Write to your elected Governor, Senator, MP or whatever you call them and tell them to look into the matter. If he does not, elect one that does.

There is nobody, i repeat, nobody else who has the power to change things.
The industry needs bums on cockpit seats, but only cheap bums.
The passengers want cheap tickets and cheap pilots, but only expert ones. They won't change a thing and this paradox, accidents or not.
The regulators want comfy salaries payed by the taxpayer and some nice goodies from the industry who then dictate the t&c's. They won't change a thing as long as they don't get pressure from their bosses.
Pilots can bring up all the shortcomings of the industry, the lack of training, the poor t&c's that do not attract the right applicants, the fatigue hurting safety due to understaffing, nobody will listen, everybody continues to treat us as 'spoilt brats', we are at the end of the food chain and have become powerless.

Your expectations above however need a change of paradigma.
If you want them met, you have to demand them.

Yepp, that's how it is....

Glofish you are so right. John Marsh years ago your wish was the norm and if a pilot was unable to comply after a "little" training he/she was let go. Unfortunately SLF want the cheapest seats so your wish is no longer affordable. I should also point out that aircraft maintenance is not what it was either, so again your wish is just that a wish.
Trouble is humans make mistakes & some sympathy should be awarded to this crew. But if a "little" training does not have the desired affect they should be let go. Unfortunately the non flying managers have ensured that only weak & complient flying managers are appointed so flight safety is no longer a priority. Whilst low cost is. ( you reap what you sow)

John Marsh, so there you have it with both barrels...
"No bounce" was confirmed after my post and FCeng 84 explained how the aircraft got to 85 ft.
Flying is still safest form of travel with 0.07 deaths per one billion passenger miles compared with motorcycling; 212 deaths per bpm. Captain Speaking says relax and enjoy your flight.

Having read the entire thread, I'm rather shocked and alarmed by the attitude that a go-around is in anyway an unusual or difficult maneuver.
As I've noted previously, I've been on the flight deck for dozens of "simulated" go-arounds - a go-around at 250 ft. AGL is a standard part of my flight test profile. But, as SLF, I've experienced at least 3 go-arounds in the 'real world'. Apparently two were due to the preceding aircraft slow to clear the runway (something I don't consider to be rare), one was for a snowplow on the runway (hopefully that is rare).
In my not so humble opinion, any pilot who considers a go-around to be an unusual or stressful maneuver has no business in the pointy end of the aircraft.

Baulked landing
 

A go-around should not be a difficult or unusual manoeuvre but a BAULKED LANDING is! In the former the donks are spooled up ready to go whereas in the latter they may in flight idle , or even worse, ground idle. Even if the shiny levers have been pushed forward it can seem like an eternity before any useful thrust is produced. Different ball game altogether.

tdracer - not defending lousy flying but in typical line operations I've experienced about one go-around for every 2-3,000 hrs.

I'd guess that the initial, 100% procedural correct, G/A is maybe 50%. Between two of us the rate rapidly becomes close to 100%.

Both pilot and copilot executed the go around badly, This should have been a fairly routine maneuver using well rehearsed procedures.

Was this in fact a GA?or was it more a Touch & Go or Roller? That is not a trained line pilot manoeuvre. I do base training and it needs the correct sequence; it is a high speed rolling takeoff with some flap retraction and engine spool up + acceleration BEFORE rotating. If executed as such, and NOT as a GA then it would have worked fine.

tdr: For a seasoned industry insider such as you are, you should not really be shocked. Or, it is just a choice of words - unusual, difficult, I see your point there. I think the logic is crudely simple.

G/A is a dynamic manouevre, requiring just the usual amount of focused coordination. But in a slightly different workflow pattern. As a EU short haul pilot, I experienced 2 for every three years on the line and that seems to be pretty much the average of my peers too.

Your esteemed test pilot colleagues have GAs as a daily bread, and yet every mission profile I suppose had been polished first in the SIM. A weekly bread to me is G/S intercept from above to 7 miles in busy airfield when people, me included, sometimes try to overachieve. But not a G/A, that just does not happen often enough.

