@Sober Lark, Ratings and Data Analytics in aviation are very innovative in selective presentation. They will find a way to include or exclude data points. Most notorious example is AI182. Entire world knows that accident has nothing to do with airliner, but rating agencies kept the hull loss and fatalities to keep its safety rating down for 30 years.

TOGA swithces are inactive after touchdown. you need to push the levers forward if you want to GA after a bounce. if you forget that and just push the switches and rotate the aircraft with both hands on the wheel, the outcome will be exactly what happened yesterday.

Was thinking more a case of trying to G/A before landing and just pushing the levers forward..instead of the TOGA switches.Followed by the thrust levers retracting and then the impact with the runway followed by the bounce..then crash.

Cazalet33

Yours is of the most valuable sentences for people who understand, on this thread.
Reminds me a bit of the AF flight at CDG some time ago that barely escaped... They did a G/A w/o moving the thrust levers to the TOGA position. Went down on the ILS to 63'. But escaped. NO SUCH LUCK this time.

Errrr, placing a crew under 'house arrest' in a hotel is SOP? http://cdn.pprune.org/images/smilies/confused.gif

OK, but why did they retract the landing gear without confirming GA mode being active, without a positive ROC and so close to the ground in a known windshear area?

Seeing as we are discussing the TOGA switch inhibition now, could someone point out where in the FCOM/FCTM this info is located. A while back I had trouble finding this info and I was sure that there was something about it being inhibited perhaps below 2 feet until perhaps 3 seconds above 5 feet after getting airborne or something like that. I was told that this info had been removed from the FCOM.

fab777...indeed and with an ambient temp of approx 120F no margin for error at all...QED.Great job to get everyone off.

It's a Standard Call at US Military air bases, and apparently other military air bases. Seems like I've heard this from civilian tower controllers also, but can't put my finger on exactly where or when.

Re "...safety record - Zero deaths in 30 years", the industry should note the comment "That we should be thinking beyond numbers, the border between a hull loss and a fatal accident may be relatively thin sometimes." page 4 in
A Statistical Analysis of Commercial Aviation Accidents 1958-2015

Our safety thoughts should focus more on those positive aspects which have avoided fatalities; e.g. Cabin Crew, AFRS, ATC comms, airport layout.

There is a general section pertinent to it in the FCTM 'Go-Around and Missed Approach - All Engines Operating'

If the sequence of events was truly as described by the FlyDubai witness then it would seem a mistake was made bringing the gear up too early after the aborted touchdown. The drag incurred by the cycling of the main gear doors is very large and in high temperatures and low density air that is going to have a very detrimental effect on your climb ability.

I've often had RR engines red line temporarily in hot and high conditions on take off. :( Obviously pure speculation (it is a rumour network!) but if the ground/air switches had toggled then TOGA would have been unavailable until after take off thus manual thrust required, were the flaps selected to 20 or the gear selected up first?

It will make interesting reading and of great interest to those of us who operate this type to hot and high destinations.

2nd Runway will open soon
 

The second runway (12L/30R) will likely be opening within the next hour or two.

FCOM 1 - Auto Flight System Description - Automatic Flight Go-Around

Thanks, couldn't find it for looking!

In Brazilian airspace, all local operators (airlines, GA, etc) are required to state landing gear status when contacting the tower on approach, unless told not to by NOTAM on a specific airport.

Great job by the CC on the EK accident, glad all came out of it alive :D

Well, I'll let you know the chairman of both entities (authority and airline) is the same. Safety management - Middle East style.

