Stall warning
 

The question of stall warning is interesting indeed. Remember that the Airbus AoA protection should prevent stall in Normal Law. The probability of being in Alternate or Direct Law AND the crew allowing the aircraft to get into the stall regime is minute, regardless of how often we discuss the tiny number of cases in which his has happened. Nonetheless, these accidents demand a response.

The question is then; in the cases under discussion, did the crew fail to recognise the stall condition, or recognise it but fail to react effectively? There is some evidence that at least one pilot in both the AF and Air Asia recognised a need to push forward on the stick.

Should Airbus provide tactile artificial stall warning in reversionary flight control laws? Historically, aircraft were designed to give natural stall warning through buffet. Where this was inadequate, or the consequences of a full stall were intolerable (deep stall, for example), artificial stall warning was added in the form of stick shakers or even AoA protection in the form of stick pushers. Another important certification requirement is that the pilot be able to clearly identify the stall itself. The following is the relevant part of CS25:

d) The aeroplane is considered stalled
when the behaviour of the aeroplane gives the
pilot a clear and distinctive indication of an
acceptable nature that the aeroplane is stalled.
(See AMC 25.201 (d).) Acceptable indications of
a stall, occurring either individually or in
combination, are –

(1) A nose-down pitch that cannot be
readily arrested;

(2) Buffeting, of a magnitude and
severity that is a strong and effective
deterrent to further speed reduction; or

(3) The pitch control reaches the aft
stop and no further increase in pitch attitude
occurs when the control is held full aft for a
short time before recovery is initiated.

If the above cannot be satisfied through the natural characteristics of the aeroplane, then the manufacturer must fit artificial devices. In the case of the Airbus types under discussion, deterrent buffet is always reached before the point of stall, and the stall itself is naturally benign. The deterrent buffet is of such a magnitude that I doubt a pilot would reliably feel a stick shaker. Aerodynamic buffet has always been the classic natural indication of stall, from the most basic light aircraft upwards. The Airbus doesn't have a stick shaker because it doesn't need one! Whether we as an industry are training pilots to correctly respond to a stall is another question...

This might be a typical misconception, similar to what we see for system safety assessments sometimes.
The same reason why the aircraft has to revert to a different law might also cause the crew to do strange things. These events are not necessarily independent. So in the end the probability of being in alternate Law might be exacly the same as the one one that a crew is confused. And it may both happen at the same time because of the same reason.

It needs to be very carefully evaluated, which failures are really independent (and their combination therefore highly remote), and which are resulting from a common cause or from each other, and hence are not so remote.
It is clear that we can not design aircraft for the combination of all possible events and conditions, but it should also be clear that we can not claim all events to be unrelated.

This is exactly the same misconception as the pilots had: when your aircraft drops its nose it wants to tell you something, and you should not try to arrest this nose-down by pulling the stick all the way back, just to find that this does not arrest the movement.

Airbus reverts to other control laws, because the computers do no longer have all the data they need to identify that you leave your safe envelope. So by the nature of this, you may not be able to provide a stall warning in that situation. If the computer still would be able to fully understand the situation, it would still run in normal law.

Volume,

I agree with you completely. However, it remains true that the aircraft remains flyable without stalling in Alternate and Direct Laws, as other crews have demonstrated. So there remains an additive element to this.

Re your other points; the quote I made is from the certification requirements, not advice to pilots! The aim is indeed that the aircraft should 'tell you something'. Likewise, your point about artificial stall warning is correct; natural buffet is independent of air data and can be relied upon regardless of the state of the aircraft's systems. That's the beauty of it.

On a technicality, loss of data is not the only reason why an Airbus might revert from Normal Law. Loss of Normal Law doesn't necessarily mean that your air data is bad.

(Retired s/w engineer interested in human factors.)

Do we know what the flight director was doing in these loss of SA cases?
Did it help? Did it hinder?

