It is possibly relevant, but as a background, AD 2014-0217 was originally issued in mid-2014 (before the AirAsia accident) in response to the AA587 A300-600 accident in Queens -- referred to in the AD as "one accident on another aircraft type" -- and a second incident on an A319. The AD added logic to reduce tail plane stress and to activate a Stop Rudder Input Warning (SRIW) function.

The AD quoted above (2014-0217R1) was a revision to update the minimum FAC part numbers required to support SRIW. This revision was requested by Airbus because the original AD had left out a couple Service Bulletins. (The updated SBs were also issued before the AirAsia accident).

Now according to rumors... on the accident aircraft both FACs were shut-off simultaneously, possibly via circuit breakers. If true, then the above AD is a moot point really. The FACs can't provide protections if they are turned off.

So although the AirAsia accident might have involved rudder limits, the above AD was not released in response to this accident, and the promulgated changes even if implemented wouldn't have had any bearing on the accident's outcome.

Great.:rolleyes:
Another sound that the pilot has to respond to immediately, probably under conditions of great stress.:mad:

It's "only" a warning... the FAC should automatically limit rudder loads regardless of pilot response.

From the BBC, 27 November 2015:

AirAsia shares slide on poor earnings results - BBC News

Some FAC Rudder Faults
 

Just *Some FAC computer failure SDRs.


(*Data is limited because SDR non-reporting is still running at over 60 % for this year).

12 A-300 Series SDRs /Problem Descriptions / (Cause) FAC Computer / Part Number (P/N).

Briefs Only.See SDR Full Texts at FAA Query, Link > http://av-info.faa.gov/sdrx/Query.aspxJust enter SDR Number, and Hit Query.

3/20/14.SDR # and Link > USAA2014032100017 “Tail kicked, bumped multible times”. P/N B397BAM0513.
6/30/13.SDR # and Link > USAA2013070100015 “Banked, Felt in Rudder Pedals”. P/N B397BAM0513.
6/3/13. SDR # and Link > USAA2013060400023 “Uncommandedmomentary input”. P/N B397BAM0513.
12/7/12. SDR # and Link > USAA2012121000012 “Yawed – 5 seconds”.P/N B397BAM0513.
8/10/12. SDR # and Link > USAA2012081300019 “Fast uncommanded movement”. P/N B397BAM0513.
7/25/12. SDR # and Link > UALA2012072704071 “Uncommanded movement”. P/N B397BAM0513.
4/19/10. SDR # and Link > UALA2010041901293 “Substantial yaw”.P/N 3945128206.
3/19/11. SDR # and Link > UALA2011032101332 “Sudden yaw movement’. P/N B397BAM0513.
2/2/10.SDR # and Link > UALA2010020300427 “Yaw felt in cockpit”.P/N B397BAM0513.
4/14/09.SDR # and Link > CA090421011“Rudder kick, veered on runway”. P/N B397BAM0513.
5/13/07.SDR # and Link > NWAA071863251“Hard rudder kick”.P/NB397BAM0515.
12/3/02.SDR # and Link > AALA20021725 “Yawed Several Times”. P/NB471AAM7.Also see ASRS Report # 567765, - “61 PRIOR EVENTS”.


End --

QZ8501 WARMUP
 

We must be getting close. The local news is in anticipation of the accident report:
AirAsia QZ8501 crash findings expected on Tuesday - Channel NewsAsia

Per earlier report (last page), the NTSC press conference is still scheduled for December 1, 2pm Jakarta time (less than 12 hours from now...)

To sum up the report in three words.

Rubbish Training standards. In all corners of their business.

Again, blame the dead - flight crew action resulted in inability to control the aircraft ...
Final report is released:
http://kemhubri.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_home/ntsc.htm

Forensics
 

Wow!

I'm impressed - no joke! - that they can detect a cracked solder joint when a plane crashes into the sea with what was probably very high deceleration.

I think this quote from the report sums it up:

Summary:

• Aircraft had a history of numerous Rudder Travel Limiter Unit faults which were never resolved
• During the accident flight, the crew received three consecutive Master Cautions related to the RTLUs, which they cleared via ECAM actions
• After a fourth Master Caution, FAC 1 & 2 were reset by pulling the Circuit Breakers
• The aircraft went to Alternate Law
• Aircraft rolled 54 degrees left
• FO applied sidestick input to roll right and pitch up
• FO continued to pitch up as the aircraft zoomed to 38,000 ft at 11,000 fpm
• Aircraft entered a stall
• FO continued to apply maximum pitch up (until the end of recording)
• Captain attempted to take over by pressing the left-sidestick priority button for 2 seconds (*)
• DUAL INPUT activated and the aircraft continued to pitch up
• Captain attempted another take over by pressing the sidestick priority button for 2 seconds (*)
• Aircraft recorded lowest speed of 55 kts, 104 degrees left roll, and then descended at up to 20,000 fpm until the end of recording

(*) The sidestick priority button doesn't latch unless it is activated continuously for 40 seconds

"Push" vs "pull" seems to have contributed to the obvious confusion

"Issues such as flight approval considered did not contribute to the accident and was not investigated. The FDR data did not show any indication of the weather condition affecting the aircraft."

