What happens next?
 

@tdracer: I appreciate your reiteration of the relationship, in terms of authority, between the FAA and NTSB. And I regret if my prior post lacked clarity.
The point I was reaching for is: when a given investigatory authority in a single country reaches conclusions (whether in the form of just recommendations or any other form presently in use by the various investigatory authorities around the world), and those conclusions relate to a problem or a set of problems which cut across national boundaries and implicate major components of the worldwide civil aviation system as a whole, what is the mechanism, the forum (no irony intended), for progress on solutions? There isn't, in the realm of civil aviation accident investigation boards or agencies, any umbrella group, or something akin to a "court of appeals", so, where can the multi-national problem-solving take place? Even if ICAO SARPs and other programming were implicated in how the AF447 and this incident unfolded (and no one is claiming they were implicated, as far as I recall), there isn't such a process in place at the Organization, as far as I know.
What I am trying to stir up, in terms of discussion, is the idea that in order to attack and redress problems like low-hours aviators who may be too reliant on automation generally, or too unfamiliar with recognition of imminent stall and recovery from stall, or the problem of airline management too cheapskate to allow for hand-flying to be experienced more extensively, the first action seems to be to create a forum (again, no irony intended) where the major constituents of, and participants in, what I will dare to call "the safety community" can conduct a broader problem-solving process than the country-by-country process as reflected in the interactions of FAA with NTSB, as noted by tdracer's post.

xcitation, #3771, thanks.

Situate, Aviate, Navigate, Communicate. :ok:
These concepts offer the potential for the most significant change in Human Factors / Airmanship training and operation in recent years.

The problem (not as a naysayer) is how to achieve this change. As much as we have difficulty in teaching the wide ranging aspects of ‘Aviate’ (flying as an art and skill), then ‘Situate’ appears even more obscure.
Many people are taught Situation Awareness by definition or level (text book), but without assurance of achievement; neither are we encouraged to practice what is a skill – that of thinking; the process of how to think, not what to think.
This problem could be the difference between implicit knowledge and tacit knowledge, e.g. we can be told how to ride a bike, but we learn how to ride a bike by doing it, … and once done never forgot, and with continual practice improved.

A view of training which might help. http://high-reliability.org/vanstral...ementation.pdf

@WillowRun, as you may be aware that the investigative process is overseen by ICAO; in this instance via the internationally agreed Annex 13 (not every State, and some have opt out clauses). There are also associated safety processes (forums) which include continued airworthiness (aircraft) and flight operations. Generally ICAO recommends, States implement, Authorities and Operators act.

In today’s complex operations the ICAO guidelines (even more so State / National interpretations) may hinder accident investigation, e.g. difficulties arising from the need to identify ‘probable cause’ and with the consideration of human factors.
Many, most accidents do not fit the old model of ‘cause and effect’; they are better represented with a systems view where outcomes emerge from ‘the seemingly random conjunction of many factors, each necessary, but in isolation not sufficient’ (James Reason, et al).

Therefore to improve safety it is necessary to encourage a systematic view, which currently is not at the forefront of safety activity, and international changes are slow. Fortunately several national investigators do venture into supposition and conjecture to provide more relevant understandings of the accident, but according to international agreements insufficient to recommend change.

An investigator can make recommendations to another State for action by a National Authority (more often operational issues); also recommend changes via the State of aircraft certification to a Manufacturer (technical issues). (ICAO Annex 13. 6.8 - 6.10)

Fortunately many National Authorities, Manufactures, and Operators will consider safety enhancements based on the subjective discussion, but this requires a ‘good’ report. IMHO this report is ‘fair to good’ given the circumstances.
Thus because more ‘worldly’ safety activity still requires factual arguments (evidence), the complexity and incredibility of modern accidents leads to frustration in judging how to manage the different points of view of safety actions, particularly where influenced by inherent human bias.
Even your examples reflect bias, suggesting that these points are known ‘causes’ (fact), whereas from a systems view they may only be contributions in a process applicable to a particular situation (probably never to be encountered again).

From the theories of high reliability organisations (the current level of safety qualifies aviation as such); it is difficult if not impossible to identify the mechanism of the next accident. It’s equally difficult to make effective recommendations from past accidents unless there is a change in safety views and processes.
Such changes take time, willingness, and understanding.

