AMR 587 Airbus Crash (merged)

[Airbubba]

Co-pilot blamed for deadly 2001 jet crash

Co-pilot blamed for deadly 2001 jet crash

Actions caused Airbus to crash in N.Y., killing 265, NTSB report says

The Associated Press
Updated: 11:42 a.m. ET Oct. 26, 2004


WASHINGTON - The co-pilot of American Airlines flight 587 caused the November 2001 crash that claimed the lives of 265 people, the staff of the U.S. airline safety agency reported Tuesday.

Investigator Robert Benzon of the National Transportation Safety Board said the copilot's response to turbulence, just seconds after the Airbus A300-600 plane took off from New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport, was "unnecessary and aggressive."

Benzon said investigators also concluded that American Airlines improperly trained its pilots to use the aircraft's rudder while recovering from upsets and said the problem could have been exacerbated by the airline's simulator training.

Benzon also said that the rudder control system on the aircraft is sensitive at higher air speeds, which is potentially hazardous.

The safety board itself was expected later Tuesday to rule on the staff's findings.

Repeated shifts of rudder

On Nov. 12, 2001, First Officer Sten Molin, the co-pilot, moved the plane's rudder back and forth after takeoff, trying to control the climbing aircraft, not realizing he was sealing the grim fate of those on board, the report said.

Molin was at the controls when the plane hit turbulence almost immediately after taking off for the Dominican Republic.

"Hang onto it, hang onto it," Capt. Edward States implored.

"Let's go for power, please," Molin said.

A second later came a loud bang, which investigators believe was the tail breaking off. Then came the roar of air rushing against the aircraft and alarms sounding in the cockpit.

"What the hell are we into (inaudible)?" Molin said. "We're stuck in it."

States' last recorded words came five seconds later: "Get out of it! Get out of it!"

Both Airbus Industrie, which manufactured the jetliner, and American Airlines, which trained Molin, agree that if he had taken his foot off the rudder pedal, the tail wouldn't have broken off, the plane wouldn't have plunged into a New York City neighborhood.

It was the second deadliest plane crash on U.S. soil.

Airline, Airbus dispute blame

But Molin didn't know he was putting more pressure on the tail than it could bear. Why he didn't — and who's to blame for that — is the subject of a bitter fight between Airbus and American.

According to investigators, Molin tried to steady the aircraft using pedals that control the rudder, a large flap on a plane's tail. When his initial movement failed, Molin tried again and again. His actions placed enormous stress on the tail.

American, the only U.S. airline to use that type of Airbus plane for passenger service, claims Airbus didn't alert it to the danger of sharp rudder movements until after the crash. The airline also contends the Airbus A300-600 has uniquely sensitive flight controls that can cause more severe rudder movements than the pilot intends.

"Airbus had the ability to truly red-flag the issue," American spokesman Bruce Hicks said.

Airbus says it told American a number of times and in a number of ways that the airline was improperly training pilots about how to use the rudder.

An Airbus spokesman declined to comment on the investigation before the hearing. However, the company has provided the NTSB with a number of documents to support its claim.

Letter warned against abrupt movement

For example, a letter dated Aug. 20, 1997, warned American chief pilot Cecil Ewing that rudders should not be moved abruptly to right a jetliner or when a plane is flown at a sharp angle. The letter was signed by representatives from The Boeing Co., the Federal Aviation Administration and Airbus.

Airbus contends that even people within American Airlines were concerned about how the airline was training its pilots. A letter to Airbus dated May 22, 1997, from American technical pilot David Tribout expressed concern about the airline's then-new training course on advanced maneuvers.

"I am very concerned that one aspect of the course is inaccurate and potentially hazardous," Tribout wrote. His concern: Pilots were being taught that the rudder should be used to control a plane's rolling motion.

Hicks countered that Airbus didn't share important safety information about the rudder after a problem with American Flight 903 in May 1997. During that incident, pilots used the rudder to steady an Airbus A300-600 plane on approach to West Palm Beach airport. The plane nearly crashed and one person was seriously injured.