In the earlier discussion in this thread there was a feeling that bad weather was a significant factor.

wheels down

If we are honest, I don't think anyone has done a particularly good job with UPRT or extended stall envelope so far, whether it be regulators, OEMs, Training Organisations, TDMs or Airlines. Lots of talk , many committees etc these past years but not much concrete action.

Organisations such as ICATEE have been around for a long, long time now yet there is very limited progress at the delivered end of the training business.

How many crews today could really state they have received comprehensive UPRT or stall training? I would hazard a guess that not that many.

Hi,

Summary:
Remake AF447
Not the same root cause .. but the same effects
Pull on the joystick with stall alarm all the way down ....
How many deaths will be needed for that ...

Resetting FACs by CB inflight......not sure I have seen that written down anywhere? :ugh:

I'm not an A'bus pilot (Boeing only)but I'd be keen to know what the QRH / ECAM response should have been to this repeated warning? I'm pretty sure it isn't to reset a CB in flight.

Spot on. UPRT training (or lack of) is a red herring. Better UPRT could have allowed the crew to recover but there was no reason for the aircraft to end up in that position in the first place.

By use of this non standard cb reset on BOTH FACs, this crew (for whatever reason) put the a/c into ALTN LAW and their inputs subsequently put it into a position from which they could not recover.

In fact, not only is the FAC reset not included in the computer reset QRH table, the table also says (in a big red box) - WARNING DO NOT RESET MORE THAN ONE COMPUTER AT A TIME.

The RTLU fault is a non event. Following the ECAM drill would have stopped the nuisance cautions and the a/c would have been Cat 3A and perfectly flyable. Unless you need Cat 3B, why even try a reset? Especially after 3 previous faults that flight?

The aircraft remained perfectly flyable even after the crew actions disabled the FACs and after they lost control - at this point, UPRT became a potential factor - primarily for the FO though as it appears the CA was trying to make appropriate inputs to recover.

Ultimately though, if the crew had done nothing about the minor RTLU fault, the aircraft would not have crashed.

The correct ECAM response is on page 15 of the report: reset both FACs, using the pushbuttons on the overhead panel.

Between 2300 and 2315, they suffered four failures of the RTLU, the time between the events decreasing from 9 to 4 and then 2 minutes. That's a lot of nuisance.

But when you consider the ground troubleshooting episode three days earlier that is described on pg. 21, it is understandable why the captain, in his growing frustration, decided to try it.

@Cripple I wouldnt say its a red herring

Although clearly the crew contributed/created the upset, their inability to recover the plane - similar to AF447 - is of grave concern.


:ouch:

It shouldn't bloody matter how many computers you reset, in what order, or why, or what 'law' you end up in as a result.

A pair of ATPLs should be able to avoid stalling a basically serviceable aircraft into the bloody drink from FL380!

As usual in most accidents, nothing is quite so simple.

1) The reset table in the QRH isn't limiting. The table only provides information about which computers are most prone to be reset. It does not mean other computers cannot be reset. The FAC is not listed among computers which are not allowed to be reset, and the caution against pulling certain CBs also do not list the FAC CBs.

2) The Captain did not reset both FACs at once. In fact he did them sequentially. FAC 1 was pulled at 2316:29 UTC and was re-energized by 2316:39. FAC 2 CB was only pulled seven seconds later, at 2316:46.

Unfortunately, even though FAC 1 had been re-energized, it was still inactive. Resetting the CB was not sufficient to reactivate the FAC, since the FAC's overhead pushbutton must also be toggled to OFF and then back to ON.

So even though the Captain had restored power to FAC 1, and its pushbutton was at the "ON" position, FAC 1 remained unavailable. When FAC 2 CB was pulled, the aircraft went into Alternate Law.

Cripple,

There seem to be a few red herrings here. The important stuff seems to be:

• They pulled the CBs (what were they thinking?).
• Both watched the aircraft roll for 9 seconds to 54° without doing anything.
• The FO zoom climbed with controlled (not full) backstick.
• The CP is calling Pull Down repeatedly. The fatal language error?
• From the stall, the CP is applying full roll with modulated pitch, the FO is applying full back stick with modulated roll.
• The "stall stall" and "dual input" continue to the impact, with no effect on the crew.

The report is quick to point out that the FO is applying incorrect inputs, but reluctant to report that the CP is doing the same. They key graph is on page 51, with STKPC (decode: stick, pitch, capt).

I'm starting to think that we need to change the stall warning from "STALL STALL" "STALL whoop whoop PUSH DOWN". Or does the industry need a third full-backstick-until-impact event before we make changes?

+1 What he said.

I’m not an airline pilot but a medic. In the end result, this is a similar crash to AF447 in that there was a very distracted crew in an aeroplane that had its automatic protections off, who were then unable to recognise a pilot induced stall and kept the plane in a stalled condition until it crashed. I can’t believe that experienced pilots don’t know about stalling. There will be other human factors involved such as psychological barriers in a crisis to accepting that the familiar rules have just changed, and that a normally “unstallable” aeroplane might, on this occasion, be doing just that. This should be considered as a training issue.