Clandestino, re “pulling full aft stick …” - normal.
To clarify the point in my post, which had previously considered the hypothesis that the crew followed the FD, then following the commanded roll and pitch could be normal behaviour.
The pilot might not appreciate the magnitude of the stick input, particularly if the FD control laws are not optimised for such a situation; also, if the FD computation and/or normal use assumes that the commands are continually nulled, i.e. a director vice a recovery indicator for a gross deviation. Thus a large roll angle and subsequent loss of altitude could result in a significant FD demand, where its magnitude could be interpreted as requiring a large stick input.
Furthermore, consider how the FD is used; is it normal to follow a combined path, pitch and roll together, or alternatively separate the axis, nulling roll independently of pitch, (which FD format did this aircraft have - single or split cue?).
If a sequential axis response was made then a FD roll demand at a high bank angle could be interpreted as having a significant pitch component; obviously this is speculative.
Another view might also conclude that the stall was induced by the FD and SOP.

Thus there may be greater safety value in considering how crews fly the FD in normal operation and how SOPs are interpreted – always follow the FD ??! .

Another ‘SOP mantra’ is ‘fly the aircraft’, but what does ‘fly’ mean.
A better approach is Aviate, Navigate, Communicate, … which should be more likely to generate the question ‘what does ‘Aviate’ mean'. Many posts focus on stick and rudder skills (fly) overlooking the preceding need to understand the situation – 90% of human thought involves understanding; when and where are the skills of understanding taught.
Some recent views of awareness suggest that we should be teaching the identification of situations where SOPs should not be followed (how to identify them), opposed to always follow SOPs.

ExV238, re ‘fail to recognise …’, see Errors in Aviation Decision Making: Bad Decisions or Bad Luck?
The decison to pull CBs?

Peter H, for info, http://xstar.ihmc.us/research/projects/EssaysOnHCC/
See Sensemaking (2), Janus principle (training), boiled frog (procedural drift)

Human factors
 

@Volume My impression is that human factors is not a science as such, and wonder if it should be. It is an umbrella label that covers a lot of different subjects (just like 'structures engineering' could cover loads, stress, stiffness, fatigue, etc).

When you dig deep into specific aspects of accidents you run into multiple factors. So you have to study them all and use the published knowledge.

Human factors indeed do not tell you what and how to design, or who to listen to. But you can and shall certainly make use of knowledge of all these aspects under that label while working on designs in design teams. Design teams consisting of people with a lot of different specialisms. I would expect that multiple people in these teams have knowledge of multiple human factors aspects.

A good designer tries to read as much as possible on as many aspects as possible. And uses and applies that while designing. I would say that modern aircraft are not and can not be designed without serious knowledge of a range of especially these human factors aspects. I have certainly seen a lot of that knowledge being applied to designs that happily fly around today.

To further improve on that you would need a lot of detailed information. And that may well be the real challenge.

What could be very useful to engineers to go beyond what they can do now, is information that is not directly available today. In such cases the engineer would not be interested in the specific airline or pilot as such. He just would like to see if pilots (new, bad, average, expert) act and react in the way the design (by lack of deeper knowledge) assumes. What he can use is information based on pilots interviews, and he of course uses test pilot inputs. The engineer would also like to have data that supports pilots statements and is accurate enough for design input (see Volume's post). In quite a few cases you have data that is available to airlines but not to design engineers. In this AirAsia case we see that KNKT investigators withhold CVR information that would certainly have been studied under human factors for years to come. Which is shocking.

There are multiple reasons why the ideal flow and type (think about video of instruments or even pilots) of information is not directly available. Every party that delivers information would wants to be sure that the information is only used for the intended purpose, and cannot be misused or even used against them. Which is hard nut to crack indeed.

Clandestino,
Perhaps my one liner posts are a little too cryptic! First, I will come clean - I have never been qualified on Airbus types, though I have on several occasions flown some of their simulators. All my experience of jet types was on VC10s, 707s and 747s, on each of which I did CofA testing which included lots of stalling.
Having watched the video you mentioned it seems clear that, in what I would call a 'normal stall environment' as done in flight testing and training, there is a considerable degree of natural pre-stall buffet. Thus there is no certification requirement for artificial protections such as stick shaker and/or stick pusher as in the T-tail VC10.
However, as others have mentioned, and I know to be the case, when under high stress the first cognitive sense to 'fail' is hearing. The person under extreme stress just does not hear what is being said to him/her. This is one of the main reasons why, on aircraft requiring artificial protections, a stick shaker was used.
It would appear, in both the Air France and the Air Asia accidents, for most of the time the pilots did not recognise they were in a stall despite the aural alarms and voice shouting 'Stall, Stall, Stall'. Thus, it seems to me, a stick shaker, even though it may not be required under current certification rules, might have provided an additional warning stimulus when the pilot's hearing channel was blotted out by stress.

