12L at Dubai has 3,600m of tarmac beyond the (displaced) threshold.

What's more relevant is how much runway they had to stop in after both main gear were on the ground. From the report's Appendix A diagram, both gear were on abeam N4 taxiway. That gives about 2600m to the end of the stopway.

We are in "what if" territory but 2600 m is more than sufficient for a b777 below max landing weight on a dry runway.

The fact is that both pilots initiated a go around with flap and gear selection, even read back go around instructions, while not realising thrust was at idle! When they eventually did notice, at 85 feet and 134 kts, it was to late to recover.

did PF really not hit TOGA, or did they just omit it in the report? It seems really baffling such a critical step of procedure was missed :confused:

looks like PM also failed on the SOP by selecting gear up without first calling positive climb

It look more like the PF did not realise that having touched down TOGA buttons Inop and only way to get TOGA is firewall the levers .

(I'm not B777 rated , electric wonder jet where this is always the only way to get TOGA)

You will not get TOGA automatic thrust but you will get full thrust with firewalling the levers in a B777 as the thrust is always linked to throttle position in a boeing. You must make sure though that the levers remain firewalled.

skydler

It doesn't matter whether the PF hit the TOGA buttons or not. For good reasons, those buttons are deactivated after touchdown.

Hey, maybe Nil further is correct. The Airbus system is more easily understood than Mr Boeing's finest???

I think the automatic TOGA thing has been beaten to death.
I'm curious, from a human factors/performance point of view if this accident was caused by an unnecessary computer call out which might have been ignored by the crew by looking out the window and using judgement. You know if you float a lot, or a little. Looking at the arithmetic supplied by others it might be that they floated a bit from 400m - 1000m. That might have triggered the computer; I've no idea how it calculates its triggers. But also there are those who claim the remaining 2600m of ground roll is more than enough to stop. I suspect they are correct.
In other words "was this GA necessary?" If not, then why do it? Is it an SOP to do so if 'Long Landing' is called?
If this call was the initiation of the whole scenario, then what followed was a technical misunderstanding & mis-airmanship with thrust & gear. So if there was no need to GA then there was no accident; so the accident started with a shifting wind, perhaps causing a float causing a computer call out. I suspect there are many slices of holy cheese that lined up PDQ'ly.

What is there to understand? Before touchdown it works, after touchdown it doesn' t. Simple.

Its actually quite easy and nothing to do with what button does what in what circumstance. These two bozos simply forgot the basics of how to fly. The big question is how and why.

Interim Report EK521
 

The Interim Report for EK521 has now been released.I cannot access it due to my location at present.

Old and horrified
The big question is indeed 'how and why'!

If a certain button produces the result you want on 99% of occasions you've ever used it, and if seeing a positive climb before raising the gear has ALWAYS worked before....

Then there lies a trap. Which needs to be well understood. Well briefed and perhaps most importantly well TRAINED!

Calling people 'bozos' simply because they fell foul of their human failings tells us more about the person using that term, than the individuals at the sharp end of a very, very long chain of the decisions of other people!

Fortunately, in the 21st century, in some parts of the world, there is a more enlightened approach than yours, which has an infinitely greater chance of saving future deaths!:ugh::ugh:

Company SOP to go around if not touched down in touch down zone.

I don't understand, if the commander's hand was guarding the 'Thrust Levers' at this critical
stage why he didn't naturally push forward and have some power even if not full thrust during the go round. Did he have both hands on the control column?

I thought one thing that been beaten to death was that the aircraft was cleared to land," wind 100 11 kts". The report implies it was given 340 11kts. Could a 777 pilot comment on whether he would have pushed on with the landing with that wind?

Since that wind is below the aircraft tailwind limit, yes they should have pressed on with that wind.

Tail wind limitation for most aircraft is 15 knots, so it was under limits if the landing performance allowed the aircraft to land in the available landing distance for that weather conditions.

