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PIA A320 Crash Karachi

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PIA A320 Crash Karachi

Old 24th May 2020, 22:46
  #461 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by krismiler View Post
With engine bypass ratios becoming higher and ground clearance being reduced, has adequate consideration gone into the location of vital components such as pumps, gearbox’s and supply lines ? Whilst space is obviously constrained, having vital systems in a vulnerable position should be avoided.
There are numerous design considerations that going into the design and location of the gearbox and other accessories (cross-engine debris, cooling, fire protection being just a few) - and as DR noted I don't think doing a go-around after a wheels up landing is one of them.
Many larger engines (larger than a CFM - e.g. PW4000, GE90, GEnx) have the gearbox located on the core instead of the fan case - but that's done for aerodynamic drag reasons (smaller diameter nacelle), not any consideration of wheels-up damage. On CFM sized (and smaller) engines there simply isn't enough room to make a core mounted gearbox practical. Similarly the 3 spool RB211 and Trent engines have a relatively fat core that also makes a core mounted gearbox impractical. The 737 engines have 'split' accessories on the fan case - instead of at ~six o'clock, they're moved to ~4 and 8 o'clock - but that's done for ground clearance - not for any consideration of a wheels up landing - furthermore there is a great deal of plumbing and wiring crossing the six o'clock so I doubt it would fare any better in a similar scenario.
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Old 24th May 2020, 22:49
  #462 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by Flyingmole View Post
With respect, a key issue in aviation incidents is human factors, and where such rituals can affect human factors they are relevant to identifying possible causation of incidents and accidents. I say that as someone who has worked in the Middle East for 20 plus years, has a huge respect for the customs and religion, but is acutely aware of the detrimental effect on operational effectiveness of prolonged fasting. The crash was, I believe, around 14.40 local and the Al-Fajr prayer call, when fasting begins, is around 03.25 in Lahore at the moment. If - and it is a big 'if' - the pilot had been fasting then given the timings I have just quoted, it is relevant to consider this in an analysis of the crash.
But since you don't know, any harangue on this as the causal factor - that is the problem we are dealing with in trying to keep this discussion professional - is a case of jumping to conclusions.

With respect to your experience, there is a chance that the forensic based investigation may or may not prove this consideration to be valid.
And we still don't know whether or not they put the gear down before the first approach.
FFS, how about we work with the basics and then climb up the causation tree. (And for all I know, you may be right!)

To put this in perspective: I had a pilot in our multi crew aircraft (a great many years ago) who - a pilot who was not Muslim nor observing Ramadan - get a bit strange on me during a night flight due to him being mildly hypoglycemic.
Negligence on his part for not taking care of an issue (diet) that he knew about ahead of time.
Different root cause, same result: he was useless to me. (Yes, he got a piece of my mind once we got back to terra firma)

How may accident investigation boards have you been on?
It's bloody hard work.
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Old 24th May 2020, 22:58
  #463 (permalink)  
 
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We did/do not know for certain,
wether or not the gear was actually down
during the initial landing and wave off. (different than go around…)
Thereafter we saw pictures of damaged engines during the subsequent approach.

That’s why I posted this…

As I had crews scraping the engines,
whilst prematurely raising the gear,
because, instead of looking at the altimeter,
they were looking at the vsi
that showed a positive rate, which in reality we had not
You cannot raise the gear with weight on wheels.....

Looking at the engine skid marks,,,they bounced it down the runway for a bit...
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Old 24th May 2020, 23:03
  #464 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Stillapilot View Post
I think it is possible that the crew were unaware they had contacted the runway, the GO around was probably initiated during the flare when they noticed the unusual attitude from the lack of gear, by the time the engines had spooled up the nacelles just touched the runway, hard enough to damage them and the IDG's but not hard enough to be catastrophic or even erode the fan cowl latches (Fan cowls stayed on). This could be why they don't mention it or call a mayday until the IDG's and engines start to fail later in the go around due to the damage sustained.
SAP
Another logical assumption emerges by one A320 pilot:-
L/Gs were down during 1st attempt. G/A was opted to avoid runway overshoot due to high altitude approach from very beginning, Flaps selection to position 3 from 4 and Gears Up selection was too early, which caused acft to sink and engines rubbed the runway, got damaged and packed up during GA to 3000 ft, acft couldn't hold 3000 ft due to dual engine failure,
RAT deployed automatically to provide emergency elect and prssurise Blue Hyd circuit to power Flt Controls, but due thrust loss acft descended to 2000 ft, that's the time pilot reported Mayday Myday--- aircraft crashed short of Runway by 1300 meters on residential area.
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Old 24th May 2020, 23:13
  #465 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by FlightDetent View Post
I did not. Also g.g.'s 2500 fpm from well above the changeover level to 10k on average sounds - like a quiet day in the office.

