Some nice comments on bouncing I think. I'm on a B767 not B777 and don't know too much about the TOGA switch but it looks like it's easiest just to handfly the airplane pitch/power and think about the rest on the way up. Looks like we will see a bounced landing scenario in future training events. I'm a friend of low automation close to the ground anyway as long as the Wx is ok.

As regards Aviate, Navigate, Communicate. This was subsumed long ago by the mantra, Trigger Action and Callout, Magenta Line, Automatic Flight.

Throw in a dose of FMC preoccupation during the final approach and don't bother looking out of the window, oh and don't get caught physically covering the Control Column and Thrust Levers....we don't do that any more.

Thank you Del Boy .#439....

+1

1helicopterppl said:

"This is a Pilot's rumour network so I would like to say thank you to all ppruners who have recognised the great job by the cabin crew, a completely successful evacuation".

Agree and a plus.

And about the hand-luggage, overhead bins and all the discussion about:

In THIS accident-incident, at last, no one seriously injured in spite of all the jam caused by the pretention (acceptable in humans) of saving some personal belongings...

Question for the 773 jocks..
 

I see too many comments like
I don't believe for a second that an OAT of 50C has any effect.
Off course at max TO weights and with an engine inop, performance is affected but with 2 engines operating and at typical landing weights there is so many power in a heavy twin that it is in fact more a challenge to control your aircraft then a worry to have not enough performance.. even at 50C!
I believe a single TOGA push gives you 2000FPM, whether it is -10C or +50C..
Any 773 driver cares to comment?

G Y S :}

I'll stick my neck out....I can't speak for the Roller -300 or Emirates ops/procedures but by way of illustration for the GE -300 at 50 celsius, sea level airfield, the landing climb limit weight ( for a flap 25 or 30 ldg) is just under 300 tonnes, that's vs. a normal max landing weight (for us) of around 250 'ish tonnes....

In other words as you say with all running normally, at the end of a normal sector, at normal landing weights the performance manual would have you believe the -300 GE at least would have had plenty of power available to cope with most things that could be thrown at it....

At the risk of verging into speculation I wouldn't expect the Trent engined version to be grossly different, the 300's don't have a reputation for being under powered......

Say what? Have you flown it in Arabian summer?

I have flown through several Arabian Summers and do not have a problem with wiggys statement.

At normal landing weights there is no issue (or at least none that I have experienced). The only issue performance wise is trying to take the -300 to JFK if it is delayed and the temperature starts rising!

Regards,

GBD

Yes, I do have time in the sandbox albeit in another heavy twin.
And that is exactly the reason I ask.
With both engines operating there never is a problem, certainly not at typical landing weight.
As I said, excess of performance is usually more an issue then underperformance..
But an EK 773 pilot will be most qualified to comment, I stand to be corrected.

Edit: sorry, thought all -300 were ER's, didn't know there are "straight -300's"

They certainly have that reputation where I am. ERs no — but straight -300s, yes. Landing climb limit weight at 50°C/0 PA is nowhere near 300 tonnes - or 250 for that matter.

Lonewolf I think you are missing the point. The training captains in Amsterdam and SFO both failed to spot deteriorating airspeed with the autothrottle in a mode where they obviously thought they had speed protection. Fairly obviously this was not the main cause of those accidents, but a contributory factor as perhaps misunderstanding the logics of the automatics (as suggested by others) may have been here. In this case there seems to have been a lack of thrust causing the aircraft to sink back onto the runway. Sufficient thrust was either spooled up too late or not at all. I can share your frustration that hand flying skills have deteriorated so far. But the reality is that experienced crews with many thousands of hours (or perhaps because of many thousands of hours using the automatics) do not seem capable of basic stuff. Human factors design of procedures and training needs to take account of this. So far I have not seen a lot of progress on this, with perhaps the exception of A350 conversion starting with some automatics off flying in the sim.

Note to myself ... :ugh: :ugh:

Fair cop guys, humble apologies for not reading the small print and going off at a missleading tangent.. So is somebody else going to stick their neck out and provide the relevant numbers for the aircraft in question?

Scroll down, video showing the a/c just as it comes to a complete stop.

