The accident report`s conclusions include the following

"5. The weather on route of M635 partially covered by the Cumulonimbus clouds
formation between 12,000 feet up 44,000 feet. The FDR data indicated that the flight was not affected by the weather condition and investigation concludes that the weather was not factor to the accident."

At 22:57 The crew took action for wx and turbulence. Within 3 seconds the first of the RTL warnings appeared on ECAM .
At 23:04 wx avoidance turn was requested and at 23:12 FL380 was requested again for wx.
At 23:16:43 A/P was lost, reversion to Alt Law and left roll up to 54 degree began. Nine seconds after this the aircraft climbed to 38,000 at 11000 ft/sec.
At 23:16:53 P1 said "Oh my God".
At 23:17:29 P2 said " whats going wrong" (in French)".
At 23:17:41 P1 said " my God "
At 23:19:58 Instruction to select CAPT 3.

All that above looks very much like a scenario of the crew trying to get out of an intense CB cell. What evidence was there on the FDR to conclude that wx was not a factor.
Was the P1`s first fearful exclamation brought about by the wrong action of the P2 or was it because they found themselves in a more perilous situation than expected after the climb.
The P2`s question is in fact an expression of surprise. Does it not suggest that the the indicated responses he expected by the instruments do not conform to his actions. He is baffled and cannot understand why the situation is worsening.

FDMII

Thank you for your excellent posts. A query. I understood that the enhanced data being released in 2016 for Std 2 single aisle and 2.6? wide body is for stall buffet only and doesn't really change the stall model as such. Have I missed something?

let the automated systems handle the recovery
 

As an engineer with experience with control systems I appreciate how much better machines handle these complex situations than human beings. On reading the many posts and aided by back of envelope calculations I realize how quickly a stall situation at high altitude can develop, where the air is thin and aerodynamic braking is small and may quickly become unrecoverable. A big red panic button, backed up by an autonomous computer and control system, saying 'Get me out of this situation!' should do the trick. If the situation develops beyond the point where normal controls work, I would recommend a drogue chute.

I don't understand one thing. Why stall warning have priority over dual input warning?

Stall represent the threatening factor, it is the problem. To solve problems "you" must control the input devices. With dual input situation the control is literally lost. It is only logical to assume that to solve any problem you must first regain control.

ZFT;

I'm not close enough to that area of the industry to say anything meaningful or helpful regarding the details of how, when, what such revisions to stall data for simulators may be introduced. I just read the industry informaiton like Flight, AW&ST, FlightGlobal and so on to stay in touch.

We know one thing: such introduction is going to have to go through a very robust process of technical testing and regulatory input and oversight prior to releasing any such performance data to be installed and used as a foundation for routine training with regard to recovering a fully-stalled transport aircraft. Whether the solution includes simulators capable of producing 'g' forces is yet to be seen, but I suspect that will be part of advanced simulators. I just flew these aircraft, nothing else.

Good point Pasha!

Simulator training must be done in parallel with real flying exercises.
Real G's must be experienced, situational awareness in a 3d scenario must be instilled. And then there is fear, fear IS the leprosy of aviation.
Fear and panic, together with lack of skills are responsible for most if not all UPRT LOC accidents aside from LOC in IMC.

Fear leads to mental blockage and motion paralysis, it can only be tackled successfully by venturing into unknown territory, not in a sim, but on proper aircraft with competent instructors.

Again
 

Peekay4, I'll try again.

Those "other accidents" have nothing to do with interconnected yokes - well, the Airbus stall accidents have nothing to do with non-interconnected sidesticks.

The problem in all the accidents is - improper flight control inputs. Many people then say, well the "other pilot"could not see what the flying pilot was doing with his controls, that is why he could not correct the mistake.

In the "other accidens" it was proven empirically that being able to see the controls as they were moved by the faulty pilot did not help one bit in those accidents.

Also many people see the algebraic summing of forces as fatal error in the Airbus system - my Egyptair example shows that summing applies exactly the same with mechanical summing (as long as you do not overpower the breakout mechanism). After overpowering the breakout mechanism, the (possibly) opposite deflections could cancel each other out just as well as an algebraic summing.