Of course they should. And no doubt this thread will gain many more posts saying the same thing.

But the constructive question is: why did two pilots, qualified to the levels the industry requires, fail to do what they were required to do?

Why?

That's the question that needs to be answered, and then the problem addressed. It's no good saying "idiots, move on".

Is there an issue with non-yoke inexperienced pilots just pulling up when in trouble (training conditioning from W/S, GPWS etc)? Are these problems caused by a complete lack of high altitude flight training? Is this a language/culture issue? Startle? Fatigue?

Stall Warnings
 

from page 108

First WarningSecond WarningThe FDR recorded that after the first stall warning, the right side stick input was consistently backward. Could the PF become so fixated on levelling the wings that he was oblivious to pitch?

Hierarchy?
 

It's strange. So many times posters on pprune have pointed out accidents caused by the strictly hierarchical structure of Asian society.

Yet here we have an accident which could have been prevented by the captain telling the FO "I have control", instead of fighting between the two sidesticks.

Why?

Dual Input
 

Of note in the report,

However, the CVR did not record “DUAL INPUT” voice message as it was suppressed by “STALL” voice warning.

I have to strongly disagree. He made what was an annoyance into a fatal accident by becoming a test pilot. It would be in the inflight reset list if it was a sensible procedure.

From the QRH
In this case if it was really annoying emergency cancel the caution then ground the aircraft after landing.

Has anyone explored whether the FO in this accident and the FO of AF447 may have trained on the same programme given their nationalities? Unlikely but a slim possibility.

Surely that should not be necessary? All the captain has to do is declare he has control of the aircraft. It's fairly obvious that he knew what to do and the FO didn't.

Could there be some unusual dynamic here, e.g. the Indonesian captain somehow feels inferior to the European FO? Surely not.

because...
 

Because of the level of the industry.

Upset recovery training is new to the industry, post-AF447. As is the strong enphasis of the "I have control" magical words (think: proper task sharing and cross-cockpit communication), that may have saved that day.

That's the point.

Is this the time where we have to have a long hard look at where pilots come from and what is "adequate" in terms of ability, training and experience? Or is it a function of the fact that aircraft now are so reliable, that exposure to things going wrong for real is so small that pilots are not able to cope?

In the past, aircraft were less reliable, so we all had exposure (horribly regular) to things going wrong. Now it is common to achieve command without a diversion or a circling approach. Let alone the a/p dumping you into a state with lots of untrimmed yaw.

My thoughts are that this has to be addressed in the sim. More sim time, and most importantly, less of the prescribed statutory "events" and more random stuff with a focus on initial actions. Once the startle is overcome and the initial quick diagnosis and initial actions done correctly, there is a much greater chance of a successful outcome.

Sim, sim, sim. Sadly though, the mantra is cost, cost, cost.

History repeating itself again....
 

I agree 100% with One Hundred Percent. The Coroner at the Air France 447 Inquest in 2013 highlighted a tendency for over-reliance on automation coupled with insufficient training. Deja vu.

I would bet my last £1 that if put in a briefing classroom and asked the following questions, both pilots would give these answers:

Q. How do you recover from a stall?
A. Reduce the AoA by lowering the nose.

Q. How do you take control?
A. By pushing and holding the takeover pb, and saying "I have control".

Yet the startle, or fear, has resulted in an initial mess. 9 seconds is a long time to intervene when the aircraft banked 53° left. What was the thought process? Was it assumed that this was the a/p? When the a/p dropped out, did the FO read the FMAs? Did he do a micro-diagnosis? Did he see/say "Alternate Law"? Did he see the beta target?

Once in a mess, the fear has escalated (ref the captain's verbal comment) and recovery is 100 times harder.

It's not "recovery from unusual attitudes" that needs training, it's "recovery from an instant and unusual condition" that needs attention. How to approach this, the mental discipline required (as well as the operational discipline).

Curiously, our last sim cycle (A320) included "startle" and unusual attitude recovery. More to be done, industry-wide, I think.

I believe Swiss and 100% are correct. Our modern world which includes cheap flights for all comes at a price - we will kill a few hundred every now and again. No part of the "system" we fly under can be absolved - including ATC with their pathetic noise maximisation procedures and prohibition of visual approaches. Everything we do is driven by cost - cheaper is perceived as being better. Our training is cut to the minimum prescribed, clowns in flight ops. departments prohibit things like manual flight and manual thrust and we spend our entire lives saving pennies. The same rot has moved into our technical departments. The clever little MBA whizz-kids have worked out how few spares we needs to carry and how little time we need to fix things so that engineers are nown under pressure to release aircraft they would prefer not to. And all of this is overseen by imbeciles like EASA (stress on the middle syllable).

We will have a kill a few more thousand and get the public really scared of flying cheaply before things will change.

PM

That the FAA would certify a commercial aircraft designed with duel flight controls which have no tactile feedback between the two pilots is unconscionable!

Boeing driver here...

Does it really, I mean really.....take 40 bloody seconds to override the other sidestick?