Go Back  PPRuNe Forums > Flight Deck Forums > Rumours & News
Reload this Page >

Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

Rumours & News Reporting Points that may affect our jobs or lives as professional pilots. Also, items that may be of interest to professional pilots.

Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:33
  #521 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2010
Location: Between a Rock and a Hard Spot
Posts: 199
If it's Boeing, I'm not going.
HEMS driver is offline  
Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:35
  #522 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2010
Location: PLanet Earth
Posts: 793
Originally Posted by ManaAdaSystem View Post
Fuel contamination, engine problems, flight control problems, terrorism, instrument problems, birdstrike, suicide, runaway trim ? Nothing can be excluded, but ony one issue is discussed.
MCAS.
Have you looked at least to the most crude bits of information on this crash before climbing up the sope box?
Fuel contamination, engine problems => 383kts, Ultra high energy impact. Scrap it.
instrument problems: 383kts (read: no stall) and sunny, nice weather => WTF instrument should cause this??? I don't see a reasonable scenario for this.
bird strike: => why spearing along at 1000ft at ridiculous speeds after being hit by a bird??? That would be exactly opposite of what you would want to do: Higher altitude and low speed. IMHO not really supported from what we know so far.

I would accept flight control problems ( would be extremely worrying though on a just 5 month old aircraft of a new type!), suicide (but why would someone fly for so long at low altitude and high and increasing speed when he wants to commit suicide?), runaway trim (here we go -that is what has been mostly discussed and wehre there is a precedence).

So if I draw a line below your objection I still end up mostly with what is being discussed here (although I agree it is much to early to be sure it was MCAS).
Would I happily board a MAX tomorrow? Not if I could avoid it.

henra is offline  
Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:39
  #523 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: Cloud Cookoo Land
Posts: 1,253
Someone mentioned that the MCAS provides 10 secs of trim input when activated. Can that be correct/verified? 10 secs of trim input is massive on the 737. The stabiliser is a powerful secondary flight control and has known limitations - for example Boeing are explicit about overuse of stabiliser trim
during the approach to stall recovery. Positioning the stabiliser in such a sense can severely reduce elevator authority - was this not the contributing factor in the FlyDubai 738 crash in Rostov? Two separate variants, one without MCAS, but with the same concerns relating to pitch authority?
Callsign Kilo is offline  
Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:42
  #524 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2019
Location: UK
Posts: 2
Big well done to Southwest Airlines Safety Department for retrofitting their Maxís with the optional head down AoA display after the Lion Air accident! I wonder how many other Safety Managers would have liked to get the budget for that too?
I read that the head down display option was an extra $60K on top of the purchase price of a new Max? Small price to pay for the extra info, although Iím not sure that more extra info is needed - the PFD is starting to look like an F1 steering wheel. Can anyone confirm if the AoA disagree warning light is also an option and was it installed on the ET fleet?



SMYDSTS is offline  
Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:42
  #525 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 3,662
Phylosocopter.
Correct, the statement is incorrect - one cannot overide manually, the system stays in and you have to motor the trim fwd electronically using the system.

Happened with Lion Air.

Wouldn't like to be the CEO Boeing tonight!

Many airlines have trained their pilots to resolve this issue properly....unfortunately, others .....have not.
Thomas coupling is offline  
Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:47
  #526 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2014
Location: wales
Age: 76
Posts: 316
Can someone clear up something for me please.

I know from reading the whole thread the MCAS has a single AoA input, but some post refer to xchecking against the 2nd AoA ( which is not connected to MCAS)

However post 188 says this

post 188

At least Southwest took it's own initiative by adding an extra AOA indicator into 737 MAX for crew to cross-check erroneous data, but, shouldn't that be a Boeing responsibility and hence fitted to the worldwide fleet? I doubt Ethiopian purchased or insisted on these upgrades.

Is this extra a 3rd AoA or is there only 1 AoA and this IS the 2nd "comparison only" one.

Just to add I was horrified to read the certification is basically a grandfather one, when major changes to airframe, engine or flying controls are made it should be a new certification, loved the analogy " like putting a new dash and a 300bhp engine in a model T and saying it is safe to use!

ta

Oldoberon
oldoberon is offline  
Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:48
  #527 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2000
Posts: 1,324
Originally Posted by henra View Post
Have you looked at least to the most crude bits of information on this crash before climbing up the sope box?
Fuel contamination, engine problems => 383kts, Ultra high energy impact. Scrap it.
instrument problems: 383kts (read: no stall) and sunny, nice weather => WTF instrument should cause this??? I don't see a reasonable scenario for this.
bird strike: => why spearing along at 1000ft at ridiculous speeds after being hit by a bird??? That would be exactly opposite of what you would want to do: Higher altitude and low speed. IMHO not really supported from what we know so far.