The above effects are not the big problem in aviation accidents - apparently insufficient training or insufficient affinity with flying is.

Chronus:
The ECAM annunciated failures have nothing to do with the weather, they were recurring and the fact that event number so and so happened just after the initiation of their deviation turn is just a coincidence.
The exclamation "Oh my god" can be expected from someone who sees that his Pilot Flying is scrxxing up, as obvious from the attitude that he can see on his attitude indicator (PFD).
The exclamation (in French) "What is wrong" is not surprising from the mouth of someone who just pulled an airliner at high altitude into a 40 degrees nose high attitude. It is logical that he then not understands that with full aft stick and the nose near the horizon, the altimeter keeps winding down so rapidly.
His instruments do exactly respond in the way you should expect when you treat an airplane like that, the only problem is, he does not understand that.

EMIT you make it sound as if they were a couple of amateurs in a sampan wrestling with their chop sticks in rough seas and wondering why their chopsticks would n`t work in the usual traditional way.

I did not suggest nor hint that ECAM failure announcements had anything to do with the wx. The only coincidence is that the whole thing went belly up soon after they took wx avoidance action. When it comes to air accident investigations should coincidences not be carefully examined.

@EMIT

No one is saying Boeings can't stall or pilots on other aircraft types can't make dumb decisions. All of your "other accidents" are completely besides the point.

In both AF447 and QZ8501, the left seat pilot tried to apply the correct control inputs and were: 1) unable to do so; 2) unable to understand why; 3) unable to resolve the dual input situation until the end. The AirAsian Captain tried to take over control -- twice -- without success, and he clearly didn't understand what was happening and why.

With linked controls there would not have been ANY ambiguity of what was happening.

Report
 

Chronus
I think that the investigation did examine the possibility and their (justified) conclusion is that weather played no part - i.e. FDR parameters did not show undue turbulence, which would have shown up as choppy acceleration traces, etcetera.

No, they were not amateurs, on the contrary, they were professionals. What I get tired of is seeing colleagues letting slip aircraft from their fingers time and again for no good reasons.

@FDMII @ZFT

Under 121.423 FAA is mandating UPRT pilot training for all Part 121 ops by no later than March, 2019. This means flight simulators must be updated by that date to accommodate "extended envelope" training, and accordingly the FAA simulator standards + qualifications are being completely revamped. Final rule on the new standards is expected early next year.

Peekay4
All the captain had to do, was push the override button to get full control. For that he did not need a DUAL INPUT aural - if he had used the override button, that warning would not have sounded either. The lights, indicating DUAL INPUT through their illumination, were not prioritized away by the STALL STALL aural.
Yes, as ex-Airbus pilot I know that the override button is hardly ever needed, so hardly ever used, but is an essential step to memorize when taking away control from your mate.

In a Boeing, it still takes more force than your mate is applying in order to override him. Will you intuitively know for sure whether you are just applying "unusually large or unusually strong" inputs or whether you are still fighting the other guy?

In my humble view there can never be for no good reason.
In this incidence the timings speak volumes. An aircraft in the cruise and in the space of less than two minutes its gone ballistic up to 38,000 feet then mushed its way all the way down into the drink. All because the automatics have decided not to play ball. So the conclusion must be that the two poor chaps up front were imbeciles as they did not know which way to twiddle their sticks. I just don`t buy it.

@Chronus
The FO most likely had The Leans, a strong sensory illusion (disorientation) when an aircraft abruptly returns to level flight from an unnoticed turn.

See extract from pg. 48 of the Final Report below:

https://s3.amazonaws.com/org.barkah....isoriented.png

(guide numbers added)

1. FAC1 & FAC2 off, aircraft enters Alternate Law and started to roll 6 degrees / second to the left unnoticed (roll position indicated by sloping purple line)
2. FO finally notices the AI after nine seconds and, startled, makes abrupt right roll to level the aircraft. (Black/Grey lines indicate right/left aileron positions)
3. At this point QZ8501 is nearly level, FO relaxes roll inputs to neutral
4. FO is disoriented due to the leans, thinks the aircraft is now in steep right turn and quickly rolls the aircraft back to the left
5. The aircraft is back near the original 54 degree left roll position, which feels "level" to the FO

The FO was likely disoriented all the way to the ground. The Captain might have been less affected due to his different physical position and his previous experience as a fighter pilot.

alf5071h,
I agree with your comments.
Either I, didn't find any reference to longitudinal trim in the report, nor in the FDR data. That's strange.

FDMII,
The THS trim position is a function of elevator movement and position, nothing else -> True, BUT elevator is not a direct function of sidestick position. In the AF447 FDR, PF pushed sidestick forward couple of times, but the elevator didn't rotate more than half nose-up and THS was at max nose-up.
Even without THS graph, I'm quite positive that is the case for QZ8501. maybe worse with apparently abnormal law triggered by AOA>30 deg, then THS was fix at max NU.

As the airplane's flight control system continued to attempt to maintain the commanded the low g-load, as the airplane started to sink, the pitch trim ran to full nose-up. From that point on, recovery may have been impossible unless the crew had the awareness to reduce that manually. Even with full nose-down pitch command, as the airspeed built up in the recovery the nose-up trim had too much influence to overcome and the airplane would pitch up despite any action on the sidestick.
Something fundamental has to change on this matter, for a simple reason: under stall it's imperative to reduce the AOA, if PF demands nose down rotation then A/C should start rotate that direction not opposite. How? engineers to figure out: THS position, moving fuel foward, etc

EMIT, "All the captain had to do, was push the override button to get full control."

Yes. The last pilot to push the button retains control while the button is pressed.

Further detail from an AOM:

Quote:

---

A pilot can deactivate the other stick and take full control by pressing and keeping pressed his priority takeover pushbutton.

For latching the priority condition, it is recommended to press the takeover push button for more than 40 seconds. This allows the pilot to release his takeover push button without losing priority.

However, a pilot can at any time reactivate a deactivated stick by momentarily pressing the takeover push button on either stick. If both pilots press their takeover pushbuttons, the pilot that presses last gets priority.

---

_Phoenix;
Yes, I know. I said this in my response to you.
Well, I don't think that claim can be made without the aerodynamic work behind it support the claim. The elevator in AF447 remained effective and could have brought the nose down.

Quote:

---

Something fundamental has to change on this matter, for a simple reason: under stall it's imperative to reduce the AOA, if PF demands nose down rotation then A/C should start rotate that direction not opposite. How? engineers to figure out: THS position, moving fuel foward, etc

---

Regarding something fundamental having to change, no, I wouldn't think so, not, at least, until the assumption the statement is based upon is well understood and supported as per the above.

Regarding using the THS wheels on the center pedestal, the THS is always available mechanically. Moving it ND would have improved chances for recovery in both this, and the AF447 cases.

Regarding the moving of fuel forward, the notion is entirely impractical for the A330/A340 due the time it takes to do so, (20 minutes, roughly from full to empty), and technically not possible in the A320 as there is no fuel stored in the horizontal stabilizer and moving fuel in the wing-tanks inboard takes more time than any meaningful improvement to CG could be accomplished.

peekay4

My understanding is that UPRT training can already be readily accomplished on (most recent qualified) simulators now as this doesn't require any additional data. The only simulator update required is the "IOS Toolkit page". The extended envelope data is required for full stalls for which the current OEM supplied data is somewhat lacking, although just what is being provided is still unclear (to me).

Control
 

In cruise in an airliner, for a cruise climb (that is, to the next useable level) you super duper machine has the performance only to sustain about one degree more of pitch. Yank the nose up more and you WILL loose speed (and continue doing that and you will stall eventually).

I can understand that in a startle reaction, a pilot might yank up the nose a bit too high (INITIALLY), but then very quickly he should realize from looking at his attitude, as indicated on his attitude indicator, clearly and unequivically, without any error or failure, if unsure, check the other guy's attitude indicator and the standby attitude indicator, all independant, extremely reliable sources, realize immediately that he has flown the aircraft into a not normal attitude and just correct the attitude to normal values, such as you stare at for endless hours during your whole career: the blue side up, the brown side down, dividing line between those colors approximately in the middle, wings approximately level - it isn't more difficult than that!

It is not a question of automatics not playing ball - when the autopilot tripped off, due to pilot action, the pilot flying did not start flying until 9 seconds later. That is a human issue, to not attend to your aircraft for such a long time, not an automatics issue.

Peekay4
The leans, exactly. Kind of funny, that the sensory ilusions (or failures of our senses) are used to make simulators seem so close to reality, but that apparently pilot training does not prepare you sufficiently for the real sensory illusions in flight.

@ZFT

The new 121.423 requirement does include recovery from full stall, so as I understand it, this requirement can't be accommodated by current simulators (possibly except Flight Safety's new G550 simulator).
The reason compliance was pushed five years to March 2019 was to allow new Part 60 simulator standards to be published and implemented.

I DON'T Understand
 

I don't understand that at all. As I, and numerous other posters said in regard to the AF447 autopilot disconnect, the thing to do is NOTHING. In AF447, instead the PF hauled back on the stick and kept it there all the way to the water.

The pilot flying is supposed to be aware of everything in the cockpit. Making precipitous control inputs is exactly the wrong thing to do. Pilots are not supposed to allow themselves to be startled. In this case, leveling the wings was the first thing to do while steadying the aircraft in pitch in yaw. Apparently this guy was not really a pilot. :ugh:

Ed
 

I get what you mean Ed, the "understanding" for startlement is only very slight - I agree that a (real) pilot shouldn't get startled in the first place, but if he does, it should only last a moment and his normal, controlled state should immediately kick back in - obviously, that did not happen in all the high altitude stall accidents.

peekay4

The new 121.423 requirements are noted with my thanks.

Does anyone know why the report says explicitly that weather was not a factor and was not analysed (in which case, how did they know it wasn't?), but there are multiple recommendations in the back about weather radar, cunimbs, participation in regional met. forums, and weather in general?

If they didn't analyse it, how are they making recommendations about it?

Weather was analyzed. However, they found that it was not a factor in this accident so the weather analysis was omitted from section 2. (The weather conditions were included in 1.7.)

Phoenix, Re #3637 and your #3659, thanks.
Noting that the A330 and A320 have different aerodynamic configurations and apparently software, the AF447 analogy is reasonable; but as before, without trim data THS/elevator effectiveness and capability for stall recovery remains supposition.

FDMII #3643, Re THS, AoA, etc, agree:
However, to reemphasise that the THS (trim) is a powerful contribution to pitch control and if mis positioned can seriously detract from the elevator’s ability to generate a nose down pitching moment.

An interesting logic diagram, but if this is for ‘normally expected’ switching (including power failures), it may not include law changes due to power interrupts as supposed in accident – would the design logic anticipate switched ‘power failure’ and stall in that order.
Also, the diagram apparently does not show the switching for the Abnormal Attitude Law. This appears to override both Normal and/or Alternate Laws and freezes the trim; in ‘normal’ circumstances trim could be recovered when the abnormality is corrected (aircraft tending to recover from a stall – (even in Alternate?)).
Earlier questions considered ‘if’ Abnormal Law was triggered whilst in a forced Alternate state would the trim ever be recovered; if not then stall recovery would have to be made with abnormal control effectiveness (elevator +/- THS), … and abnormal rudder trim.
… now how many of the proposed sim training exercises required by FAA /EASA will include this?

Is anyone able to verify / comment on whether an incorrect seat positon - #3466, i.e. not at the design eye positon, will affect the ability to positon the sidestick to demand a quick roll response without an inadvertent pitch-up input? Noting that in the RHS, right roll and nose down requires the longest reach.
Perhaps some real simulator tests might determine the capability (likelihood) for a range of seat positons.
Also, consider similar problems for the left seat; and how quickly an appropriate seat positon could be achieved after leaving the seat (electric seat motor?).

Anyone remember all those years ago when just after rotate a Capt’s seat slid back because of the seat rail locking failure, and s/he could not reach the centre stick?

Perplexed
 

I am forced to accept the initial miscommunication "pull down".
What I cannot accept is how the FO, a french pilot would block out the grim similarity with his stick inputs to AF447. Surely FO would have read and discussed the AF447 reports several times so I am incredulous that a french pilot on similar type could ignore his grim replay. I did not read in the report if they look into the psychological background of the FO.
At a minimum I would expect FO to confirm response like "stick full back at the stop, pitch up". Then at least every 30 secs "maintaining nose up, stick full back". In the absence of call outs the capt should have ordered them.
Is there a need for a tightening of regulatory standards to improve flight crew cross communications?

Do pilots study crash reports?
 

xcitation's question begs another question I have always wondered about:

How many working pilots actually read these reports in detail? Do they have the time? Or the interest? I imagine the answers to this are all over the map. It would seem, in the absence of any pertinent facts :confused: that, had FO studied the report, a lot of ppl would still be walking around the planet.

I know a certain pilot who blogs about piloting, and after a brief initial discussion on AF447, it was obvious that he had little interest in any of he nuts-and-bolts of that crash. Maybe complacency is part of this problem.

Any on this forum who have been in a tight corner may perhaps appreciate that most would have been concerned about sphincsters rather than thinking now then lets see, read about this somewhere and then declare la voila AF447 n`est pas. The sim seems to be lacking that je ne cepas qua of real life emergencies.
The published CVR transcripts are mostly sanitised, they only show what has been said and not how it was said. As they say it is not what you say but how you say it, remember Billy Connoly and the meaning of the f word ? Sometimes voice stress analysis is provided which gives a better understanding of the events unfolding before the eyes of the crew and their reactions. Nothing of the kind seems to have been provided in this instance. Why is that I wonder, is it because all that was recorded was just routine and said in the expected sang froid manner of Sully Sullenberger.

Likewise, could you be forced to accept that the PIC actually said, "full down".:confused:

Bingo
 

mm43 wrote: Likewise, could you be forced to accept that the PIC actually said, "full down"

(First, it's good to see you posting again. It takes me back to the days of AF447...)

People familiar with Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian language) – especially those who study linguistics, and specifically those who are involved in the study and use of aviation English – will immediately realise the significance of mm43's observation. His exact interpretation of the Captain’s words has been the subject of MUCH discussion among those who have heard the audio file.

For those unfamiliar with spoken Indonesian, there are many English words that start with the letter "f" (or that contain an "f") wherein the "f" is pronounced by many Indonesians as a "p". Examples are "Fantastic" and "Coffee" and many other words where an "f" is commonly treated as a "p". To emphasise the point, there are also native Indonesian words, spelled with an "f" but always pronounced as "p" (i.e. “kafan”, which is always pronounced as “kapan”). There are historical and linguistic reasons for this but for the purpose of this discussion that background is not important. What IS significant is that there is a very good argument to be made that the Captain was saying, “Full Down!” And some of us believe (for many reasons additional to what I mentioned here) that’s exactly what he said…

I've been a bit slow in reading the full accident report and analyzing the parameters provided, too much other stuff going on in life.

The commonality with the loss of control that occurred in AF447 after the drop to Alternate law is too compelling a similarity to ignore.

I've had bad vertigo at night and I've seen roll PIO in a simulator and I'm trying to form an opinion on which of these might have been at play that terrified the PF. Of course it could have been solely that he was terrified of simply handflying in actual instrument conditions.

In any case, we now have two cases where apparently weak sticks completely lost the bubble by inexplicably pulling back on the stick when unexpectedly thrust into an Alternate Law-Roll Direct situation. That is the common thread I am concerned about.

Of course Airbus has put their test pilots into the same situation and they say, "no big deal, just fly the aircraft." Maybe what we need to do instead is to put some of the newer pilots behind the controls of a simulator that accurately behaves as the aircraft does at altitude and to try to replicate some of these loss of control incidents. Then we could actually interview some survivors to find out what really happens. You could grab them fresh off a line flight while they are still tired to improve the odds of having a loss of control to study.:E

Until we accurately understand why these loss of control incidents are happening in Alternate law, we are throwing darts in the dark as to the best corrective action.

Or perhaps we need to concentrate on teaching pilots to do pilot stuff. The industry in now full of 250hr wonder children, who are automatics dependent from just after take off to just before landing. They have never had an opportunity to develop handling skills.

It doesn't matter if it's an Airbus in ALTN law, or a Boeing in a turning departure (Flash airlines and Ethiopian) or a Boeing stalling on approach ( Turkish and Asiana). Some pilots don't have the Skill to consistently handle something slightly out of the normal. No matter what equipment they sit in, if the fella with them is not up to scratch the outcome may not be desirable.

A non-pilots question. If a person is out of their seat (perhaps pulling a CB), what will a sudden 60 degree (or 102 degree) roll do to them? Couldn't they be thrown around enough to be injured or severely disorientated?

An AoA Sensor on the wings is more a roll sensor... And sensitive to flap setting. Good enough for a stall warning, but not as a primary flight instrument.
Especially if the roll is induced by rudder, so coupled with significant yaw, meaning lateral acceleration in the cockpit.

Operators need to realise that wasting valuable simulator time on full use of automatics instead of giving crews (particularly low experience copilots) hands-on raw data instrument flying practice at high and low altitudes and circuit work with crosswinds, is counter productive. The current accident record of Loss of Control events attests to this

To stop the rot of automation dependence and automation addiction which is the basis of most loss of control in IMC accidents, the time is well overdue to reverse the rush to still more automation in the simulator and fix the problem by increasing the amount of manual raw data flying given to pilots in the simulator.

Let's face it - you are never going to change the oft myopic view of airline management that manual flying even in the most ideal ATC and weather, is a hazard inflicted on passengers and must be avoided at all costs lest one grumpy passenger complains his coffee is being spilt by the actions of a ham-fisted captain or co-pilot.

It is a good bet that most check pilots and simulator instructors tasked with conducting type rating and recurrent simulator training, would never dream of taking a control seat in order to demonstrate what they want the "student" to do. We are talking about hand flying on instruments without the crutch of a flight director. After all, even the most inexperienced low hour instructor at a flying school has to chance his arm and first demonstrate a manoeuvre to his student. If simulator instructors don't have the skills to do that, they shouldn't be in the job.

if the simulator instructor is too scared of stuffing up in front of the crew member he is supposed to be training, then how on earth can the crew member learn by example? A picture is worth a thousand words is so true in the context of simulator training.

Centaurus,

The Aircraft itself must be used to fly raw data up to RVSM on a regular basis!

The Sim will never, ever be able to recreate the feel of the aircraft. Sim is for emergency training, not for learning how to bloody fly. That should have been taught years before and upkept during your day to day job.

Any airline not supporting raw data flying is simply a danger in tha air.
Any pilot afraid or unwilling or unable to fly raw data on a regular basis simply has no business on a flightdeck.

Simple solution to the problem.

This is all the inevitable consequence of airlines who have stopped their own training.
Students who have to spend large amounts of their own money will go to the schools that don't fail them - in other words, schools that make it easy, and absolutely minimise the training which might cause them to fail. The same applies to the airlines who cannot man their fleet and make a profit unless they find a way to take cheap, low time, pretty-poor-really pilots. And they all lean on the regulators to 'go easy'.
It is not at all unique to aviation - take a look at railway maintenance for another example.

Connected controls?
 

So now we have had two Airbus accidents where the PF kept pulling back on the stick of a stalled aircraft, and no one tried to stop him - possibly because they didn't even realize what he was doing.

It has been unfortunate in these two recent cases that the spoken "dual input" warning gets suppressed by the stall warning. But it seems that audio warnings go unnoticed in stressful situations anyway.

In fact, I can think of several warnings that might warrant a more robust way of getting the message across than there is today:

• Stall/approach to stall: Now spoken, and indicated by the speed tape. Add a stick shaker and a text message "Stall - pitch down" on the ECAM and the PFD.
• Terrain: Now spoken/whoop, and terrain painted on the NAV display. Add a text message "Terrain - pull up" on the ECAM and the PFD.
• Dual input: Now spoken, and indicator lights on the glare shield. Add a text message "Dual input - PF/PNF roles .. clarify" on the ECAM.

There's my wacky idea for today. But at least it would take less effort to implement than interconnected sidesticks.

..or having pilots who can actually fly an aeroplane...