The devil in the detail lies inside the words "slightly different workflow pattern". Us average line Joes cannot rely on any seat of the pants or motoric action for croschecking nothing went amiss. Every item requires cognitive processing, even the FMA modes read different and your mouth would not spell them out automatically as it would for take-off.

The drill is just not there, and the typical amount of SIM G/As, that are mostly OEI requiring yet another slightly different pattern, is not enough to build one.

I did approx. 10000hrs on widebody Aircraft. In this time we flew 4-5 Go Arounds.
All were completely safe, no stress on the flight deck.
What I start thinking is that the Autothrust System of Boeing Aircraft seems to be too complex for todays pilots.
Airbus A/T seems much simpler.

What is complicated about pushing the thrust levers fully forward irrespective of any automation. I cannot recall an aircraft where pushing the thrust levers forward didn't give an increase in power.

Nonsense.

Boeing's FCOM and SOP's direct the PM to VERIFY proper engine thrust application, that G/A thrust is sufficient, and to adjust if necessary. Verification is a cognitive act and is a matter of primary importance for the procedure, as written by Boeing. Here, they adhere to the principle of Aviate first by clearly spelling-out that BOTH pilots are supposed to focus/be in the loop of VERIFYING that both correct G/A pitch attitude and Thrust setting are achieved. This act verification/cognitive act precedes moving on to other tasks (monitoring and calling out "positive rate", setting up navs, radio calls, etc.). That is basic airmanship, and the FCOM/SOPs reflects this level of importance and priority.

In fact, the importance of thrust when it comes to making an aircraft go up instead of down is so axiomatic that most well-developed SOPs regardless of type, manufacturer, or Company reflect it with some sort of audible call-out referencing thrust or power. Whether it's a "Check", "Set", or something else, the entire idea for it's inclusion is to reinforce it's necessity and drive awareness straight to it it.

The PM checking the engine instruments after initiating a G/A is most certainly NOT, as you say, "adding an extra step that increases workload, good luck to us all if they try that". On the contrary, the step is already there for supremely obvious reasons, and at that moment during the procedure the required act of verifying G/A thrust has been applied by the PF and sufficient power output has been achieved is a prime responsibility of the PM..it's not dividing attention away from something more important or delaying more critical duties. Engine instruments are the primary indicator of thrust being produced, levers moving or advancing to the stops is feedback of engine control input. There's a difference.

I would be highly interested to hear how you as a PM (or PF) would verify sufficient thrust setting without looking at the engine instruments. Why would it differ from how it's done during a T/O?

To assert that both pilots skipping the simple yet supremely essential and explicitly required, cognitive act of verifying GA thrust represents "very skilful" execution of the maneuver is ridiculous. You may as well say the same re a crew that flew an aircraft straight into the ground with correct G/A thrust and flaps set but neglected to change and/or verify correct pitch. At anything close to professional level proficiency and developed skill in any type of jet aircraft, correct applications of pitch and power are reflex actions. To imply that the Pilot Monitoring has better things to monitor than achieving G/A thrust (and pitch) at that point during this very critical phase of flight is completely at odds with what is clearly spelled-out in the FCOM, airmanship, and common sense as it relates to duties and responsibilities in a multi-crew aircraft. If the PM isn't monitoring those exact things (pitch and thrust) and/or verified them as directed before moving on, he's stepping outside the loop and not doing his job in support of the PF.

My question to you would be, if indeed you are a pilot in a multi-crew aircraft, as PM just what are you doing and focusing on over in the other seat as after the PF called for and initiates a G/A? I'm asking because your statements make it sound like you think it's overloading you to do anything more than slap a flap handle and immediately put on blinders to anything outside climb rate, the radio, and airspeed after it has decayed.

As the PM, if an engine were only developing partial thrust on the G/A or was even experiencing a roll-back would you be oblivious to it? Do you expect it's the PF's responsibility to notice and alert you to the fact?

