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Originally Posted by PAXboy
(Post 9500587)
...I wonder if the size and force of the bounce ...
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F-16GUY, tks. had to chuckle at last two lines...
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Though faced with a fast diminishing runway as well they still managed to do a dry Sullenburger.
I would suggest that Sully's wet arrival had a modicum of control about it: I suspect this was was under the control of gravity. |
Originally Posted by RAT 5
(Post 9500781)
Though faced with a fast diminishing runway as well they still managed to do a dry Sullenburger.
I would suggest that Sully's wet arrival had a modicum of control about it: I suspect this was was under the control of gravity. |
Nobody in this threat has considered a couple of crucial factors on WHY this Captain decided to GO AROUND AFTER TOUCHDOWN.(after 6 seconds wheels on the ground)
1.- EK PUNITIVE CULTURE: - This Captain felt a burning and penetrating heat in his ass after the "LANDING LONG" RAAS came out. "WARNING LETTER AHEAD!!! ****!!! GO AROUND!!!" - This Captain Touched down 1,100 meters from the runway 12L threshold. - Distance left to Stop the aircraft to taxi speed: 2500 meters. - Enough Runway left to stop the aircraft safely and vacate via M12 or M13. Anybody disagrees? 2.- POOR LINE TRAINING: - In order to feel comfortable to Brake and Stop a B777 under this particular situation, Crews must trained accordingly by their employer. This basic piloting skills, will allow Crews to feel confident to Land on auto brakes, take over the brakes manually, slow down gradually, to reach taxi speed before reaching your planned exit taxiway. - EK Training Department expects and encourage Crews to use AUTOBRAKES until reaching 40 or 60 knots (i do not remember exactly now), even if you have 1000 meters runway ahead before your planned exit taxiway. I had this discussion with a TRI after a Line Check. His highly qualified and professional answer was: "this is what we expect"... 3.- It is not a secret that CREWS in EK have practically no room to make decisions based on their own Judgement and experience, and have been turned, unfortunately, into mere machine operators, and modern slaves operators. EK management has perfectly aligned the Holes of the infamous swiss cheese Model. The next "Operational Incident" it is just a matter of time... |
An airliner isn't an F-16 or a SEL doing a touch and go. It isn't as easy as an F-16 or an SEL but it also isn't as hard as this event turned out.
Trainee - "how high can I go on a go-around if I don't advance the power?" Instructor - "that's a stupid question. Who would do that?" Trainee - "I was told it's 85'." Instructor - "really? How'd they come up with that number?" |
Can you be more specific! What makes it more difficult to add power and set an attitude in an airliner?
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F16 ... you clearly don't know the airline world (anymore or yet).
In the airline pilots didn't know how to fly planes back in the days of "Children of the Magenta" video (1997). And in those days cross-checking, AoA and power, "aviate-navigate-comm" was still in the back of their heads. Today pilots don't even know what they don't know. They really don't fly planes that's for for sure and that is because they have never been trained to fly planes, till the point a level-off can be a very challenging maneuvers with all the automation engaged. And what the airline managements are doing about it? Micromanaged with overdose of NOP. This is proven to create task saturation and general confusion. They think they can fly the plane seated in the office. They will pretty soon but not yet. They have not solve the morale/social dilemma of a passengers plane without pilots! |
So here we have a number of posters with no relevant experience asking apparently reasonable questions, but with no context.
I've just written this in a PM, and it pretty much sums up my view: Have 'basic' flying skills been degraded, perhaps even devalued? Yes, absolutely! But to a large extent, that's an occupational hazard inherent in the type of flying we do, and the environment in which we do it. It does nobody any good, nor solves any problems, to simply blame the 2 'bozos' (not my choice of word!) in the front when all the holes in the Swiss cheese align! That is the context against which to judge the opinions of people with little (or no!) recent experience of long haul airline flying. So what's the answer, when Joe public picks their flight and airline PURELY on the price of their ticket, and airlines cut costs to the bone to compete? Oh, and pay their execs massive bonuses of course!!! |
So what's the answer, when Joe public picks their flight and airline PURELY on the price of their ticket, and airlines cut costs to the bone to compete? Oh, and pay their execs massive bonuses of course!!! |
Note the captain had approx 7500tt. I wonder how many takeoff and landings he had.
Given that EK is mostly a long haul airline. Im guessing he had approx 1000 To/ldgs. Half as handling, half as non handling. So approx 500 handling TO/LDGs. This was probably his first real G/A,outside of the sim. If this is reasonable speculation was the captain experienced enough?. |
If this is reasonable speculation was the captain experienced enough?. |
If this is reasonable speculation was the captain experienced enough?. |
Enough so that he could do a go-around without crashing the aircraft.
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I guess you answered yourself!
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Originally Posted by Bleve
(Post 9500596)
There is no mention of a bounce in the report. They got an overshoot shear in the flare, which caused them to float down the runway due to excess IAS (energy). Right gear touched down 1100m from the threshold followed by the left gear, then the 'LONG LANDING' warning, then the problems began.
The subsequent gear up touch down seems to have been more gentle. |
This airplane did not bounce!
Now that the scenario of this long landing followed by a go-around from wheels on the ground is better understood it is very clear that this airplane did not bounce. The crew took the deliberate action to fly away from the ground.
Climbing 85 feet starting at a typical landing speed translates into a loss of approximately 10 knots due to transfer of energy from kinetic to potential. This could well have brought the airplane close to stall. It would be very interesting to see actual time history data for speed, altitude, and throttle position. Did the crew recognize the lack of power and push the throttles forward before reaching their max G/A altitude of 85 feet? My guess is that they did not and were already headed for their gear up impact when those precious 12 seconds had passed and they finally followed up with the throttles. |
... the initial 'touch down' caused one of the FA's seat to collapse, all the blinds in one of the cabins dropped closed and some of the cabin oxygen masks dropped... |
How low a descent rate do you claim to be able to achive in a A320 at a fixed speed (speed for max endurence) with both engines out? |
There is no such thing as a planned Go Around. |
Ken V in a A320 with a double engine failure you would not be in normal law and there would be no protections unless you had something other than the rat providing Elec power.Sully I believe had the apu and were both engine gens and the hydraulics still on line?
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" Sully I believe had the apu and were both engine gens and the hydraulics still on line?"
Uhhh with both engines gone- its doubtful/impossible for engine gens and engine hydraulics to be on line. !!! |
One engine was still running. ( just) Sully was in normal law.
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Airbus state that the aircraft was in Normal law and alpha prot until touchdown. The busses hydraulics come up to operating pressure well before engine idle and the generators come on just below idle. The fadecs were doing their best to keep the engines running even at below normal idle. Hydraulics and Generators all comes off the engines accessory gearbox . If only one engine was running it would power the opposite hydraulics through the PTU.
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I don't think it's only a hand flying thing in this case, more like a don't understanding the automation problem as well. There is a v/s button that can be used as guidance for a descent rate in a hand flown RNAV approach passed your MDA. That is why Boeing put that thing in the middle of the panel. In my airline and I assume at EK as well it is really not liked to use it, but in the old days that is the only thing we had. I know... the protections.....
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There is a v/s button that can be used as guidance for a descent rate in a hand flown RNAV approach passed your MDA. That is why Boeing put that thing in the middle of the panel. |
I'm curious how you could achieve a zero descent rate at fixed speed with no thrust. Where would the energy to make the lift come from?
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There is no such thing as a planned Go Around. EVERY approach may end in a G/A... unless you are able to land from it!!! |
Read the NTSB report. Look at the FDR data. They didn't max perform the airplane. We need to understand what they did right, what they did less than optimum albeit under huge stress, and what the aircraft did to protect them. In a non FBW a/c they'd have been in big trouble. Guys need to learn the lessons the NTSB report mentions.
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The engines were 'gone' as far as being able to produce useable thrust.