I would accept flight control problems ( would be extremely worrying though on a just 5 month old aircraft of a new type!), suicide (but why would someone fly for so long at low altitude and high and increasing speed when he wants to commit suicide?), runaway trim (here we go -that is what has been mostly discussed and wehre there is a precedence).

So if I draw a line below your objection I still end up mostly with what is being discussed here (although I agree it is much to early to be sure it was MCAS).
Would I happily board a MAX tomorrow? Not if I could avoid it.
Have you read what FAA says? They canít draw any conclusions.
You obviously know better.
ManaAdaSystem is offline  
Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:52
  #528 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2013
Location: Clichy
Posts: 2
Originally Posted by oldoberon View Post
Can someone clear up something for me please.

I know from reading the whole thread the MCAS has a single AoA input, but some post refer to xchecking against the 2nd AoA ( which is not connected to MCAS)

However post 188 says this

post 188

At least Southwest took it's own initiative by adding an extra AOA indicator into 737 MAX for crew to cross-check erroneous data, but, shouldn't that be a Boeing responsibility and hence fitted to the worldwide fleet? I doubt Ethiopian purchased or insisted on these upgrades.

Is this extra a 3rd AoA or is there only 1 AoA and this IS the 2nd "comparison only" one.

ta

Oldoberon
They opted to have an additional sensor added as backup verification. A feature which I believe should have been installed as standard.
savall is offline  
Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:53
  #529 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2014
Location: Sydney
Posts: 3
Originally Posted by Caygill View Post
According to math an unlikely indecent is more likely to happen the next day than on "the average" time.
Perhaps I can help. Some "indecents," while unlikely, may be welcome. Others are unwelcome and one hopes they remain unlikely.
downunderupover is offline  
Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:54
  #530 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2007
Location: Germany
Posts: 23
Originally Posted by joema View Post
I don't know if it's behind a paywall but NYT has a chart showing which 737 MAX operators have grounded them as of today.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/...-airlines.html

Grounded - # of 737 MAX in operator's fleet
=================================
China Southern Airlines - 22
Air China - 15
SpiceJet - 13
Hainan Airlines - 11
Shanghai Airlines - 11
Xiamen Airlines - 10
Lion Air - 10
Jet Airways - 9
Shandong Airlines - 7
Shenzhen Airlines - 6
SilkAir - 6
Ethiopian Airlines - 4
China Eastern Airlines - 4
Lucky Air - 3
Cayman Airways - 2
Eastar Jet - 2
Fiji Airways - 2
Fuzhou Airlines - 2
Kunming Airlines - 2
Okay Airways - 2
9 Air - 1
Garuda Indonesia - 1
Comair - 1

Not Grounded (partial list)
====================
Southwestern Airlines - 34
Air Canada - 24
American Airlines - 24
Norwegian Air - 18
TUI fly - 15
WestJet - 13
FlyDubai - 11
Turkish Airlines - 11
Smartwings - 7
GOL Airlines - 7
Aeromexico - 6
Aerolineas Argentinas - 5
Oman air - 5
(remainder omitted for brevity)
I see at least Lion Air and Spice Jet sill flying max on FR24 ...
LandASAP is offline  
Old 12th Mar 2019, 00:00
  #531 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: sierra village
Posts: 146
I have difficulty in believing that this is a similar failure to the Lion Air one.

After the LionAir accident, any 737 Max pilot worth his salt would have read up on it, understood the new system and would be clear in his mind on how to deal with it. This is what all of us would do without exception.

lucille is offline  
Old 12th Mar 2019, 00:00
  #532 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Oct 2011
Location: Lower Skunk Cabbageland, WA
Age: 69
Posts: 354
Originally Posted by Hedge36 View Post
You'd do well to stay home, then. It's not whether or not mistakes are made - they're always being made. The question is whether or not they're recognized and corrected before things go pear-shaped.
Well, quite. I didn't intend to say that "mistakes can never be made," but rather that we not mention them so casually as if they don't matter. Sometimes they do. I'll sit down and be quiet now.
Organfreak is offline  
Old 12th Mar 2019, 00:02
  #533 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Oct 2002
Location: London UK
Posts: 6,232
Originally Posted by joema View Post
I don't know if it's behind a paywall but NYT has a chart showing which 737 MAX operators have grounded them as of today.
You would normally expect that the FAA/EASA, as principal safety regulators, would be making the running here, but they are getting left behind by the operators, the ones who get the financial hit from such action - and who are headed up by decidedly practical and knowledgeable aviation professionals.