Mystery Sheet
 

A couple years ago I was flying 777 and landing in EWR. Crew of 4 pilots. During landing with wx clear.. winds light and variable,, no traffic in the air or on the ground, no external factors and GE engines normally spooled for approach. We hit a massive smash of something from the right and was forced off centerline. I slammed the throttles forward attempting a G/A but the aircraft didn't respond. Control was marginal and I didn't call for gear up as we continued marginally uncontrolled descent.. Managed to get back close to centerline with full power and smashed the landing. Rammed into reverse and smashed the brakes as the spoilers came up.. Me 6000 hours of 777 PIC time. and 30,000 total time. FO 500 777, IRO C5 driver and other IRO I don't remember.. Stopped on the runway turnoff and all expressed total surprise and wonderment. None of had ever seen anything like that before.. I asked the company for FOQUA data to see what happened and they refused.
Don't be so quick to blame the crew. Mystery sheet happens in aviation.

Interesting interpretations: Where do you set a bounced landing in reference of inhibiting TOGA? And is bouncing airborne again considered "in the air", or "touch and go"?
It is not crystal clear and i remember me pushing the switches multiple times and shoving up the levers in the sim with a similar scenario to finally get TOGA .....

(Ahhhh, wishing back the spring-loaded firewall switch of the MD11: Shove the levers through the spring resistance and the AP and AT go off, max available thrust kicks in, FD commands wings level and max nose up and no automatic reversal whatsoever happens until the pilot switches stuff back on to his liking.

That could save your day.)

Humans have the ability to find patterns in every aspect of life, including speculative views of events based on very limited data.
Does the 777 FD logic represent a poorly engineered technology, something which enables opportunity for 'error', being a mismatch between the procedure for bounced landing vs an airborne GA. (Note a conceptual similarity with SFO 777 auto thrust; it's so much easier to blame the human, demand more training, vigilance, monitoring; opposed to re-engineering the aircraft to help the often resource limited pilot). How many 777 FD 'near misses' have their been, written off as human error, not understanding the system, or because other pilots manage to cope (they know/ remember), then everyone is expected to cope in all situations, all of the time.

As an extremely speculative thought, with the hazard of biased false pattern matching.
What if this is similar to BA 38.
Un-commanded thrust reduction late on final ... Heavy landing ... GA procedure, but no thrust response ... Then a subsequent heavier landing .. Fuel tank rupture, and Fire.

But then that's just a pattern, a figment of imagination ... ... Or is it worth a thought for safety if only to dismiss it?

Captain Doug:

Makes me think of the 777 at Heathrow.

Your incident likely demonstrates how automation engineers don't always do such a sterling job. And, your company's attitude was appalling. Makes them part of the problem rather than the solution.

Gear down three green Landing checklist completed..... or go around flaps 20 positive rate gear up..... congrats to the cabin crew!!!!!!! 90 seconds.... Wow!!!!!

If I remember correctly the GCAA were widely praised on the UPS 747 crash at Dubai.
I doubt very much any of the big chiefs will try to influence the report. Interesting the F word hasn't been thrown in much either. If both crew have been working their nuts off then this is the stuff the investigators might get the big chiefs worried. Any regular on ME forums know what the score is.

(Note a conceptual similarity with SFO 777 auto thrust; it's so much easier to blame the human, demand more training, vigilance, monitoring; opposed to re-engineering the aircraft to help the often resource limited pilot).

I will admit that Korean Air pilots are usually resource limited, however, it should be noted that San Francisco, that day, was clear and a million, and it was a visual approach, for goodness sake's!

Findings about the UPS 747 would not have embarrassed any local operators or well connected local airlines, while findings about this could.

All credit to the local investigators if they produce a truly clear and factual report and all credit to the government if it lets them do so. It would show they have advanced their safety culture towards Just and factually based.

As the first major entirely domestic accident - hull loss by home airline at home - in the UAE, the investigation report and process will be used by others not only to form opinions of EK and DXB operations, but also to rate the UAE regulator and safety authorities.

Mmmmmm, the time line seems to makes sense now after the eye witness Pilot report above......

