KAL's next crash, just around the corner?

[Roadtrip]

KAL continues to have very serious problems. Viastra seem to excuse them as normal by comparing KAL to the rest of the world combined. Truly astonishing. Even more astonishing is that they apparently want a PR fix rather than a change of culture, which is what they need.

[Rongotai]

Spiraldriver wrote:. .. ."I did not say that it doesn't happen elsewhere. I said the cultural paradigm elsewhere reduces the chances of it happening. ". .. .Absolutely right. Not only that, the chances have been quantified (source: "Riding the Waves of Culture" by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner.. .. .Here are some numbers, based on large sample surveys in every major country.. .. .Percentage of employees who believe that respect is based on social background or formal position more than on performance and competence.. .. .South Korea 80%. .Indonesia 76%. .Japan 74%. .China 72%. .HK 68%. .Phillipines 67%. .Thailand 65%. .India 63%. .Singapore 63%. .Germany 60%. .Denmark 51%. .UK 44%. .NZ 38%. .Canada 35%. .Australia 30%. .USA 25%. .Norway 23%. .. .However the highest scoring western country is Spain (87%). The world's highest scoring country is Egypt (96%). Singapore is the lowest scoring of all Asian countries. Norway is world's lowest scoring country.. .. .CRM conceptually has its roots in countries in the bottom half of that table. It is clearly going to have different effects (and different levels of acceptability) in countries in the top half. There is no need to get into discussions about 'good' cultures and 'bad' cultures, or any other racist stuff. It is just objectively self evident that there will be a difference.. .. .So there is a high risk in using CRM, or any other set of western safety management tools, in top of the table countries unless it is modified to take account of the cultural realities in those countries. There are also clearly special flight crew management issues which are MORE LIKELY to occur when you put two people together whose cultural predispositions come from opposite ends of the table.. .. .The cultural differences about who is seen as being responsible for an operational error are a lot more complicated when comparing Asian and western countries - but this message is already too long!

[Percy De Havilland]

A better book on this subject is Geerte Hofstede's - Cultures and Organizations.. .Hampton Turner taught me at uni and as far as lecturers go......he's a very good author.

[Rongotai]

I actually agree, Percy. It just happened to be the one I had to hand!!

[Captain104]

Hello Viastra,. .by all means no bashing intended.. .. .Do I guess right, that you were never involved in pilot training instructing cockpit crews from far east countries?(South Korea, Republic of China, Indonesia a.s.o.). .Believe me, there ARE some cultural aspects to be considered.. .Did you note on the left the header TECH/SAFETY, there you find the KAL-DELTA audit report dated 9/98. Read it and call me back. <img border="0" title="" alt="[Wink]" src="wink.gif" /> . .. .Roadtrip. .Couldn't agree more.. .. .Regards

[Viastra]