I wonder what, if any, compensation to the operators Boeing will be offering.
WHBM is offline  
Old 12th Mar 2019, 00:04
  #534 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Feb 2015
Location: Hong Kong
Posts: 9
Originally Posted by rmac2 View Post
The procedures that were rushed out after Lionair and didnt appear to help either pilot in the cockpit in this case ?
Originally Posted by ManaAdaSystem View Post
Nobody knows what caused this crash, and nobody knows what actions they did.
Not only does nobody know what caused this crash nor the exact actions or inactions of the pilot and FO, it's woefully premature to speculate whether the pilot and FO even knew about Boeing's post-Lionair crash new procedures let alone whether they read the procedures, followed the procedures nor whether such procedures were even related to the cause of Ethiopian air crash. Premature much rmac?
YukonHusky is offline  
Old 12th Mar 2019, 00:09
  #535 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2008
Location: UK
Posts: 121
The graph has striking resemblances to Lion Air crash...

Last edited by bluesideoops; 12th Mar 2019 at 00:10. Reason: Add photo
bluesideoops is offline  
Old 12th Mar 2019, 00:10
  #536 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2002
Location: Under the sea
Posts: 482
Originally Posted by Callsign Kilo View Post
Someone mentioned that the MCAS provides 10 secs of trim input when activated. Can that be correct/verified? 10 secs of trim input is massive on the 737. The stabiliser is a powerful secondary flight control and has known limitations - for example Boeing are explicit about overuse of stabiliser trim
during the approach to stall recovery. Positioning the stabiliser in such a sense can severely reduce elevator authority - was this not the contributing factor in the FlyDubai 738 crash in Rostov? Two separate variants, one without MCAS, but with the same concerns relating to pitch authority?
MCAS trims 0.27 units per second - up to 2.5 units in 10 second cycle
extreme P is offline  
Old 12th Mar 2019, 00:18
  #537 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: canada
Posts: 16
Originally Posted by savall View Post
They opted to have an additional sensor added as backup verification. A feature which I believe should have been installed as standard.
i believe SWA simply added an AOA display. The standard 737 does not display AOA readings nor does it directly indicate an AOA disagree status.
tarkay01 is online now  
Old 12th Mar 2019, 00:21
  #538 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2014
Location: wales
Age: 76
Posts: 316
Savall

yes I k now that but is this additional one 2nd or 3rd AoA, some posts ask why they didn't look at the other AoA read out ie there are 2 others appear to say there is only 1.

If only 1 adding another very wise , if there are already 2 why add a 3rd

oldoberon
oldoberon is offline  
Old 12th Mar 2019, 00:21
  #539 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Nov 2010
Location: Atlanta
Age: 51
Posts: 427
Originally Posted by oldoberon View Post
Can someone clear up something for me please.

I know from reading the whole thread the MCAS has a single AoA input, but some post refer to xchecking against the 2nd AoA ( which is not connected to MCAS)

However post 188 says this

post 188

At least Southwest took it's own initiative by adding an extra AOA indicator into 737 MAX for crew to cross-check erroneous data, but, shouldn't that be a Boeing responsibility and hence fitted to the worldwide fleet? I doubt Ethiopian purchased or insisted on these upgrades.

Is this extra a 3rd AoA or is there only 1 AoA and this IS the 2nd "comparison only" one.

Just to add I was horrified to read the certification is basically a grandfather one, when major changes to airframe, engine or flying controls are made it should be a new certification, loved the analogy " like putting a new dash and a 300bhp engine in a model T and saying it is safe to use!

ta

Oldoberon

AFAIK there are 2 AOA-s on the 737, the MCAS uses only AOA-1, Southwest elected the option of having AOA-1 on the PIC EFIS & AOA-2 on FO EFIS. please correct me if I am wrong.
Also if you want to see "grandfathered", compare the DC-9 cockpit with the B717. Same type rating, one day differences class is all that is required to go from one to the other.....
hans brinker is offline  
Old 12th Mar 2019, 00:23
  #540 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Nov 2010
Location: Atlanta
Age: 51
Posts: 427
Originally Posted by savall View Post
They opted to have an additional sensor added as backup verification. A feature which I believe should have been installed as standard.
I don't think so. There is 2 AOAs installed on every MAX, SWA bought the option to have the AOA info displayed to the pilots on their respective instruments, not just the AOA disagree light.
hans brinker is offline  

Thread Tools
Search this Thread

Contact Us Archive Advertising Cookie Policy Privacy Statement Terms of Service

Copyright © 2018 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.