It's been a few times already when the 1000 ft stable rule failed the crew and perhaps a little questioning is due. Not the crew, questioning of the rule.

FWIW my employer says when you land from unstable at 500, the PIC is fired. When you go-around from unstable at 500, the PIC is demoted for 6 months before being allowed an attempt to regain the second half of the salary.
Blimey, demoting someone for going around is hardly a just culture. Maybe that might be a necessary if the same thing keeps happening time after time, but that behaviour is a failure of the FDM, safety department and the training (re-training) system if they can't put the guy right.

Landing unstable at my outfit would result in a temporary withdrawl from flying duties until an quick investigation and subsequent retraining package is provided (if deemed necessary). They often put send the guilty party to a room or a videochat and play back the FDM and ask you for your opinion, it's an open and inquisitive discussion rather than a dressing-down. I haven't had this personally but friend did for a bit of a rushed approach where they forgot the gear (a bit of swiss cheese due to ATC pressure requesting a 1200ft platform and a 4-5nm final for an ILS), they went around at 750ft with the master caution and landed safely 5 mins later. The facts and FDM were the sum of his debrief - food for thought, not a punitive slap on the wrist, but demonstrating the findings of the investigation. For most normal pilots, that should be a bit of a kick up the backside to get you to slow it down and tell ATC unable. Obviously if the pilot still thinks they did nothing wrong, questions will have to be asked.

On the other hand, a pilot going around at 500ft because they're unstable here will probably result in the award of a bottle of champagne. This works well in the Europe and we don't crash planes due to unstable approaches. Your milage may vary elsewhere in the world.
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Old 24th May 2020, 23:24
  #466 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by turbidus View Post

You cannot raise the gear with weight on wheels.....
Looking at the engine skid marks,,,they bounced it down the runway for a bit...

Apart from the fact that many, many landing gears have already been unintentionally raised with weight on wheels,
the game is not necessarily over yet, after humbly just having been able to manage to only get your aircraft airborne,
you could still bounce back onto the runway…

Better not rely on ’cannot’… learner . . .
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Old 24th May 2020, 23:34
  #467 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by double_barrel View Post
What do you guys think is the significance of the exchange during the 1st approach.where they say they are established on the localizer for 25L, ATC says 'turn left heading 280', they then repeat that they are established on the localizer with no further comment from ATC ? If they were truly on the localizer and flying 250, then 280 would require a right turn. This seems odd.
I heard the instruction as fly heading 180. I figured the controller realized the were high and close and tried to vector them but they said they were established. Also the ATC observation of being 3,500 FT and 5 miles was likely a polite way of saying "do you guys know what you are doing".
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Old 25th May 2020, 00:00
  #468 (permalink)  
 
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EGPWS

Speculation 2.0 PF is expecting "Sink rate" warning, so he calls for EGPWS/TAWS off(not standard but management pilots can justify anything). Of course checklist was either not done or rushed through without xchecking. We know the rest.
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Old 25th May 2020, 00:06
  #469 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by T28B View Post
But since you don't know, any harangue on this as the causal factor - that is the problem we are dealing with in trying to keep this discussion professional - is a case of jumping to conclusions.

With respect to your experience, there is a chance that the forensic based investigation may or may not prove this consideration to be valid.
And we still don't know whether or not they put the gear down before the first approach.
FFS, how about we work with the basics and then climb up the causation tree. (And for all I know, you may be right!)

To put this in perspective: I had a pilot in our multi crew aircraft (a great many years ago) who - a pilot who was not Muslim nor observing Ramadan - get a bit strange on me during a night flight due to him being mildly hypoglycemic.
Negligence on his part for not taking care of an issue (diet) that he knew about ahead of time.
Different root cause, same result: he was useless to me. (Yes, he got a piece of my mind once we got back to terra firma)

How may accident investigation boards have you been on?
It's bloody hard work.
And it is the unfortunate thing on this forum that happens every time there is an aircraft incident in a non-western country that culture is always raised as a cause, with the barely concealed bias that the culture is inferior when it comes to safety. Not only do people start making baseless assumptions that there is a cultural reason for the accident they start proselytising based on that assumption. But when pilots in the west nearly land on taxiways it's a matter of fatigue and poor situational clues, for example.

There are potential culturally-influenced dietary risks all over the world, such as alcohol and drug consumption or dieting for cosmetic reasons in the west. The issue of saving face is always raised, like a mantra that every asian person is obsessed with saving face, and there are never people in the west who want to save face. You don't have to look very far to see some very prominent western leaders spending most of their public life trying to save face. And the other issue that is always raised is power gradient in the cockpit, when we know some of the most significant disasters in western cultures involved causal factors that were the result of power gradient problems. Some or all of these factors may have played a part in this instance, but none of us know if any of them are relevant.
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Old 25th May 2020, 00:14
  #470 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by turbidus View Post
There is no wording one way or the other ...a combination of less than 260 KTS on both ADR's AND the lever down will open the hyd valve....
I kind of read it slightly differently
How about "A combination of less than (260 KTS on #1 ADR OR less the 260 KTS on #3 ADR OR WOG) AND the lever down will open the hyd valve."
As shown, once the ADR went under 260, the valve should have opened, unless there is some other input, or the lever switch is a Momentary (which I would doubt)
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Old 25th May 2020, 00:14
  #471 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by giggitygiggity View Post
Blimey, demoting someone for going around is hardly a just culture. Maybe that might be a necessary if the same thing keeps happening time after time, but that behaviour is a failure of the FDM, safety department and the training (re-training) system if they can't put the guy right.

Landing unstable at my outfit would result in a temporary withdrawl from flying duties until an quick investigation and subsequent retraining package is provided (if deemed necessary). They often put send the guilty party to a room or a videochat and play back the FDM and ask you for your opinion, it's an open and inquisitive discussion rather than a dressing-down. I haven't had this personally but friend did for a bit of a rushed approach where they forgot the gear (a bit of swiss cheese due to ATC pressure requesting a 1200ft platform and a 4-5nm final for an ILS), they went around at 750ft with the master caution and landed safely 5 mins later. The facts and FDM were the sum of his debrief - food for thought, not a punitive slap on the wrist, but demonstrating the findings of the investigation. For most normal pilots, that should be a bit of a kick up the backside to get you to slow it down and tell ATC unable. Obviously if the pilot still thinks they did nothing wrong, questions will have to be asked.

On the other hand, a pilot going around at 500ft because they're unstable here will probably result in the award of a bottle of champagne. This works well in the Europe and we don't crash planes due to unstable approaches. Your milage may vary elsewhere in the world.
I think the original poster was emphasizing that his airline has a strict adherence to initiating a GA if not stabilized at 1,000ft. No doubt they too get champagne for a GA initiated at 1,000ft. Pushing on with an unstabilized approach below 1,000ft has disciplinary consequences. Just Culture has its place when dealing with unintentional errors whereas deliberately breaking company SOP at such a critical phase of flight requires disciplinary action.
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Old 25th May 2020, 00:23
  #472 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by mnttech View Post
I kind of read it slightly differently
How about "A combination of less than (260 KTS on #1 ADR OR less the 260 KTS on #3 ADR OR WOG) AND the lever down will open the hyd valve."
As shown, once the ADR went under 260, the valve should have opened, unless there is some other input, or the lever switch is a Momentary (which I would doubt)
Yes I confirm that if lever is down and speed is below 260kts, L/G will extend, no need to recycle the lever; Actually if you try and lower the L/G above 260kts you will get an master warning and ECAM alert L/G NOT DOWNLOCKED
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Old 25th May 2020, 00:29
  #473 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by 1.3vso View Post
I heard the instruction as fly heading 180. I figured the controller realized the were high and close and tried to vector them but they said they were established. Also the ATC observation of being 3,500 FT and 5 miles was likely a polite way of saying "do you guys know what you are doing".
That's why the response of 'we are comfortable' immediately followed by 'we can make it' really raises suspicions as it isn't exactly clear whether that last sentence was meant for ATC or the PM. Have to wonder who that was intended for. Earlier in the thread there was an unconfirmed report that two captains were at the contols. Don't know if that's true or not but PF and PM but either way CRM was an issue.
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Old 25th May 2020, 00:38
  #474 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by bud leon View Post
There are potential culturally-influenced dietary risks all over the world, such as alcohol and drug consumption or dieting for cosmetic reasons in the west. The issue of saving face is always raised, like a mantra that every asian person is obsessed with saving face, and there are never people in the west who want to save face.
Cultural impact to CRM isn't unique to geographic regions. Would you not agree that Tenerife was in part cause by culturally-influenced CRM (or lack of)? Perhaps United 173 also?
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Old 25th May 2020, 00:46
  #475 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by b1lanc View Post
Earlier in the thread there was an unconfirmed report that two captains were at the contols. Don't know if that's true or not but PF and PM but either way CRM was an issue.
That was also the case in the 1990 crash of Indian Airlines 605, a dual-bogie A320 doing route training. Knobology issues led to an unstable approach without a timely go around.
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Old 25th May 2020, 00:53
  #476 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by learner001 View Post
Apart from the fact that many, many landing gears have already been unintentionally raised with weight on wheels,
the game is not necessarily over yet, after humbly just having been able to manage to only get your aircraft airborne,
you could still bounce back onto the runway…