A lesson from quantum mechanics, first accept that nothing is certain.
We live and operate in an uncertain world, thus our safety activity must involve managing uncertainty, particularly where changes could be applied to aspects which were previously assumed to be satisfactory.
What was uncertain in this accident?

From a systems view, the industry’s problem is that we may not know what the problem is.
In ‘problem situations’ the human can be an asset in resolving the issue, but with ‘messy situations’ the problem is often the human.

How complex systems fail.

Systems Thinking.

We are not flying in quantum mechanics ! That is for very small scale.:=
We are not flying in general relativity ! That is for very high speeds:=.
We are not flying in the neuroscience bigdata and complexity.
:=
We are flying in the Newton world, and are able to be aware quickly of simple situations with KISS design, maintenance, teaching, training.:ok:

I subscribe to this.
Moreover, regarding KISS design, in my previous posts my intention is to show the necessity to clearly distinguish between overspeed vs stall, at high altitude, then the importance of having the AOA indicator or the bird (FPV) on PFD.
Another point is to clearly identify who does what, PIC, SIC or automation.
A more philosophical issue is the complexity of LAWs, especially the Alternate in combination with incipient stall condition when g is below 1.0 then a pitch input close to neural, i.e. 0.9g to 1.1g > 0.5g, for computers that is a Pull Up command that will bring THS at max NU. I think a simpler design would imply two laws Normal(all protections) and Direct(conventional), similar to Bombardier philosophy. All these changes should not imply a huge amount of money and it can be done quietly just by a simple software update, by bring the bird on PFD and revise the FCOM

roulis, I think most can agree that Quantum Mechanics may not apply directly but, if I may, that is not what is being suggested.

I interpret Safetypee's remarks as the recognition and acknowledgement of both complexity and uncertainty that requires a change in approach concerning the question, Why do "accidents" still occur?

Safetypee is seeking a model for understanding why accidents occur which may be more successful than the present Newtonian (Cartesian) model of classical physics.

Rather than wagging a finger, shouldn't we take our lessons from where we find them when confronted with aviation's Gordian Knot, human factors?

We must examine experience in other, perhaps-unfamiliar ways because, as SP has pointed out, the old interpretations of how accidents happen are showing themselves as no longer able to carry the potential for strong change and improvement. What imagination as much as we need knowledge.

Cartesian approach has largely resolved, (we cannot quite say eliminated) the old problems of mechanical failure, weather, navigation, communication, CFIT and mid-air collision. That is, aviation has resolved these direct causes through changes in technology.

Despite coming to terms with direct causes, accidents continue to occur is a result of human frailties - errors in perception, comprehension, or other "normal", human incapacities in complex, rapidly-changing systems and environments in which accidents presently seem to unfold.

We are moving back to the discussions several of us here had at length concerning AF447 on the Tech Log.

I disagree about going directly from "you can't stall or over-gee this plane" to "a pure stick displacement equals corresponding control surface movement". Several considerations regarding that implementation.

The whine I have is two ALTERNATE laws and a lack of training as to how the plane flies in either or both. Secondly, some things may be lost from the primary NORMAL law, but seems a few simple things could still be in play such as over-gee, as that can be derived from within the flight control computers themselves. Ditto for some of rates and pitch/roll limits. Finally, loss of air data should be no biggie, as several 'bus crews have demonstrated before and since AF447 - "standby gains" for many functions and basic "keep doing what you were doing" training.

Yes, the pilot is aware of pushing the envelope limits (tactile soft stops), so let him go through it in order to clear a cumulus granitus or the tree tops or allow to flare the plane over Hudson.
Details about soft stop in video below at 0:54
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=QN0qQrMaLYw
The direct law should not be spooky, but just a reversion to conventional flying. Many of Cseries tests were performed in direct:
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=OghtdzFXFoo

Many thanks, Safetypee and RDMII, for enlightening discussion. SP: "unless there is a change in safety views and processes"; RMDII: "change in approach concerning the question, Why do "accidents" still occur?" What would such a change - or changes (plural) - look like? (and if that question seems impertinently stated, then, is it even a useful question to ask, "is the present system moving in the right direction for such change or changes to occur?")

The "How Complex Systems Fail" article (the link to which SP provided) is at least 15 years old - can't help but wonder, how have any more current analyses looked at the overall complexity construct?... any differently, or differently in ways relevant to the general subject matter of the thread?