Quoting from the OM-A stable approach criteria:

MULTIPLE WIND SHIFT
FLARE & TOUCHDOWN PAST TDZ
RAAS "long landing, long landing"
Panic, impulsive reaction, Sop???
GO AROUND INITIATED
NO THRUST !!!!!!
FLAP + GEAR RETRACTED !!!!!
VREF -13 KTS
"CHECK SPEED"
FULL THRUST
"DON'T SINK DON'T SINK"
TOO LATE !

Amazing !!!

1. A GA shall be made if landing not within TDZ ( I assume after)

2. A380. "Long Landing" = GA. What about B777.

Next question: should these be advisory or mandatory? Sometimes I think the judgment of captains has been diluted or removed too much. Yes, there will be those who are press-on jockeys. Yes there have been those who ignored F/O's call to toss it away. Yes, there will be those who ignore computerised SOP calls & actions. But I wonder if this accident could have been avoided using captain's discretion. I know about the mis-airmanship afterwards, but I'm still asking about the computer v captain(Pilot) decision making process.

True; if they'd executed the GA correctly all would be OK, but they didn't. If they'd stayed on the ground they should have stopped short & everything would be OK. Which would they more likely have succeeded at? It's a moot point and the start of a circular debate with, perhaps, no black & white answer. However, IF the SOP says the computer is boss and you WILL GA, that is black & white, but should, it be the SOP?

A comprehensive and professional interim report.
Those who forecast otherwise might reflect on their views and adjust attitudes before making further contributions, lest they be ignored.

Re the discussion on wind; for reference see the documents linked here. http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/58346...ml#post9489344
It would be interesting to know the basis of the wind speed and variations discussed in the report, and thence the likelihood that the crew would have been aware of them. Data, communication, time, understanding.
Also, if RAAS uses a wind-speed input (even if only to compute groundspeed).

RAAS 'smart landing' has two landing awareness calls on the runway, 'long landing' followed at some point by the runway 'distance remaining'. The long landing distance (a defined touchdown zone) can be selected by the operator and preset in the system software. Presuming that this is a fixed value vice differing values for every runway, then selecting the most limiting, shortest runway option might be logical.
Are there any posters who can expand on this, and also if the operator policy is to rejected a landing in the event of an awareness call, and by using the GA procedure.
In addition whether the end of the RAAS touchdown zone a calculated from the threshold position (normally in the EGPWS / RAAS database), or is it a specific GPS location?

P.S. RAT, it would be difficult to compare the A380 ROPS with the B777 RAAS as the alerting philosophies differ; this may affect the choice of procedure.
AFAIR A380/ Airbus ROPS does not have a 'long landing call' - perhaps for a good reason?

don, would you like to define TDZ, and justify the reasoning.

RAT, it was not the long landing call that caused the go-around. It was the fact that they touched down beyond the TDZ. They would have done (go around) this even without the RAAS as that is company policy.

It's very relevant how ineffective a number of the slides were in particular their response to wind. Could some method be considered that would place a slide back in a useful position in the event it was blown up against an exit door?

Those runways in Dubai are 4km long, you could land halfway down and still stop using auto rake 3 on the 777. Far from idea, but better than screwing up the GA and writing off the hull.

The 380 does NOT have a Long Landing call. That is on the RAAS fitted to the 777/330/340 EK aircraft. The 380 ROW/ROP gives a 'runway too short if wet' or a 'runway too short' aural warning...

And to clarify the company policy:

If touchdown cannot be accomplished within the desired touchdown zone, a go-around SHOULD be CONSIDERED.

ergo it is not MANDATORY

I'm splitting hairs with you Don:}

Reading the report it apears that BOTH recent accidents of UAE registered aircraft may be attributed to an experienced crew failing to revert to basic airmanship during a normal go-around situation. One question immediately comes to mind, knowing the operating environment and culture, posed to those with the local experience:

Is there a PERCEIVED detrimental career effect of performing a go-around (never mind what he SOP says) at EK/FZ ? If so, the induced additional stress when making the decision would (in part) explain why a reasonably experienced crew could ommit / fail to notice till too late basics in such a situation.

