spreads that the manuals would otherwise determine. If the AOA value (for a given type) is known, it is far more expedient to fly it first, then if one needs the comfort of a speed target, then by all means look up the equivalent.if time permits.

The point I was trying to convey (which I am sure you grasped) is that all "speeds" are those which result only when the correct angle of attack is achieved, and for just about anything you wish to do in a given type there is only one corresponding AOA to fly it at, irrespective of the WAT. Best rate, best angle, best glide, min sink, and a LOT more.

The trick here is to learn the AOA's for your type....and I suspect this will only come by ASKING those who are responsible for training on your type.

Incidentally, I recently had reason to conduct two test flights, one in a factory new aircraft, and one on an aircraft fresh out of maintenance. Both schedules included confirming the AOA indication at which the stick shaker and push triggered. In all configurations in both aircraft the events triggered within less than 1% of the manufacturer margins.Clearly it is an accurate indicator.

Its only limitations? It requires electrical power, and anti icing.
Industry limitations? We need to be taught how to make best use of it!

Flying the AOA?
 

If only things were that simple!

Aircraft performance is much more complex than simple aerodynamics theory.

Engine efficciency is an important element, and this one is a function of many intricate factors.
To start with, forget about thrust being in a direct, constant ratio to fuel flow ....
Then, give me please that unique AOA for best rate of climb with a jet ? ...:uhoh:

Wind is another important factor when it comes to flying best range, best angle of climb, best glide ...

When it comes to keeping a decent safety margin above stall, and especially when you don't have two big engines responding immediately to very sensitive sensors, wind gradiant, and gusts are then of prime importance as well ...

Up to now, I don't know of a single instrument, nor of a single computer program that would dispense a crew member of being a knowledgeable pilot.

Shame on the manufacturers for not puting emphasis on the kind of graph that is dispayed here (Page 148 of this thread)
Shame on the authorities for not making it mandatory.

"....and the rest of the flight was uneventful."

Aren't two running engines MEL? Right then.

The "rest of the flight" might well have been a return to land which was "uneventful".