Firstly let me apologize if I managed to confuse what seems to have been mainly honest and I hope constructive comment with what seemed yesterday (a long day) a little destructive arrogance. I will try harder to sort the wheat from the chaff in that regard.. .. .This is a very useful airing of views. If it degenerates into “who’s got the worst horror story about when they flew with some instructor or F/O who tried to kill them” then we won’t advance our collective cause much at all. Lets not kid ourselves…if Asian and Middle Eastern airlines had a glut of well trained, respected, experienced safe and CRM competent culturally neutral pilots available then there’d be precious few jobs around for expats. . .. .It would be foolish to say that the culture issue is not big. Even vast. But it is not intractable. I was trying to point out a couple of things:. .. .1. That we should ALL be careful because nothing is worse than any pilot with an inbuilt sense of superiority. That is why I made reference to other accidents.. .. .2. Many airlines (and cultures) are not that far removed from the “Captain/boss/leader/manager/ruler/commanding officer etc is always right” stage. Some cultures found overturning that sort of BS easier than others. Some will be still trying in a hundred years. . .. .3. It may be seen as a trite observation, maybe even “New Age BS” as someone said yesterday. But there is truly a vast effort to change and modernize and it has borne fruit. Not enough yet…not fast enough sure…not in everyone’s heart of hearts of course…but it is in the right direction and having lived in Asia for quite a while now I can certainly see the difference. . .. .My experience suggests that the new generation of university educated and overseas trained (US/Australia etc) F/Os have a much healthier attitude to CRM. If it has taken a goodly number of expats not born to tug forelocks in order to show these younger guys a “new and better way” then so be it. . .. .We see very published history of the methods used by myriad airlines to overcome their past (some long ago) problems in the cockpit. Has anyone written a book on what happened inside KLM after Tenerife? Or what has happened in Qantas after Bangkok? This would be really useful stuff to share.. .. .Cultures can change. I am old enough to remember when very tough seat belt and drink driving laws came into Australia. It has taken a long time to wean the Anzacs off strong beer and fast cars…but it was done. That program at least has been well documented. When my father went to England to fly bombers in 1943 as an Australian Captain with an RAF squadron he found that the English NCO crews (Navs. WOPs, gunners etc) much preferred Australian/Canadian captains to the local product because they figured that the colonials were more likely to think more about staying alive and less about rigidly following orders. I’m very very sure that the world inside the RAF has changed much since then. . .. .It would be nice to get a lot of feedback on how our respective cultures coped with what might have seemed like intractable problems and overcome them. Rather than pretending that one particular group with a lot of Confucian/military baggage can never get over it. Sure they have further to travel but that just means those in a position to change things have to work all the harder. And my observation is (pause to take off rose coloured glasses) that there is much hard work being done, and not all by expats.. .. .Safe flying. .. .Viastra.. . . . <small>[ 07 March 2002, 00:10: Message edited by: Viastra ]</small>

[Pegasus77]

On a side note..... .Why does an FO rather die than say something? . .. .From all the crashes I've heard of I've learned as well, and the biggest crash in history still is the Tenerife 747-KLM-disaster, where both FO and FE knew about what was going to happen and didn't do anything about the captain.. .. .It was the start of good old CRM, but still afterwards several accidents happened, where the FO was right, but didn't want to push the captain and they then crashed. Personally, this lead me to believe (as well as because of my own experiences) that even I as a modern, CRM-minded, FO in a western airline, can come into situations where I don't like to be, but I have promised myself to smack the captain in the face before I let myself die on an airplane. Till now, I once almost had to <img border="0" title="" alt="[Big Grin]" src="biggrin.gif" /> ..... .. .Point is... In the given case the FO clearly knew what was wrong. If I would be in the same seat, and knew what was going on, my wish to stay alive would have pulled the power back, or knocked the captain out of his seat.. .. .Whatever is claimed here in this thread about KAL, safety records, accidents and chain of command, is in the end irrelevant... It is irresponsible, and I dare freely to call it simply WRONG to conduct a flight in this way. It doesn't matter if the wrongness is based on culture or a headache. The captain might have been an asshole, or might have behaved like captains within KAL normally do, the FO really should have done something here.. .. .I can understand there are differences in culture, our colleages at KLM in the right seat can apply take off power themselves, and can initiate a RTO anytime, in my company the FO can't. It's a difference in culture, and in experience as well. This doesn't free me from my responsibility to my passengers, my family and not in the last place to myself. . .. .I don't want to sound heroic, I'm just not willing to give my life for the captains personality.