‘Rapid loss of controlled flight’

Afterward, Airbus told the NTSB that it included a warning that abrupt rudder movement in some circumstances "can lead to rapid loss of controlled flight," and, in others, could break off the tail.

Hicks said Airbus' comments didn't specifically say the rudder movements on Flight 903 had exposed the tail to so much pressure that it could have been ripped off.

Immediately after the Flight 903 incident, an inspection found no damage to the tail. But five years later, the plane was inspected more closely because of concerns aroused by the crash of Flight 587. Cracks were found and the tail was replaced.

John David, a spokesman for American Airlines' pilots union, said pilots had always thought that they could use rudders to the full extent without hurting the airplane. He also believes Airbus didn't properly communicate what it knew.

American now gives its pilots specialized training on the rudder control system based on information learned during the investigation.

[Ptkay]

Ohhh....
That's really interesting !

So what is the meaning of Va and "flight envelope" at all,
if you cannot apply full controls below Va ????

Did I really miss something in my ground school ????

[Flight Safety]

Ptkay, the accident has nothing to do with Va, please read the entire thread.

The accident was caused by the pilot trying to use the rudder to assist the roll of the aircraft during a wake encounter. He did not intend to use full rudder, but a strongly suspected design flaw in the rudder control system, caused the pilot to apply full rudder deflection when he did not intend to.

Again please read the entire thread, and the other thread regarding this accident.

[Ptkay]

I still don't get it, sorry.

Intended or unintended, applying full controls below Va
is allowed, according to all FAR, JAR or whatever you wish...

"VA – the calibrated design maneuvering airspeed. This
is the maximum speed at which the limit load can be
imposed (either by gusts or full deflection of the control
surfaces) without causing structural damage."

Quote from:
PILOT’S HANDBOOK
of Aeronautical Knowledge
2003 (FAA-H-8083-25), page 9-19.

So just to satisfy my curiosity:

What is the Va for Airbus 300-600 ?

[cringe]

Ptkay, this excerpt from Airbus' response to AA may be of some help:

Item: Design Maneuvering Speed (VA) - From the American Airlines submission (p. 42): "Pilots worldwide had ... the erroneous belief that rudder movements at any airspeed below the design maneuvering speed could not cause structural failure." The definition of VA impacts certification requirements, which presently require the structure to withstand the force of full control surface movement in one direction, then a return to neutral, but not the greater loads imparted by reversals (i.e., the air loads due to large induced sideslip angles). Comments: Both the airline and Airbus believe that the term VA needs to be clarified. In its June 2002 technical bulletin on the use of rudder, Boeing's comments about VA suggest an improved working definition: A speed at or below which "a single input to any set of control surfaces (elevators, ailerons, rudders to the maximum available authority ... to be in one axis (not in combination) and do not include control input reversal or oscillatory inputs." This Boeing bulletin was issued in response to an NTSB recommendation coming out of the AA 587 investigation. Airbus issued a comparable document, which cautioned: "Certification regulations do not consider the loads imposed on structure when there is a sudden, full, or nearly full, rudder movement that is opposite the sideslip."

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articl...114714587/pg_2

[RRAAMJET]

In my opinion, the origin of this, and several other US accidents, lies in the method of training here in the USA and not necessarily in the content.

Specifically: a great deal of the training is done by rote parrot-fashion Air Training Command-esque "repeat after me...".

There is very little " let's check your understanding of that ".

This is highly controversial stuff, for which there are great implications involving cost and time, both for the student and the employer. I know many of my colleagues will be saying to themselves right now " ooooh hang on a minute mate, let's not open up that can of worms. Trouble....". But it has to be said, and it has to be dealt with.