Are you one of those who believe radio calls need to be immediately answered during a high-workload environment where transitioning to another phase of flight requires almost simultaneous pitch, power, and config changes and the necessary focus and back-up on all 3 of these critical items by both crew?

OK, I obviously did a lousy job of making my point, so I'll try again. Let's postulate that go-arounds occur every 2000 flying hours (my SLF experience suggests it's more frequent, but perhaps I've just been unlucky). Although it hasn't always been this way, today engine failures occur less than once per 100,000 hours, yet pilots spend countless hours learning how to deal with them. It's been a long time since we lost a multi-engine commercial airliner due to a single engine failure. That's because the aircraft is designed for it and the flight crews train for it.
We've had at least two major crashes this year due to botched go-arounds. It's been suggested here that having to do a go-around is a white knuckle experience - my point is it shouldn't be. Perhaps the reason for the go-around is white knuckle, but past the startle factor doing a go around should be routine. Unlike an engine failure, it's pretty much a given that a professional pilot is going to have to perform many go-arounds during their flying career, and getting just one wrong could make for a really bad day.
Maybe it means more simulator time doing go-arounds - with some failures thrown in (such as the TOGA switch not working). I'll leave that to the crew training experts. But we do need to figure this out - we can't let botched go-arounds become a leading cause of air disasters.
As a designer, I worry about failures that may occur once every 10 million or even 100 million hours - and one part of the safety analysis is to take credit for the pilot being able to successfully perform a go-around if needed. It never entered the equation that the go-around itself could cause a crash...

Thanks, Ken. I was really reacting to the "fixed speed." But I think I must have taken it more literally than you meant.

Jesus Christ! There is a lot of "technical" discussion and advice going on in this thread.My personal concern is that there is a lot of BS being dished out as "good advice" and some of our less experienced fellow pilots might actually believe/follow it.
Im not going to promote my own "superior" knowledge, HOWEVER I have been privileged to be an instructor on big jets for a long time and I spend a lot of time when in the SIM using my discretion to let the guys practice the things that we hardly do on the line and the various GO-AROUND types, especially the all-engine one is a favourite.Errors are common, but can be trained out.I have to say that the particular event that the EK crew faced would most likely have a high degree of "startle" factor and would cause at least initially some confusion as it is a very rare event.Im now getting trainees to practice it in the SIM and the results are very surprising indeed.Peter.

One thing that hasn't been mentioned is time, confusion & disorder.

If everything is done SOP, the PM knows exactly what is going on, and what the PF will likely lead to a predictable and safe outcome.

I've been doing a lot of reading about the fighter pilot John Boyd and his OODA loop (an absolutely fascinating topic in itself PM if you want some links). The core of this loop is to create confusion in an opponent by compressing his timescale. Time is the key element causing mis-perception, confusion and defeat.

Exactly the same thing occurs close to the ground, our timescale is compressed. We no longer have the luxury of time to sort out a mistake or a system misunderstanding either within ourselves or between pilots. This can leads to confusing events and misunderstanding, and sometimes an accident.

If I read the preliminary report correctly, the PF applied SOP's right up to the point where the aircraft thrust levers failed to advance in response to his pushing TOGA. At that point, because the thrust levers didn't advance, the confusion, or perception of what was actually happening began diverged from reality. However, it takes time for the consequences of mismatch to become apparent, it didn't appear straight away.

It is also likely that the ATC call, PM's "positive rate" likely all reinforced the crew's perception that things were going just as they expected, just as their training had taught them. However, by the time they realised the error, that the system had not responded as expected, there was insufficient time to recover despite attempting to do so.

A question then is what is the EK SOP for hand on the thust levers? Is it SOP to press TOGA and then place back on the control column or leave it on the thrust levers? If it is, then this increases the risk that error of the thrust levers failing to advance would have been delayed. If every single time that you press TOGA, the thrust levers advance (normal takeoff & Go-Around prior to touchdown) during training and line ops, why won't it do it today? My airline doesn't train for GA from on the runway after touchdown, but our SOP for GA is hand on thrust, stiff arm of thrust , this is just an intuitive response. Pressing TOGA is icing on the cake and for some time was a cognitive effort to remember for me personally.