[Rongotai]

Pegasus,. .. .Flight deck's are only the most dramatic example of a common phenomenon - in crisis there is a strong tendency for cultural conditioning to overcome self-preservation. There are very sound evolutionary reasons for this, and under pressure we all have a tendency to revert to genetically imprinted behaviours. Without this wars would be impossible, but so would society.. .. .Illustrative case - looking at the Delta-KAL audit elsewhere on this board and the descriptions of FO behaviour therein, there will be strong instinctive reasons for a Korean FO to prefer (unconsciously) death and the survival of family honour than personal survival and family dishonour. It may sound crazy, but there is a mountain of confirming research. And precisely because it is instinctive and unconscious it is not susceptible to 'reasonable' solutions.. .. .This is why it is essential to ground any practice in a supportive culture. Without a culture which supports a particular way of behaving, trained for procedures will always be at risk of breaking down just when they are needed most. . .. .There are problems when the desired workplace culture is in tension with the precepts of the national culture - as seems to be the case in the current subject of discussion. There are strategies that can deal with this - but it requires VERY smart managers in flight ops.

[Viastra]

Sorry this is a little long...might be of interest to those who study this subject with a little historical flavour.... .. .The Loss of the 'Victoria' 22 June 1893. .. . . .The best known and most tragic collision beween ships in the history of the Royal Navy was that between the battleship Victoria - the flagship of the British Mediterranean Fleet - and the Camperdown, on 22 June 1893. . .. .On a hot afternoon in the Mediterranean in June 1893 the British Mediterranean Fleet was about to anchor, in formation, off Tripoli [on the coast of Syria - now in Lebanon]. . .. .The fleet, consisting of 10 battleships, or large armoured cruisers, of about 10,000 tons each (and one despatch vessel), had been organised into two divisions. They were formed in these divisions, in line ahead disposed abeam, with the Victoria leading the first division and Camperdown leading the second division. . .. .The fleet was under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir George Tryon, who flew his flag in the Victoria. The second-in-command was Rear-Admiral Markham who flew his flag in the Camperdown. . .. .Admiral Tryon was an expert in fleet handling, and had trained his captains to expect a variety of complicated manoeuvres at any time. He was a great martinet, a large taciturn man who sought counsel from nobody and rarely informed his staff of his intentions. . .. .On this occasion, however, Tryon had discussed his anchoring plan with his Flag Captain, the Staff Commander and Flag Lieutenant. He told them he intended to form up in two columns steering away from the coast with the columns 1,200 yards apart, with ships in column at normal station-keeping distance apart, which in those days was 400 yards. He intended to reverse the course of the fleet by turning the columns inwards, leaders turning together and each ship following in succession the next ahead. He then intended to close the columns to 400 yards apart. Finally he intended to turn the whole fleet together 90 degrees to port, and then to anchor the fleet. . .. .It was intended to be an impressive sight to those on shore who witnessed it, and indeed it would have been. Even in those days it was not often possible to see ten large warships anchoring together. The Victoria would have hoisted a two-flag signal which denoted 'anchor instantly.' The Camperdown would have repeated the hoist, and, as Victoria's signalmen hauled it down, ten blacksmiths armed with hammers would have knocked off the slips holding the cables and down would have simultaneously splashed ten anchors. . .. .The Staff Commander and the Flag Captain remarked to the Admiral that 1,200 yards was insufficient to allow the leading ships to turn together towards each other, and the Staff Commander suggested that 1,600 yards would be better, but even that would have been insufficient. . .. .The Admiral agreed, but later told his Staff