For example: I went through that same Maneuvering programme, and from previous experience had no doubt whatsoever that the co-ordinated, circumspect use of rudder was for very low speed already-departed situations, and then only as a last resort. I had always, from previous experience and aerodynamic theory, been aware of the limitations on a fin during divergent phugoid motions, especially at high speeds. This is well documented from the early days of jet transport, not to mention DP Davies' excellent works. I was also acutely aware of the limits on engine pylon mounts during yawing/pitching.

Now here's the bit that's going to get me in trouble, but if it saves someones a$$ in the future:

Many times I have been through training here in the US and some of my fellow students have come out with a blank stare on their faces. Nobody checks their understanding of the material being taught, and by that I mean in depth on the theory and principles behind it. It's just "repeat to me the Memory Items" so that we can fill in a square.

The US ATP exam is a prime example.

In many cases that I have seen, students are trying to make a basically unsupervised leap from slower, smaller, domestic equipment to widebody international, in many cases to end up sitting on reserve lacking practice instead of being supervised and intimately challenged by senior staff, such as happens at BA, CX, etc.

International training is just ticking the boxes. Look around at US pilots' reputations in overseas ops if you are in denial.

The union tries extremely hard to prevent extra examination, or no-notice sim-checks.

I am absolutely convinced that a prime factor in this accident is that the pilot involved may have left training having misunderstood the ideas being presented, but there was no in-depth examination of his understanding of the material. WINO has put this more eloquently than I, in a posting many months ago. Most of us were quite clear that the rudder was still a footrest at high speed, but 100% of us? Without follow-up in-depth checking, who knows?

Despite the dire straits of the US airline industry, it needs to get it's standards in order, and pay less attention to "filling squares" and graduating gradesheets.

[Airbubba]

>>Despite the dire straits of the US airline industry, it needs to get it's standards in order, and pay less attention to "filling squares" and graduating gradesheets. <<

Yep, we need to make things more complex, expensive and paperwork intensive and ask great questions like how many notches on the Airbus speedbrake quadrant.

Been there, done that, no thanks...

[411A]

Strange that only AA has had this problem with the A300-600.

Several times.

Clearly the buck stops at the way AA trains their pilots.
The head folks in the AA training department have had ample opportunity to read and understand the problems that can occur with large rudder inputs at higher speeds...they are all quite documented in incident data.

The fact that AA advised the abrupt use of the rudder at higher speeds, to their line pilots is...gross negligence, plain and simple.

Shark-type lawyers...line up to the left on the courthouse steps please, and prepare for big-time settlements.

AA's actions are nothing less than disgusting....period.

[RRAAMJET]

AirBubba: no, not my point at all. Precisely less emphasis on paperwork and more on practicality, application and understanding. It does not need to be more complex.

For instance: it is one thing to be able to regurgitate a "red box" in the classroom, but in a smoke-filled cockpit it is far more practical to have emphasis on what your hands are actually doing, not getting brackets and commas in place.

The toughest checkrides I have had, by far, were all at foreign carriers. Funnily enough, the people who complained about them the most being too tough were all from the US.

[Ralph Cramden]

Flight Safety
All due respect but how do you know whether he intended to apply full rudder or not. Slapping the rudder around is a no, no, for any large A/C IMHO. An 300 ain't no Pitts.

[Flight Safety]

Ralph, I find it very difficult to believe that a professional pilot would apply full rudder to assist the roll of fully deflected ailerons. He would apply only as much rudder as was needed to assist the roll. Applying full rudder would negate the finess required to assist a roll, while preventing too much disturbance to the passengers in the cabin at the same time. Of course we now know that in the A300-600, you should NEVER use the rudder at high speed, to assist a roll or anything else.

I just can't see a professional pilot kicking his passengers around like that. Granted, during the climbout shortly after take off, the passengers would be belted in, but during most of the flight some would not be. A 0.3G or 0.4G sideslip (caused by the fully deflected rudder) could cause serious injuries to the passengers who are not belted in.