Hard bounced landing, ATC see it and advise "climb to 4,000' " thinking they were helping ( they were not helping, a very bad time to call the Aircraft which does happen around those parts )
The FO answers this ATC call when he should have been doing other things like MONITORING, they never get TOGA, Gear selected up, they never maintain a positive climb as it's damn hot 49c, perhaps a slight Windshear from the tailwind ( reported 310/11 ) and there you go.........

Ground contact........game over.......

Lucky it's built like a Tank.

There is a call by the PM of "go-around thrust set" then "positive climb"

As for the unnecessary calls from ATC, I see it in America with the tower asking for the go-around reason pretty much right away. To all ATC types, don't distract us with unnecessary questions at critical times.

:=


Being a DXB regular, I actually think they are amongst the best controllers in the world.

Well I guess that depends on which controller is working on the day.

It's not just DXB, it happens all over Asia as well.

Aviate
Navigate
Communicate.

Please tell me why the tower controller thought it necessary to remind the crew to climb to 4,000' whilst still at such a low level so early in the bounce? It's a standard missed approach for goodness sake, they will climb as published to 3,000' If he requires some non standard procedure then he should have advised them before this point earlier....."in event of missed approach climb to non standard 4,000'" for eg...there was NO RUSH.

However having said that the crew should not have answered.....

So wave your finger at them not me.....

You mean like how it is done on the Airbus Glofish? :)

I think Crew, Controllers and ARFF teams did a great job individually and collectively.

Also kudos to FDB857 crew for alerting ATC.

We haven't heard from STC, is that normal for a CEO to stay quiet after an operational incident.

12L / 30R Open again... 30hrs later. Quite an achievement.

.

Any news on how the firefighter died ?

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=0SaqWxvdtYo

Full ATC recording - good quality plus all the diversion calls.

Caught in an explosion.

Emirates pilots tried to abort landing when they crashed into Dubai runway | Daily Mail Online

Automation dependency? With or without auto throttles and FD pitch mode it's the pilot's responsibility to fly the a/c. Automation should be a backup and not the primary driver of flying.

Removing your hand from the throttles to do what, put two hands on the yoke? I've seen 105 lbs women fly with one hand so I don't understand 250 lbs guys using two hands.

If you push the TOGA and they don't work, or don't push the TOGA buttons, or push the throttles forward and but they are set at a lower power setting (ie CLB or CRZ) which drives them backwards, removing your hand from the throttles removes the tactile warning you'd get if you'd have kept your hand on the throttle.

As an industry we've become over-reliant on automation and are teaching, or accepting, habit patterns (ie hand off of thrust levers) that were unacceptable years ago. Maintaining those standards would have saved, or prevented, many incidents.

hauled away
https://instagram.com/p/BIrzM5pAQOR/

Anyone remember the Ansett B743 in Sydney in the mid 1990s ? Landed with the nose gear retracted, Captain tried to reject after touchdown but was prevented by the F/E as the thrust reverser so had already deployed.

I wouldn't be too quick to blame automation dependency. The 777 AT system has some well know foibles that are easily overcome and often trained. The situation and the time line will come out eventually. Whether or not we get to see it given the 'sensitivity' of the UAE and the somewhat 'nepotistic' accident and safety investigation system employed remains to be seen.

I certainly don't think any parallels can be drawn with the BA38 as that flight had a long cold soak. Correct me if I'm wrong but the flight from India to Dubai certainly won't have had a cold soak and I'm not sure the fuel would have had time to get below freezing much less close to the freeze point!

Time to wait for the preliminary report methinks.

It would be very important to determine if was a go around or a wind shear manouver. As you well said, during a wind shear must not be any change in the configuration due to the increase of drag. On the other hand, if it was a go around, before gear up y you have to verify positive climb, that in this case could take a while due to the temperature and aircraft weight.

GA commanded by tower
 

I can understand the FC calling GA after a bounce, just not the tower! (Previous posts said the tower called it).

I cannot understand why the FC would raise the wheels before the go around was safely established. Unless perhaps they thought it was...