So to all who say that any standard manoeuvre should "just happen" put yourself in a situation where you think you are doing everything is going SOP, but you fail to get the expected response, now, you are confused. How quickly you can resolve the confusion will determine how it ends up.

Alternatively, imagine yourself as PM, when the PF makes make one single unexpected selection or action, you now end up with confusion that takes a finite amount of time to resolve. Normally the time taken to resolve the confusion is very quick & we get away with it because we likely have previous memory of a similar scenario (experience) and we aren't close to the ground.

Everyone needs to think about how they would handle an unexpected system response by the aircraft or mistake by someone else at a time critical point, leading to your own confusion and how you will resolve that confusion. How you would communicate the resolution to the other pilot? Not so easy is it? We are all vulnerable to the unexpected at just the wrong time.

Confusion is a feature of system of our perception & the fact that we can never have a complete understanding of the world around us. There is always a mismatch between what we think is happening and what is actually happening. In aviation, we spend large sums of money to train & build aircraft & systems to make that mismatch as small as possoble. However, it is there, and sometimes it leads to an accident. Boyd demonstrated this from first principles using universal laws of maths, quantum mechanics and thermodynamics. He also demonstrated that attempts to increase our own knowledge about the state of a system can actually leads to greater confusion & disorder.

Highly recommended reading is his 1976 paper Destruction and Creation for a much deeper explanation of how and why this process of confusion occurs.

Absolutely. Although we are all required to demonstrate proficiency at performing a go-around during our six-monthly simulator checks, the manoeuvre is normally a fairly canned exercise requiring a go-around from the minima. We also need to practice going around from other points in the approach/landing, with an emphasis on ensuring the correct attitude and thrust have been set, ABOVE ALL ELSE.

Automation isn't going away any time soon, so there should also be an emphasis on how to use the automation properly and what to do if something unexpected occurs. On Boeing aircraft such as the B777, there is a subtle difference in the handling of the automation if a go-around is required after touchdown (ie a rejected landing). That difference needs to be taught and practiced. Some airlines already do that, but it seems that most do not.

Good point well made CT.

This in particular goes to the heart of the matter. Its not as simple as "Well they should've just pushed the thrust levers up at the start!" By the time they worked through their own confusion as to what was going on, time and gravity had taken over.

Training training training practice practice practice: the only defence against the Startle Effect. You have to be so familiar (developed muscle-memory) with doing "similar" things that when the unexpected occurs, you'll have enough spare brain space to think outside the square and realise in time that something isn't right.

We can't train for every specific eventuality, but we sure can do much more training in the groups of events that could cause us grief, GAs being one of them. IMO it is not acceptable to merely have one go at an exercise and say OK, you're good with that or "there's a procedure for that in the FCOM, therefore box ticked". It has to be more than that. Currently, it's not.

I think the real question 'why didn't they just push the thrust levers up at the start?'
I think the answer is not so much to do with the individual pilots involved in this incident, but more to do with how all of our brains learn and behave. For the two brains there on the day, the auto thrust had been doing it's job so reliably and so consistently in all phases of flight for so long that the sub conscious motor skill of manipulating the levers to get what is desired had eroded, conscious thought and processing was required.
This requirement for processing came at a moment in time where several other things were competing for processing bandwidth; processing the "long landing long landing" audio, processing the ATC instruction to climb straight ahead to 4000ft, processing the calls from the PM , processing what step comes next regarding flap and gear etc etc. There is a limit to how much an individual can process in a finite period of time.
The pitch and thrust should not require significant conscious thought for a professional Airline pilot. We have automated the thrust to the point where it now requires conscious effort to manipulate it because there is so rarely a requirement to do it. That is the heart of the problem IMO.

