AMR 587 Airbus Crash (merged)
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Airbus 1997 internal memo warned against moving the rudder (AA587)
The Airbus memo referenced in a New York Times article today appears to be different than the report cited in a recent thread regarding structural design loads on the A300 fin. Some of this may be 'blame game' maneurvering before the NTSB hearing later this month on AA587, but it does seem a bit untoward that Airbus, based on its analysis of an earlier incident, kept internal a memo warning that swinging the A300 rudder may result in the fin failing.
97 Memo Cited in '01 Queens Airliner Crash
By MATTHEW L. WALD
WASHINGTON, Oct. 11 - An airplane manufacturer's memo written in June 1997 explicitly describes the hazards of the maneuver that caused the November 2001 crash of an American Airlines plane in Belle Harbor, Queens, but the memo was kept within the company, and the pilot was never warned about the procedure.
American Airlines obtained the memo a few months ago from the manufacturer, Airbus, as part of its suit over how the companies will share the payments to the families of the 265 people killed in the crash of Flight 587. The memo is now being cited by American and the pilots' union in an effort to put part of the blame on Airbus.
The maneuver involved swinging the rudder from side to side, and the memo, written after a 1997 episode with a different American Airlines flight in the same kind of plane, an A300, warns that it could cause the tail to break off. That is what happened to Flight 587.
After the crash, the National Transportation Safety Board issued a recommendation against the maneuver. If Airbus had shown the memo to the board before the crash, "instead of concealing it from them, the N.T.S.B. would have issued the recommendation before the crash," said John A. David, an American Airlines pilot who is the chief representative of the union, the Air Line Pilots Association, in the investigation.
Clay McConnell, a spokesman for Airbus, said that at the time the memo was written, Airbus was not a party to the investigation of the first event, and that when it did join, it was involved with crew performance, not structural issues.
The memo, from a German member of the Airbus consortium, Daimler-Benz Aerospace, said that "rudder movements from left limit to right limit will produce loads on the fin/rear fuselage above ultimate design load" - the amount of force that a part is designed to handle without breaking.
The memo's main point was that the tail of the plane in the 1997 event should be inspected. It was, and no damage was found, but it was reinspected more thoroughly after the 2001 crash, when some problems were found.
In the Flight 587 crash, the co-pilot, flying the plane, moved the rudder back and forth when it encountered the wake of a plane that had taken off 140 seconds earlier from Kennedy International Airport. Pilots are warned not to use the rudder above a certain speed, which varies by airplane, but Flight 587 was still below that speed. They were not warned, until after the crash, never to use the rudder in alternating directions.
The safety board warning went to all jet airliner pilots, and experts say that the A300 is no more vulnerable to this maneuver than many other planes. Separately, however, the airline is arguing that a system called the "rudder limiter," which keeps a pilot from moving the rudder farther than is safe at the airplane's speed, does not work well on the A300.
The safety board has scheduled a meeting for Oct. 26 to establish the probable cause of the crash. Under its charter from Congress, the board finds probable cause, not fault, but its findings could influence the outcome of the litigation between the airline and the plane manufacturer.
The union and the airline are contending that in an era of very few passenger airline crashes, reducing the accident rate further will require that all elements of the industry volunteer any information they have on any potential safety problem.
In the 1997 episode, the crew of an American airlines plane near West Palm Beach, Fla., mismanaged the controls and allowed airspeed to fall too low. When the plane slowed down to the point that it could not stay in the air, the crew performed a sloppy recovery but averted a crash. But the investigation focused on the initial error and the poor recovery, and not the rudder issue.
Mr. McConnell of Airbus said his company had stressed to American after the 1997 event that pilots should not use the rudder in recovering stability.
"If the pilots didn't know it, it isn't for our lack of trying," he said. He acknowledged that the advice concerned not using the rudder, and not the more specific case of using the rudder in alternating directions. But, he said, "there is no good piloting reason to use alternating rudder, none, in the history of aviation."
By MATTHEW L. WALD
WASHINGTON, Oct. 11 - An airplane manufacturer's memo written in June 1997 explicitly describes the hazards of the maneuver that caused the November 2001 crash of an American Airlines plane in Belle Harbor, Queens, but the memo was kept within the company, and the pilot was never warned about the procedure.