Lieutenant to close the columns to 1,200 yards. . .. .The signal was hoisted and the Staff Commander, seeing that 1,200 yards was hoisted, told the Flag Lieutenant that he must have made a mistake as the Admiral had agreed to 1,600 yards. The Flag Lieutenant therefore went to the Admiral, who was in his sea cabin, and queried whether it should be 1,200 yards or 1,600, explaining that "1,200" was flying. The Admiral, somewhat tersely, told him to leave it at 1,200 and to execute the signal as soon as possible. . .. .The fleet was formed accordingly. It should be noted that, when the fleet was formed in columns like this, the normal distance between columns laid down in the manoeuvring instructions was in those days "the distance apart of ships [in this case 400 yards] multiplied by the number of ships in the longest column." In this case the longest column had six ships in it and the distance apart of columns should have been 400 x 6 = 2,400 yds., which would have left plenty of room for carrying out the intended manoeuvre. . .. .The distance between columns was worked out to allow for a favourite manoeuvre in those days - forming a single line by turning leading ships of columns 90 degrees to port or starboard, the remaining ships following their leaders in succession. By this means a single line could be formed - at right angles to the original line of advance. . .. .If the distance between columns was too small then in this manoeuvre the end ships of columns in the direction of the turn might have got muddled up with those of columns not in the direction of the turn, with a consequent risk of collision. If the distance between columns equalled the number of ships in the columns multiplied by their intervals apart, the end of the column in the direction of turn should have fitted perfectly with the leading ship of the column away from the direction of the turn. . .. .The fleet increased speed to 8.8 knots, and shortly afterwards, at 15.00, the Admiral directed his Flag Lieutenant to hoist two signals. One was addressed to the first division and directed it to turn in succession, preserving the order of the fleet, 16 points (180 degrees) to port. The second was addressed to the second division and directed it to turn in succession, preserving the order of the fleet, 16 points to starboard. . .. .The columns were thus to turn towards each other. The signals were made in separate hoists and it would have been possible to execute one signal (by hauling it down) before the other. However - the Flag Lieutenant knew perfectly well what was in the Admiral's mind. . .. .The turning-circle diameters of Victoria and Camperdown, under "tactical" rudder, were each about 800 yards. Thus even the 1,600 yards which the Staff Commander had suggested was only barely sufficient for the manoeuvre. . .. .If the two battleships had used full rudder their turning circle diameters would have been reduced to about 600 yards. It would then have been possible for the two ships to turn inwards without colliding, but with only 20 yards or so to spare. However, the standing instructions were that during manoeuvres tactical rudder should be used. . .. .It must have been obvious to every captain in the fleet that the manoeuvre was an exceedingly dangerous one - yet every ship, with the sole exception of the Camperdown, went "close up" with her answering pennant in full acknowledgment of the signal (it was - and still is - standard practice to keep the answering pennant "at the dip" if the signal is not understood). . .. .Camperdown, being the leading ship in her column, repeated the hoist, but Rear Admiral Markham - aboard her - ordered the repeated hoist to be kept at the dip, signifying that he did not understand the signal. At the same time he ordered that a semaphore signal to the flagship should be made indicating that he did not understand the flagship's signal. . .. .However, the semaphore was never sent. Admiral Tryon - "ever impatient" - ordered Camperdown's pennants to be shown, an expression of impatience which no officer would like, and sent a semaphore signal of his own saying "What are you waiting for?" Rear Admiral Markham, seeing this and having complete confidence in his superior officer, thought that Admiral Tryon would solve the problem somehow. He therefore had his own semaphore cancelled and ordered that the repeated signal be hoisted close up. . .. .At the subsequent court-martial Markham was questioned as to why, given that he knew the intended manoeuvre was dangerous - if not impossible, he had allowed the repeated signal to be hoisted close up? He answered that he had such faith in Admiral Tryon that he thought that he must have some trick up his sleeve. . .. .Markham considered that there were two possibilities - either the C-in-C would execute the order to the Second Division (Markham's column) first and, when this division was safely turned, would turn his own division; or he intended to turn Victoria and the First Division with less rudder and therefore turn outside the Camperdown's division. . .. .Nonetheless when the signal was executed the two divisions were turned simultaneously and Camperdown started turning to starboard, while Victoria started turning to port, with both using tactical rudder. Even then, although it was obvious to all the onlookers that a collision was imminent, both Captains failed to put their inner screws astern, not being prepared to do so without permission from their division commanders. . .. .In fact Captain Burke - the commanding officer of the Victoria - had to ask three times for permission to put his port propeller astern before it was eventually given. . .. .The two battleships met halfway between their respective columns. Camperdown struck the Victoria on the flagship's starboard side, opening up an enormous hole at and below the waterline. Camperdown's ram had penetrated the flagship's side by about 9 feet, at a point about 12 feet below the surface. It struck a transverse bulkhead almost directly and, as the two ships swung together, the breach became enlarged to about 100 square ft. . .. .Just before the impact the order "close watertight doors and out collision mat" had been given aboard the flagship - but only a few doors had been closed when the collision took place. Thus water was able to get into a coal bunker just forward of a stokehold. Victoria began to list to starboard, and the list started to increase more rapidly when the starboard battery began to flood as water entered the broadside gun ports. . .. .As the collision occurred "Collision Stations" was piped aboard Victoria, and the crew lined up four deep on the port side. At first it was hoped to beach the flagship and the gallant men in the engine-room and stokehold were still keeping the machinery running. . .. .However, by now the ship was down by the bows as well as listing heavily. Suddenly the bows went down and the stern rose, with the screws still turning. Victoria foundered soon afterwards - only 13 minutes after the collision. . .. .The order "Abandon Ship" was given just before the end, and the ship's company - which had remained in good order - then broke ranks. The list was by then so heavy that it was difficult to leave the ship - many men were left on board and went down with the ship. In all, 358 were lost, including Vice Admiral Tryon. 357 officers and men were rescued, among them Commander John Jellicoe, the Victoria's Executive Officer, who went on to become C-in-C of the Grand Fleet during the First World War and arguably Britain's greatest Admiral since Nelson. . .. .Admiral Tryon's last words were 'It's all my fault' and at the court martial he was found entirely to blame. No one can tell what was in his mind . . .one perhaps can only assume he had some sort of mental blackout, as he was probably working under a strain. . .. .What is quite inexplicable is how 11 Captains and one Rear-Admiral could all have acknowledged the signal ordering the turn 'received and understood', and how Admiral Tryon's own staff, who knew the manoeuvre to be dangerous, did not expostulate more with him when the signal was hoisted. The only explanation is that both his staff and his Captains had such infinite faith in him that they thought he had some last-minute manoeuvre up his sleeve to save the day. Also, it must not be forgotten that he was a difficult man to approach, and it was perhaps a brave staff officer who queried a manoeuvre he had ordered. . .. .[ Text from John Marriott's "Disaster at Sea" Ian Allan, London 1987pp. 38-43 ]