CurtainTwitcher,

Funny you bring up John Boyd, as his other big contribution beside the OODA loop, is Energy Management Theory. To this day you will still find a hardcopy of his book in most fighter squadrons, and it is considered as a mandatory read item for any fighter pilot who wants to become an ace (who wouldn’t) and be able to master his jet in a dynamic environment.
Highlights from his EM theory are as follows: Potential energy, Kinetic energy, Losing or gaining energy, where is the jet going and where is the jet in relation to other objects (the opponent).
IMHO OODA loop and EM is something that is very useful in all kinds of aviation.

Capn Bloggs,

So right you are. Training training training and practice practice practice is what makes you cope when the **** hits the fan. Sure, you might get startled, but having your muscle memory react in response to a bad situation will free up brain bits to handle the rest of the situation in a safe manner.
There is no replacement for proper and repeated training of basic skills.

Training and practice are only effective if the procedure is executed correctly to develop not only muscle memory but also develop cognitive focus on certain critical items where and when it's called for. But it doesn't take training and practice in a sim to KNOW the procedure, and KNOW where these cognitive focal points are. If they are spelled out in the AFM/FCOM/SOPs, it's our responsibility to know them even if common sense and experience don't tell one so. Knowing the procedure is essential to our duties in whichever role we are in for that sector, every time we fly.

Verifying G/A thrust setting is a cognitive act to be performed as one of the first steps in the procedure whether it be using the automatics, manually flown, has touched down, or not. It is no different than verifying pitch, and checking the thrust is supposed to occur for every T/O or M/A as well. If muscle memory pushes the thrust levers forward, it still doesn't do away with the procedural and common aviation sense item to verify thrust is being produced.

It's the procedural focus on verification and where it falls where it does in the procedure that acts as a backstop for flaws in automatics and/or muscle memory because it will expose something is amiss and will elicit a immediate response by either pilot. Mental discipline to do those 2 things (verify pitch and thrust) is the weapon against fixation and distraction, and every professional has the responsibility to maintain their own mental discipline and not lapse into bad or incomplete cognitive habits.

If either pilot had accomplished this initial, fundamental step in the procedure that is based on putting primacy of cognitive action and focus on aviating, nobody here would be talking about re-designing every aircraft system that can lead to confusion for those not willing study, or designing fancy wind sensors because someone might build a hangar within 1 mile of a runway. The idle power would have been immediately noted, fuel would have been manually stuffed into the situation within a second by either pilot without having to think, and the non-event hiccup de-briefed at a later time.

Hmmm.....do you find that the locals at EK have it easier when it comes to upgrades(or initial checkout)?

Great post. I'd like to add,

A cognitive act followed by positive reinforcement would be better still.... Which is why I think any G/A Baulked landing should be announced and commanded by "G/A check thrust"!

The problem with "G/A Flap xxx" is that the PM's attention could be directed away from the position of the T/L's and the EPR's / N1's because he has heard a Flap xxx command.

It's also for this reason that I would say it's quite reasonable for the PF to remove his hand from the T/L's after he has commanded Check Thrust as it allows a positive reinforcement to be followed by a confirming action, the PM can adjust/check/verify thrust.

Not all aircraft are FBW so the aircraft will be out of trim for the G/A and that may just require 2 hands to control the aircraft's out of trim state for a short period of time...

Which would also allow the PM to verify and then state "Thrust Set"

You now have everyone on the same page and bernoulis being generated so can call for the required config changes and continue the procedure.

Anyway. I just think that putting in the notes at the bottom of a page, something like... "The PM will very thrust increase" is just plain ridiculous. It should be part of the procedure, not a footnote!

PukinDog,

Agree, but would like to ad that muscle memory is a way to reduce the startle effect, thereby freeing up brain power to deal with the cognitive challanges.

I never operated modern highly automated aircraft and thus am not qualified to comment on the way in which airline crews interact with these aircraft (my last aircraft was the 747-200). However:-

1. Everyone has cocked up a landing at one time or another, particularly in rapidly changing wind conditions on final approach and has had to go-around; even from touchdown. Every landing should be planned with the pilot remaining ready for a go-around right up until the point that reverse is selected.