A wild ride
 

A wee bit off topic- but the ability to recover from unexpected aircraft attitudes when everything turns to worms comes from skill, practice, and bucu luck

For a stunning example of EXTREME upsets and recovery- the following is classic

Chuck Yeager Interview -- page 2 / 8 -- Academy of Achievement

scroll down to the section that starts

there is a short video that follows - film taken from a cockpit camera.:cool:

My explanation is that he recovered one axis at a time.

Situate, Aviate, Navigate, Communicate
 

TY safetypee for one of the best posts I have read in a long time. This identifies the root issue. All of these pilots knew how to fly, however they failed to understand their situation, their awareness was behind what their a/c was doing. This caused them to apply the wrong/opposite solution to their situation. Being aware of what the other pilots inputs to flight controls is a part situational awareness!

For this reason I suggest a modification of the flying maxim:
(where situate means situational awareness).

In my first flying lesson around 12 yrs old I vividly recall trying to move the stick and finding it stuck, then looking at my instructor and seeing he had limited the sticks travel. Ever since then I always communicate who has control without exception. This is not a side stick vs shared control column issue. It is about knowing your plane and having strict discipline. Current flying practice has been honed in blood over the decades, are we to learn from the lessons of others or blaze our own trail?

xcitation,
I believe you are correct. When things go horribly wrong you first have to diagnose the problem, then you have to recover the situation and/or carry out the correct procedure. It is not unlike the pilot shutting down the wrong engine. He misperceives the situation, therefore misdiagnoses the problem and then carries out a perfectly correct action on the wrong engine. Finally, when under extreme stress the human being has great difficulty in changing his perception - he tends to cling to his original view.
Thus, in an unexpected stall (which may or may not have all the characteristics of what I called in a previous post a 'normal stall') the startle factor causes confusion and a consequential misperception. the pilot fails to realise he is in a stall and carries out the wrong procedure - he pulls back when he should have pushed forward to unstall the wing.
And in all the mayhem that is going on around him he cannot bring himself to change his mind.

unfathomable, unthinkable or unspeakable?
 

It appears that some very important questions are either being politicised or deliberately ignored so I'd like to ask if anyone is willing to simply apply robust airmanship without prejudice or agenda to any of the following?

***

The commonalities between aspects of this accident and AF447 raise some questions which, however obvious, ridiculous or otherwise they may appear, simply cannot be dismissed IMHO:


1. Was the PF of either accident aware they were operating the aircraft in a degraded FBW condition (e.g. alternate law)?

2. With what degree of certainty can we know the answer to question 1, above?

3. Did anyone in the flight deck verbalise or otherwise communicate the change from normal to alternate law, regardless of the obvious cues/indicators etc?

4. Given the PF's action of moving the sidestick fully aft [in both accidents] is arguably more rational in Normal law, how can we be certain that all bus drivers are proficient and/or confident operating in degraded FBW conditions, in all phases of flight, irrespective of the answer to question 1, above?

5. Assuming each PF commanded a stall unintentionally, and maintained the stalled condition unintentionally, is there a possibility, however remote one may wish that to be, that operating in a degraded FBW condition is one layer of complexity too many when faced with the deteriorating situation each found himself in (i.e. swiftly decreasing altitude with nose up attitude, unreliable or decreasing airspeed, stall warnings etc), especially considering the same action of full aft sidestick does not have entirely the same effect in each law?