Emirates plane crash fire: Live updates as hundreds gather for hero firefighter's funeral after jet crash-lands in Dubai - Mirror Online

Still nothing conclusive as to why the go-around in the first place.
Or when the Missed Approach was called/executed.

I assume that the execution of the Missed Approach was "complete", the gear was retracted

Golfy to answer your question on #449

B777 FCOM 4.20.17

"Pushing either TO/GA switch activates a go-around. The mode remains active even if the airplane touches down while executing the go–around."

However and this is relevant in a GA immediately after touchdown

"The TO/GA switches are inhibited when on the ground and enabled again when in the air for a go–around or touch and go."

ArchieBabe:

Where I worked the gear was retracted on a missed approach or balked landing once a stable positive rate of climb was achieve.

Pilot error
 

Whatever way you look at this, pilot error has to be a factor. (And we all know pilots are human right?)

Maybe toga was pressed but was disabled. Maybe they held the thrust leavers against the stops.

But one glaring error was putting the wheels up!

If it's nowhere near 300 or even 250, then what is the actual weight limit to achieve min Landing Climb performance at 50C/0' for the straight -300?

Is there some suggestion based on aircraft "reputation" that WAT limits were exceeded in this case? Scorching hot summer temps in Dubai/ME is predictable and operating in them routine for operations based there. Until proven otherwise I would assume that even this straight -300 was dispatched legally, including at a weight that met all T/O, Approach, and Landing Climb requirements.

Disagree, our FCOM states "POSITIVE CLIMB", definitely not rate!

Media control
 

If you guys pay attention, almost all the video links posted here have mysteriously been deleted.. EK media department working hard I guess. Lets hope they don't interfere on the investigation at least.

The Landing Climb Weight of a 777-300 with Trent 892 outside temp 50deg and QNH 997 is ~ 245tons, only corrected for pressure alt, not for density alt which would paint a more bleak picture .... (MTOW 299'370 / MLW 237'682)
The GA Climb Gradient is around 2%.

Having flown that bird many times in these conditions leaves me with some doubts about these values though .....

And that climb gradient is single engine presumably?

[QUOTE]Disagree, our FCOM states "POSITIVE CLIMB", definitely not rate!/QUOTE]

Interesting 28 years ago I joined my current airline and had to learn 'Positive Climb' after using 'Positive Rate' in my old company. A couple of years ago we went 'Back to Boeing' and so now it is 'Positive Rate' again - The circle of life..............

Umm.. At 50 degrees you are correcting for density altitude. Don't need to correct twice.

The other significant (possibly more so) factor about RR Trent engines is that they take a LOT longer to spool up as they are 3-spool as opposed to the GE which is 2-spool...

Plenty of time on all six of the 777 variants, and the go-around feels very different on 773 versus a 77W (ER)...

Severe windshear
 

Aluminium shuffler. Your post:
Indicates you have not read my post.

I referred to all environmental conditions. AFAIK, no a/c are 'certified' for landing in 'severe windshear'! (Are you aware of the definition of severe?) If that is what you are alleging occurred, then I would counsel you to tread very careful indeed. The added complication you would of course need to address is that the gear seems to have been retracted? Not part of any windshear procedure of any aircraft manufacturer!

As for the suggestions that the B777-300 is unfit for operations in DXB in the summer, again I would suggest great caution. Not that I believe it would be allowed/tolerated, but the allegation is a very serious one!

It is pointless to try to analyse the goaround performance of an aircraft that probably had less than 10 tonnes of fuel on board and two engines working. Basically it would be very good. That same aircraft could take off from R/W 12L at OMDB with 50C OAT at 300 tonnes and lose an engine at V1 and still drag itself safely into the air conforming with Perf A requirements. So its goaround performance on 2 engines at an estimated weight of 70 tonnes lighter would be pretty good. You can goaround in the flare, it may touch down and trundle along briefly but it lifts off pretty well.

I agree, my point in asking was (since I don't have access to -300 perf manual numbers) to find out why a GA with all engines operating at a lighter landing weight would be such a dicey performance struggle in terms of climb, as some were suggesting, when the same type of aircraft loaded to much higher weights were legally taking off at the same field.