Also couldn't help but note a slight, not objection, but "reservation" about seeing ICAO Annex 13 as an "oversight" process or method relative to nationally-authorized safety boards or agencies (but it's not too important to discuss further right now).

Reading comments by RDMII & Safetypee over again, was reminded of the not-too-long ago ICAO Loss of Control In-Flight Symposium (May 20-22, 2014). Exclusively in the interest of contributing, possibly, to the discussion of safety improvements (however difficult those may be to identify, enunciate and make happen), much info apparently very relevant to observations by prior posters is listed in the Symposium program and Key Outcomes (presentation powerpoints also can be accessed - though lacking the intensity of videos of flight parameters - slides only).
The program for the Symposium:
http://www.icao.int/Meetings/LOCI/Do...enda_FINAL.pdf

and Key Outcomes:
http://www.icao.int/Meetings/LOCI/Do...20Outcomes.pdf

Control law reversion, etc
 

@ Phoenix.......

Good video links.

The point about "direct" is that the computers still bias your control stick deflection or pressure using some math function.

Is one degree of stick deflection equal one degree of elevator deflection? If not, what is the ratio?

Is ten pounds of stick force about like we used to feel with the fully hydraulic systems ( no mechanical linkages, just hydraulic pressure to move an actuator) that used pneumatic and spring doofers to provide a bit of feel. And BTW, are the stick movements at the same pressure regardless of how many degrees they move?

I have no problem with the test pilots using some DIRECT implentation initially, then going to the NORMAL mode. But I have no idea of the gains or control input ratios to control surface movement or even how fast they move ( rate of surface movement).

Hooray for Bombardier. I like their approach.

But I still wannna see some charts and graphs.

Thanks Gums! Soon CS100 will get the type certificate, then more data will be available publicly (in Canada or Tech Log )

If it's not possible to link sticks mechanically, disallow for dual input mode altogether. Too much complexity. One stick has control, the other is blocked, in order to make it clear for the respective pilot, that he has no control.

In case of takeover-button conflict, the captain gets priority.

@WillowRun, even with some heartening views expressed at the symposium there are few indications that the industry is changing, excepting perhaps some aspects of SMS.
The reluctance to change could represent the difficulty in changing culture, which conventionally might take a generation. In that respect 15 yr old thoughts could still be valid, more likely they represent exceptional forward thinking. For more recent views see Cook and Hollnagel, refs.

Ah, Annex 13 ‘Oversight’ – perhaps ‘Overarching Standards and Practices’ is better.

One ‘change’ initiative, amongst others is the awkwardly termed ‘Resilient Engineering’ - to build resilience (and how to spring forward, not back to an original positon).
The fundamental concept seeks a different way of thinking about safety – safety is not something to have, but that which is done. Furthermore, safety thinking should be against the backdrop of what happens in every-day situations – the successes, and most importantly to view humans as an asset, not as a hazard. Also, by comparing ‘work as done’ against ‘work as imagined’, any gaps in safety assumptions could be understood.
With understanding and improving the ‘successes’ there should be less opportunity for the failures. Unfortunately this assumes that the industry does not demand more activity, in more complex operational system, and the need to work near to the edge of established safety boundaries.
Distantly this can reflect the gap between researches seeking to better understand human behaviour (know-what) vs the industry’s need for the ‘know-how’ to enable current academic views to be implemented, an aspect which is reflected in some symposium presentations (inconsistent HF, CRM, TEM, training).

The change of view above is often defined as ‘Safety 2’, unfortunately with the potential for misinterpretation as a replacement for what we do now – Safety 1. I subscribe to the concept of “Safety 1 and Safety 2”. S1 has enabled today’s successes and should not be totally rejected, but in order to progress – high reliability organisation, complex operations, etc, S1 and S2 could provide the means for managing the uncertain nature of modern operations and reducing the potential for major accidents. Additionally, S2 thinking in areas of S1 may add unseen safety advantage, particularly in the ‘safety – commerce’ balance which could be overly subjected to S1 type commercial thinking.

A practical aspect RE starts with Learning, and then cycling though Responding, Monitoring, and Anticipating. The cycle can be entered at any point, i.e. Learn from accidents, Monitor the Responses made based on what has been learnt, which could provide the Anticipation to avoid or minimise the effect of future events, even to the point in not being exposed to situations which could not have been foreseen – we never know - uncertainty.
The points of learning should not require massed evidence or deep understanding; they could be questions about what is done ‘normally’, individually or collectively. Thus relating to this accident ‘what is the normal cruise seat positon’, ‘can full control be achieved from this position’, ‘is the SOP to follow the FD overstated’, ‘how is the FD interpreted’, ‘should we leave our seat to switch systems’, trim, etc.
With answers to these then the responses the required safety activity should be clearer, quicker, and pertinent to operations opposed to time-delaying regulation and training.