***

We have to assume that neither PF intended to mush into the drink from cruise and are therefore faced with a reality in which two pilots applied full aft sidestick in the belief that doing so would command a climb/arrest his rapid descent/recover the situation. The only logical explanation for such an action is that the PF either:


A> was unaware he was operating in a degraded FBW condition

B> was aware he was operating in a degraded FBW condition but did not understand that applying full aft would not have the same effect as doing so in Normal law

C> was unaware he was applying full aft sidestick or was gripped by fear/other human factor


I can think of no other logical explanations for applying full aft sidestick and therefore, as we have 2 instances of this occurring, I believe we are able to derive some conclusions and make some recommendations in order to help prevent further recurrence. Explanations A> and B> above can be mitigated by:


I> Removing any element of doubt about which FBW condition/law one is operating in at any given time

II> Removing any element of doubt about what the correct course of action is during an upset in the law/FBW condition one is operating in at the time

III> Training crews to operate the aircraft in all FBW conditions/laws in all phases of flight


I'll leave mitigating C> above for the interesting 'human factors' discussion ongoing on these and other pages, but the point is that action can be taken, in numerous/varied guises, to address some of the concerns arising from some of the similarities between this and the AF accident.


And even if one takes the view all of this is too simplistic, or not necessarily relevant, there is little harm in doing all possible to ensure one more PF doesn't hold full aft sidestick all the way to his, his colleagues and his passengers' premature doom.

IMHO.

There have been several incidents of Airbus A330's degrading to alternate law and the crews successfully riding through the procedures and ECAMS. In 2009 alone a Northwest 330 and 2 Jetstar A330's had unreliable airspeed incidents in severe weather in the Asia region that degraded to alternate law. Crews in each case got through the 5 minutes or so of uncertainties without major pitch changes. And a couple of Qantas 330's suffered ADIRU faults causing uncontrolled pitching, resolved by experienced and trained crew. If you pull full up in most aircraft (canards excepted?) you will stall, Airbus being the exception when in Normal law.

This may not go down too well & I expect the post to be removed:

Back in the day I was once told:

You can teach a monkey to fly:

BUT a very big BUT

Only 5% of the population could actually be trained to be a Pilot. (This means that only a small number of people have the ability to assimilate information whilst under stress & such things as coping with responsibility etc etc)

Again a BUT

Only 2 to 3% will actually make it & become a PILOT. (Sorry for shouting)

Maybe aviation is now starting to see the results of every tom dick & harry getting their flying licences. (Monkeys)

Trouble is that with the lack of available training aids (Sims for upper Air Work) the Monkeys can not be trained, so you have to rely on pilots which now appear to be very few & far between. (Would the likes of Chuck Yager "lost" the aeroplane )


IMHO Airbus particularly tried to design an aeroplane for the monkeys but have obviously failed in that respect.

THS
 

Is it the third time in 7 years an Airbus ends up stalled in the water with full trim up ... ?
THS grah ... anyone ?

Yes, and its the third time that a SS has been held full back and the Trim Wheel has been calmly spinning with no-one realizing the implications; the aircraft is no longer in Normal Law.

SS has been held back because of the overspeed mindset, also the overspeed is accompanied with buffet and awful aerodynamic noise. The FO PFD was not recorded in the FDR. The only reasonable explanation is an amazing speed shown on FO side. FO relaxed SS at the same time with selection of CAPT 3. That`s not a coincidence...
What would you do, in the second part of this video?
https://youtu.be/MbiVuPWX5K8

What are the situations in the air where you require full back stick or yoke? I can't visualize any other than EGPWS activation which is basically a lower level phenomenon unless you were flying over the Himalayas or Alps. Even at lower levels in a non protected aircraft it can cause structural damage. I am not sure this basic information is understood in that manner. A pilot doing that in any aircraft at cruising levels will stall the aircraft. In speed stable aircraft it may not auto trim but if the stick is held back disregarding the stall warning will the aircraft unstall itself without the yoke being released? In airbus FBW which is flight path stable once the stick is held out of neutral it is g demand reverting to AOA demand at lower end with the trim following it up unless the stick is neutralised. In both AF and QZ the pilot pulling and holding full back stick is extremely bizarre handling of the aircraft at those Flight levels. Any full application of flight control at cruise will end up in disaster. Full rudder will cause separation of tail, full bank can roll you on your back a 747 has done that.

The question probably is, was the PF fully aware what it means to fly a FBW aircraft in degraded condition?
Was he aware, which FBW functions were still operative (e.g. Autotrim, Stall Warning) and which were not (e.g. artificial roll damping, Stall Protection).
Are humans designed to fly half-automatic? I feel fine to program and monitor automatics fly the aircraft, I feel fine to hand fly. But I find it strange to share the job between the automatics and me. I find it strange if a system is still able to warn, but no longer to protect me.

I keep wondering about the VSI...

For those not familiar with the FBW systems, once outta neutral you are commanding a "change"

So as Vila points out for the 'bus, pulling back on the stick in NORMAL you have a blend of AoA and gee when slow, but mainly gee when not slow. This means you can increase pitch to steep angles with only a slight amount of back stick as you are not commanding elevator position - the computer is!. In DIRECT, you do command position, but in either of the ALTERNATE laws you do not.

We discovered this aspect of FBW in the Viper after the first deep stalls. Just a tiny amount of back stick kept increasing pitch and we got too slow too quicky for the AoA protection to take effect. AF447 did the same thing but at a much lower pitch attitude, and the elevator/THS had little to no command authority for getting the nose down, although some sim tests showed it was possible using manual THS trim and nose down command.

Deadheader and others,

Q1 and 2
We will never ever know what they knew for certain. However the post by safetypee an xcitation are excellent possible answers, they knew not where they were.

All these pilots and I can include colgan in this reacted in a way they thought was correct.
None of them realised the situation they were in and reacted using gut instinct.

No amount of legidlation or "protection" can protect against this.

Air france thought overspeed.
Colgen thought .... well we don't know but he fought to maintain height overriding stike push etc.
This one? Well we cannot know, and there is no cvr transcription worth a damn to analyse.

I was always tought

FIRST SIT ON HANDS

Volume and Deadheader
I was thinking along the same lines but with a rather different direction.

Pavlov ringing a bell and his dogs salivated as a conditioned reaction. For some pilots a lot of flying is conditioned reaction when there is a sudden workload increase with failures and alarms - it is the conditioned reaction that will win as the tunnel vision increases and the hearing fades to nothing.

In both AFR 447 and this flight the PF relatively inexperienced was suddenly dropped into alternate law. The roll becomes really squirelly and both PF fought to get wings level (tunnel vision) but their conditioned reaction from all their flying on the aircraft was that to go up pull back and the aircraft will go up. This is of course not the case in Alternate law. Pull hard back and the aircraft will stall.
So what cues are there to a PF with tunnel vision fighting for wings level that the aircraft is now in Alternate law and requires different handling. Almost none.
I would suggest not a stick shaker but perhaps some kind of 'stiffener' so the stick is less easy to move a haptic clue that you are now in Alternate Law respect the stick as there are less protections. This could also reduce PIO by slowing the rate of movement (less mayonnaise more thought).
Of course there will be those who had and have no problem with dropping into Alternate Law but there will always be some out at the end of the probability tail that don't notice and revert to type expecting protections that are no longer there. There will also be those that are perfect in the Sim but lose it in the real aircraft.
So a brake on the sidestick making it a little more difficult to move might be sufficient to remind them that they are in Alternate.

Ian W,

Your implication is that they didn't know that they were in Alternate Law, and that if they knew then they wouldn't have zoom climbed.

May I suggest that even in Normal Law, it's a really bad idea to fly into protections anyway? And that therefore your suggestion is targeting the wrong area?

What pilots need is adequate training such that when bad stuff happens they don't start madly flailing with the controls, but they engage in a discipline which promotes diagnosis and then considered actions.

Adequate training will not happen until we can break away from the cycle of greedy airlines looking to sap the last penny from the operation, customers who will choose one airline over another to save a penny, and regulators who simply want a quick V1 cut, circuit, NPA to G/A and S/E landing.

Ironically, with the advent of safer, more "protected", complex aircraft - never has there been more need to ramp up the training. Old boys in crap aircraft were exposed to situations like this every day. Newbies now "fly" FBW+A/P from ILS to ILS day in, day out.

IW: Sorry, I need to ask in hope of understanding your point. Are you aware of the differences in pitch control between normal and alternate law of 320?

100pp: "Old boys in crap aircraft were exposed to situations like this every day" 35+ degrees AOA with ,75 mach at FL350 under heavy leans/vetigo? Really?

Personally I think 100pp has got a bit of a point.

