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why did they not ask for fire services in that first call? The fire warning will cause the 'Stop' call to be made then there is a pause for all three pilots to confirm the indications and identify the potential cause. Once the cause has been established then the appropriate call can be made. The delay is to ascertain exactly the severity of the situation as putting your passengers out of the aircraft, down the slides onto an active, busy airfield isn't a decision that any Captain would take lightly. Once the initial 'alert' call has been made and the fire verified then the second call would be made. Simple answer never rush! |
Human nature of a imminent threat has a lot to do with passengers taking their baggage or not. I'm sure some didn't know how serious the situation was at the time . A simple leave all carry on bags after the evacuation order would help as well as convey the serious situation. The industry as a whole has to do more to stress the importance of leaving baggage behind during a evacuation order .
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Just reviewing the comments and available evidence it would appear that:
Those who were trained professionals in this incident (on the flight deck, in the cabin, in ATC and the rescue guys) all acted in a highly professional manner and all contributed to stopped this incident becoming a tragedy. Some of those who were not trained (ie the pax) acted irrationally because of selfishness or lack of awareness. My conclusion - the bags issue is an industry problem and training/education is the only answer. |
Mickj3 Not sure if this has already been mentioned but I was surprised to see the escape chutes on the port side (side of the engine fire) being deployed. Passengers escaping into a danger area (engine fire, fire service vehicles manoeuvring etc). |
Boeing and GE comments on FAA's 2011 "unsafe condition" qualification of GE80-85B
From FAA AD 2011-15-06 concerning "unsafe condition" of GE90-76B; GE90-77B; GE90-85B; GE90- 90B; and GE90-94B Turbofan Engines
末末末末末末末末末末末末末末末末末 "This AD was prompted by cracks discovered on one HPCR 8-10 spool between the 9-10 stages in the weld joint. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the HPCR 8-10 stage spool, uncontained engine failure, and damage to the airplane". "Request Two commenters, General Electric Company and The Boeing Company, requested that we remove the ''Unsafe Condition'' paragraph from the AD, and reword the Summary section to resemble the Summary section of AD 2002-04-11. The commenters stated that, by their analyses, cracks in the weld joint would not develop into an uncontained failure. The commenters stated that HPCR 8-10 stage spools, P/Ns 1844M90G01 and 1844M90G02, be inspected by an enhanced inspection, similar to those parts covered in AD 2002-04-11. Answer We do not agree. AD 2002-04-11 was issued because of additional focused inspection procedures that had been developed by the manufacturer. Because cracks were discovered on one HPCR 8-10 spool between the 9-10 stages in the weld joint, this unsafe condition is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design. The unsafe condition could result in failure of the HPCR 8-10 stage spool, uncontained engine failure, and damage to the airplane. We determined that this unsafe condition requires mandatory repetitive inspections for cracks. We did not change the AD." |
There is a picture of the starboard side of the aircraft in this story.
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/ar...engine-416536/ A lot of soot just aft of the R2 door. |
"Some of those who were not trained (ie the pax) acted irrationally because of selfishness or lack of awareness. My conclusion - the bags issue is an industry problem and training/education is the only answer."
I would think that given the difficulty inherent in trying to educate those either potentially, or actually, in an emergency situation to act responsibly and according to regulation, the only answer to this dilemma is to seriously restrict the amount of baggage that can be taken into the cabin to begin with. This would be enforceable on the ground prior to departure; it may cause some issues and arguments but they will be contained away from the A/C. It would be reasonable to allow folks access to their medication, and devices en route - phones, laptops and so on - and indeed pragmatic in terms of items with batteries which are liable to catch fire from time to time, and better in the cabin than in the hold - but the size of bags could be limited to a laptop carrier or small backpack, which could be stored under the seat and carried easily on ones person. Overhead lockers would be slightly defunct if no one was allowed to use them for baggage, but in a situation like this, it would cut out one of the potential threats to fast evacuation. Simply put: if the baggage isn't there, people won't be trying to access it, or indeed have to waste time trying to prevent others from accessing theirs. |
@ tourist. I disagree. Endangering life is exactly that. I would dearly love the Federal Authorities to go and arrest those who are sitting there in their hotel room with their carry-on luggage in their possession. In fact, the airport authorities could have easily separated those with their luggage as they arrived at the terminal building.
All this talk of minor inconveniences because people have not got their passport vs a few fellow passengers being burned alive is frankly very depressing and indicates a lack of humanity by those suggesting otherwise. Leave luggage behind. Period. |
I am surprised at the number of posts that feel the crew reaction was slow. I suspect most if not all those posts are not from professional pilots. There is a lot to do in the cockpit in this type of situation. Their overall response time was as quick as I can possibly imagine. At first glance everything about this incident appears to be textbook perfect. The last thing in the world you want to do is rush. It's been shown over and over that knee jerk reactions lead to very bad situations. The timing, communications, exits used and outcome were all perfect.
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90 Kt Taxi?
BA were reporting that the aircraft was taxiing at 90 Kts? Obviously a take off roll abort at 90 Kts fits the description better.
Well done the Gatwick crew who ensured the safety of the passengers and acted so professionally.:D Hope their company appreciate it since their bit is what is seen more by the passengers than anything else. Shame they seem to be in line for pay and condition cuts and have new contract forced on them.... And the decision to throw passengers and crew down slides will always result in some injuries, that there were so few can only be seen as a good thing. BZ all round.....:ok: |
Reply to #152
Listening to the ATC tape, there does appear to be a time-gap between the Speedbird stopping message, and the Mayday fire services requested message. Did the flight crew not realise that a fire was (or was likely to have) started? ATC appear to have despatched fire services anyway, but given this delay, and the damage already occuring to the fueselage/cabin, we're looking at few seconds before catastrophe, it seems. In no way am I critical, but I'm just interested in this gap between announcing stop, and calling for fire service. BA SOP's :- After STOP called and being achieved, PNH might well advise TWR of intentions. Capt continues (else resumes) as PH and when safely stopped (if circumstances & brain functions allow : stop close to a taxiway for easy access of emergency vehicles; if RWY width & surroundings appropriate, nose into side of fault if headwind; away if tailwind). Capt calls "Identify the Failure". FO presumably called "Engine Fire Left"; fault confirmed between both. Capt calls for "Fire Engine Left Memory Items". FO identifies the appropriate switch, monitored and confirmed by Capt before actioning each switch. Autothrottle Arm Switch ... Off Thrust Lever Left ... Closed Fuel Control Switch Left ... Cutoff Engine Fire Switch Left ... Pull If Fire Eng message remains - Engine Fire Switch Left ... Rotate to stop & hold 1 sec If Fire Eng message still displayed after 30 secs - Engine Fire Switch Left Rotate to other bottle Capt must rely on significant information from ATC and/or cabin crew. BA Cabin Crew are authorized under certain 'catastrophic' circumstances to contact the flight crew directly rather than going through the Cabin Service Director/Purser. (Health Warning : author of above was a 35 year career with BA ending up as Capt 777 for his last 9 years before retiring over 5 years ago) |
I like BA as it still does show considerable professionalism from its staff. I usually fly BA and will continue to do so. The Las Vegas incident reinforces my choice to take BA.
