Umm....perhaps it's not..

:ugh:

I thought required SOP for using the evacuation slides was "Shoes OFF".

To avoid tearing and deflating the slide, or catching a foot in a crevice or fold and breaking a leg.

Or is this like grabbing luggage - "I'll do what is best for my feet - and screw the SOPs and everyone else!"

Stilton - yup I always leave my shoes on - I always wonder why some pax settle in, shoes off, blankets on, eye shades on before we've even left the gate.

Flew SAA for the first time in a looooonnnnggg time last month - thought their policy of NO Blankets taxi/TO/Land was brilliant

I fly EK all the time & on each & every flight regardless of the class of service at push back the cabin crew do the following

1) Ask you to disconnect cell phone charging & put away loose cables
2) Put your shoes on
3) Every piece of hand luggage no matter how small put into a bin & not even in front of you
4) Every glass cup towel news paper is asked to be tucked away
5) in Economy blankets are usually not there on the sub continent flights & are handed out on demand post take off. US & Europe flights they are in place on your seat.
6) Kids are firmly asked to sit in place.

Perhaps if you were wearing high heels. Our seat pocket safety cards used to specify leaving shoes on for takeoff and landing, so I took this to mean that you'd need to keep them on during an evac.
At what point would you take off your shoes? Personally, I'd prefer running over burning pieces of twisted metal and plastic in sturdy, enclosed shoes, thanks (and I remember a time when check-in staff would ask pax to put on sensible shoes if they turned up at the desk in less-than-suitable footwear).

Hi,

In answer to a previous question, looking at a 777-200 drop test, it took about 20secs to retract main landing gear fully.

Daniel

B777 - Rejected Landing

If a go-around is initiated before touchdown and a touchdown occurs continue with normal go-around procedures. If a go-around is initiated AFTER touchdown:

- MANUALLY advance the thrust levers to go-around thrust.
- TO/GA switches are INHIBITED.
- Autothrottle is NOT available.
- Autobrakes disarm.
- Speedbrake Lever stows.
- CONFIG FLAPS warning will occur.

Maintain Flap configuration

At VREF rotate normally.

Once safely airborne press TO/GA switches.

Perform normal go-around.

QUOTE

I see that evacuating passengers were burning their feet on the 49C tarmac

Hotter than that .............. air temp is driven by surface temp, and a blacktop is hottest of all.

Much hotter than that!

"High Heels Off".

I agree with NSEU. Leave your shoes on. Less likely to fall in a crevice than a smaller, more malleable, bendable foot.

Singing....."The comments in this thread go round and round, round and round....."

For the love of ........please read above and stop repeating old ideas and thoughts.....

PLEASE.

Moderators, given its size would it be possible to split this thread into two? One thread to discuss the accident and the other to discuss the evacuation issues?

Be interesting to see if there's a source, simply because that "procedure" (and the comments/notes) ties in exactly with our teaching on handling baulked landings, as is practised in the sim from time to time...however I'm not sure I've ever seen it written in the manuals.

Edit to add after another search: Best I can find is that the 777 FCTM mentions that the manoeuver is "trained and evaluated by some operators" (my emphasis), says that "the FCOM/QRH does not contain a procedure or maneuver titled Rejected landing" and then refers you to a narrative on "Go-Around after Touchdown", elsewhere in the FCTM, which fills in a lot of the gaps but (as stated) there seems to be no procedure published by Boeing..

The procedure that was quoted is exactly as written in our B777 FCOM - Normal Procedures/Go-Around and Missed Approach: Rejected Landing.

In terms of the Go Around balked landing does this not seem similar to the SQ debacle in Munich a few years ago???

Those levers on the pedestal are not hand rests!!!

I teach bounce recovery training in the 777 at my carrier.

1. Re-establish a "landing attitude" (~4 to 5 degrees pitch) to prepare for a possible second contact with the runway.
2. MANUALLY advance the thrust levers to GA thrust limit.
3. When airborne and climbing select TOGA
4. Command "Flaps 20"
5. (PM) calls positive rate off altimeter
6. (PF) call "Gear Up, check missed approach altitude"
7. 400 ft - check roll mode
8. 500 ft A/P on
9. 1000' - Speed up and clean up.