American Airlines obtained the memo a few months ago from the manufacturer, Airbus, as part of its suit over how the companies will share the payments to the families of the 265 people killed in the crash of Flight 587. The memo is now being cited by American and the pilots' union in an effort to put part of the blame on Airbus.
The maneuver involved swinging the rudder from side to side, and the memo, written after a 1997 episode with a different American Airlines flight in the same kind of plane, an A300, warns that it could cause the tail to break off. That is what happened to Flight 587.
After the crash, the National Transportation Safety Board issued a recommendation against the maneuver. If Airbus had shown the memo to the board before the crash, "instead of concealing it from them, the N.T.S.B. would have issued the recommendation before the crash," said John A. David, an American Airlines pilot who is the chief representative of the union, the Air Line Pilots Association, in the investigation.
Clay McConnell, a spokesman for Airbus, said that at the time the memo was written, Airbus was not a party to the investigation of the first event, and that when it did join, it was involved with crew performance, not structural issues.
The memo, from a German member of the Airbus consortium, Daimler-Benz Aerospace, said that "rudder movements from left limit to right limit will produce loads on the fin/rear fuselage above ultimate design load" - the amount of force that a part is designed to handle without breaking.
The memo's main point was that the tail of the plane in the 1997 event should be inspected. It was, and no damage was found, but it was reinspected more thoroughly after the 2001 crash, when some problems were found.
In the Flight 587 crash, the co-pilot, flying the plane, moved the rudder back and forth when it encountered the wake of a plane that had taken off 140 seconds earlier from Kennedy International Airport. Pilots are warned not to use the rudder above a certain speed, which varies by airplane, but Flight 587 was still below that speed. They were not warned, until after the crash, never to use the rudder in alternating directions.
The safety board warning went to all jet airliner pilots, and experts say that the A300 is no more vulnerable to this maneuver than many other planes. Separately, however, the airline is arguing that a system called the "rudder limiter," which keeps a pilot from moving the rudder farther than is safe at the airplane's speed, does not work well on the A300.
The safety board has scheduled a meeting for Oct. 26 to establish the probable cause of the crash. Under its charter from Congress, the board finds probable cause, not fault, but its findings could influence the outcome of the litigation between the airline and the plane manufacturer.
The union and the airline are contending that in an era of very few passenger airline crashes, reducing the accident rate further will require that all elements of the industry volunteer any information they have on any potential safety problem.
In the 1997 episode, the crew of an American airlines plane near West Palm Beach, Fla., mismanaged the controls and allowed airspeed to fall too low. When the plane slowed down to the point that it could not stay in the air, the crew performed a sloppy recovery but averted a crash. But the investigation focused on the initial error and the poor recovery, and not the rudder issue.
Mr. McConnell of Airbus said his company had stressed to American after the 1997 event that pilots should not use the rudder in recovering stability.
"If the pilots didn't know it, it isn't for our lack of trying," he said. He acknowledged that the advice concerned not using the rudder, and not the more specific case of using the rudder in alternating directions. But, he said, "there is no good piloting reason to use alternating rudder, none, in the history of aviation."
The Airbus memo referenced in a New York Times article today appears to be different than the report cited in a recent thread regarding structural design loads on the A300 fin. Some of this may be 'blame game' maneurvering before the NTSB hearing later this month on AA587, but it does seem a bit untoward that Airbus, based on its analysis of an earlier incident, kept internal a memo warning that swinging the A300 rudder may result in the fin failing.
It seems to me that the applicable words to the issue are contained in this quote lifted from the memo.
"If the pilots didn't know it, it isn't for our lack of trying," he said. He acknowledged that the advice concerned not using the rudder, and not the more specific case of using the rudder in alternating directions. But, he said, "there is no good piloting reason to use alternating rudder, none, in the history of aviation."
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What about the breakout force on the A300 rudder? Isn't it true that at higher speeds, the breakout force on the A300 rudder is large enough compared to the force required for full deflection that at higher speeds that the A300 rudder becomes more of an on/off switch -- either zero deflection or full deflection?
If that is the case, wouldn't that be a contributing factor in the incident?
If that is the case, wouldn't that be a contributing factor in the incident?
Union Goon
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Exactly.
The A300 is a TINY TINY little fleet at american airlines a total of 35 aircraft out of 800 aircraft MD80 size or larger.
Yet this is the ONLY fleet at American that had rudder issues. repeatedly. Somehow none of the boeings or the Douglas aircraft EVER had any problems, yet a miniscule fleet operated at over a short period of time had repeated problems....
Cheers
Wino
The A300 is a TINY TINY little fleet at american airlines a total of 35 aircraft out of 800 aircraft MD80 size or larger.
Yet this is the ONLY fleet at American that had rudder issues. repeatedly. Somehow none of the boeings or the Douglas aircraft EVER had any problems, yet a miniscule fleet operated at over a short period of time had repeated problems....
Cheers
Wino
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From the first post of this thread....
Perhaps of more relevance is the manipulation of the rudder by the pilot in question. 
Maybe some peeps should stop trying to blame the cause of the AA accident upon Airbus Industrie and accept, instead, the glaringly obvious.
.....evidence exists that may prove that Airbus Industries, which is headquartered in Hamburg, “manipulated” the engineering test numbers relating to the rudders of its A300-600 aircraft, the same type of jet airliner that flew as American A
Maybe some peeps should stop trying to blame the cause of the AA accident upon Airbus Industrie and accept, instead, the glaringly obvious.
Union Goon
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And maybe you should stop ignoring the factual impiric evidence from millions of operating hours at AA.
800 jet fleet. No rudder problems anywhere except in one micro fleet. Multiple aircraft flown by different pilots experience same problem. And somehow that ISN'T an airbus problem? Had AA NEVER bought airbus there would have been no crash in Long Islan Nov 12 2001. That is a FACT....
So because AA bought an an airbus product hundreds of people died.
Cheers
Wino
800 jet fleet. No rudder problems anywhere except in one micro fleet. Multiple aircraft flown by different pilots experience same problem. And somehow that ISN'T an airbus problem? Had AA NEVER bought airbus there would have been no crash in Long Islan Nov 12 2001. That is a FACT....
So because AA bought an an airbus product hundreds of people died.
Cheers
Wino
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The NTSB conducted extensive research into the pilot application of rudder following the Pittsburgh 737 crash of 1994, and concluded then that they were unable to reproduce the pattern of rapid rudder movement apparent in the accident. Indeed in a survey of some 10000 sectors, the Board was unable to find another incidence in which a pilot had commanded full rudder deflection as a response to an upset. It was this inference that led them to suspect beyond reasonable doubt that the pilot had not mishandled the aircraft involved in the Pittsburgh accident, and that his inputs were attempting to counter the rudder hardover, the flawed design that Boeing later had to rectify.
How then can we now be expected to accept a new paradigm that suggest that pilots should be told that a rapid, reversing application of full rudder might compromise the structural integrity of an aeroplane? It had been shown in the NTSB’s own research before the AA587 accident that such pilot behaviour was uncharacteristic and unnatural.
Are we now suggesting that pilots need to be warned of all possible control inputs that might be hazardous to the aircraft? Should the Airbus 380 Flying Manual include advice not to roll inverted and pull immediately after take-off?
The accusation that Airbus somehow failed to caution operators that such extraordinary manoeuvres might be potentially hazardous is sheer folly. I suspect if it had been a Boeing 737 that crashed at Queens and not an Airbus, we would not be having this conversation.
The Atlantic is getting wider and wider by the day.
How then can we now be expected to accept a new paradigm that suggest that pilots should be told that a rapid, reversing application of full rudder might compromise the structural integrity of an aeroplane? It had been shown in the NTSB’s own research before the AA587 accident that such pilot behaviour was uncharacteristic and unnatural.
Are we now suggesting that pilots need to be warned of all possible control inputs that might be hazardous to the aircraft? Should the Airbus 380 Flying Manual include advice not to roll inverted and pull immediately after take-off?
The accusation that Airbus somehow failed to caution operators that such extraordinary manoeuvres might be potentially hazardous is sheer folly. I suspect if it had been a Boeing 737 that crashed at Queens and not an Airbus, we would not be having this conversation.
The Atlantic is getting wider and wider by the day.
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you mean to say wino that american don't operate the 737?
What about the rudder problems that caused a couple of crashes on that a/c ?
I dont know if any american airlines a/c were involved there, but it seems to me that rudder problems are not an exclusive airbus problem
What about the rudder problems that caused a couple of crashes on that a/c ?
I dont know if any american airlines a/c were involved there, but it seems to me that rudder problems are not an exclusive airbus problem
Proposal for A300B4 Rudder Response Simulator
If I were AA's lawyer, I'd have an A300B4 Rudder Response Simulator built.
Specifications:
Specifications:
- Swivel chair with seat belt
- Attached platform with rudder pedals that rotates with chair
- Mechanism to rotate chair and platform
- Rudder pedal travel -- 1 inch
- Breakout Force -- 22 pounds
- Full Deflection Force -- 35 pounds (as best I can recall)
- Yaw rate to pedal position ratios -- same as A300B4 at accident airspeed
- Initial external yaw -- same as encountered in wake just before rudder application
Union Goon
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Farheel.
AA flies NG model 737s. There has never been a rudder problem at AA other than the A300fleet. 100s of boeing and douglas aircraft at very high utilization no problem.
35 airplanes at relatively low utilization, multiple problems with different aircraft and pilots (there fore it can't be an issue with one pilot)
Cheers
Wino
AA flies NG model 737s. There has never been a rudder problem at AA other than the A300fleet. 100s of boeing and douglas aircraft at very high utilization no problem.
35 airplanes at relatively low utilization, multiple problems with different aircraft and pilots (there fore it can't be an issue with one pilot)
Cheers
Wino
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Wino
Care to summarise those problems here?
Please include, in your summary, the number of rudders (fins) which snapped off.
.....multiple problems with different aircraft and pilots.....
Please include, in your summary, the number of rudders (fins) which snapped off.
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To whom it may concern:
October 8, 2004
U.S. BUSINESS NEWS
Airbus May Not Have Pressed
Plane-Tail Safety Warnings
By ANDY PASZTOR
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
With pilot error expected to be cited as the primary reason for the 2001 crash
of an American Airlines Airbus A300 jetliner, newly reviewed documents
underscore that Airbus engineers years before realized but failed to explicitly
warn pilots or airlines about the potential for such a catastrophic accident.
The new information is likely to renew debate about how much of the cause can be assigned to the American
crew versus the design of the jet's tail, and also whether Airbus, an arm of European Aeronautic Defense &
Space Co., ought to be faulted for what critics allege were shortcomings in raising red flags about possible
hazards.
The National Transportation Safety Board is poised to conclude that the plane's cockpit crew inadvertently
created forces that ripped off the tail and killed 265 people by swinging the rudder rapidly from side to side
during a climb after takeoff. The board is expected to discuss additional questions about design issues and
regulatory approval of the A300 when it holds a public hearing later this month.
Testimony and documents already have revealed that Airbus had warned about the matter, but many of the
warnings were overlooked and the aircraft maker itself failed to push the issue.
The latest internal Airbus
documents shed more light on what the plane maker knew, and how concerned some of its own engineers
appeared to be, about a 1997 incident that didn't result in a crash but seriously stressed the tail of a different
American Airlines A300 aircraft over South Florida.
Airbus strongly disputes that the internal memorandum -- which surfaced in litigation over the 2001 crash --
indicates the company knew more about the dangers than it disclosed at the time, or that it subsequently
failed to promptly or fully advise the airline about the matter.
John Lauber, the top safety official for Airbus
in the U.S., has said that "aggressive use of the rudder" by American pilots in 1997 was "analyzed
preliminarily" by the company and "caused us concern about possible damage in the tail section."
An Airbus spokesman said yesterday that the company "pressed hard" for American, a unit of AMR Corp.,
to take the specific plane out of service for an inspection. The company maintains that it wasn't until 2002
that it was able to use updated techniques to conclude that the stresses on the tail of the plane in the 1997
incident exceeded its "ultimate" design limit -- an all-important limit 50% above the highest stresses any part
is supposed to undergo in flight.
The June 16, 1997, memo warned after the South Florida incident that, based on data from previous flight
tests and simulators, "rudder movement from left limit to right limit will produce [structural] loads" on the
rear of the A300 exceeding the "ultimate design load" the parts were expected to withstand. The memo
circulated among Airbus engineers seems to include a more-explicit and definitive warning about the
potential for structural failure than other Airbus documents examined by investigators.
When Airbus participated in the safety board's investigation of the 1997 incident, it told the board that pilots
"using too much rudder" to recover from an upset "can lead to structural loads that exceed the design strength
of the fin and other associated airframe components." But recently, current and former board investigators
have told industry representatives that those conclusions weren't highlighted by Airbus and their full significane it was missed ,according to ailine and pilots-union officials.
Page 1 of 2 WSJ.com - Airbus May Not Have Pressed Plane-Tail Safety Warnings
10/11/2004 http://online.wsj.com/article_print/...1307439650,00.
October 8, 2004
U.S. BUSINESS NEWS
Airbus May Not Have Pressed
Plane-Tail Safety Warnings
By ANDY PASZTOR
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
With pilot error expected to be cited as the primary reason for the 2001 crash
of an American Airlines Airbus A300 jetliner, newly reviewed documents
underscore that Airbus engineers years before realized but failed to explicitly
warn pilots or airlines about the potential for such a catastrophic accident.
The new information is likely to renew debate about how much of the cause can be assigned to the American
crew versus the design of the jet's tail, and also whether Airbus, an arm of European Aeronautic Defense &
Space Co., ought to be faulted for what critics allege were shortcomings in raising red flags about possible
hazards.
The National Transportation Safety Board is poised to conclude that the plane's cockpit crew inadvertently
created forces that ripped off the tail and killed 265 people by swinging the rudder rapidly from side to side
during a climb after takeoff. The board is expected to discuss additional questions about design issues and
regulatory approval of the A300 when it holds a public hearing later this month.
Testimony and documents already have revealed that Airbus had warned about the matter, but many of the
warnings were overlooked and the aircraft maker itself failed to push the issue.
The latest internal Airbus
documents shed more light on what the plane maker knew, and how concerned some of its own engineers
appeared to be, about a 1997 incident that didn't result in a crash but seriously stressed the tail of a different
American Airlines A300 aircraft over South Florida.
Airbus strongly disputes that the internal memorandum -- which surfaced in litigation over the 2001 crash --
indicates the company knew more about the dangers than it disclosed at the time, or that it subsequently
failed to promptly or fully advise the airline about the matter.
John Lauber, the top safety official for Airbus
in the U.S., has said that "aggressive use of the rudder" by American pilots in 1997 was "analyzed
preliminarily" by the company and "caused us concern about possible damage in the tail section."
An Airbus spokesman said yesterday that the company "pressed hard" for American, a unit of AMR Corp.,
to take the specific plane out of service for an inspection. The company maintains that it wasn't until 2002
that it was able to use updated techniques to conclude that the stresses on the tail of the plane in the 1997
incident exceeded its "ultimate" design limit -- an all-important limit 50% above the highest stresses any part
is supposed to undergo in flight.
The June 16, 1997, memo warned after the South Florida incident that, based on data from previous flight
tests and simulators, "rudder movement from left limit to right limit will produce [structural] loads" on the
rear of the A300 exceeding the "ultimate design load" the parts were expected to withstand. The memo
circulated among Airbus engineers seems to include a more-explicit and definitive warning about the
potential for structural failure than other Airbus documents examined by investigators.
When Airbus participated in the safety board's investigation of the 1997 incident, it told the board that pilots
"using too much rudder" to recover from an upset "can lead to structural loads that exceed the design strength
of the fin and other associated airframe components." But recently, current and former board investigators
have told industry representatives that those conclusions weren't highlighted by Airbus and their full significane it was missed ,according to ailine and pilots-union officials.
Page 1 of 2 WSJ.com - Airbus May Not Have Pressed Plane-Tail Safety Warnings
10/11/2004 http://online.wsj.com/article_print/...1307439650,00.
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RatherBeFlying:
In America's overly litigious society*, I expect plaintiffs' lawyers will try to make much of Airbus, after the near-crash of another AAL A300, writing a memo in 1997 assessing the likelihood of a fin failing when subjected to certain maneuver-induced loads and not sharing that assessment with anyone. If the Airbus spokesperson's statement is fairly reported, the memo was not shared because Airbus' participation in the 1997 post-incident investigation was confined to human factors; i.e., pilot performance.
* No better evidence of the unpredictable results that American courts and American juries can produce, amid their search for 'deep pockets' and a prevalent desire to generously compensate victims than the recent jury decision in a Los Angeles County Superior Court, in which Parker Hannefin was found solely responsible for the crash of SilkAir 185 because it had poorly manufactured a servo-control; a conclusion no other investigation into that crash reached.
ACBus1
I have not the time to search through the over 400 posts on PPRuNe on AA587, but I have a recollection that the fin from the AAL 1997 incident was pulled from that aircraft and subjected to destructive analysis as part of the AA587 investigation. However, I did a quick search through the the NTSB's extensive, albeit partial, list of exhibits related to AA587 and did not come across a reference to that. The NTSB web address is below.
In America's overly litigious society*, I expect plaintiffs' lawyers will try to make much of Airbus, after the near-crash of another AAL A300, writing a memo in 1997 assessing the likelihood of a fin failing when subjected to certain maneuver-induced loads and not sharing that assessment with anyone. If the Airbus spokesperson's statement is fairly reported, the memo was not shared because Airbus' participation in the 1997 post-incident investigation was confined to human factors; i.e., pilot performance.
* No better evidence of the unpredictable results that American courts and American juries can produce, amid their search for 'deep pockets' and a prevalent desire to generously compensate victims than the recent jury decision in a Los Angeles County Superior Court, in which Parker Hannefin was found solely responsible for the crash of SilkAir 185 because it had poorly manufactured a servo-control; a conclusion no other investigation into that crash reached.
ACBus1
I have not the time to search through the over 400 posts on PPRuNe on AA587, but I have a recollection that the fin from the AAL 1997 incident was pulled from that aircraft and subjected to destructive analysis as part of the AA587 investigation. However, I did a quick search through the the NTSB's extensive, albeit partial, list of exhibits related to AA587 and did not come across a reference to that. The NTSB web address is below.
I have a recollection that the fin from the AAL 1997 incident was pulled from that aircraft and subjected to destructive analysis as part of the AA587 investigation.
Lots of self serving pronouncements by the parties, claiming that if they had only known , however one of the responsible parties, the NTSB, is immune from litigitious blame finding.
I suggest that those of us on the sidelines wait for the NTSB hearing to sort out the details and ignore the stuff in the news print.
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Structural damage on the aircraft from the 1997 incident was identified only during the 587 investigation in 2002. Six other planes that were also inspected around that time came out clear. From NTSB Press releases:
Feb 25, 2002:
Mar 11, 2002:
Apr 12, 2002:
http://www.ntsb.gov/Pressrel/2002/020225.htm
http://www.ntsb.gov/Pressrel/2002/020311.htm
http://www.ntsb.gov/Pressrel/2002/020412b.htm
Feb 25, 2002:
As a safety precaution, Airbus and American Airlines are removing the vertical stabilizer of that aircraft for non-destructive inspection; Safety Board investigators will be present later this week when the stabilizer undergoes ultrasonic inspection to determine whether the stabilizer sustained any damage during that incident.
Investigators report that an indication of damage (possibly delamination) has been found that apparently was not present at the time of manufacture. The indication is at the pin bushing of the right rear lug.
In addition, the FAA and Airbus identified seven Airbus A300-600 and A310 aircraft whose vertical stabilizers needed to be ultrasonically inspected because of possible high lateral loads experienced by those aircraft. Three of the aircraft were from American Airlines, and the other four were from FedEx, Tarom and Interflug (two European carriers), and the German air force. The FAA reports that all seven have been checked and only one exhibited any damage to the vertical stabilizer. That was the previously reported American Airlines flight 903 aircraft that experienced an upset event in 1997.
http://www.ntsb.gov/Pressrel/2002/020311.htm
http://www.ntsb.gov/Pressrel/2002/020412b.htm
Union Goon
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You got it a little backwards lompasso.
AA wanted to pull the tails of the airbuses at various times and was "Advised" in the strongest manner not to, that the risk of damage from removing the tails for NDI was higher than the probability of finding anything wrong with them and that Tap tests and partial ultra sound (it is not possible to get an accurate full ultrasound while installed) of the tail would be more than enough.
Airbus was doggedly sticking to this position because they were claiming that there were no aging aircraft issues with composites and were presenting it as a cost savings over aluminum. When they pulled the tail of the other airplane and found damage, THEN airbus changed their position on inspections of the tail.
That the aircraft had flown for 5 years with that damage undiscovered at various C and D checks means the aircraft ALL need to be ultrasounded as part of a heavy check. Again, Airbus is fighting that tooth and nail....
CHeers
Wino
AA wanted to pull the tails of the airbuses at various times and was "Advised" in the strongest manner not to, that the risk of damage from removing the tails for NDI was higher than the probability of finding anything wrong with them and that Tap tests and partial ultra sound (it is not possible to get an accurate full ultrasound while installed) of the tail would be more than enough.
Airbus was doggedly sticking to this position because they were claiming that there were no aging aircraft issues with composites and were presenting it as a cost savings over aluminum. When they pulled the tail of the other airplane and found damage, THEN airbus changed their position on inspections of the tail.
That the aircraft had flown for 5 years with that damage undiscovered at various C and D checks means the aircraft ALL need to be ultrasounded as part of a heavy check. Again, Airbus is fighting that tooth and nail....
CHeers
Wino
Wino
I thought that not recommended to inspect applied only to normal wear and tear and not necessarily following an event
I'm happy to be corrected on this and hope that the NTSB hearing will clear this up.
I thought that not recommended to inspect applied only to normal wear and tear and not necessarily following an event
I'm happy to be corrected on this and hope that the NTSB hearing will clear this up.
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Did anybody see the BBC's Horizon documentary about AA587 shown last night on BBC World?
I found it very informative and if anybody didn't see it then I recommend you try to obtain it possibly from the Beeb's Archive section although it could be repeated as a fair bit of the BBC World schedule is.
I was quite shocked to see the Chief of the American Airlines A300 fleet Training Department re-enacting the conditions in the Sim'. with a group of independant analysts who applied Airbus's own G factor limitations monitoring his rudder control inputs AFTER the Head of Airbus had done the same demo. showing that it was recoverable. Airbus recommended NEVER APPLY A FULL RUDDER REVERSAL yet this vastly experienced AA trainer was kicking the rudder pedals like David Beckham kicks a football and,as the sensors showed, he completed a couple of full rudder reversals WITHOUT the rudder separating from the fin.
When Airbus applied the NTSB supplied data from the accident aircrafts FDR's, Airbus ran it through their computer's and simulators and were astounded at the severity of the rudder inputs applied and doubly astounded at the 'punishment' the control surface withstood before failiure. It suffered 3 or 4 full rudder reversals prior to failiure and it exceeded Airbus's own figures by quite a margin.
One of the most memorable interviews was of an AA Senior Captain who was almost ghostly white when presented with the Airbus bulletin concerning FULL RUDDER REVERSAL. He simply said that he didn't know that such a manouvre could have such catastrophic consequences.
Shortly after the accident both Airbus and Boeing re-issued bulletins concerning rudder applications during flight. AA however haven't reviewed their training policy on recovery from jet upset or a wake turbulance encounter.
According to the FAA 7 aircraft needed checking, 3 of them belonging to AA and 1 other to the largest operator of A300/A310's in North America - Fedex.
3 out of a fleet of 30 something. Is it me or does something look wrong here?
I found it very informative and if anybody didn't see it then I recommend you try to obtain it possibly from the Beeb's Archive section although it could be repeated as a fair bit of the BBC World schedule is.
I was quite shocked to see the Chief of the American Airlines A300 fleet Training Department re-enacting the conditions in the Sim'. with a group of independant analysts who applied Airbus's own G factor limitations monitoring his rudder control inputs AFTER the Head of Airbus had done the same demo. showing that it was recoverable. Airbus recommended NEVER APPLY A FULL RUDDER REVERSAL yet this vastly experienced AA trainer was kicking the rudder pedals like David Beckham kicks a football and,as the sensors showed, he completed a couple of full rudder reversals WITHOUT the rudder separating from the fin.
When Airbus applied the NTSB supplied data from the accident aircrafts FDR's, Airbus ran it through their computer's and simulators and were astounded at the severity of the rudder inputs applied and doubly astounded at the 'punishment' the control surface withstood before failiure. It suffered 3 or 4 full rudder reversals prior to failiure and it exceeded Airbus's own figures by quite a margin.
One of the most memorable interviews was of an AA Senior Captain who was almost ghostly white when presented with the Airbus bulletin concerning FULL RUDDER REVERSAL. He simply said that he didn't know that such a manouvre could have such catastrophic consequences.
Shortly after the accident both Airbus and Boeing re-issued bulletins concerning rudder applications during flight. AA however haven't reviewed their training policy on recovery from jet upset or a wake turbulance encounter.
According to the FAA 7 aircraft needed checking, 3 of them belonging to AA and 1 other to the largest operator of A300/A310's in North America - Fedex.
3 out of a fleet of 30 something. Is it me or does something look wrong here?
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There are a number of good exhibits available on the NTSB website for this accident.
This link included excerpts from the AA A300-600 Operations Manual, both before and after the accident, indicating how to use the rudder:
AA Operations Manual
This link covers the FDR and simulator sessions showing exactly what happened in the final seconds of flight AA587. Page 19 particularly shows what happened to the rudder and the ailerons, when the pilot attempted to coordinate them.
NTSB FDR and sim analysis with graphs
The AA Operations manual discusses using the rudder in coordination with the ailerons to assist with rolls during certain upset recovery maneuvers. Wino mentioned that this was in the training course. The accident data shows that the ailerons were sometimes at their limits as the pilot tried to roll the aircraft level during the second wake encounter.
However its seems to me that the mere mention of using the rudder to coordinate with ailerons to effect roll maneuvers in both the AA manuals and the training course, assumes that the pilot MUST have the ability to control the amount of rudder (and side force) being applied. The rudder limiter of the A300-600 (and its all-or-nothing design flaws) basically prevents the pilot from controlling the amount of side force generated at high airspeeds, therefore the ability to affect good coordination between the ailerons and the rudder is compromised. To me, this is clearly shown in the FDR and sim analysis in the above link. I don't think that this accident was caused by a training problem, because the AA training program assumed that the rudder system operated correctly. Clearly after the accident, the training program had to be modified to accommodate the limitations of this particular rudder system on this particular aircraft.
I personally think that a really good lawyer should be able to tag Airbus for this one, without too much trouble.
(edited to fix a link)
This link included excerpts from the AA A300-600 Operations Manual, both before and after the accident, indicating how to use the rudder:
AA Operations Manual
This link covers the FDR and simulator sessions showing exactly what happened in the final seconds of flight AA587. Page 19 particularly shows what happened to the rudder and the ailerons, when the pilot attempted to coordinate them.
NTSB FDR and sim analysis with graphs
The AA Operations manual discusses using the rudder in coordination with the ailerons to assist with rolls during certain upset recovery maneuvers. Wino mentioned that this was in the training course. The accident data shows that the ailerons were sometimes at their limits as the pilot tried to roll the aircraft level during the second wake encounter.
However its seems to me that the mere mention of using the rudder to coordinate with ailerons to effect roll maneuvers in both the AA manuals and the training course, assumes that the pilot MUST have the ability to control the amount of rudder (and side force) being applied. The rudder limiter of the A300-600 (and its all-or-nothing design flaws) basically prevents the pilot from controlling the amount of side force generated at high airspeeds, therefore the ability to affect good coordination between the ailerons and the rudder is compromised. To me, this is clearly shown in the FDR and sim analysis in the above link. I don't think that this accident was caused by a training problem, because the AA training program assumed that the rudder system operated correctly. Clearly after the accident, the training program had to be modified to accommodate the limitations of this particular rudder system on this particular aircraft.
I personally think that a really good lawyer should be able to tag Airbus for this one, without too much trouble.
(edited to fix a link)