Resilience Engineering.

Introduction to S-I and S-II.

Resilience Analysis Grid.

The Resilient Organisation.

From Safety 1 to Safety 2

and for roulishollandais, et al; Non-Newtonian View of Accidents.

Alarming...
 

As I'm sure the poster of the above knows, Part 25 certificated aircraft are tested for structural behaviour (flutter) up to VD/MD, but not above. Above VD/MD all bets are off and the designer has no more data for you. Flutter can develop in seconds and can be catastrophic in only a few more. To take the A320 as an example, MD is approximately MMO+20 knots at FL390. If you allow your aircraft a '50 knot overspeed', then you are not only conducting experimental flight test, you're doing a research programme that's unlikely to end well.

In contrast, all Part 25 aircraft have to demonstrate safe stall characteristics, and there's no reason why AoA should develop to 40° unless you hold the aircraft into the stall. Even then it should be recoverable with the published technique for your type.

Let's all be REALLY careful what we post on this professional forum, and REALLY careful what we read and believe. Let's base ourselves on the facts. Seriously.

Careful of WHAT? Seriously.

Better advice of immediate use for those pontificating to those reading would be to be "REALLY careful" when flying with fully aft stick. :hmm:

Flying in alternate law
 

Can someone who actually flies a bus tell me

Are you trained /practiced in flying in alternate law at cruise altitude?

Is there any policy that says pilots should / should not recieve this training?

Why/ Why not ?

Overspeed vs Crazy AoA.
Surely there are too many variables to say which is preferable:
how much energy a/c has, are the engines at idle and how long until they can be safely spooled up without providing a pitch moment due to under slung turbines, is pilot 2 whisking mayo, how much altitude above and below, traffic, terrain, wx, aircraft hot high and heavy, are we in a war zone. :confused:

SOLUTION
 

There are only two realistic solutions to the problems we are having in aviation with perfectly flyable planes crashing and killing the pour souls on board.

1.The PIC must be highly experienced and well-trained in all scenerios.By this I mean at least 7-10000 hours in general, and a comprehensive simulator syllabus.

2.The F/O might be low hours meaning only 200-300, that is okay but must have a significant simulator training syllabus as well, not the cheapskate rubbish now being accepted.

In order for these things to happen a lot of money needs to be allocated.What we have now is just crap.The airlines know it and the regulators are just going along with it, both have a lot blood already on their filthy hands.

In my opinion the problem is not that mystical or of serious systemic deficiency requiring drastic modifications but of insufficient knowledge of effects of flight controls in alternate law. With all protection removed applying and holding full back stick is very dangerous and totally unwarranted. In alternate law at lower levels even with EGPWS warning you don't do it. If this is done with sufficient speed the aircraft will do a loop. With rate of roll doubling pilots action on roll should be very gentle. At higher cruise levels to do all this is sheer madness. In alternate law you never, ever pull and hold back stick. If this simple thing was instilled during training and flying these accidents would never have happened. Following are my inputs to some of the suggestions by members:
At cruise levels let alone alternate law but it is simply not possible to even fly manually due to RVSM.
Having only experienced PIC is ridiculous because one has to start as inexperienced to get experience.
In AB FBW in direct law computers do not modify pilot inputs, it is a linear direct relationship between stick and elevators. Except max elevator deflection is function of C of G.
About shiny red button, fear of pilots using it is not unreal. If they can reset forbidden CBs then nothing prevents them practicing in direct law by using the button and erroneous activation of a protection can be handled in alternate law. Why is it so difficult to understand that in alternate law you never use the side stick to any extreme, leave alone pulling the stick back and holding it there? which is what started it all.
In Airbus FBW there is only one way to take over controls and that is by pressing the take over button. One needs to develop the habit.

phylosocopter #3818, an interesting thought, where it would be logical to assume that pilots would have some exposure to alternate law. Yet the law is only an ‘alternate’ and does not, as AFAIU, pose any great difficulty in control; more so with protections in place.
A different question could ask if crews have been exposed to the situations where their apparent inability to fly in alternate law was noticed, but these are very rare and often unforeseeable. Why attempt to train every 1 in 10-9 event, which represents impossible reactive safety, we never catch up. Why not ‘ask’ (determine) how many pilots inappropriately (foreseeably) pull CBs in flight.