I wouldn't claim to be that much of a man but even a callow youth such as myself remembers hand flying a heavy in the cruise at high level (even if you were not doing it for the heck of it it was part of our cruise trimming procedure on the 747) and a lot of the "old boys" I knew hand flew the 747 from just before top of drop all the way through to the landing when circumstances permitted, something that these days would ring alarm bells in the office and a telephone call when you got home.

I'm not saying doing the above is a panacea to all handling ills but it sure as heck sharpened up the scan and above all reminded you how gentle you had to be and how small some of your margins could be at high level. Above all you sure as hell knew that applying full back yolk at high level was never appropriate and was never going to end well.

Oh carp, does that mean I'm an "old boy..".........

I exaggerate slightly. ;)

My first transport aircraft had no autopilot, so hand flying in the cruise was second nature. The 737 has left me with no autopilot in some pretty odd attitudes, and we hand flew it a lot because we were better than the rough old autopilot fitted.

This aircraft did NOT give them 35 degrees AoA. It simply rolled to the left as a result of rudder deflection. Nothing else. It was the PF who did nothing for 9 seconds and then yanked in the back stick which caused a pitch of +9 (while rolling it right).

Ian W and deadheader
Simply emphasizing on the pilots that at higher levels applying full back stick is bizarre, irrational and suicidal and never to be done in any law is good enough. There are enough indications on the PFD to indicate change in flight control law for anyone who cares to look. Applying back stick and not checking attitude is simply poor instrument flying technique. It is as bad as SFO accident where visual approach was flown without ever looking at speed. In all these accidents there were professional deficiencies in pilots who were at controls and those were exposed, that's it. As I said before all one has to do is to routinely notice the bank, pitch and thrust the automation uses at higher levels and when you loose the automation just do the same yourself.

As I said before all one has to do is to routinely notice the bank, pitch and thrust the automation uses at higher levels and when you loose the automation just do the same yourself.

100%: oh that todays training emphasised such basics and allowed pilots to practice, attain & maintain these basic skills. It really is KISS, but there are too many higher influences that are acting against this basic principle. Those of us at the sharp end of TQ training, and those at the sharp end of Line Training are screaming for changes, but deaf ears abound. In many other instances on here there has been the cry that "until a smoking hole occurs nothing will happen". In recent years there have been too many smoking holes caused by serviceable a/c. What has been the reaction? Sadly too little. It is not yet too late. Who is holding their breath?

What would you do?
 

First of all: AP off, FD Off;
Move the thrust levers to idle and disconnect the A/T. (A/C is over speed);
Then aliviate the angle of attack (zero G, if needed);
Bring the nose to the horizon and wings to level;
Adjust Thrust as necessary;
Confirm speed brakes in;
Return to the desired flight path.

aguadalte:
Given all the performance parameters displayed your summation seems reasonable. Can someone explain why there was the 'stall' audio warning going off? I wonder if that seemingly conflicting warning was behind the question? Would your ears override your eyes and make you do something different?

I'd assume because it stalled in overspeed condition. Caution advised, it is a SIM not a plane, still it looks controllable, but without seeing the pilot's commands dangerous to draw conclusions.

Proffesional observation at 1:33 The aircraft will guard/safely take care of itself, if it was not for the pilot standing in the way.

WOW! Bingo! So the stall warning goes off and we all would say(including me) Nah! The PFD picture shows overspeed (then AOA ~0deg), so the appropriate response is: PULL UP! :ok::ok: ->from both french FOs

What are the similarities between overspeed and stall?
- Buffet, impressive aerodynamic noise, bells and whistle sounds, pitch down, high descent rate, altimeter indication, FD (pull up!).
What is different:
- Airspeed indication
But from report (page 185, comments 39):
...the airspeed from ADRIU was unavailable... (showed unreasonable values)
See Figure 28: stall warning on! airspeed - red SPD! - This upset would initiate overspeed scenario.
The red SPD indication remained until switch to CAPT 3 when FO released SS after 2.5 min of pulling... At that time everything was too late, with AOA over 40 deg
So we all would be dead... by watching again the video at 1:10, substitute the speed indication with red - SPD

Because video is forgery and quite a bad one.