Trundling along, as you say, waiting for spool-up I can certainly see but I'm just not seeing it not having the ability to climb away fairly easily once they're producing GA thrust (assuming the thing was legally dispatched). Bemoaning poorer performance at 50C compared to cooler days of 40C is akin to complaining water is wetter in a monsoon than in a downpour, but either they met the req'd Approach/Landing climb perf number weight at that current temp, or they didn't.

SUN
Are Emirates CAT 111? If so they should be familiar with low alt GA. Even if not low energy go arounds and WSH go-arounds should be part of recurrent training.

Some questions
 

Are there any pictures that show the landing gear after the crash?

Also, How long does it take for the gear to retract on a 777?

Finally, does the gear actually unlock before the gear doors open.

Thanks for any replies.

Regards,

OBD

how well do you know your aircraft?

Issues here
 

I can only speak from my own experience a 777 regardless of version with that load does not have performance issues.
Correct me if am wrong, no one has mentioned wake turbulence.
After many years of flying on the region yes it does get bumpy and rough. Windshear possible, I was not there at the time.
Secondly if someone makes a mistake and they do happen even on an isa standard day. In that region sorry beforehand but the culture there makes people lose sleep over a Normal human error, not good.
I am also looking for an answer to what happened in rostov with fly dubai.
My 5 cents worth.
Sandbags filled and helmet on😂😂😂😂😂😂

Note: it is still an airplane at the end regardless of modes and such. If you want to go up you firewall and point the nose up between 10 and 15 degrees.
Yes if you don't press toga you will have to fight the system but otherwise will go up

Thanks, tdracer.

Glofish, curious about your preference for a GPWS escape. IMO, the "~4-5°" was given as a typical landing attitude (which is what Boeing suggest I aim for in my [completely different] type if I bounce it). I assume the idea is that, if the aeroplane slows down further and descends before the power comes up, it will again contact the ground on the wheels.

Pulling the nose higher doing a GPWS escape will only increase the chances of a tailstrike. Firewall power and 3°/second to 20°NU/stick shaker, I suggest, is not what you want to do if you bounce it.

As much as I hate to say it, I think Airbus' "Positive Climb" call is more reflective of what you are looking for than Boeing's "Positive Rate". :{

The people loading the ac would have known the performance conditions at DXB for the landing, and it would have been weight limited accordingly to meet performance.

As far as windshear, I have seen quite a few GA due to WS at this airport, sometimes 4 and 5 ac in a row. One can hardly imagine wheels up at this altitude, more likely stalled with a good tailwind/headwind change

Totto

If you firewall the TLs and pitch up to 15* while MLG still in contact (or sinks into contact ) with ground you will have a tailstrike pulling up through 8.9* on the 773, 10* on the 77W and 12.1* on all the 772s - (struts extended)

The 300 is a special case when it comes to TS & low level GAs.

assuming windshear
 

"no a/c are 'certified' for landing in severe windshear!" is a point finally emphasised.

Given the likelihood of windshear plus a reported temp of 49C, the landing attempt could have been re-assessed quite a while before touchdown. An unstable approach, initially lower than normal power and high ROD to maintain the glide path might have been additional red flags for this approach.

Certified 2 engine or single engine missed approach capability may not be actually relevant. I would be more interested in reported landing conditions that could be beyond the capacity to safely land. Since windshear can exist for relatively short periods, it is up to that actual crew to be completely in the loop, including a direct report from the previous landed or missed approach aircraft when there is doubt.

There is no shame in an early missed approach, holding, or diversion, even when previous and later aircraft land without incident.

Climb requirements are pretty simple.

14 CFR Part 25.121(d) requires the plane to be able to achieve 2.1% gradient in the conditions, with a critical engine failed, with the gear retracted.

Part 25.119 covers Landing Climb, All Engines operating. Gradient requirement of 3.2%. that is in landing config, e.g., F30, Gear Down. The sub para (a) is pertinent on some aircraft, (the PW4098 was one that could be a long time between wanting and getting, but well within the required periods).

The gradients for the aircraft cover therefore approach configuration engine out, and all engines in full landing configuration. That is rational and works well.