2. They landed 1,100 mtrs deep and 10kts too fast on a 4,050 mtrs long runway. Even allowing for the displaced threshold, that leaves (at the worst) some 2500 mtrs of runway remaining. What is the landing distance required for a 777 at this landing weight? Was a go-around really necessary? I doubt it, but SOPs probably said yes.

3. The thrust levers were advanced 12 seconds after initiating the go-around. This is incredible - 12 seconds is an awfully long time to sit there with no power applied. Some have mentioned the startle effect but, if the pilot has planned the go-around as well as the landing as part of his normal mindset there should be no startle effect.

4. There is no doubt that a go-around can be initiated after touch down, and even if the auto-thrust did not activate. a mighty push on the thrust levers would have achieved the desired result. Therefore did the pilots think the auto-thrust system had applied go-around power when it hadn't? Did the handling pilot forget to push the TOGA button? Did he take his hands off the thrust levers? Is there some peculiar interaction between the weight switches and the auto-thrust system I do not know about? I think not.

5. But what I do know is that you only have to press the red buttons (auto-pilot and auto-thrust disconnect) and you have a perfectly normal aircraft to fly. It seems to me that too many pilots are forgetting this simple fact on highly automated aircraft.

The following is a direct cut and paste from the preliminary report, rewritten in chronological form (calculated times in RED)
There is a lot happening to process in a very short space of time. There would have also been the cross flight deck commands as well as the ATC instructions /readback.

The report doesn't include anything about TOGA during the factual sequence, however, it get special emphasis in the Go-Around section (1.17.2)

F16-GUY, I wondered if you would drop in with your handle being Boyd's design. My understanding is his EM-Theory was to find a way to enable incredibly high turn rates, and high rates of acceleration and deceleration (fast transients) to confuse an opponent.

What is even more interesting is how he took this concept, and adapted it to the more general case of timescales & confusion (Destruction and Creation) applicable to almost all human activity. His thinking can be applied to the civilian aviation world by knowing what to avoid, that is, things that cause confusion. Keep safe by avoiding trying to do many complex things too quickly too close to something hard.

The captain stuffed up. The first officer failed to notice.

You flight instructors can write page after page of "Airplanes for dummies" but it boils down to:

Thrust and pitch

Can we discuss why four slides were blown out of position in what appears to be light to moderate wind conditions?

My airline doesn't train for GA from on the runway after touchdown

My point, a few posts earlier, precisely; was this manoeuvre really a GA? It has been stated that EK's SOP calls for a GA if landing beyond the TDZ zone. I can understand the thinking behind that SOP, and it makes good sense on limiting runways; but is it s one size fits all edict? It might be true for a 2500m runway if you are 500m too long. Is it still necessary if 600m too long on a 3300m runway?
However, the SOP demands the crew executes a GA. The decision to GA would be made hopefully above the runway as you realised you were landing long. The engines might be at idle or not, depending on the circumstances. There is one procedure for an all engine GA. It has always been practiced in the sim, or for real, with the engines above idle and the a/c above the ground. This was a new area and the standard GA procedure is not appropriate. IMHO this was a touch & go, untrained and a modification of a GA.
If EK have their SOP, and therefore it is highly likely that a floating aeroplane making a long landing will have the engines at idle, then this should have been a trained manoeuvre. Local crews can tell us if it is.

Airplanes do not go up without thrust, no matter what your starting point is.

seeing the prelim report above cut n paste
i assume the thrust levers should have been put into full from idle at around 08.37.20 to 23secs and not 08.37.35 secs

flaps 20 and then followed by gear up were initiated some 12 secs before TO/GA engine thrust was spooling up

surely to get yourself out of trouble you want some power PDQ?

I am sure this will point to the interface of reliance on AT and wheels on the ground sensors whereby AT is inhibited for some seconds unless you shove the throttles yourself in a TOGA situation - which is flawed automation in my limited brain - it leaves open as it did in other accidents the crew thinking everything will be done for them and the plane will not crash

jammed stab. what the hell has that got to do with anything? Keep racist innuendos and bigoted views out of this please.

You have never worked in the ME.