We emphasize not to retract the gear until you are sure you are climbing away from the runway. Hitting TOGA on the runway won't engage the auto throttles into G/A Thrust nor change your flight director pitch commands. However, once airborne and climbing, TOGA works fine. Of particular note is that a SINGLE PUSH of TOGA on any G/A commands a thrust that will give you "approximately 2000'/min VSI) for passenger comfort. With both engines running, you have to hit TOGA twice to get true G/A thrust.

After reading all the thread, I find something missing (possibly because there's no way to match the puzzle).
This is a correct TIMELINE.
Timing of events is ESSENTIAL in these cases.
We've got a misunderstood ATC recording, a partial video of an EVAC procedure, etc. Better no mention the possible mess in cockpit when tings went wrong...
Putting all the clues TOGETHER in the right tempo could give to all of us a better "approach" the the real things that happened.
In the meanwhile, all is timewasting...

Thanks Buzz, looks like this might indeed be a company "thing" ( which TBF is what our FCTM says), since as far as I can see it's not published procedure in any of our docs.

Guess we can come back to this if it is shown to be relevant to the accident.

(my emphasis)

It would appear you haven't read many actual accident reports. They all explicitly state in the beginning that the purpose is not to apportion blame, but to find causes and thereby prevent a recurrence, as mandated by ICAO Annex 13.

Accident investigators most emphatically do not make judgments who to blame.

Apologies to all. I didn't make my original post clear (I failed to communicate effectively), it was late and I put my error down to fatigue.

My post was triggered by a comment made by David Reid and not so much this incident at DBX. I fully appreciate that whilst on that runway then NAVIGATE and COMMUNICATE were completely irrelevant.

The point I was trying to make was that there is the AVIATE>NAVIGATE>COMMUNICATE train of thought and I don't believe that is always the best course to take, and as I said, it always led to a good debate.
AVIATE will always be first, no doubt whatsoever, but there will be many occasions when the communication aspect should take priority over the navigation aspect.

All I was trying to do was to generate some thought and debate about something that is ingrained and perhaps need to be considered.

Here the link to the UAE AIP for those interested.
To find the OMDB (Dubai Intl.) browse in the left panel to find the AERODROME(AD) section
then AD2 and OMDB ---> OMDB AD2.24 CHARTS RELATED...
All the plates inside are in PDF.
UAE 521 was initially following the BUBIN Arrival and vectored to the 12L ILS Approach.

https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/aip/current/...dex-en-GB.html

some problems to it:

Especially in hot conditions with an underpowered aircraft, the situation will look more as a impending stall than a bounce recovery. Therefore giving pitch values is delicate. With 5 degs a -300 will fall out of the air.

For such situations, i suggest (not teach) to apply the GPWS "pull up" warning procedure. Because it's something we train quite often and will save your day.

Give it all it has, again as per "pull up", don't chase any value.

Note that it is difficult to press the TOGA switch when desperately pressing the thrust levers full forward, due to the angle. We should train to call the PM to press the switch, call out the FMA and engage the AT again.

The rest is as per normal GA.

Not entirely true. You will get full GA thrust if the aircraft does not get 2000'/min. As this is ample to feel safe, a second hit is not important and should not be chased for.


For such threatening situations, what i often suggest is:

Don't go for modes, go for moves.

Move the levers and yokes yourself, you can check the automation/FMA later

Hello:
Could you pls share date and AC registration of AF snafu at CDG ? Interested to see if BEA reported it. tnx. fly safe.

There is a lot of stuff on here which seems unlikely as has already been pointed out. There are however some things which seem pretty factual.

The captain was local with 7000 hours (sounds ok but probably a newish captain). The first officer was a Qantas guy on loan with again lots of hours, one year at Emirates (so in reality not too much 777 time).

The weather was 49c with windshear and low QNH all affecting performance. The position of the gear, communication etc. indicate a go-around was being attempted. Everyone got off alive, which shows how solid Boeing build them and what a great job the cabin crew did given the pictorial evidence.

Go-arounds are one of the worst flown manoeuvers in airline flying. Autothrottle logic as a contributing factor has caught people out on several occasions, for example Turkish in Amsterdam and Asiana in SFO. There does seem to be a possible scenario developing.

Good post Glofish. Fly the airplane.

The rumor I heard from insiders was that it was a complete handling f@# up.
That, combined with the not-so-stellar performance of a straight -300 and the high pressure altitude, did them in.

But once in a while these things happen, bottom line is that everyone got out in one piece. Good work by the cabin crew.
Real sad the firefighter died.

