MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
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A technical clarification is in order. At no time did the automation (i.e. MCAS) "override" pilot inputs.
But that never happened, since the appropriate switches / sensors had been bypassed or disabled due to incorporation of MCAS.
So splitting technical hairs - did MCAS override pilot input ??
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The underlying presumption in this particular case is that the pilots could have used the fully functioning Main Electric Trim to return the aircraft to somewhere close to an in-trim state before turning off the electrics. Yes, we know that didn't happen, and the reason why that didn't happen is an important discussion. However, we need to first recognize that the capability was actually there.
That is asking a lot of Joe Pilot.
He's been taught to trust the instruments which are now driving him into the ground, for reasons he does not understand or know about. Plus his inputs are reversed at much higher speed by automatics he does not know exist.
I'd hate to be subject to that test, because I'm sure I'd fail it.
Where that leaves Boeing is beyond my competence, but I cannot see the regulators remaining oblivious.
Imho, the MAX is dead.
He's been taught to trust the instruments which are now driving him into the ground, for reasons he does not understand or know about. Plus his inputs are reversed at much higher speed by automatics he does not know exist.
I'd hate to be subject to that test, because I'm sure I'd fail it.
Where that leaves Boeing is beyond my competence, but I cannot see the regulators remaining oblivious.
Imho, the MAX is dead.
The point was AoA indicator is not needed. That's why it was an option. It's not required by the FAA/EASA/etc.
You fly attitude and power not AoA.
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It was also not my intention to imply "the pilots should/could have just flown attitude and thrust" . Rather I was trying to have a discussion around the need for there to be an understanding that the automation can (and did in this and other situations) loose situational awareness , in such case it should not be raising any situational alarms or (as in this case) taking any action. In this case the FMC did know it was foo-bar but did not have a programmed response of shutting down all situational processes and alarms to a fail safe state. It could and should have!
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I agree that it would be a lot to ask of any pilot who had not been trained for a malfunction like this, but it is not inherently an impossible situation with the proper training. I think the germane question is whether changes need to be made to the current pilot training regimen. I can tell you from personal experience that until the MAX accidents, training for anything that looked like runaway stab trim had been spotty to non-existent at my airline (a reasonably well-regarded "developed world" operation). I suspect we were not the only ones who neglected this training for far too long.
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Compensation being offered by Boeing over family losses is a pittance USA wise, I would have expected at least a naught on the end.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-49803068
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-49803068
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tomaski
Lets see - Assuming pilot realized he had to use trim switch to get near level trim BEFORE hitting kill switch - how long did he have ? Seems to me he had at best 5 seconds - now with a typical call - response - action - how much ' slack ' was available ??
I agree that it would be a lot to ask of any pilot who had not been trained for a malfunction like this, but it is not inherently an impossible situation with the proper training. I think the germane question is whether changes need to be made to the current pilot training regimen. I can tell you from personal experience that until the MAX accidents, training for anything that looked like runaway stab trim had been spotty to non-existent at my airline (a reasonably well-regarded "developed world" operation). I suspect we were not the only ones who neglected this training for far too long.
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You don't understand the severity nor scope of the Max crisis. Ironically your strategy is exactly what the crews did, simply tried to fly an attitude. It didn't work.
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It looks more like a secondary indication than an alert.
The non-certified aviation seems to have a better grasp of human factor and ergonomics.
This is how a better thought out display could have looked like, with an alert in the direct field of vision of the pilot.
And an AOA indication at a useful place.
The non-certified aviation seems to have a better grasp of human factor and ergonomics.
This is how a better thought out display could have looked like, with an alert in the direct field of vision of the pilot.
And an AOA indication at a useful place.
How do you fly attitude in a loss of pitch control situation?
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I like! I like very, very much!
It looks more like a secondary indication than an alert.
The non-certified aviation seems to have a better grasp of human factor and ergonomics.
This is how a better thought out display could have looked like, with an alert in the direct field of vision of the pilot.
And an AOA indication at a useful place.
The non-certified aviation seems to have a better grasp of human factor and ergonomics.
This is how a better thought out display could have looked like, with an alert in the direct field of vision of the pilot.
And an AOA indication at a useful place.
At the time the indication was designed, presumably Boeing considered it to be purely informational.
Rather than a warning that there was a risk of the aircraft becoming uncontrollable and killing everyone on board ...
Rather than a warning that there was a risk of the aircraft becoming uncontrollable and killing everyone on board ...
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I have no doubt that ten years from now an AoA/Mcas related fault will kill some poor bastards again.
Edmund
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If pilots were never properly trained to handle critical emergencies like engine failures and windshear during takeoff, we would not be surprised to see accidents when these events occur. But we do train for them, pretty much every single time we go through a sim session. How often were the accident pilots exposed to a Runaway Stab Trim scenario? I haven't seen one in years, though I expect that will probably be changing.
Yes, MCAS was a crap system and never should have made it past certification. Not informing crews of its existence was borderline criminal. That doesn't mean it was not possible for pilots to have been exposed to the type of training that would have allowed them to survive this malfunction. (And before anyone jumps on this bandwagon, I am NOT blaming the pilots. The pilots do not create the procedures, the training syllabus, or the corporate culture that gives a short-shrift to safety. However, they are products of all the above).
Specifically as to training and general operations, here are some areas that need attention:
- Automation policy. By their very nature, some malfunctions strip away the automation. The pilots need to be able to operate without automation/normal law AND respond to a critical malfunction. That only comes from regular practice flying without these aids. If it is an airline's policy that pilots operate at the highest levels of automation all the time, we should not be surprised when they become task-saturated when the automation is no longer there to assist them.
- Overly-scripted training. Pretty much every where, training has become a series of scripted malfunctions that are known in advance. Multiple malfunctions are not presented. There is little, if any, use of surprise or ambiguity. Real life does not go by script, nor is there any natural law prohibiting multiple or ambiguous malfunctions.
- Over-reliance on procedure, not enough big picture. Procedures are a pilot's bread and butter, and should not be disregarded lightly. However, every manufacturer will also state that they cannot devise a procedure for every situation. In certain situations pilots need to recognize when a situation does not fit a specific procedure (rather than going heads down looking for a procedure that does not exist), and rely on basic airmanship and systems knowledge to do what is necessary to stabilize the situation. If this concept is not instilled into flight crews, then they be poorly equipped to navigate the unexpected.
Last edited by Tomaski; 24th Sep 2019 at 13:39.
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Yes, MCAS was a crap system and never should have made it past certification. Not informing crews of its existence was borderline criminal. That doesn't mean it was not possible for pilots to have been exposed to the type of training that would have allowed them to survive this malfunction.
Edit: Also, there is some question about the likelihood of pilots promptly recognizing improper MCAS intervention, even if they know about the system. And, in the original version, if you didn't identify the problem and sort it out in 40 seconds, you and your pax were dead. It's OK with me if you want to try to train aircrews for situations like that, but I wouldn't want to bet my life on the results of that training.
Last edited by OldnGrounded; 24th Sep 2019 at 13:48.
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I quite agree. Personally, I think it is very unlikely that MCAS will ever cause another aircraft accident. However, I think it is almost certain that in the not too distant future there will be another novel malfunction on another aircraft with another crew, and the specific training issues that I mentioned will be a factor in how well that crew responds.