Any assumption that after some millions of hours of operating we suddenly get a plane that cannot achieve a gradient would have to assume some extenuating circumstance well outside of normal operations. High temps are an issue, the reported temp and local temp of an airmass that the aircraft passes by are different, but you will likely find that that is not a big issue in this case. Wind shear equates directly to a change in the CAS as the energy state of the aircraft alters with a time domain delay due to inertia, either increasing it or reducing it depending on the sequence of encounter. In these conditions, again they would have to be rather severe to critically affect the energy state of the aircraft. Increasing tailwind, or reducing headwind result in loss of CAS. Modest shear will alter the performance outcome from an expected outcome such as a pitch attitude that is selected, the flight path then is reduced where CAS is lower than expected. That may seem pretty obvious, but when you rotate you are not necessarily looking at pertinent data, and routine standards evals show that the same is true for the PM case, what they are looking at during the change in flight path is not necessarily what you may expect. Bottom line, pitching up and assuming that the plane will achieve a certain performance is human nature, reinforced by the routine expectancy being matched by reinforcing outcomes, (we don't get surprises that often, fortunately).

On any day, proceduralizing of our processes in the cockpit act as much as a threat to the operation as an enhancement. How often is a checklist item answered without the actual condition being confirmed... "clear left/right!... without anyone looking, standard callouts being made without the requisite action being taken that is supposed to be verified/reinforced by the callout. Sucks to be human, but then humans also can do things that computers cannot do, so it really sucks to be walk-on freight. You get what you pay for...

Emirates is a compliant airline; look at any IOSA audit and you will find that in fact most are. (in fact, almost all are, and that should make one ponder for a moment, and then the moment will be lost in time). Emirates has a public image that is one of competence. Airlines are obliged to balance safety and economics, no matter what PR may say, that is not just the air transport industry, that is every human endeavour, in fact every system in nature that has a choice of actions. We are likely to find not very much was out of the ordinary here; we tend to forget due to the amazing reliability of the global air transport system that very flight involves an extraordinary confluence of things going right, with great demands for perfection. A failure can occur when a number of conditions are just sufficiently outside of normal to act together in concert to result in an unanticipated outcome. Such a failure mode comes from the reality of complex systems having potential for resonance to occur, where stochastic system behaviour of various inputs results in something that is outside of the expected occurring. Such a failure doesn't need active failures, it can occur with a number of within limit conditions just ending up at the wrong place at the wrong time. Sometimes, it just sucks. If that sounds depressing to people that may gain succour from linear or quasi linear causation, it need not be. It indicates that the most important thing we can have in operations is situational awareness, and that means, knowing when it likely to be compromised hints at how to get serious about maintaining system integrity. But, it is much easier to shoot the messenger, that cures the problem immediately, and everyone is satisfied that both justice, and system safety has been satisfied. Unfortunately, the world is not linear, nor quasi linear, and so a similar event will not be avoided.

Wonder how the Emirates management will respond, insight or pavlovian responses.

If resonance appears a strange concept, one should consider their daily experience, or read up on complex systems failures as Ladkin or Hollnagel consider. Aircraft losses are brutal, so is a nuclear power station loss, and similar critical coupled systems.

Flight crew are not served well by rigid SOPs that end up affecting SA. Losing SA is just being human, yet our systems tend to belt the stuffing out of our crews for merely being so.

never dull

If Emirates management is trying to make this accident go away by treatening legal action to those websites that display videos of it, it is a clear indication of how they will conduct the investigation.
It also reveals the unhealty connection between Emirates and DCAA as they have the same leader.

Sorry but no it would not strike
Afm numbers regardless or not the gear is compressed or not is irrelevant. If you bounce your are already halfway up no? If in shear regardless of reason you are having a bad day😊
If your gear is up when pointing the nose up what degrees does then apply?
Either it is a massive cockup or shear/wake. Wait send see.
Here is where transparency would be good
Deleting videos or removing evidence does not really help does it?

No, it doesn't help.
Before you call this a possible massive cockup, you need to look at the rosters for the two pilots, and how many hours they have been flying monthly for the last years, how many (or few) days off/leave they have had, night duties, etc.
EK management is sitting on a big box full of smelly rosters.
If it is legal, it doesn't mean it's safe.