I study major incidents as my role is to risk manage/ensure safety in hospitals. This incident gave me the shivers as it was so similar to the Manchester air disaster. I am amazed that there were only very minor injuries. The crew did exceptionally well that no one died. All credit too to the emergency services on the ground. No one will think of this incident in a month or two. That is a good thing. |
Hopefully the following might explain the gap, which I thought appears to infer a controlled and prompt actions from the flight deck. BA SOP's :- After STOP called and being achieved, PNH might well advise TWR of intentions. Capt continues (else resumes) as PH and when safely stopped (if circumstances & brain functions allow : stop close to a taxiway for easy access of emergency vehicles; if RWY width & surroundings appropriate, nose into side of fault if headwind; away if tailwind). Capt calls "Identify the Failure". FO presumably called "Engine Fire Left"; fault confirmed between both. Capt calls for "Fire Engine Left Memory Items". FO identifies the appropriate switch, monitored and confirmed by Capt before actioning each switch. Quote: Autothrottle Arm Switch ... Off Thrust Lever Left ... Closed Fuel Control Switch Left ... Cutoff Engine Fire Switch Left ... Pull If Fire Eng message remains - Engine Fire Switch Left ... Rotate to stop & hold 1 sec If Fire Eng message still displayed after 30 secs - Engine Fire Switch Left Rotate to other bottle Remember, neither pilot can see anything more than part of the wing tip on his side even when pressing ones cheek against the cockpit window. Capt must rely on significant information from ATC and/or cabin crew. BA Cabin Crew are authorized under certain 'catastrophic' circumstances to contact the flight crew directly rather than going through the Cabin Service Director/Purser. (Health Warning : author of above was a 35 year career with BA ending up as Capt 777 for his last 9 years before retiring over 5 years ago) |
I visited the US a few years back - Edinburgh - New York - Pittsburgh - Dallas (I think) - Las Vegas - New York - Edinburgh.
I was astonished how much carry on luggage people had, until I was told by my friends in Pittsburgh that bags were very frequently lost or had stuff stolen from them. I started taking my valuables in the cabin, had to buy an extra bag for them. |
If the concern is that people who took their hand baggage slowed others behind them, perhaps we should ban all things that delay quick evacuation.
Fat people. Old people. High heels. Unsuitable clothing. Children. Disabled people. Pregnant people. All these delay evacuation.... Some of them are even personal choice.... |
Can't believe the crew grabbed their hats! |
Baggage Policies
Just another thought for those criticising pax who take large amounts of luggage into the cabin. Many airlines now charge an additional fee - often substantial - for checking luggage into the hold. This system is rapidly educating customers to take as much as possible into the cabin with them free of charge. We increasingly see this as standard behaviour on all flights, regardless of the baggage policies offered by individual carriers.
If the industry is enthusiastically encouraging pax to keep luggage with them - reinforced by financial penalty for checking-in hold luggage - we cannot then complain when they take their full permitted quota into the cabin with them. The industry must take the lead on this. It is a problem induced by the policies of airlines themselves, not customers. We can't blame a regular family for avoiding the expense of discretionary hold baggage charges. They WILL bring maximum cabin baggage instead if they can. It is just common sense. |
The decision to open a door is left to the cabin crew member at that door. They look out, assess for danger and then decide. The crew member at L2 made a very good decision. To L1 and L4 it presumably looked clear, because it was.
Wallets, phones, passports are easily replaced. Hats on the other hand, are like rocking horse cr@p. Grap that, but throw your license on the fire, that should give you a nice long break. |
Mickj3
I merely expressed my surprise that deploying the port escape chutes was delivering the escaping passengers into what could be (in this scenario) a danger area. I am well aware that the pilot cannot see the engine from the cockpit and was perhaps unaware of the extent/seriousness of the fire. Hope that helps and reduces the element of surprise. |
The industry must take the lead on this. It is a problem induced by the policies of airlines themselves, not customers. We can't blame a regular family for avoiding the expense of discretionary hold baggage charges. They WILL bring maximum cabin baggage instead if they can. It is just common sense. Nice to see an intelligent post. The industry should have stamped on this marketing ploy (creating headline prices based on over more creative upselling policies) as soon as it appeared. It is human nature to reduce cost if it is possible - even wealthy people do this by deeply ingrained habit. It is also human nature to protect ones important belongings and finally it is human nature to act irrationally under extreme stress. If the industry wants an increased safety margin where baggage is concerned the answer is 100% in its own hands. Set a common standard for carry on baggage and enforce industry wide. The rest goes in the hold. Airlines can price it however they want, but not alter the standards. I'm sure there will be someone along to say it's not possible...but frankly it really is that simple. |
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