And for the pax carrying their carry-on off the plane, we'd better get used to it, fact of life.

The time period we are talking about lasts only 55 seconds.
521 came on to the Tower frequency 13 seconds after tape started. (as shown on video)
At start + 14 Twr acknowledges.....plan to vacate at M9
At start + 20 521 acks
At start + 26 Twr clears aircraft to land
At start + 32 521 acks
At start + 35 565 checks in with Twr at 6 miles
At start + 38 Twr acks...plan to vacate at M9
At start + 42 565 acks
At start + 46 Twr tells 521 continue straight climb to 4000 feet
At start + 48 521 acks
At start + 1 min 08 secs Twr tells 565 to go around

The crash landing is underway by now. The transmissions can be clearly heard and match the sub-titles. The only time in which 521 might have made a go around call
would have been in the gap between the end of 565's ack at + 42 and Twr's climb call to 521 at + 46. 2 to 3 seconds at most. There was no such call nor any indication of simultaneous transmissions. One conclusion must be that Twr saw some reason not to continue to land and wasted no words or time in telling aircraft to climb away.

Hi, PORTMANTEAU

1.- If the records have passed some kind of "supervision" of the UAE authorities I'm not so confident on the real contents.
2.- When I mention the "timing", I mean the TOTAL timeline, from that "second zero" to the last crew member to abandon the hull. I think it could be a good amount of minutes...

Coming from military, and having served in SAR all of my career (chopper, navy), I've been in close relation with people in extreme conditions (desperation, anger, resignation, etc) and the EVAC video dosen't seem to me to reflect an EXTREME PANIC inside the a/c.
I guess things weren't "that wrong" for pax or they couldn't take a real idea of what was happening.
There is one sure-thing: the CC were absolutely aware of what they had to do. And they did "hats off".

A sidenote after listening to the tapes:

The words "delay not determined" should be removed from the ATC vocabulatory. It ranks up there with pilots "due to operational reasons we have to, etc, etc.
If there is a crash on the runway, say so. If the ATC radar is down, say so. If will save a number of calls asking for information.

guadaMB, You are entitled to your opinion of course, freedom of speech and all that but it is disappointing that you and several others assume automatically that events will be covered up and reports fabricated. I can assure you that Emirates, the airport and the UAE aviation authority are totally professional and will investigate and report completely in accordance with ICAO procedures as they have done many times in the past. Any suggestion that they will not is absolutely out of order.

Portmanteau, your not serious are you???!! I can only assume you wrote your comment with tongue very firmly planted in cheek!!

formationdriver:
comment and full report on 2011 Air France B777 event can be accessed at
picma.org.uk/?q=content/2011-b772-cat-3-loss-control-paris-france.

But the original post 326 (by swish266) gets it the wrong way round. It states "Yours is of the most valuable sentences for people who understand, on this thread. Reminds me a bit of the AF flight at CDG some time ago that barely escaped... They did a G/A w/o moving the thrust levers to the TOGA position. Went down on the ILS to 63'. But escaped. NO SUCH LUCK this time., that Captain as PF DID push the thrust levers all"

In fact it was the reverse. The Captain (PF) did not press the TOGA switches but pushed the autothrust disconnect buttons instead. He fully advanced the thrust levers and pulled on the control column. However the autopilot remained engaged and coupled to the glideslope. Consequently the aircraft accelerated with increasing nose down pitch.

The PNF initially concentrated on the G/A reconfiguration, and the relief crew member called the pitch discrepancy from correct G/A attitude. Both pilots then applied nose-up control inputs, pulling 1.84G and disconnecting the autopilot at a minimum Radio Altitude of 63 ft. achieving a maximum pitch angle of 19 deg.

Subsequently the Captain applied nose down inputs while the F/O applied nose up and a second high G oscillation occurred. The gear was finally selected up some 25 seconds after the initial g-around call, at a height of 870ft. and the aircraft positioned for a second Cat 3 autoland.

Couple of things to point out, that seem glaringly obvious to me.

A modern jet airliner, adequately handled, should never strike the ground with the gear in any position other than down and locked. I have no idea if that was the case here, but purely from the damage it seems it was not?

A 777, in any configuration, has sufficient thrust in all certified environmental conditions, to climb away from a runway. There has been no mention of lack of available engine power.