No practical flying fixed wing can reach stall angle in overspeed without severely busting structural limit and transport machines limited to ultimate 3.75G can even less so. It's vee squared thing (or envelope, for visual types)
Would you be so kind to provide page reference, sır?

Clandestino,

Stall and overspeed warnings together happen in real life too:
Incident: LOT B763 near Toronto on Jun 19th 2009, unreliable airspeed, simultaneous overspeed and stall warning

Just imagine the AOA of a bird while flapping the wings.

...which doesn't change the fact that video posted has nothing to do with either QZ8501/AF447 and was probably made by overdubbing stall warning or that 767s don't flap their wings to fly.

This is another lack-of-knowledge-discussion, the possibility that the crew was thinking to be overspeeding. If they really were thinking that and reacted like that it would be again meaning not being up to the task to hold a seat upfront.

Although overspeed is not desirable in a modern transport jet, it is much less harmful than stalling it.

Talk to test pilots and certifying engineers. Modern transport jets are deliberately flown into heavy overspeed situations, and they are just fine compared to being in a fully developed stall with 40° AOA and falling like a stone.

If I could pick 50kt overspeed or 40° AOA I would always choose overspeed.

As vilas rightly said, fully pulling the stick / yoke is never ever a wise thing except when you are low and approaching cumulus granitus. If you think you are too fast, gently fly your plane out of it, may be by help of the speedbrake. For sure you are not supposed to violently react.

Thank you, Cland

Many here should wade thru the thoudands of posts we had concerning AF447. Points/counterpoints and many volumes of 'bus manuals and procedures.

I feel most of us from those discussions thot we had enuf new training as a result of that tragedy to prevent another duplicate. Sheesh.

I must remind all that when you see the FDR numbers from AF447 and the "airshow demo" crash by a "test pilot", that the 'bus seems to have very benign stall buffet/burble and such. So you can fly into the stall regime and not realize it. Then there's the problem of control law reversion that still seems to be a problem that the crews do not understand.

"You can't stall this plane", huh? YES YOU CAN!!!

Besides the crew coordination and the "I got it", "You got it" and such, I still see a lack of understanding about how the 'bus works when not in the NORMAL law. I also see a need for some warning that clearly lets the crew know they are in ALTERNATE or DIRECT.

Lastly, I go with the philosophy expressed by a few here, which says, "Don't do something, just sit there". There are a very few problems that require a reaction within a second or so ( however, the 9 second reaction by the PF in this tragedy puzzles me). If the warning lights come on and the jet is not pitching or rolling violently, than don't screw the pooch.

Then, what happened?
 

First, no comments whatsoever (or even questions) will be found in this post about comparisons of control yokes and sidesticks, and also nothing about control inputs or piloting techniques.

But what I do want to comment on, or ask about, is: what is the next level of authority, above the level of a given country's air accident investigatory outfit? I know already that there is nothing actually above the particular country's investigation board - that's just the point. It's up to "the industry" or some rudely conceptual agglomeration of constituents such as pilots (professional or otherwise), manufacturers, regulators, and so on.

What can happen and where?; specifically, where can the multiplicity of factors about avoiding or preventing the "next AF447" incident get sorted out? Maybe the answer is, there is no such thing. Which means, the sorting out of what to do to fix the problem or problems, preceded by the analysis of the cause or causes, defaults to . . . legal processes and the less-than-binding methods of the status quo. The efficacy of which speaks for itself, in this occurrence (and others).

WillowRun, the investigation board typically has no rule making authority - however it can issue 'recommendations'. The regulatory authority then reviews those recommendations and determines what (if any) action to be taken based on those recommendations.
So, in the US, the NTSB makes recommendations and the FAA determines what action to take as a result. This has sometimes resulted in considerable friction between the NTSB and FAA when the FAA determined the NTSB recommended action was not justified.

• The SIC was pulling more that the PIC was pushing but the PIC could not see it so was not able to understand the situation.
• Initially the SIC responded correctly to the first STALL warning but not to the second one ... Was he preoccupied by the bank angle, was he trying to follow that "pull down" ambiguous directive from the PIC or was he chasing unrealistic FD Indications ... ?
• How was doing the THS ?

Similitudes with AF447 are all over the place.

This time at least the STALL warning never quit ... The conditions were not met or the program was modified ... ?