I just can't see a professional pilot doing this, so I feel certain that this pilot did not intend to deflect the rudder fully.

To the moon Alice.

[Pontious]

Ironbutt 57

It is as cut and dried as that. It is that simple.

What part of the issue of a JOINT 'Upset and Recovery Training Aid' issued JOINTLY by Airbus AND Boeing in 1998 PLUS a signed letter from AA's MD-Flight Ops- Technical to Airbus expressing grave concerns over AA's 'In-House' Upset Recovery training can't you grasp?

Kicking the rudder around at speeds greater than Va, Vref80, Green Dot or whatever is a big No-No! First Officer Mollins wasn't taught that. Ignorance of the system is scant defence. If he was taught an incorrect technique then the blame rests squarely on the shoulders of the training department.

You can't hold the spotlight on Toulouse for this. Other operators of the A300-600/A310-300 DID NOT have as many rudder concerns or problems as what AA had. This was a 'Home Grown' problem whatever way you look at it and AA training has to take a long hard look at itself. The bottom line is AA WERE informed otherwise we'd have heard from all the other A300-600/A310-300 operators screaming that they hadn't got the bulletin but they are silent meaning they probably had notification of the OEB's and other Advisories. If it 'got lost in the post' then that's unfortunate. If, however, it was sent but not acted upon then that is nothing short of Gross Negligence.

I implore anyone to watch the BBC documentary before apportioning blame.

Flight Safety

Please watch this documentary and judge for yourself the AA training procedures demonstrated in the sim' by their own guys. It was quite scary to watch and the techniques demonstrated easily induced a PIO at speeds greater than Va with HUGE rudder inputs. Please judge for yourself.
What this Co-pilot intended to do cannot be assertained. What he was trained to do can.

[Rollingthunder]

Would the same rudder control inputs under the same circumstances have resulted in the same outcome with any other widebody aircraft?

[whauet]

I don't believe that accidents such as this are due to a single factor, but a series of failures...

There was a training issue at fault at AA for rudder input, but if Airbus was aware that excessive rudder input could cause structural failure, do they not have an obligation to modify systems to compensate? Dampen rudder input at higher speeds as to avoid this very situation from taking place?

(Not taking sides, just trying to take an objective viewpoint)

[SaturnV]

While the NTSB findings are not yet published on its website, press reports (New York Times and Washington Post and excerpted below) of yesterday's board hearing indicate the following:

1.) The board said that the copilot pushed the rudder too far to one side and then overcorrected by pushing hard in the other direction, and that the crash would not have occurred had he not touched the rudder. The five-member board agreed unanimously on the causes of the accident, but disagreed over whether the training or the tail sensitivity should rank second.

2.) The co-pilot had attended American's advanced training program, which sought to teach pilots how to better recover after an unexpected, dangerous incident. In one scenario similar to the Flight 587 accident, American's training video prompted pilots to respond to dramatic wake turbulence after following a 747 into the sky. American's simulation taught pilots to use the rudder, which controls the vertical tail's back-and-forth movements, along with the wings to stabilize the plane. But the safety board said the training was inaccurate because it taught pilots to associate wake turbulence with using the rudder. The co-pilot incorrectly perceived these reactions of the aircraft as being caused by outside turbulence rather than his own actions.

3.) The safety board concluded that the Airbus rudder was more sensitive than those on comparable aircraft and that its performance differed dramatically on the ground, in the air and at high speeds.

For all airliners there is a "maneuvering speed" above which rudder use is unsafe, but the A300's system for limiting rudder use as speed increases is unusual. On most planes, as speed increases, the pedal must be pushed farther and farther to get a given amount of movement out of the rudder. On the A300 and the A310, the system simply limits how far the pedal can move. The result is that very small pedal movements produce relatively large rudder changes. Since pushing the rudder produces a delayed result, pilots may push too far when they get no immediate response, then overshoot.

Dr. Malcolm Brenner, a psychologist with the board, called it "an inherently unfriendly design."