A different approach is to consider the problem at a higher level. The informative presentation Managing Startle gives some well-constructed views of the human issues, but even then solutions to the ‘how to’ problems of imparting and refreshing knowledge, teaching and practicing SA, and need to plan ahead, are not outlined.

The underlying problem appears in both teaching relevant knowledge – ‘know what’ (but who decides on what is relevant), and the much more difficult acquisition of ‘know-how’ skills, when and where to use the knowledge.
From a previous post, you can provide knowledge of how to ride a bike, but you have to do ‘it’ to be skilful. What is the ‘it’ in flying (not the hands on bit) that is so elusive, perhaps we have to get on our metaphorical bikes to find out.

Of course you do it, unless you don't mind ground contact ...
Apply full back stick, just don't hold it when approaching the stall speed or buffet is coming.

You demonstrate "insufficient knowledge of effects of flight controls in alternate law."
Or are they too many laws in the Airbus world ... ?

CONF iture
You don't apply full back stick in alternate law but steadily pull up to stall warning, by stalling you won't avoid ground contact. In alternate law You pull full back stick if you want to do a loop which in absence of pitch attitude protection is possible. I have made points very clear and you haven't added anything. In any case your opinions about airbus are more visceral than technical. You seem to be supporting the unnecessary rapid full pitch inputs in these accidents and suggesting revolutionary changes in aircraft design which are not going to happen.

May be I formulated my point in an unclear way. So I try to rephrase, since I consider it important.

VD/MD of the A320 is 381kt / M0.89. As we usually don't fly over 340kt / M0.80, and we were talking the high level case, '50kt overspeed' is a rough ballpark just to show that you can go very far on this side of the performance.

In reality you will have an extremely hard time to bring your aircraft to such an overspeed in high level. It needs considerable pitch down plus engines at full steam to accelerate that fast (if I remember correctly we talk about a pitch down of 7.5° compared to the pitch before plus full thrust but certification pilots will sure correct me on that).

If you cruise happily along with AP/FD/ATHR on and suddenly the alarm bells go on or your plane is throwing ECAM failures at you, there is ZERO need to be ****-scared about overspeed. If you are overspeed, it won't be in any lethal way, just gently fly your plane out of it. No need to pull the stick fully backwards.

In such a situation, while you pull GENTLY out of the overspeed, AOA should be your concern, because it doesn't take a lot of degree pitch up to stall at such levels.

Once you are in the fully developed stall (high AOA due to low forward speed due to huge drag due high pitch), it takes a lot of pitch down to make your wing fly again (you basically have to pitch down nearly to your flight path vector), then a lot of time to accelerate again to a speed that supports level flight, and again a lot of time to gently change your flight path from rapid dive to level flight. I don't want to image how many thousands of feet that takes.

@ conf and vila

If the DIRECT law has a completely linear plot from zero stick/elevator to full deflection, then how does cee gee come into play? Show me the plot of deflection/stick pressure versus control deflection. 45 degree line? Is a degree of stick equal to a degree of elevator movement? Maybe it's 1:2 or 2:1 or whatever.


I have to agree that full stick deflections are not always the way to go even in NORMAL laws. I also point out that the two 'bus crashes we have dissected appear to indicate very little buffet or shaking or such that many of us here were used to in other jets.

TNX 1201, you sound like the crowd that thinks "don't just do something, sit there"

Hey Gums, see the graph in reference below at page 112.
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2008/d-la...a081127.en.pdf

At the bottom of page, the flight law switched from normal to direct = "intuitively" alternate law + landing gear extended, between 15:45:15 to 15:45:40. See the purple and green curves are proportional, however the elevator is at 75% (12.5 deg out of of 17 deg) for stick at full ND.
Note: Interesting for pitch in alternate law, the stick to elevator relationship, is opposite ?!
As per FCOM, the pitch in direct law is a direct stick-to-elevator relationship (elevator deflection is proportional to stick deflection). However, maximum elevator deflection varies as a function of CG. No protections are available.