Didn't think you had many left whitey :) but you are correct.

[QUOTE][) The Aircraft was vectored for an area
navigation (RNAV/GNSS) approach to runway 12LQUOTE]

This would imply that VNAV was the vertical mode used for the approach. With an OAT of +48 this would create a very steep glide path which would exacerbate a tailwind component. The report mentions that the flare commenced at 35 ft which is also a tad on the high side. There are two possible causes for that. Either the higher descent rate required to maintain the profile caused by the met conditions or following the F/D guidance at low level which would have levelled the aircraft at 50 ft above the runway. Possibly a combination of the two. Is there any reason why they were conducting an RNAV approach rather than an ILS ?

Surely the last 2-300' of either is a visual? Oh, here we go again. The topics start to link up all by themselves.

A lot of companies, in order to make decision making easier for the crew stipulate that if touchdown is expected beyond x feet from start of runway then a go around is mandatory.

In my honest opinion this is crap and now we have a destroyed 777 and a dead firefighter to show why. I understand where the airlines are coming from, they figure pilots shouldn't be trying to make judgements that close to the ground and to make it easier and to improve pilot discipline they say if you don't touch down by x feet go around.

But a go around is no joke and we've lost a 737 with all pax and crew dead and a 777 hull with one death. Airlines need to reassess this. Imagine landing on a 4000m runway and you're flying a narrow body and because you've floated to let's say 1200 metres down the runway even with 2800m left the 'company'procedure is to go around even though a perfectly safe landing can be made. Meanwhile the guys who came up with this policy are patting themselves on the back for establishing such discipline. Yet there will be unnecessary go arounds, but that's OK for them I guess. So why not let pilots handfly the plane some more, get more practice? Wont that make things safer? And if you have the odd go around so what. Why is it that in the case of manual flying it's not OK to have some go arounds for the greater good?

OK so this blind categorisation of acceptable touch down zones has to go. Here's why

1. More and more planes are coming with runway over run warning and protection systems. They will accurately calculate landing distance requirements and let the pilots know when they don't have enough runway.

2. Go arounds cost the airline money and add congestion in already busy airspace.

3. Pilots do not fly go arounds very often and can screw them up.

Airlines cannot simply have a blanket touchdown zone criteria, it needs to vary depending on runway length and other criteria. If I was in KTM and floated for whatever reason I'm landing unless I'm definitely not sure I can stop in time. There's no way I'm going around, it's way more risky.

Pilots can calculate factored landing distance before landing and agree on a point (perhaps a taxi way or some other easily available landmark) after which they will go around. This is called airmanship. The usual reason for floating is weather conditions. So why would you want to go around and try another approach in bad weather due to company procedure, when you are sure you can land and stop safely?

You sure? Not saying I agree with the principle when there's miles of runway left, but they did get this RAAS call.
OM-A Quote:
if a valid "LONG LANDING" alert (smart landing-equipped aircraft) or a Runway Overrun Warning relevant to the current runway state (A380) is activated, then the PM shall announce "GO AROUND" and an immediate go-around shall be flown.

Why was auto throttle left in? The great debate again? Boeing is recommending that on the NG and I guess 777 that when manual flight is called for and actioned thats what you do, go full manual flight inc A/T

Thoughts?

The 777 is not a 737.

Cause?
 

Did they or didn't they forget to increase the thrust when initiating G/A?

The PM had called "check speed" ...but at such a critical moment, his survival instinct should have shoved and held the thrust levers forward, irrespective of the captain's hand on the thrust levers. It's called assertiveness.

That would work out really great with a local capt.

If you are scared of the local Captain captseth, EK ain't the job for you. Nor is being a pilot.

Pretty simple to me. Long landing, too early gear up, too late full throttle. The question is just Why?! As always.

But speedbirdhopeful1; define for us the VALID part of the 'valid long landing'. There's a reason I didn't bring that part of the OM-A into it!