They're weren't 'gone' as far as spinning fast enough to allow the engine accessory drive to keep functioning. |
Ummm, isn't this the Emirates B777 DXB accident thread? :confused:
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Originally Posted by maligno
(Post 9500989)
Nobody in this threat has considered a couple of crucial factors on WHY this Captain decided to GO AROUND AFTER TOUCHDOWN.(after 6 seconds wheels on the ground)
1.- EK PUNITIVE CULTURE: - This Captain felt a burning and penetrating heat in his ass after the "LANDING LONG" RAAS came out. "WARNING LETTER AHEAD!!! ****!!! GO AROUND!!!" - This Captain Touched down 1,100 meters from the runway 12L threshold. - Distance left to Stop the aircraft to taxi speed: 2500 meters. - Enough Runway left to stop the aircraft safely and vacate via M12 or M13. Anybody disagrees? Originally Posted by Tipkcoc View Post We can focus on obvious things like the need of increasing thrust in a GA. But I hope the investigation committee will say something about the punitive environment at this airlines (and also other airlines), which for me is the basis of this accident. It prevents pilots from properly flying their aircraft and/or execute proper judgement and make them act as robots instead. 2.- POOR LINE TRAINING: - In order to feel comfortable to Brake and Stop a B777 under this particular situation, Crews must trained accordingly by their employer. This basic piloting skills, will allow Crews to feel confident to Land on auto brakes, take over the brakes manually, slow down gradually, to reach taxi speed before reaching your planned exit taxiway. - EK Training Department expects and encourage Crews to use AUTOBRAKES until reaching 40 or 60 knots (i do not remember exactly now), even if you have 1000 meters runway ahead before your planned exit taxiway. I had this discussion with a TRI after a Line Check. His highly qualified and professional answer was: "this is what we expect"... 3.- It is not a secret that CREWS in EK have practically no room to make decisions based on their own Judgement and experience, and have been turned, unfortunately, into mere machine operators, and modern slaves operators. EK management has perfectly aligned the Holes of the infamous swiss cheese Model. The next "Operational Incident" it is just a matter of time... The main meat of this accident is the punitive culture at this and other airlines. Everybody can screw-up (including the ones here pretending it won't happen to them), forget the Thrust levers etc.. etc... Safe aviation comes by the presence of a non-punitive culture. Then comes training and whatever. I would have expected more emphasis on this issue and I hope the investigation committee will confront Emirates with this. It is too easy to solely blame the pilots (Pilots are usually pilots worst judges) |
These two pilots had been flying 60 - 80 hrs/month in the last three months.
Far from the 100 hrs+ EK pilots say they are doing every month. They came from a 29 hrs layover in Thiruvanamthapuram. Not fatigued and not tired. A minor windshear, RAAS warning, SOP mandatory go around and a punitive culture. No choice in the matter, you go around even if you know landing is safe. The same happened with the A 380 in MAN. A rushed goaround. Flaps, gear and radio call all at once. It is not unusual to see this in a goaround, but it's not necessary. A captain who forgets to push the throttles forward. A first officer too busy to notice. The rest is history. Isn't it weird when an airline use group exercises as part of the selection, and look for pilots who can think outside the box, then when they get hired they use a whip to keep the same pilots inside the box? |
Whatever the good intentions were of ATC, it must be possible that the crew followed/were influenced by their instruction to go around. It was definitely not required in this situation.
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Don't know if anyone else spotted this but looks like there was a gear up early issue on the go around that happened on the Air Asia "diversion" to Melbourne in the other top thread at the moment.
Fortunately this was higher up than the Emirates but the handling pilot miss-interpreted the aural alert as a flap overspeed warning and reduced power when the gear up below 750ft horn went off. Page 18 of the report states: "A further review of flight data indicated that during the go-around the landing gear was selected up prior to the engine thrust levers reaching the take-off/go-around position. The flight crew reported that, in response, the captain reduced power below the take-off/go-around position to correct a suspected flap overspeed. As the aircraft was below 750 ft above ground level, this would likely have momentarily activated the L/G GEAR NOT DOWN master warning." |
2 engine go arounds are one of the more frequently stuffed up events.
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EVERY approach may end in a G/A...
unless you are able to land from it!!! Spot on and should be beaten into every cadet pilot until the scream; assuming of course they have also had it beaten into them how to do it instinctively. Same with 'every takeoff is an RTO' until it isn't. |
portmanteau:
Missed Approach procedure will be included in the midair briefing but I dont think anyone ever says here's what we will do if we bounce 85 ft or land with the wheels up. Both events happened to this crew and they must have been shocked to the core. Is it too much to expect pilots to expect the unexpected and be able to deal with it? |
I'm curious how you could achieve a zero descent rate at fixed speed with no thrust. Where would the energy to make the lift come from? |
Missed Approach procedure will be included in the midair briefing but I dont think anyone ever says here's what we will do if we bounce 85 ft or land with the wheels up. Both events happened to this crew and they must have been shocked to the core. 1. They did not "bounce" 85 feet. The aircraft had a normal (although long) landing and then after touchdown the crew elected (apparently due to company SOP regarding long landings) to perform a go around. Both pilot and copilot executed the go around badly, which had nothing to do with being "shocked to the core." This should have been a fairly routine maneuver using well rehearsed procedures. 2. I agree that no one plans to land gear up. Further, there really is no procedure for a gear up landing other than an orderly evacuation. That they landed/impacted gear up was due to the badly executed go around. The aircraft was fully capable of getting airborne after the long landing and climbing to a safe altitude whereupon the crew could have done a second approach. Sadly, that did not happen. Happily the flight crew was NOT "shocked to the core" after the gear up impact and executed an orderly evacuation. |
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