Negative - GPWS requires to apply full back stick - Alternate law is still a load factor demand law as Normal law is - Load factor protected - Apply full back stick, let the law working, just don't hold it when approaching the stall speed or buffet is coming.
As instructor you pretend to be, that you disseminate false information is a bit disturbing.

For GPWS warning, Airbus gives no other choice. Alternate laws work the same except the responsibility to avoid stalling will be yours so full back stick you cannot hold for ever.
And of course Direct law is something else totally ...
I know ... many laws !

Re decoupled sidesticks and possible involvement on AF447 and AirAsia, it was already mentioned in this thread the new G500 and G600 will have "active sidesticks" which are electronically coupled.

I just saw this brief video that explains it:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vXhCJYWvwd0

The system is made by BAE. I wonder what the cost/risk/complexity would be to retrofit this to an Airbus?

Commercial Active Sticks - An Active Role | BAE Systems | United States

However this FlightGlobal article says BAE has no plans to offer it as a retrofit option:
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/ar...-aircr-411455/

1201,

Thanks for that clarification. I certainly agree with you that a heavy pull on the stick at high altitude to avoid an overspeed is inadvisable. But let's not underplay the risks of exceeding VD/MD. And I'm talking about a real overspeed here, not a falsely indicated one in the unreliable airspeed case.

The Part 25 VD/MD tests require the dive to be held for 20 seconds, which isn't that long really, and at less than full power. The testing is one aspect of determining VD/MD, but be clear that the aircraft won't have been flown above that speed.

The extreme AoAs reached in the Air Asia and AF cases were the result of pulling and holding the aircraft into the stall. A correct recovery flown at the point of stall warning, or even at the stall itself, will not lead to such AoA, or to huge altitude losses.

What I'm saying is that the stall case is recoverable, but that the result of flutter probably won't be.

You're not Buzz Aldrin, by any chance?!

It sorta stretches the imagination to see AB endorsing such an item that they don't offer "in house"....

...maybe one day after it is offered as a nextgen option to a neoneo model 350 then maybe the wheels might start turning for such a retrofit

https://www.faa.gov/training_testing...olume1/4d3.pdf


TERRAIN AVOIDANCE PROCEDURE


Applicable to FBW aircraft: A319, A320, A321, A330, A340 in NORMAL LAW


Immediately:


- THRUST LEVERS TOGA


I- A/P DISCONNECT
- SIDE-STICK* PULL UP, WINGS LEVEL


- SPD BRK Check retracted


[f necessary, use full back stick and maintain a max speed until terrain clearance is assured,


(GPWS warning ceased and radio altitude increasing).


When flight path is safe, decrease pitch and accelerate.

When speed above VLs and V/S positNe, retract flap and gear as required.




*In pitch alternate or direct law, pull up aggressively, wings level. if necessary, maintain speed at stall warning until terrain clearance assured.

Not sure what you mean by "in house", but BAES hasn't been part of the AB consortium for many years. I'm sure that if approached by AB as a potential customer for this sidestick they'd be delighted to negotiate a sale of sidesticks for AB to integrate and certify on their aircraft.

PDR

:ok: Not at all, just a strong admirer of what these guys managed to pull of in the Apollo program. It seems I am not alone with that.

C'mon CONF, as Vilas has posted, you only use full stick if you have to and you still have some "protections" ( tho I call them "limits").

Problem is we have ALT1 and then ALT2 and then DIRECT. Good grief!!!

I do not like DIRECT unless in a high-performance jet fighter that pilots can handle or a modified DIRECT that has given relations of stick displacement to control surface displacement, and then there's the rates/gains to consider.

Sheesh.

I do not see a lotta engineers here or pilots that went thru the birth of FBW and all the "laws". Many things to incorporate and many inputs to the computers. Human factors played a large role back in the 70's. The current discussion about not having sticks connected is a good example. Ditto for "pressure" versus "displacement" of the controls, be they yokes/wheels/sticks or touchpads.

I still dont get this.

If the aircraft is not carrying persons who can fly it in alternate or direct law at cruise altitude how can it be certified to be there ?

Thats regulatory failure.

If it is not certified to fly at cruise except in normal law then how can it be certified whithout an agreed process for getting from cruise to some other altitude in event of law degredation.

So vilas, where does it say "Do not apply full back stick" ... ?
Make your own procedures as you like, but they're not from Airbus.