Better not rely on ’cannot’… learner . . .
so were are the tires marks?
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Old 25th May 2020, 01:01
  #477 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by asdf1234 View Post
I think the original poster was emphasizing that his airline has a strict adherence to initiating a GA if not stabilized at 1,000ft. No doubt they too get champagne for a GA initiated at 1,000ft. Pushing on with an unstabilized approach below 1,000ft has disciplinary consequences. Just Culture has its place when dealing with unintentional errors whereas deliberately breaking company SOP at such a critical phase of flight requires disciplinary action.
I disagree. You say ‘pushing on’ but there may be a million reasons why this error wasn’t noticed; and consequently trapped at the appropriate gate. Swiss cheese and all.

I’m sure the PIC didn’t set off to work that morning with a explicit plan to disregard SOPs. It is incumbent on an airline to investigate why this gate might not have enabled the trapping of an error, rather than just fire the PIC involved. I’m not saying that in this case it’s excusable, but that it should be investigated fairly and a just culture applied rather than an immediate escalation to disciplinary proceedings and the assumed cover-up applied for the sake of the share price.

If you fire people based solely on the FDM, your crew will get very good at flying the FDM rather than the aircraft.
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Old 25th May 2020, 01:10
  #478 (permalink)  
 
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All we can say for certain at this stage is:

1. They were high and fast.
2. The approach was unstable.
3. The engines scraped the runway.
4. They became airborne again and tried for another approach.
5. They aircraft crashed.

Once the FDR is read we will know what the position of the landing gear was:

1. Selected up the whole time.
2. Selected down but did not extend.
3. Selected down but retracted too early before the aircraft was positively climbing away resulting in ground contact.
4. Which systems were lost and what was the aircraft state afterwards.

Crew actions seem to be the major factor here, and the CVR should prove vital in determining:

1. Were they aware of the height/distance situation in the first place ?
2. Was there a CRM breakdown ?
3. Were they aware that they had a damaged aircraft or if they had contacted the runway at all ?

I was questioning the location of critical components underneath the engine with the Sioux City DC10 in mind, a turbine failure managed to sever all the hydraulic lines due to them being concentrated in a small area. Standard military doctrine is to spread things out, be it soldiers not bunching up whilst on patrol or aircraft parked close together. Unfortunately it appears that aircraft engines don't offer too much freedom in this area.
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Old 25th May 2020, 01:10
  #479 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by b1lanc View Post
That's why the response of 'we are comfortable' immediately followed by 'we can make it' really raises suspicions as it isn't exactly clear whether that last sentence was meant for ATC or the PM. Have to wonder who that was intended for. Earlier in the thread there was an unconfirmed report that two captains were at the contols. Don't know if that's true or not but PF and PM but either way CRM was an issue.

Absolutely! They were tragically 1400 ft above the path therefore trying the “capture Above” the sound reported (din din din ) was not associated in my opinion to unsafe gear but to overspeed. Flaps auto retracted for load relief. Tunnel vision aural alarm at that point “too low gear” was another sound over the mess in which pilots behind the plane forget also they’re own name. The go around was the tragic mistake.



Last edited by ZAGORFLY; 25th May 2020 at 02:33.
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Old 25th May 2020, 01:29
  #480 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by giggitygiggity View Post
I’m sure the PIC didn’t set off to work that morning with a explicit plan to disregard SOPs.
But after a month or two of non-flying (if that was indeed the case yet to be determined), memory fades quickly. Not all SOPs or memory items remain in short term memory.
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