The Board recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration require manufacturers and aviation operators to provide better pilot training on rudder capabilities and proper rudder use in flight. It also recommended the FAA review the rudder design of Airbus A300-600 and the similar rudder on A310 aircraft. Airbus said it would work with the FAA if the agency decides to review its rudder design.

4.) The board voted to discuss developing more formal standards to have the FAA receive reports of overseas safety incidents that might help prevent similar incidents in the United States.

The issue arose after investigators said they were "disappointed" that Airbus and American were less than forthcoming in providing information about the rudder performance of another A300-600 involved in a non-fatal accident four years before Flight 587 crashed.

American alleged that Airbus withheld information about its rudder system in the 1997 incident, in which the plane stalled and its rudder was damaged; pilots regained control of that plane. The safety board ruled that incident was unrelated to the rudder-design issues raised by Flight 587.

5.) In the board meeting, staff members and members of the board engaged in extended discussions intended to disprove the idea that the crash was caused by sabotage.

6.) The board also rejected the idea that the tail failed because it was made of composite materials.

7.) The "tragic coupling of both the pilot and the aircraft really was the precipitating event that took down Flight 587," NTSB Vice Chairman Mark V. Rosenker said.

[lomapaseo]

Would the same rudder control inputs under the same circumstances have resulted in the same outcome with any other widebody aircraft?

Each manufacturer of aircraft meets the design regulations, and often employs differences in their novelty of design, avoiding patent infingements while still meeting the regulation. An obvious example of this was the sidestick vs the crotch stick control as well as more subtle items like auto-throttles.

Thus, it is a mute point to attempt to answer the quoted question.

[Ranger One]

411A:

Strange that only AA has had this problem with the A300-600. Several times.

Yes. But AA fly many other types - have they had problems on other types when the PF pedals it at high speed?

Are there significant differences between the way AA taught the rudder (and upset recovery generally) on the 300-600, and on other types on their fleet?

Not stiring or axe-grinding, just thinking out loud. Seems to me there's clearly both a training issue and a rudder sensitivity issue, and even the board couldn't agree on which was more significant.

R1

[lomapaseo]

Not stiring or axe-grinding, just thinking out loud. Seems to me there's clearly both a training issue and a rudder sensitivity issue, and even the board couldn't agree on which was more significant.

Right on!

It's like buying a new high performamce sports car after driving a cushy soft limo style.

All of a sudden in an avoidance manuever you snap the steering back and forth and you now find youself quickly in the ditch with the much nore responsive steering.

It seems that you chose the sports car but failed to anticipate its differences from your ingrained skills.

So who's fault?

Should there be a level playing field in designed response of aircraft to pilot inputs?

Better petition the regulators then, because clearly your taining departments may not adjust your training for such difference.

[OFBSLF]

And doesn't change the fact that you should be trained NOT to use full rudder to recover from an airplane upset condition

If that's true, doesn't that mean that on the A300-600 you should be trained not to use the rudder at all at higher speeds? Given that the rudder break-out force is so high, relative to the force required for full rudder deflection, at high speeds, isn't the A300-600 rudder effectively on (full deflection) or off (no deflection)?

[RRAAMJET]

A lot of use of the term " recovery from an upset condition " has been used, both by the NTSB and by users of this thread.

One of my points is that I think there may be a case that this was not an "upset condition" - a la remarks of the Board member who stated that the inputs were inappropriate - but Molin, for some reason, thought it was. It is very unlikely that you are going to get a full upset at low altitude at 250 knots/ 1g flight/ climbout due to wake turbulence in a heavy jet, but perhaps the training Molin received did not instill in him this idea.

Of course, AOA indicators might have helped him realise that the A-300 was nowhere near a departed condition on the wings, rendering aileron inputs secondary. If you fly through wake turb in the 777, which has AOA on the PFD, you'll see very little deflection towards red, even clean/heavy.