We are all human. Even the finest of aviators have bad days! I will be extremely surprised if human factors are not a major contributor here.

There but for the grace of God.

Being the carrier it is, it's difficult not to wonder whether other issues may also have played a part, and may continue into the investigation?

Sorry, your adding the unwillingness to pay attention to one's airspeed as an "auto-throttle logic problem" is a reach too far. They weren't 5 or 10 knots slow on final at SFO, they were 35+ knots slow on final. If any of us were even half that slow on final on any check ride we ever flew we would have failed the check ride. Aviate / Navigate / Communicate applies here in spades, since aviate means fly the aircraft, not "wonder what it's doing." Training and habit pattern issue, and for that matter SOPs for a given carrier, contribute to flight deck crew habits on final.

Which brings us to this go around after the wheels touched.
Is that trained?
How often is it trained?
How often during the sim training are various errors made?
What are the most common errors?


If you are a Professional Pilot, how well do you know your aircraft systems?
If you know how it works, you can make it work. If you don't know how it works, you'll sometimes have difficulty in making it work. That's true for machines less complicated than a 777 as well.


@keepitrealok: thanks for your points on A-N-C.

Many thanks.

4468, your post indicates that you have never flown into an airport with severe windshear, as can happen frequently. To have variable winds, not just gusting, means you can have a strong headwind suddenly become a strong tailwind, losing 40, 50kts or even more. That has nothing to do with certification or pressure altitudes. Start a go around from a bounce and have a 40kt airspeed loss from wind change and you are not going upwards, regardless of which engine spec or what weight you are.

What's with all the systems knowledge d!ck swinging on here?

What has a vnav engine out anomaly got to do with this accident? Or AF or SQ?

Why don't you muppets start an "I know more than you do" thread in the tech section and leave this thread for relevant info.

I'm sick of reading through all this crap.....

LJ

Had you read the post for comprehension, you'd have noticed that a VNAV engine out scenario was not the only place this bug could manifest itself. And it could to limit thrust to cruise thrust in a go-around. If you can't see the possible relevance, you may not understand the incident at hand.

Things that are puzzleing me:

Isn't there ANY other airport videos (except the ones taken by possible pax or civilians at the airport public facilities, mainly throug windows)?????
Isn't there ANY records of the ramp sector? And the runway?
And ANY from the inbound sector (this meaning the planes APPROACHING) just to determine if the T7 came with or without the gear extended, for example????

These UAE's are crystal-clear giving info... Sure.

The report...should prove interesting (in so much as, how it gets compiled).

"On completion of the investigation, GCAA shall prepare and publish the final investigation report," said Ismaeil Al Hosani, AAIS assistant director general.

The authority also warned against sharing videos, news or pictures of the accident on social media.

"Sharing such practices is considered to be irresponsible and disrespectful to the victims and is punishable under UAE law," it said

No speculation. No comments. No pictures. Not even a "pre lim" report.

Of note, Sheikh Ahmed Bin Saeed Al-Maktoum (chairman at EK) is also a board member at the GCAA.



What will the report say ?
My guess "pilot error". A standard procedure.... badly executed, by a "well rested" crew.


Edit 1 Anyone come across the rosters of the crew yet ?

Edit 2 And will Emirates "Fatigue Committee" provide info in the GCAA report as well as EK's existing "Fatigue Management System".

"Isn't there ANY other airport videos....."

No doubt there is.
But you'll not get to see them. This is "Dubai".
Leak them, and you'll be arrested.

I am a retired senior crew member & can fully understand all the comments regards passengers taking their belongings with them in an emergency evacuation. However, I think we should consider the culture of passengers from this region where the aircraft was flying. I operated many flights from the area & there was always an issue with cabin baggage. When all the overhead bins were full in one cabin we would utilise bins that were less full in other cabins. The culture of passengers in this region made them totally averse to handing you their bag for safe keeping unless it was stowed in the locker above their seat. so I'm not at all surprised passengers were trying to remove items from the overhead bins in an emergency. Also my airline introduced a new initiative to speed up boarding where a second yellow tagged bag was allowed to be put under the seat in front of you. We all know what happens to loose items in the cabin & bags in the overhead bins when they open in an emergency.
Furthermore, passengers from all regions rarely consider others welfare or safety.

This is a Pilot's rumour network so I would like to say thank you to all ppruners who have recognised the great job by the cabin crew, a completely successful evacuation.