[MateoSix]

All this makes me laugh! I do not disagree with you, but if you point out that KAL is dangerous than you should take a good look at the airlines in México. Before start, I do not want to discriminat or pick on a specific airline. . .. .I used to fly for Mexicana airlines, and I can tell you that there’s hardly any professionalism. I personally have witnessed flight attendants at the controls during a sector flight, some of them are even doing the whole flight (yes, t/o and landing). I guess it has to do with the mentality (“so? What’s gonna happen?). That’s the main reason I prefer flying the corporate jets. At least the pax can see who is flying the plane. . .. .There are lots of other worrying things in México, but this is by far the worst. I wouldn’t recommend anybody to fly with them. And yeah, if you see a female pilot, half of them have been involved in incidents (kept secret of course), and the other half “slept” there way to the cockpit (with … sorry, can’t tell) . .. .I posted a similar thread a few months ago, but Pprune didn’t like.. .. . <a href="http://www.pprune.org/cgibin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=36&t=000520" target="_blank">My deleted post</a> . .Don’t know why, this is true. Don’t understand why good people have to pay for stupidity of others. If anyone in adminstration disagrees, write me, I got nothing to hide.. .. .Mateo

[Wiley]

Pegasus 77, Rongotai‘s got a very good point in his last post re some (many?) people preferring to die ‘with honour’ rather than stand up to a figure of authority. And it’s not solely an Asian trait. Two ‘Western’ examples readily come to mind, one aviation related, the other not.. .. .First, (I can’t remember the details, but I know the crew were all Americans [as in U.S.A.]), was back in the 70’s on a 707 (or maybe it was a 74) freighter. The FO had objected to the Captain’s course of action in an approach in marginal conditions but the Captain and the FE made light of his objections and proceeded with the approach. The last words on the voice recorder were the FO’s, apparently almost pleased with himself for being vindicated: “I told you it wasn’t gonna work.” . .. .There have been some comments regarding Australians being ‘the safest’ because they’re more willing to speak up, so my other example might be worthwhile exploring. (Please bear with me, I do get to the point eventually.) I know it’s not aviation related, and I know it’s from another, very different time frame… But how many Australians haven’t seen the film ‘Gallipoli’, a relatively accurate depiction of a rather seminal event in Australian military history, the battle of the Nek in August 1915? (For those not familiar with it, it starred Mel Gibson when Mel still had a six pack.) . .. .To cut a loooong story short, after three waves of (unmounted) Australian Light Horsemen had been sent over the top in broad daylight in an confined area not much longer than a tennis court, and all three waves had been wiped out almost to a man, many of them not even making it out of their own trenches before they were cut down, an Australian officer obeyed orders and blew his whistle, knowing that the senior officer who had just confirmed the attack order for the fourth wave was acting on totally erroneous information. (Sound familiar, KAL baiters?) . .. .And we in Australia look upon his actions almost with pride, showing that he and his troops, all of whom must have known they were going to their deaths to no good purpose, were made of the ‘right stuff’. What an Asian might call ‘honour’.. .. .I call it (and the actions of many FOs in following potentially fatal orders) the ‘Captain William Calley Sydnrome. (For those of a younger generation, Captain William Calley, followed orders issued by senior officers and entered a Vietnamese village in 1969 with his troops and killed some hundreds of unarmed civilians.) . .. .Why Captain William Calley Sydnrome? Well answer me this: what would have happened if Captain Calley had said ‘no’? Would the world have ever heard of him? Would anyone among the thousands of journalists who toppled rain forests writing about the Mei Lai massacre have been there to defend his ‘failure to obey orders in a combat zone’? Could he have ended up in Leavenworth Prison for twenty years for failing to obey those orders – (or, far more likely, just quietly been posted off to be officer in charge of an outdoor laundry detachment in Alaska – the military equivalent of a permanent First Officer)? . .. .Do you see where I’m going here? In the KAL corporate culture, what happens to a Korean FO who intervenes and saves the day? (And let’s be honest with ourselves – if maybe to a lesser degree, in less rigid corporate cultures that KAL, to any FO who sticks his head above the parapet to the point where he takes over from his captain?) Thanks to his intervention, there wasn’t any accident – he stopped it. But you can bet your silver bippy that won’t be the way many captains would report it to his mates on the 4th floor or its equivalent. My guess is that the word ‘mutiny’ would be mentioned relatively early in the piece.

[Spiraldiver]

Viastra:. .. .And interesting yarn, or should I say yard arm? While the general metaphors on tyranny, ego and blind faith are relevant in some respects, i think the lemmings-over-the-cliff analogy is really only applicable in cases pertaining to military philosophy or applications. Not so much to the airline cockpit.. .. .Too many fundamental differences exist.. .. .Soldiers are paid to follow orders unquestioningly. They know that sometimes following those orders may cause them to die, presumably so others may live. This can get in the way of critical thinking. <img border="0" title="" alt="[Big Grin]" src="biggrin.gif" /> . .. .Airline pilots are paid to question everything and to, above all else, not die - lest others die with them. This encourages critical thinking. . .. .A pilot who is unapproachable, reticent and entirely self-reliant should not be in a multi-crew cockpit. Just as the unfortunate Admiral, who was clearly marginally insane, should not have been in charge of anything but his own dinghy, if even that.. .. .Such pilots are a cancer in the industry and should be cut out, no matter the airline they work for. And no matter where they come from or how they got there. . .. .And when flying with such a cretin, remember, no one will forgive you for allowing them to endanger your life or anyone elses. To stand up, speak your mind and worry about the consequences later is the only viable course of action. . .. .That is the effective reality of modern CRM. If you think it ain't right, you have a responsibilty to say so. If someone says you're wrong, you are obligated to find out why, and who's right, before proceeding. Unfortunately, the Delta review of KAL suggests these basic tenets of CRM are almost never followed by KAL crews. That has to change.. .. .To do anything less is criminal. . .. .And worldwide, there are still a lot of criminals out there.. .. .Fly safe.

[L1011]

Culture is too broad a subject to be really addressed in this often puerile forum.. .. .Go read Hofstede, Trompenaars, Reason, Helmreich and Merritt. Then make your own conclusions. Know the positives and neagtives of your own culture and modify your behavior accordingly. Predjudice is no substitute for knowledge.. .. .NO one culture (none, zero, not US nor UK or anyone else) has the ideal mix of attributes for flying airplanes. In fact overly "masculine" behavior is potentially dangerous in itself, and 98% of pilots are male, right?. .. .Rant over. Some really interesting posts, nice to see.. .. .Back to lurking. <img border="0" title="" alt="[Cool]" src="cool.gif" />

[grange.guzzler]

Spiraldiver and others. Many quote the "Delta Report". As has been pointed out on this forum many times, the so called Delta report is NOT. The report to which you refer is a set of personal observations of a guy who was appointed as one of many to carry out audits on Delta's behalf. The observations as presented were forwarded to Delta and were considered along with many others in the preparation of the REAL DELTA REPORT. You and none here have seen that report. It was a confidential document circulated at the highest levels of KAL and Delta.. .The observations to which you refer were produced by a pilot with the purest of motives but with no previous check and training experience and very little in the way of guidlines with which to conduct the audit. . .An analysis of that pilots findings will reveal a very personalised version of what is right and what is wrong. For instance (from memory) the reporter made a big deal of the fact that a pilot had flown an approach with his armrests down. Well I recently observed that same reporter flying both a takeoff and a landing with his armrests down. Suprise suprise, he did it quite sucessfully and his "irresponsible actions" did not endanger the operation. . .. .The moral of the story: be very careful with the information you wish to use and quote as authorative, some of it is a lot less than it is cracked up to be.. .. .To the gentleman who suggested that Viastra had no experience in training or checking in an asian cockpit. Dead set wrong pal. If you are in the area you would be well advised to heed his somewhat lenghty words.

[4Greens]

Viastra et al:. .Very good book on the whole subject - "Attitude or Latitude" by Graham Braithwaite of UNSW. Starts off looking at OZ safety but encompasses cultural attitudes as well. Published by Ashgate of UK

[Huck]

1. The ridiculed f/o was on an Alaska Airlines flight into a bush strip, where the captain got high and hot. The f/o kept hinting and outright saying that the captain (the PF) was screwing up. He was ridiculed by the F/E, who at one point told the captain, "Know the difference between a copilot and a duck? A duck can fly!" At one point he also said, "Don't worry, the fox has got it wired." I like to use this line when somebody is starting to mess it up.. .. .2. Never forget, the KLM F/O at Tenerife actually pulled the throttles back to idle once after the captain had advanced them. He just didn't do it a second time. I once attended a day-long CRM seminar on that subject - cases where a crewmember knew something was wrong, and even acted on it, but at some point gave in - with terrible consequences.

[Spiraldiver]

GG, . .. .Thx, I didn't know that. It is quite a different matter if it is interpreted as subjective document. ie. one crew on a bad day with a nitpicker just looking to find stuff wrong. . .. .*Pause*- while I eat a grain of salt and re-read the non-report.. .. .Salty interpretation- There are some pretty damning observations in there all the same, regardless of who it was written by, or why it was written (the ILS and visual app. stuff comes to mind). But there is a volume of micro-managed interpretation as well (perhaps caused by flying in a jumpseat for too long?). . . . .Personally, I like to read such reports so I can file away the information and use it in an effort to never make those mistakes myself. By talking about their mistakes , I talk about my own, or ones I might make. And thereby avoid them (hopefully). . .. .Fly safe.

[Loc-out]

I remember not too long ago, a representative of a certain "flag carrying" airline, boasting that they had never had a prang. One month later, they had one.. .. .Many years ago, I was involved in a type of aviation that was far more hazardous, than I am at present. Anyhow, to cut a long story short, we had this pilot who was not quite as young or as good as several of the aces around at the time. Two of the most vocal and critical of this individual, who laid wages on how long he would survive, were themselves killed within 2 years in aircraft (pilot error) accidents. Coincidence?. .. .What I suggest to some of you, is to leave the safety audits to the experts and the barrack room lawyers should wind their necks in.

[Pegasus77]

Rongotai & Wiley,. .. .As I am much interested in all sectors of HF and HPL, I already knew of the "I told you so"-case. Offcourse that reaction is only human, but that is what the whole science of HF consists of.. .. .There might very well be a cultural element, where a Korean pilot prefers to die to save his honor (and that of his family); only thing I do is calling it WRONG. It has no place on a flight deck.. .. .But the most interesting point you are bringing up is the 'mutiny'. I couldn't agree with you more. Even in modern western fully-CRM-rated airlines there is a tendency not to tell things to the management, because you never know how many friends the captain has.. .This especially counts for training captains, who all know eachother, and can decide about your career in 1 base check.. .. .I threw myself into the battle about a captain, who IMHO did fully irresponsible and really dangerous things. . .Offcourse I had a debriefing with him myself after the flight, and because he didn't show any understanding for my points of view, I decided that it was my duty to go to the management with the story.. .. .Luckily in my company it was all solved in a professional way, and afterwards I get along with the captain in question just fine. . .. .The astosnishing thing is, a few weeks later I met an FO-colleage, who just a week before myself flew with the same captain, got in exactly the same fight, and after the flight got into his car, and was glad not to be flying with the guy again. I was surprised by so much carelessness.. .. .What I think is important, that the same mistake is not made twice. I learned from the Tenerife-disaster, as well as I learned from the 'the copilot is a duck' or the 'sorry Dave, we lost a wing'-stories. All contain a number of human errors, from which the entiry flying community can learn. All those stories are known to our Korean colleages, and also to all other professional pilots in the world, who culturally tend to listen first and then die. . .. .There was an Italian airplane in Switzerland, where the FO called for a go-around, and the captain said 'nooooo, we'll make it', and 3 seconds later everybody died. . .It is my professional duty to learn from this story, and to prevent it from happening again. The same counts for every captain and copilot in the entire world. . .. .A few weeks ago I read a text from an older captain, who complained about the new generation of flightcrew, who were supposed to be boring, too serious, not going out, not drinking, not screwing cabin crew etc. This, he stated, could affect the safety, because the atmosphere in the crew would be less good.. .. .I am proud to be a modern, boring, serious pilot (who loves his drink sometimes!).. .Old traditions are there to be changed, sometimes, and the same counts for old cultures. I don't think I'm discriminating if I call the listen&die-culture simply wrong. . .. .There is no question about cultural differences, but PLEASE let someone within KAL, and all other affected airlines, open up a CRM/HF-office, let him/her be fully backed up by the management and not be afraid by old captains who claim too much authority.

[Rongotai]

Pegasus,. .. .you say:. .. ." There might very well be a cultural element, where a Korean pilot prefers to die to save his honor (and that of his family); only thing I do is calling it WRONG. It has no place on a flight deck.". .. .Of course you are correct. But my point is that you don't achieve the necessary changes in behaviour simply by knowing that you are right, or by writing out SOP's predicated on your being correct.