I had an open mind about the ME until two very brief transits in Dubai airport.

Not for me, and my wife was exceedingly unimpressed.

Never again.

I am not a pilot but have read almost every post on here on a daily basis since 1999, especially those involving accidents and incidents.

Here would be my line of thinking as a pilot, given what I have read here about SOPs and whether a situation is trained for or not:

I am a pilot responsible for 400+ lives every time I go to work.

On top of this I would quite like to come home in one piece after my next trip.

Just seen an accident on the news about an airliner crashing in Dubai (or wherever)

Right - my next task is to find out every scrap of information about this - this is part of my job.

Is there anything I can learn from this? Ok, so they got into an unusual situation which they didn't get out of. Could this happen to me?

Yes, we don't train for a go-around from after touchdown.

Am I 100% sure I could get out of this situation?

If not, I am going of my own initiative to book a 4 hour session on a simulator and practice this situation until I am completely happy.

I am also going to raise the issue via my training department, but even if they don't listen I am going to make sure that I am ok.

In the Boeing Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM) in Chapter 5 under the heading 'Go-Around and Missed Approach - All Engines Operating' there is just this single line about the behaviour of the automatics
Further on in the same chapter under the heading 'Go-Around after Touchdown' there is the single sentence:
In the FCOM Chapter 4, Section 20 under the heading 'Automatic Flight - Go-Around' there is one line:

I have always felt there are many items in the Boeing manuals which have cursory or vague explanations of various systems or scenarios. Given the importance of understanding the inhibition of the Autothrottle system in the event of a rejected landing and especially in light of this accident the explanation in the Boeing manuals of this particular quirk of the system seems woefully inadequate.

M.Mouse,

I agree, absolutely. The standard manuals ARE vague and there is no specific 'Rejected landing' procedure in the standard FCOM. Indeed, the standard FCOM says to perform a 'normal' go-around in the event of a rejected landing. We can argue all day about a 'normal' go-around requiring the correct attitude and thrust, but there is also a subtle difference in the actions required in the event of a rejected landing and most airlines don't train for it. The airline where I work recognised the problem many years ago and modified their FCOM to include a 'Rejected landing' procedure, with no objection from Boeing. The procedure is trained during the conversion course and is also practiced during our cyclic training.

Regarding the slides, based on the OMDB prevailing wind conditions detailed in the preliminary report (extract below) it looks very much as though a change was moving through. The a/c finsihed pointing roughly 240 so it was lined up betwixt and between the change of direction.

Site ....... Dir ...... Speed ....... Gusts
Tower ... 340 ..... 11.0kt
12L ....... 315 ....... 9.1kts ..... 29.2kts
30R ....... 118 ..... 15.6kts ..... 21.4kts
12R ....... 131 ..... 13.0kts .... 22.2kts
30L ....... 117 ..... 17.5kts .... 23.5kts
South .... 115 ..... 21.2kts .... 22.0kts

There is a 2004 study done by the National Aerospace Laboratory of the Netherlands on the performance of slides in real emergencies. They looked at 150 survivable aircraft accidents during the period 1970–2003 in which slides were used, in 89 cases (59%) one or more slides did not function properly. Of those 89 cases, 11 (12.4%) were wind affected - winds ranged from as light as 6 knots up to 32 knots, gusting 42 knots (average of 18 knots gusting 32 knots). To quote the report "wind direction relative to the aircraft’s position/attitude played a key role."

DtA

This has been hinted at before. But the question is... did they REALLY get into an unusual situation... or did the fact that the powers that be that write SOP's that do their utmost to remove airmanship from any equation, cause this to become an "unusual situation". They had more runway in front of them than the total length of some other runways they regularly operate into.

Sims are quite busy with Pilots ticking boxes, you might have to wait a long time.

Having said that, when you create an SOP that says a Pilot must do something and then don't train him in the thing he should be doing... well... Some might call it negligent.

You could start a whole new thread on this topic... But sadly it should probably reside in the Jet Blast forum, as I'm sure it would get quite colourful.

@ManaAdaSystem, spot on