Not too sure why vilas choose to post a paper old of 20 years, but just opening the actual FCOM in the emergency procedures and GPWS ALERTS will put things straight :
"PULL UP"
Pull to full backstick and maintain in that position

No choice really - Maintain if you're fully protected in Normal law, but don't if you're only partially protected to respect the stall warning.
Alternate law in pitch is still a load factor demand with maneuver protection included, why wouldn't you take advantage of it if it can save you from hitting the ground ?

Vilas makes rules that are not in the books.

I've been a private pilot for years and I'm an emergency doctor with an interest in human factors.

Surely, there is a basic design flaw in a system which hands the aircraft back to the pilot in an emergency in one of a number of different control modes, all of which have different levels of protection and response to control inputs. The pilot, already stressed and faced with an emergency situation, cannot fly the aircraft automatically, but has to devote much of his higher cognitive function to trying to remember what he should and shouldn't be doing in this particular mode and what happens with different control deflections. For responses to be automatic and instinctive in this kind of situation, where there are so many different variables, seems to me like it would require a frequency of recurrent training and a level of basic handling skill which may be untenable.

Aircraft need to be designed to be flown by idiots, because some day one will.

Conf
What you are repeatedly saying is true only in normal law. You never pull full back stick in alternate. If you can quote any document stating you pull full back stick even in alternate law I will accept it. I don't make procedures but only keep quoting airbus documents unless there is a discussion where opinions are expressed. Even quoting airbus has irritated some people.

"Manual flying" is just an illusion. Basically, pilot sends impulses to computer: up/down, left/right, the rudder is a footrest. So the aircraft is already designed to transform a pilot in idiot, but you need superman to fly the alternate laws.

_Phoenix;

I'm sure what is said below will be familiar to you - just reiterating some of the characteristics of the Airbus system for the discussion. I don't intend here to be pedantic or instructive.

With that in mind..., "manual flying" has been an illusion for over fifty years.

The DC8 ailerons and rudder were hydraulically-powered with spring-tab backup while the elevator was cable-pulley & tab. Boeing had introduced hydraulic flight controls on the B707 in the late-50's.

Back then, it was fluid that sent the impulses - today it's electrons. Springs on control column/control wheel circuits & mechanisms provided feedback to the pilot.

The AB SS provides such feedback by the same method, (springs), so doing steep turns, for example, in either Normal, Alternate or Direct laws, the stick has to be held back more firmly when the bank angle is exceeds 33°.

What may be confusing to some, particularly when discussing the Airbus, is the difference between C* laws in FBW systems, and the various protections that may be built into EFCS systems. FBW in and of itself, offers no "protections"; FBW is just another way of moving flight control surfaces. "Protections" are possible because the system is digital and as we all know, anything that can be imagined can also be done with digital signals.

The rudder pedals have been, and should absolutely continue to be a footrest except in the usual circumstances with which pilots are familiar - crosswind landings and engine-out yaw control.

You do not need, "superman to fly the alternate laws", (an exaggeration I'm sure). What you actually need is a thorough understanding of the airplane and that comes, as always, with training, experience and continuous learning through staying in the books, (which is something I really wonder about in today's pilots, who seem to be discouraged by managements, (who are focussed entirely on slavishly following SOPs rather than encouraging airmanship and thinking), from deepening their knowledge of systems, high-altitude, high-speed, swept-wing flight by study, and reading accident reports.

Alternate Law circumstances are regularly-trained in the sim as a result of system failures which are in the script. Alternate law is a non-event; the airplane is conventional in the sense that one just flies the airplane normally, including respecting the stall warning. When actually flying the airplane, the change in laws is essentially transparent to the pilot. The cautions (and therefore the responsibility for knowledge of one's airplane), are related to loss of protections, not to any "special handling" requirements due to FBW.

I don't think you can say that computers have transformed pilots into "idiots" any more than hydraulics have.

Even as technology is never neutral or innocent, it is, in my view, the abuse of the tools that has done so because airline managements began assuming that "these airplanes fly themselves", and so require/mandate that the autoflight systems be engaged as soon as possible after takeoff and remain engaged until the landing rollout is completed. Asian carriers monitor this with FDM, a wholly inappropriate abuse of a safety technology, so disconnecting and doing something with the airplane is both an institutionalized fear as well as a safety problem. A more irresponsible mandate on the part of an air carrier could not perhaps be conceived/implemented, but there it is - a growing generation of "pilots" who can't fly and who are increasingly afraid to try.

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Correct! :ok: